• Lawyers in Sydney
• Lawyers in Melbourne
• Lawyers in Brisbane
• Lawyers in Perth
• Family lawyers
• Employment lawyers
• Criminal lawyers
• Wills and estates lawyers
• Find a lawyer

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Bradley Moore (Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
Ms R McEwen (Plaintiff)
Ms C Goodhand (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor for New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid New South Wales (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2025/00486219

Publication restriction: Not applicable.

JUDGMENT

1. HIS HONOUR: By summons filed on 10 December 2025, the plaintiff seeks a final order that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order (“ESO”) under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”).

2. However, at this preliminary hearing, the plaintiff only seeks that orders be made pursuant to s 7(4) of the Act – that is, orders appointing two qualified psychiatrists and/or psychologists to separately examine the defendant, to furnish their reports to the Court, and to direct the defendant to attend such examinations. No interim supervision order (“ISO”) is sought, and nor could it be, due to the operation of s 10A(a) of the Act. The defendant is presently subject to conditions of parole and that sentence does not expire until 21 August 2026.

3. In short, the substantive issue to be resolved is whether the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, which it is, then I must make orders in accordance with s 7(4) of the Act.

Background and criminal history

4. Within this section, I have identified the salient features of the defendant’s background and criminal history having regard to the parties’ comprehensive joint statement of agreed facts (“Agreed Facts”).

5. The defendant, a 65-year-old man, reported an “uneventful” childhood in Valentine, New South Wales, with his parents and younger sister. He was appointed school captain when he was in Year 6, but that resulted in him spending time alone with the school headmaster who, as it transpired, was a “serial abuser of children”. The defendant developed a very low sense of self-esteem and a chronic state of shame arising from those experiences.

6. The defendant completed high school and chose to enter the workforce instead of university. But, since then, the defendant has suffered various setbacks and complications throughout his life.

7. In 1988, the defendant was assessed as being affected by Borderline Personality Disorder. In the early 1990s, his business failed and he filed for bankruptcy. In 2004, he was injured in a home invasion and was unable to work for a number of years. In 2007, he started his own dog-sitting business which then ended after his own dog died.

8. The defendant’s criminal history is limited but it is nevertheless serious. It will become apparent that, while his criminal history is not overly lengthy, he quite clearly found it particularly challenging to comply with the ESO that was imposed in 2020 for a period of 3 years.

9. His first set of offences came about in 1988 when he was convicted of 3 counts of indecent assault, each committed against a child, while he was in a position of authority. For these offences, he was placed on a recognisance and ordered to perform community service.

10. The next set of relevant offences, which occurred in 2015, concern offences against s 474.26 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and s 91H of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (the former being the index offence).

11. For the use carriage service offence (s 474.26 of the Criminal Code Act), the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 4 years with a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months. Then, for the procurement offence (s 91H of the Crimes Act), he was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 2 years without a non-parole period. In the sentencing proceedings, Syme DCJ made the following more pertinent remarks:

“I do note that the offender, by his statement to his psychiatrist and to the Probation and Parole author, he shows little insight into the consequences of his offending. He shows, I find, a callous disregard to the victims of the child abuse material and no insight into the probable consequences for a child who he thought he was procuring for penetrative sexual activity. He apparently has little insight into the personal consequences for children often being forced, or convinced to participate in the activities depicted in the child abuse material or for the consequences for young people who are convinced by online activity to make themselves available for sexual activity”.

12. The defendant sought to appeal his sentences, but the Court of Criminal Appeal ultimately refused leave. Beazley P (as her Honour then was) summarised the defendant’s offending at [7]-[11] in Moore v R [2018] NSWCCA 26 (Garling J and Hidden AJ agreeing):

“The s 474.26(1) offence

7. In March 2015, the police identified the applicant, then 54 years old, as being involved in communicating with and befriending young males online. The police commenced a covert investigation using the fictitious identity of a 14 year old male. After the fictitious identity ‘friended’ the applicant on Facebook, the applicant and the fictitious identity engaged in sexually explicit communications over various forms of media for approximately 10 weeks.

