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Statutory framework

5. The plaintiff’s application for an ESO is brought pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Act. Those sections provide as follows:

5B Making of extended supervision orders—unacceptable risk

The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if—

(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and

(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and

(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and

(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.

9 Determination of application for extended supervision order

(1) The Supreme Court may determine an application for an extended supervision order—

(a) by making an extended supervision order, or

(b) by dismissing the application.

…

6. The power to make an ESO pursuant to s 5B is discretionary. In that regard, the Court is guided by the objects of the Act, and the paramount consideration and matters set out in s 9 to which the Court must have regard in determining whether or not to make an ESO. Relevant provisions of the Act in these respects include the following:

3 Objects of Act

(1) The primary object of this Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community.

(2) Another object of this Act is to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation.

9 Determination of application for extended supervision order

…

(2) In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration of the Supreme Court.

…

(3) In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must also have regard to the following matters in addition to any other matter it considers relevant—

…

(b) the reports received from the persons appointed under section 7 (4) to conduct examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such examination,

(c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such assessment,

(d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further serious offence,

(d1) any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community,

(e) any treatment or rehabilitation programs in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such programs,

(e1) options (if any) available if the offender is kept in custody or is in the community (whether or not under supervision) that might reduce the likelihood of the offender re-offending over time,

(e2) the likelihood that the offender will comply with the obligations of an extended supervision order,

(f) without limiting paragraph (e2), the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an earlier extended supervision order,

(g) the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004,

(h) the offender’s criminal history (including prior convictions and findings of guilt in respect of offences committed in New South Wales or elsewhere), and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history,

(h1) the views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the offender,

(i) any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will commit a further serious offence.

7. A “serious offence” is defined in s 4 and includes a “serious sex offence” and a “serious violence offence”. A “serious violence offence” is defined in s 5A(1) and includes a serious indicatable offence (relevantly, within the meaning of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)) that is constituted by a person:

(a) engaging in conduct that causes the death of another person or grievous bodily harm to another person, with the intention of causing, or while being reckless as to causing, the death of another person or grievous or actual bodily harm to another person, or

(a1) an offence under the Crimes Act 1900, section 37(1) or (2), or

(b) attempting to commit, or conspiring with or inciting another person to commit, an offence of a kind referred to in paragraph (a) or (a1).

8. Section 5D of the Act provides that the Court is not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine that there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.

The evidence

9. The evidence relied upon by the plaintiff included the following material:

10. Five affidavits of Lucy Nichols, affirmed on 7 November 2025, together with Exhibit LN-1, and on 21 November 2025, 2 December 2025, 6 March 2026 and 30 March 2026;

11. Two affidavits of Erica Mulligan, affirmed on 21 November 2025 and 30 March 2026; and

12. The reports of the two Court-appointed experts furnished in accordance with the orders made on 8 December 2025, namely:

(a) A report of Dr Sally McSwiggan, neurologist, dated 16 February 2026; and (b) A report of Dr Gordon Elliott, general and forensic psychiatrist, dated 17 February 2026.

10. The experts both attended the hearing before me on 1 April 2026, gave further oral evidence and were cross-examined.

11. The defendant read two affidavits, including the annexures thereto, namely:

12. An affidavit of Sarah Salman sworn 23 March 2026; and

13. An affidavit of Sidnei Pettit affirmed 23 March 2026.

Documents provided to assist the Court

12. I am considerably assisted by the parties’ submissions and a number of documents provided in accordance with the Supreme Court Practice Note SC CL 12. These include the statement of the plaintiff’s case and the joint statement of agreed facts. Written submissions for the plaintiff have also identified precisely where the evidence supporting various statutory factors I am required to take into account may be found. The table of conditions includes side by side comparison of the positions of the parties and the reasons therefor.

13. As there is much that is agreed in these proceedings, and significant work put into summarising the evidence by the parties, these reasons to a large extent incorporate aspects of these documents rather than endeavouring to describe the evidence myself. I have had regard to the important aspects of the evidence (for example the reports and oral evidence of the Court-appointed experts, risk assessment reports, risk management report, Ms Mulligan’s explanation of the reason for and capacity to implement the proposed conditions, the information regarding the defendant’s progress since his release from custody and the defendant’s evidence regarding aspects of the defendant’s Aboriginal culture relevant to conditions, and his compliance with the ISO).

Unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision

Background

14. The defendant is presently 48 years old and a First Nations man. He has a significant criminal history of violent offending dating back to the 1990s. The index offence, which provides this Court with jurisdiction to make an ESO, is an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm contrary to s 33(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). It was committed on 26 December 2017.

15. By virtue of s 5A(2A)(c) of the Act, this amounts to a “serious violence offence” within the terms of s 5A and thus also meets the definition of “serious offence” in s 4 of the Act, as set out in the analysis of the statutory framework above.

16. I will address important aspects of the evidence by reference to the pertinent factors set out in s 9(3) of the Act (abbreviated in the following pages – see [6] above for their full terms). The joint statement of facts and written submissions of both parties have been of considerable assistance in focusing attention on and summarising this evidence.

Facts underlying the index offending

17. The index offence was committed whilst the defendant was on parole for an offence of reckless wounding contrary to s 35 of the Crimes Act committed in 2013. That earlier offence was committed against the defendant’s then-partner and involved hitting her with a hammer several times to the head. The defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 5 years and 6 months for that offence. The index offence was one of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. He was sentenced, following a guilty plea, to a term of imprisonment of 7 years and 6 months, with a non-parole period of 5 years. The sentence commenced on 27 May 2018 and was due to expire on 26 November 2025. For reasons earlier explained, this date was extended to 24 February 2026.

18. The defendant and the victim of the index offence were in a relationship for nine months and began residing together with the victim’s mother a week prior to the commission of the offence. On 26 December 2017 the victim returned home with her mother at 10:30 pm from a Christmas party. An hour later the victim entered the bedroom where the defendant was. The defendant was angry and called the victim a “slut” and “dog” and said “You’re a cheating slut. Do you think I’m dumb?” to which the victim responded “Yeah I do think you’re dumb because I’ve been joined at your hip. How could I cheat? You can go. I don’t want you anymore.” The victim was about to leave the bedroom when the defendant grabbed her by the back of her head and threw her to the ground. The defendant straddled her and punched her to the face multiple times with both hands. The defendant pressed a pillow against the victim’s face then removed it to let her breathe. He then punched her in the face again and repeated this process as the victim went in and out of consciousness. The defendant then put his hands over her mouth and nose to stop her from breathing and said “If I can’t have you, no one will”. While this was happening, the victim tried to alert her mother by banging on the walls and screaming but the defendant covered her mouth. The victim reported that she had to pretend she was dead and not move.

19. Between 11:30 pm and midnight the victim’s mother heard the arguing and the banging on the walls. Around 5 am the next day the victim’s mother observed the defendant leaving the house. She entered the bedroom to see the victim face down on the bed, appearing lifeless at first, then regaining consciousness. The victim could not communicate verbally due to the bleeding and swelling on her face, mouth and jaw. The victim was taken to the hospital and was found to have bilateral mandible fractures (fractures to her lower jaw) and required significant surgery to remove her wisdom teeth and have titanium plates and screws inserted.

20. On 27 December 2017 the defendant returned to the house to collect his belongings. The victim’s mother refused him entry and asked him why he hurt her daughter. The defendant said “… because she had been talking to other guys”. The victim’s mother called the police but the defendant had left by the time they arrived. The police saw the defendant jump from a window of another house into the front yard and arrested him.

21. The defendant was released to parole on 4 December 2023 but parole was revoked on 2 July 2025 (effective from 11 June 2025) including because of his outstanding charge.

Court appointed experts – s 9(3)(b)

22. Dr Elliott stated that the defendant was unwilling to discuss his offending history or his substance use history in any detail, and instead preferred focusing on future prospects.

23. The defendant was found by Dr Elliott to meet the diagnostic criteria for mild to moderate intellectual disability. Dr Elliott did not complete further cognitive testing of the defendant and instead relied upon the comprehensive testing referred to in the Risk Assessment Report (“RAR”) prepared by Tahnee Liewes (summarised below) in making the diagnosis of intellectual disability.