8. During the course of these communications, the applicant described anticipated sexual acts, such as fellatio, anal intercourse and ejaculation, in explicit detail. On one occasion, he sent an image of a naked pubescent male to the fictitious identity. The applicant also activated his web cam during Skype communications and masturbated while the fictitious identity was online. The applicant urged the need for secrecy and caution. This was relevant as the fictitious identity was 14 years of age.

9. On or about 8 May 2015, the applicant sent the fictitious identity a prepaid mobile phone. The phone was later used to organise a meeting at Caves Beach on 22 May 2015. The applicant was arrested at the planned meeting place.

The s 91H(2) offence

10. On 22 May 2015, a search warrant was executed at the applicant’s home. The police located child abuse material on the applicant’s computer and an external hard disk drive.

11. The devices were analysed using forensic software, which randomly samples the files and estimates the number of offending files with an acceptable margin of error. The software calculated that the applicant’s computer contained between 284 and 714 images and 31 videos containing child abuse material, and the external hard disk drive contained between 1,238 and 2,776 images and between 28 and 52 videos containing such material. The images and videos identified were then classified according to the Child Exploitation Tracking System scale as falling within categories 1 to 4. The material thus ranged from material that depicted children with no sexual activity, although being sexually suggestive or sexual in nature (category 1), to penetrative sexual activity involving a child or children or both a child or children and adults (category 4).”

13. In November 2020, this Court (Wilson J) made an ESO against the defendant for a period of 3 years: see State of New South Wales v Moore (Final) [2020] NSWSC 1695. Since then, he has been convicted of 13 offences on 6 separate occasions, almost exclusively pertaining to breaches of the ESO. The ESO expired much later than it was planned to because, each time the defendant entered custody, the ESO’s operation was suspended. It eventually expired on 17 January 2026 and, from that point onwards, the defendant has been solely subject to conditions of parole, which is set to expire on 21 August 2026.

14. I will briefly set out the circumstances of the defendant’s breaches of this previous ESO.

15. First, condition 27 of the ESO required the defendant not to approach or have contact with anyone he knew to be under 18 without the consent of his Departmental Supervising Officer (“DSO”). In November 2021, the defendant spoke to a 17-year-old male who worked at Coles. He later returned to the same Coles and provided the young man with an envelope which included a note reading:

“You asked if you could help me a couple of weeks ago… Maybe? I need a friend!!! [mobile number] BRAD.”

16. The young man told his parents, and the matter was reported to police. On 30 November 2021, the defendant was charged with failing to comply with his ESO contrary to s 12 of the Act. He admitted to the incident and said he did it because he did not often have outings and was lonely. For this offence (and for the offence at paragraph [18] below), the defendant was convicted and sentenced on 23 January 2023 to a term of imprisonment for 12 months, with a non-parole period of 6 months, concluding on 16 March 2023.

17. Secondly, between April and May 2022, when the defendant was on conditional bail for the first breach, he used his mother’s mobile phone in breach of condition 33 of the ESO. He used the device to send emails and had taken photos of himself naked. On 24 May 2022, he was charged with 3 counts of failing to comply with the ESO contrary to s 12 of the Act. He was sentenced to eight months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four months.

18. Thirdly, on 8 December 2022, when the defendant was on conditional bail for the breaches referred to immediately above, he set up a new bank account in contravention of his ESO. It subsequently became apparent that the defendant had done so with the intention of assisting his then-partner who was in custody. On 23 January 2023, he was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 months for this offence (together with the sentence relating to the offence set out above at paragraphs [15]-[16]).

19. Fourthly, on 12 June 2022, when the defendant was on conditional bail for the breach referred to immediately above, a search of his mobile phone revealed he had set up an Etsy account in the name of “Brad the lad”. He used Etsy to initiate conversations with other men and, according to the facts, a large portion of the conversations were of a personal nature and were centred around the defendant’s sexuality and his parents’ illnesses. On 14 June 2023, when police attended his address, he asked the police to enter through the side of the house, where he was found in the backyard with two large kitchen knives concealed under his dressing gown. He said, “don’t come near me, I’m not going back to jail. You are going to have to shoot me”. On 14 June 2023, he was charged with failing to comply with his ESO and for carrying a cutting weapon under apprehension contrary to s 547D of the Crimes Act. For the first offence, he received a community correction order (“CCO”) for 2 years, while for the second offence he received a CCO for 12 months.

20. Fifthly, between August and September 2023, when the defendant was subject to the CCOs for the previous offences, he wrote a lengthy handwritten letter to a person in custody at South Coast Correctional Centre, despite being issued a formal direction not to have contact with any incarcerated inmates. On 28 September 2023, he was charged with failing to comply with his ESO and, then on 11 October 2023, he was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment to be served by way of an intensive correction order (“ICO”). In delivering the sentence, Magistrate Olischlager (as his Honour then was) noted in respect of this offending:

“As far as the objective seriousness, it is the failure to comply with the direction not to communicate with inmates and in terms of that it is no dispute that you well knew that there was that direction not to communicate by way of letter. I do accept that the nature of that communication is nothing inappropriate in terms of the content, particularly in light of the nature of these types of orders, but clearly, of course, you well knew that you should not have been communicating. I do accept that it is still in the lower end of objective seriousness range for this type of offence”.

21. Sixthly, between January and March 2024, when the defendant was subject to the ICO, he joined multiple social media sites directed to sex, dating or chats. On 22 May 2024, he was charged with 5 counts of failing to comply with his ESO. On 17 December 2024, he was convicted and sentenced (after a successful appeal to reduce his sentence) to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 2 years and 3 months, concluding on 21 August 2026, with a non-parole period of 15 months, concluding on 21 August 2025.

The legislative scheme

22. As noted, s 7(4) of the Act provides that, if following this hearing, the Court is satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO, then orders must be made appointing the relevant experts to conduct examinations and furnish reports, as well as an order directing the defendant to attend such examinations. If the Court does not reach the level of satisfaction required by s 7(4), the application must be dismissed in accordance with s 7(5).

23. Section 5B of the Act provides for the relevant threshold requirements before the Court may make an ESO. It is worthwhile identifying the whole of that provision, as below:

5B Making of extended supervision orders—unacceptable risk

The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if—

(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and

(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and

(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and

(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.

24. It is necessary, in determining this application, to consider the meaning of “unacceptable risk”. Its meaning is very central to the resolution of the application.

25. Though not defined by the Act, s 5D expands upon the concept of “unacceptable risk” insofar as it provides:

… the Supreme Court is not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.

26. The authorities have provided extensive guidance on its meaning, with Chen J more recently summarising the concept in State of New South Wales v O’Hara (Final) [2024] NSWSC 225 at [34], as follows:

“Unacceptable risk

…

34 The concept of an ‘unacceptable risk’ has, unsurprisingly, been the subject of considerable judicial consideration, which establishes the following:

(1) The phrase is to be given its everyday meaning within its context, having regard to the objects of the Act: Lynn at [55]–[58].

(2) What the Court must find to be unacceptable is the risk that the offender poses of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision; that is, an assessment of the likelihood in the absence of any supervision: Lynn at [51] and [55]; State of New South Wales v Donovan [2015] NSWCA 280 at [24]. That finding provides the basis for imposing control on the offender: Lynn at [127].

(3) The interests of the offender in liberty and privacy are not relevant to the assessment of whether there is an ‘unacceptable risk’, but can be taken into account when considering whether to make, under s 9 of the Act, an ESO or to dismiss the application: Lynn at [44], [143] and [148]–[149].

(4) Unacceptability of risk ‘involves considerations of both likelihood of the risk eventuating, and the gravity of the risk that may eventuate’: *State of New South Wales v Simcock (*Final) [2016] NSWSC 1805 at [71]; State of New South Wales v Chaplin [2019] NSWSC 471 at [15]. The nature of the risk ‘posed ha[s] to be assessed by reference to past conduct, the seriousness of the possible future conduct and the period over which the risk may come to fruition’: Lynn at [126].