24. Dr Elliott also determined the defendant to have a history of Substance Use Disorders, more specifically an Alcohol Use Disorder, and problems with opiate and stimulant use. Dr Elliott also considered that the defendant displays features of Anti-Social Personality Disorder (“ASPD”).

25. Dr Elliott considered the defendant’s problems with substances to be a chronic condition. When considering the defendant’s ASPD, Dr Elliott opined that with age, there is a general trend towards those with ASPD reducing the frequency of their offending.

26. Dr Elliott considered the defendant’s intellectual disability as a factor in increasing his risk of committing a further serious violent offence. This is because the condition confers problems with impulsivity and lack of ability to exercise restraint and reflect upon consequences, particularly at times of relationship conflict. Dr Elliott considered the defendant’s substance use as a key risk factor for committing a serious violent offence. In particular, the possibility of relapse into alcohol and methamphetamine use both markedly increase the risk of recidivist violent offending. The defendant’s ASPD features were thought to contribute to his risk of serious violent offending, with the condition frequently occurring in the context of early developmental modelling of violent responses to problems, including relationship conflict. Dr Elliott noted that despite the defendant’s completion of offence targeted programs, he is likely to retain a sense that violence can be justified as a response to perceived infidelity or at times when a partner may wish to leave him.

27. To determine risk, Dr Elliott completed the structured risk assessment utilising the Historical Clinical Risk Management-20 (“HCR-20 V3”). The defendant has a high loading of historical factors, including a history of violent offending, antisocial behaviours, poor relationship history, lack of sustained employment and features of ASPD. The defendant also has a history of early traumatic experiences and violent attitudes, as well as issues with responding to supervision. The defendant shows moderate loading of clinical risk items on the HCR-20 V3, such as poor insight into problems and his reasons for offending, recent violent ideation, and unstable behaviour in the community. Dr Elliott considered the defendant’s unwillingness to engage with professional services, as evidenced by his disengagement with his NDIS provider. Overall, according to Dr Elliott, while the defendant’s behaviour had stabilised in custody, his history and current circumstances suggest a significant risk of future violent behaviour.

28. Dr Elliott considered that key aspects of the defendant’s cognitive deficits that contribute to the risk of committing a serious violence offence relate to problems with impulsivity, problem solving and reduced capacity to assess consequences of his actions particularly at times of emotional dysregulation or intense anger.

29. Dr Elliott considered the defendant to pose a risk of committing a serious violent offence, falling within a group of offenders who would be considered high risk. He noted that this is the result of the fact that many, if not all, of the factors operating at the time of his previous offences remain unchanged. He expressed the opinion that the defendant’s risk factors will fluctuate depending on his relationship status and the nature of any future intimate relationships, and they would increase markedly with any return to substance use. Dr Elliott did not consider that the defendant could be managed in the community without an order being imposed, but that the risk he poses could be managed effectively with an ESO.

30. Dr McSwiggan considered that the defendant would most likely fulfill the diagnostic criteria of ASPD. She opined that the defendant’s Polysubstance Use Disorder remained in controlled remission in custody but stated that the defendant’s capacity to manage his own abstinence long term remains highly questionable given the mixed reports. Dr McSwiggan concluded that the defendant does not have a diagnosis of schizophrenia despite his self-reports. Dr McSwiggan considered that the defendant’s conditions would contribute to his risk of violent offending given a personality disorder is a lifelong pattern of impulsive decisions and behaviours without consideration of the consequences. Dr McSwiggan also considered that personality disorders result in limited empathy toward others and lack of due regard for societal norms. Dr McSwiggan noted that the defendant accepted he was guilty of all his previous offences and identified “stress” as a precipitant and did not engage in overt victim blaming. Dr McSwiggan noted that the defendant’s substance use, primarily alcohol, would contribute to impairing his judgement and increase the likelihood of impulsive or reactive thoughts and behaviours.