(5) An offender may pose an unacceptable risk, even where the likelihood of committing another serious offence is low, if the likely consequences of such an offence are very grave: *State of New South Wales v Kamm (Final) [*2016] NSWSC 1 at [41] and [43]; [State of New South Wales v Golding (Preliminary) [2018] NSWSC 1041] at [16]; State of New South Wales v Devaney (Final) [2022] NSWSC 60 at [73].”

27. In determining the threshold test under s 5B(d), regard must be had to s 9 of the Act, which provides that the Supreme Court may determine an application for an ESO by either making the order or dismissing the application for one. But importantly for this preliminary hearing, s 9(2) requires the safety of the community to be the paramount consideration of the Court. There are then other various matters to be considered as identified by ss 9(3) and 9(4) of the Act.

Consideration

28. In this application, the central issue revolves around s 5B(d) of the Act. I am well satisfied that all of the other statutory preconditions for the making of an ESO are satisfied and nor is there any dispute about that.

29. Thus, the issue here is: whether the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, satisfy the Court to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision.

30. Now, as Adams J (as her Honour then was) observed in State of New South Wales v Archer (Preliminary) [2024] NSWSC 1149, the task of the Court at the preliminary hearing is “similar to the task in committal proceedings”. At this preliminary stage, I must take into account all of the supporting documentation and assume it will be proved at a final hearing. In the end, the risk with which the Court is concerned is the risk of the further commission of serious sex offending as defined in the Act; not technical breaches of an ESO or even the commission of other offences which are not “serious” within the meaning of the Act, such as the possession of child abuse material (other than those aggravated offences under the Criminal Code Act which are addressed further below).

31. This was accepted by Ms McEwen who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff at the preliminary hearing. In particular, Ms McEwen acknowledged that, in order for final relief to be granted, the Court will need to be satisfied as to the question of risk, as posed by s 5B(d) of the Act, having regard to the potential for “serious sex offences” to be committed – and not offences falling outside of that.

32. Supporting documentation has been provided in accordance with s 6(3) of the Act, which provides that an application must be supported by documentation that addresses each of the matters in s 9(3) and is to include an expert report (prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner) that assesses the likelihood of the offender committing a serious offence.

Section 9(3) matters

33. Bearing in mind that the safety of the community is of paramount importance (s 9(2)), I have had regard to the following additional matters under s 9(3) of the Act.

The expert reports; and results of any statistic testing or other assessments: ss 9(3)(c) and 9(3)(d)

34. The defendant has been assessed on numerous occasions. However, the plaintiff relied mostly upon the risk assessment reports of Dr Richard Parker, a senior psychologist, dated 18 April 2024 and 25 September 2025. As Ms McEwen noted at the preliminary hearing, Dr Parker’s reports largely synthesise the rest of the material comprising the supporting bundle exhibited to Jessica Leigh Murty’s affidavit affirmed on 10 December 2025 (Exhibit JM-1).

35. During the hearing, Ms McEwen made reference to [106] of Dr Parker’s report dated 18 April 2004, which provides as follows:

“As Mr Moore aged, it would have been increasingly difficult for him to access prepubescent or pubescent children due to being a single male who was not involved in professional or leisure activities that provided access to children. This may be a reason why he acquainted himself with teenagers and young adult males. Some individuals from this age group may likely still retain youthful physical characteristics that resemble those of a pubescent male and are less likely to be subjected to adult supervision compared to younger individuals. It is noted that since his sexual offence charges in 1998, Mr Moore did not receive any further charges for sexual offences until his index convictions. This appears to be more reflective of psychological and physical issues that he experienced following an assault in 2004 and restricted access to the target age group after he returned to reside with his parents, rather than a reflection of active self-management. As evident from index offences, when Mr Moore’s mood improved or became elevated and he discovered a new avenue that allowed him to access the target age group, he resumed his offending behaviour by offering some form of support to build trust with the victim in aim to pursue the victim for sex”.

36. Ms McEwen also drew the Court’s attention to the following paragraphs from that same report:

“110. Based on Mr Moore’s history of offending and his stated sexual preferences, he may continue to choose young sexual partners. If he were to seek out young adult males for company or relationships, his risk of accessing adolescent males may increase by associating with their peers. His potential victims may be pubescent or vulnerable young males. He may likely offer material support to potential victims to establish trust with them and to justify seeking sex from them as a part of a transactional relationship.

111. Alternatively, Mr Moore may also use online activities to meet his sexual needs, particularly if he is unsuccessful or perceives that he would be unsuccessful in meeting a sexual partner of his preference in person. Given he appears to continue to endorse inappropriate sexual interest of pubescent males, he may be more likely to view sexualised images of people who match these physical characteristics. This may in turn increase his risk of seeking child abuse material”.

37. Notably, Dr Parker appeared to refine his opinion in a supplementary report dated 25 September 2025. It is important to set those paragraphs out in full, as below:

“27. Based on Mr Moore’s history of offending and his stated sexual preferences, he is likely to continue to choose young sexual partners. If he were to seek out young adult males for company or relationships, his risk of accessing adolescent males may increase by associating with their peers. Alternatively, his failure at such exploits may lead him towards younger targets. His potential victims may be pubescent or vulnerable young males. He may likely offer material support to potential victims to establish trust with them and to justify seeking sex from them as a part of a transactional relationship.

28. Alternatively, Mr Moore may also use online activities to meet his sexual needs, particularly if he is unsuccessful or perceived that he would be unsuccessful in meeting a sexual partner of his preference in person. Given he appears to continue to endorse inappropriate sexual interest of pubescent males, he may be more likely to view sexualised images of people who match these physical characteristics. This may in turn increase his risk of seeking child abuse material. However, I note this would not constitute a serious offence under the Act, although it could potentially be a pathway to a hands-on offence against a child.”

(Emphasis added).

38. In light of Dr Parker’s findings and opinions, the plaintiff submitted that there are three categories of potential sexual offences that could possibly justify the making of a final ESO against the defendant.

39. First, that there is a potential for sexual offences involving contact with young males. However, Ms McEwen did acknowledge this is not a significant risk having regard to the defendant’s current personal circumstances and the lapse of time since he last offended in this way.

40. Secondly, that there is a potential for online grooming type offences. Ms McEwen submitted that this is a more prominent risk, of which the index offence provides an example.

41. Thirdly, the plaintiff submitted that there are potentially relevant aggravated offences under the Criminal Code Ac**t which constitute “serious sex offences” under the Act. For example, while the possession of child abuse material does not ordinarily fall within the scope of the meaning of “serious sex offence” under the Act, it can, when committed in circumstances of aggravation, by reference to ss 471.22 and 474.24A of the Criminal Code Act, namely, where the offence is committed on 3 or more occasions and where the commission of the offence involves 2 or more people.

42. However, the plaintiff did not over-emphasise the defendant’s risks pertaining to this third category of offences. While Ms McEwen did not concede that this type of aggravated offending is entirely irrelevant, she did accept it does not feature prominently as part of the State’s application with respect to the defendant. That concession is well made. Indeed, Dr Parker does not even refer to this type of offending in his reports at all. In any case, given the defendant’s age, his personal circumstances and his limited interest in developing and maintaining connections with other people, it is difficult to envisage him becoming involved in some group sharing or group publishing endeavour of the type prohibited by these select aggravated offences under the Criminal Code Act.

43. Ms Goodhand, appearing for the defendant, identified limitations in Dr Parker’s risk assessment reports. She emphasised that Dr Parker relied on risk assessment tools, specifically the Static-99R and STABLE-2007, which were undertaken in 2020 and 2023 by other people. The risk assessment tools were not re-administered at all, even when considering the defendant’s dynamic risk factors. Rather, Dr Parker relied wholly on previous assessments and did not consult the defendant in order to inform his findings.