31. Dr McSwiggan stated that the defendant’s history showed he is a recidivist violent offender who is unlikely to be fully rehabilitated given the frequency of reoffending in his lifetime. Dr McSwiggan identified the inherent limitations in any process of risk assessment for the prediction of violent offending. More effective risk formulation is conducted utilising evidence-based risk factors for the purpose of informing ongoing management and rehabilitation. Neither professional judgment nor structured discretion methods yield an actual probability of an individual like Mr Moore seriously violently reoffending.

32. Noting the above, Dr McSwiggan assessed the defendant using the Violent Risk Appraisal Guide (“VRAG-R”). The VRAG-R is designed to predict the occurrence of at least one violent reoffence (not necessarily a “serious” violent offence) in a lengthy period of opportunity. In addition, the predictions in all cases were made at the time the offender was assessed after the commission of the index offence, thus changes in the offender that may have occurred during institutionalisation or post-release were not considered. The VRAG-R placed the defendant in the High-Risk category for violent recidivism (level 7 out of 9). Dr McSwiggan noted that offenders at this risk level demonstrate nearly twice the recidivism rate of violent offenders in the middle of the risk distribution. The middle distribution recidivism rate was roughly 32% over a five year period.

33. Regarding protective factors, the defendant was evaluated with the Structured Assessment of Protective Factors for Violence Risk which examines factors that may mitigate an individual’s risk of violence recidivism. Dr McSwiggan considered that the defendant’s only internal protective factor was a secure attachment in childhood. The defendant’s external protective factors were suggested to be his stable living circumstances and the control enforced by the ESO. The basis on which the last suggestion was made by Dr McSwiggan is not clear to me, as the defendant was still in custody at the time of her interview of him and her report (although he has subsequently been released from custody, been subject to the ISO, and secured stable accommodation). She described as motivational protective factors his having leisure activities, his capacity for financial management and his accepting medication. It was Dr McSwiggan’s view that the defendant has very limited protective factors.

34. Dr McSwiggan was not prepared to confirm a diagnosis of intellectual disability, and expressed the view that the defendant had not engaged to his best capacity in the questioning relevant to this issue. She made clear that she was not suggesting that he was functioning at an average level and trying to “pull the wool over people’s eyes” but that he had made very obvious blunt attempts to perform poorly, probably indicating a very low functioning man. She was of the view that he was clearly cognitively compromised, and that her impression was that he was functioning at a borderline level. She expressed the view that his institutionalisation may have reduced his general adaptive functioning and the longer he is in the community (with appropriate support) the more his skills may increase.

35. Dr McSwiggan did not consider that the defendant could be managed in the community without an ESO.

36. I will deal with the views of Dr Elliott and Dr McSwiggan regarding the duration of any order and its conditions when I come to address those issues.

Risk Assessments – s 9(3)(c) and (d)

37. On 3 February 2025 Tahnee Liewes, Senior Psychologist, prepared a RAR pursuant to s 6(3)(b) of the Act. The following relevant findings appear in the RAR:

(a) Ms Liewes noted the defendant’s previous diagnoses of Schizophrenia, Alcohol Abuse and Psychosis not Otherwise Specified Resolving, Major Depression, Alcohol Dependant and Personality Disorder with Cluster B features. Other diagnoses of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and Borderline Personality Disorder (“BPD”) were also noted. Ms Liewes outlined the reviews completed in 2021 and 2022 that indicated “little evidence for psychotic symptoms”, and that the defendant denied having any current mental health issues or symptoms, stating he has not experienced psychotic symptoms for 15 years. The defendant has an intellectual disability and cognitive impairment, and has ongoing issues with literacy and numeracy. (b) Ms Liewes noted the defendant had been assessed using the following actuarial tools:

(i) Level of Service Inventory-Revised (“LSI-R”): Medium to High. (ii) Violence Risk Scale (“VRS”): The defendant was assessed as falling within the high-risk category in December 2022, before he was reassessed in November 2023 following psychological treatment. Whilst the defendant’s score reduced marginally, he remained in the high-risk category for violent offending. Ms Liewes noted that the VRS was reviewed and considered in the defendant’s current circumstances, and the treatment targets identified in the post-treatment VRS remained current. (iii) Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (“ODARA”): 10 (0% of men in the ODARA construction obtained a higher score than the defendant and when followed up for approximately five years, more than 70% of men in the defendant’s risk category committed a new domestic assault). (iv) SARA Dynamic Risk Factors (SPJ Domestically Violent Offending) (“SARA V3”): High level of effort or intervention to prevent further domestic violence when taking into account the factors on the SARA V3.