44. It is noteworthy that Dr Parker concluded that, if an order like an ISO is not made, then the defendant would be at “unconditional liberty”. Ms Goodhand raised an issue with this conclusion in her written submissions, providing that:

“Dr Parker’s conclusion that the defendant would be at unconditional liberty with no CSNSW monitoring is not correct. If an ISO is not made, then the defendant will continue to be under a parole order until 21 August 2026 and also obligations under the CPOR Act”.

45. While Ms Goodhand’s submission is correct, the plaintiff does not seek an ISO from this preliminary hearing in any case.

46. Beyond Dr Parker’s reports, the plaintiff tendered other supporting documentation which I will briefly address as follows.

47. In 2020, Ms Mandy Lau prepared a risk assessment report dated 12 February 2020, and then a supplementary risk assessment report dated 22 May 2020. On the issue of risk, Ms Lau concluded that:

“[s]uccessful risk management would involve containment of behaviours associated with risk. The ultimate goal of further intervention and supervision would be to encourage the development and maintenance of a stable and sustainable lifestyle, so that new habits can be formed that might endure beyond supervision, even when Mr Moore is not under any form of legal order. Based on the identified risk areas specific to his offending, continued support and intervention in improving sexual self-regulation, interpersonal skills, particularly in building intimate relationships, effective problem-solving and emotional regulation would be helpful in mediating his risk of further sexual offences. Given Mr Moore may have a very limited parole period remaining after completing treatment, an additional period of supervision would allow him an opportunity for gradual integration into the community with the benefit of professional supports. Having a network of professional supports may be crucial in assisting Mr Moore in managing his risk areas as the personal support network that he has identified appears to lack a thorough understanding of his sexual offending and Mr Moore has yet to develop a high level of insight into his identified risk factors to effectively self-manage his risk.”

48. Ms Lau, in her supplementary report, opined that the defendant does not meet the criteria for Paedophilic Disorder, but noted that possession of child abuse material is considered a sexually motivated offence and it would therefore be captured as one form of sexual recidivism predicted by the STATIC-99R and the STABLE-2007 risk assessment tools.

49. Both Dr Anthony Samuels and Dr Richard Furst have previously furnished reports to this Court for the purpose of the earlier ESO application in 2020.

50. Dr Samuels, a psychiatrist, prepared a report dated 23 September 2020 and, like Ms Lau, opined that the defendant does not meet the criteria for paedophilia. Despite that, Dr Samuels expressed the view that whether or not the defendant technically meets the criteria for paedophilia is “somewhat semantic as there is clear evidence that Mr Moore has had a sexual interest in boys who are at least under the age of 16”. Against that, Dr Samuels ultimately concluded that the defendant poses a risk of committing a further serious sex offence as defined in the Act. He specifically said:

“Although he has only been charged with one serious sex offence pursuant to s 474.26 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Mr Moore has a history of sexually offending against underage adult males going back to at least 1988. Serious offences involved two young males were dismissed in 1997. At the time of his most recent offence he was on bail for the Commonwealth Offences which highlights a longstanding recalcitrant pattern of offending behaviour. It seems that only recently has he acknowledged a problem of sexual deviance. In addition, even whilst completing the HISOP program in custody he displayed challenging behaviours, had a collection of images of young men in his cell and targeted young male prisoners. In my opinion Mr Moore remains at high risk of continuing this pattern of sexually offending behaviour and of committing a further serious sex offence.”

51. As to risk, Dr Samuels noted:

“The main risk factor would appear to be opportunity and the means to offend, including access to the internet and mobile phones or being in localities frequented by vulnerable young males. There is evidence that in the past he has used money or drugs as forms of inducement or to reduce the resistance of young men to engage in sexual activity with him… There are some questions in regard to whether or not Mr Moore has a psychotic disorder and how this impacts on sexual offending but certainly mood instability, impulsivity, increased energy and risk taking behaviours may be associated with sexual offending risk, and non-compliance with prescribed psychotropic medication would be an issue of concern.”

52. Dr Furst, a forensic psychiatrist, prepared a report dated 12 October 2020 and similarly considered that the defendant poses a risk of committing a further serious sex offence. He observed that:

“Mr Moore has a significantly higher risk of committing a serious sex offence compared to the average male offender”.

Any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community: s 9(3)(d1)

53. Tab 6 of Exhibit JM-1 contains a risk management report prepared by Community Corrections Officer, Mr Michael Taylor, dated 21 May 2024. Ultimately, that report concluded:

“Mr Moore’s response to community supervision has remained generally positive, despite moments of order complacency and poor decision making leading to minor infraction(s) of ESO conditions”.

54. Also, there is a supplementary report from 29 October 2025. It provides relevantly:

“… since Mr Moore’s most recent release to the community in August 2025, his overall response appears to have been satisfactory. It is noted that he attended his scheduled appointments with his DSO and engages in an appropriate manner. It is noted that Mr Moore has shown greater insight into his offending history and his overall risk factors. There have been no identified breaches to date”.

55. Both of the risk management reports contain a proposed supervision plan. It includes, for example, continued engagement with private therapy and with CSNSW psychology services for ongoing risk management sessions.

Treatment and rehabilitation programs / available courses: ss 9(3)(e) and 9(3)(e1)

56. The defendant completed the High Intensity Sex Offender Program (“HISOP”) in 2020, and subsequently a treatment report was prepared because of that on 19 August 2020. The report described his participated as “mixed” and observed that, “Mr Moore was not receptive to feedback and lacked insight into his own behaviour”. Additionally, the report identified that the defendant “significantly minimised his own sexual offending history by attempting to explain his current defences as ‘entrapment’”; that he engaged in a “range of other unhelpful and inappropriate behaviours”; and that he engaged in behaviour aimed at obtaining a single cell placement or, alternatively, with a cellmate “noticeably younger than himself”.

57. The defendant’s behaviour in the HISOP resulted in various sanctions and external management strategies being adopted, including a request from the psychology team that he not be placed in a cell with anyone under 30 years of age or anyone participating in the custodial program for those with lower cognitive functioning.

The likelihood that the offender will comply with the obligations of an ESO; and his previous compliance with particular obligations: ss 9(3)(e2), 9(3)(f) and 9(3)(g)

58. As noted, the defendant has been convicted of failing to comply with his ESO: see “Background and criminal history” above.

59. I have also observed that, since the defendant’s release from custody in August 2025, there were no further breaches of his ESO (which expired on 17 January 2026) and nor has there been a breach of parole or any other fresh criminal charges.

The offender’s criminal history and any pattern of offending disclosed by that history; views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed: ss 9(3)(h) and 9(3)(h1)

60. These matters have also been addressed earlier in these reasons: see “Background and criminal history” above.

Any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will commit a further serious offence: s 9(3)(i)

61. The plaintiff directed the Court’s attention to the defendant’s criminal history and, against that, submitted that it may have regard to alleged offending from 1998 of which the defendant was ultimately acquitted. In the context of the current application where there is unlikely to be any testing of the evidence relating to the 1998 charges, it is difficult to attach any weight to the existence of these previously dismissed charges.

62. Separately, Ms Goodhand submitted that the defendant continues to engage with Mr Lee Knight, Clinical Nurse Consultant, each fortnight for therapeutic treatment which is funded partially by Medicare and then otherwise by himself.

Determination

63. Taking all of the above information into account, and after considering all of the parties’ submissions, I find that, if the current supporting documents are relied upon at a final hearing, taking the supporting documents at their highest, there would be evidence allowing a conclusion that the Court would be satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence, namely a serious sex offence such as an on-line grooming offence, if he was not kept under supervision under the proposed order.

64. Hence, I have reached the requisite state of satisfaction that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO.

65. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

66. An order pursuant to section 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW):

(a) Appointing two qualified psychiatrists or registered psychologists (or any combination of the two) to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and (b) Directing the defendant to attend those examinations.

2. An order that access to the Supreme Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.

**********