(c) Ms Liewes considered that the defendant’s most significant dynamic risk factors included: a lengthy history of interpersonal aggression, emotional control and impulsivity, antisocial peers, stability of relationships, community support, violence cycle, release to high-risk situations/residing in Dareton, compliance with supervision, substance abuse and cognitive distortions/impairment. (d) Ms Liewes considered the defendant’s connection to his cultural and professional supports such as Corrective Services NSW (“CSNSW”) and his Community Corrections Officer (and any National Disability Insurance Scheme (“NDIS”) services if he re-engaged) would be protective factors. She also descried as protective factors his close relationship with his mother and children and strong sense of culture. (e) Ms Liewes opined that the defendant’s most likely risk scenario for further violent offending is violence in the context of an intimate partner relationship. Specific triggers for such violence include: infidelity (actual or perceived); his partner attempting to end the relationship; his partner using substances; and other situations causing the defendant to feel jealous or angry. Given the escalation of violence in his previous intimate partner relationships, Ms Liewes considers the likelihood of serious violence in this context to be high. (f) The defendant may also reoffend with the use of general violence. The most likely scenarios for general violence include: if the defendant is denied access to medication he feels he requires; if he relapses into alcohol or substance use; real or perceived violence by others; and ongoing contact with antisocial peers. (g) Having regard to the tools set out above, Ms Liewes opined that overall, the defendant is at a high risk of further violent offending. Due to the nature of violence previously used and the escalation of violence against his previous intimate partners, Ms Liewes considered it possible that any future violence, including domestic violence, could include a “serious violence offence” within the meaning of the Act. (h) Ms Liewes noted that due to the remote location the defendant resided in at the time the report was prepared, his cognitive impairment, lack of engagement and tendency to change his phone number, it would be difficult to implement intensive supervision, monitoring and case management.

38. In an updated report dated 3 April 2025 Ms Liewes considered the defendant remained in the high-risk category for further violent offending.

*Corrective Services reports regarding the extent to which the defendant can be managed in the community – s 9(**3)(*d1)

39. The Risk Management Report (“RMR”) prepared by Kerry-Anne Troeger, Senior Community Corrections Officer, on 19 May 2025 indicates that the defendant’s response to supervision since his relocation to Dareton has been unsatisfactory as he has disengaged with services and supports. Ms Troeger opines that intensive domestic violence and substance abuse interventions are imperative to mitigating the defendant’s ongoing risk to the community and his domestic partners, noting that the effective management of the defendant is contingent upon his willingness to engage with and maintain a structured treatment regime.

40. The RMR recommends a suite of conditions to manage the defendant’s risk, in support of the following risk-mitigation measures outlined in the risk management plan which would be utilised if an ESO was made:

(a) Weekly interviews with the defendant, scheduled and unscheduled home visits and field visits to assess his level of compliance with the conditions and identify any escalation in risk to effectively manage concerns. Due to the remote location, supervision will likely alternate between in-person contact and video conferencing. (b) The defendant will be referred to CSNSW Forensic Psychology Service (“FPS”) to engage in in-person or phone individual and/or group Violent Offender Therapeutic Program (“VOTP”) maintenance sessions, along with a referral for cultural support via CSNSW Aboriginal Community Engagement and Culture Officers. (c) Regular third-party checks and liaison with various stakeholders to identify emerging risks and monitor compliance, and to collaboratively work with stakeholders to implement a tailored rehabilitative case plan.

41. The affidavits of Erica Mulligan, Manager of the Extended Supervision Order Team, Corrective Services, are referred to in more detail below in connection with the conditions to be imposed. Her evidence supports the necessity of an ESO, and the way in which some of the proposed conditions address the defendant’s risk. She is aware of the defendant’s cognitive impairment, and particular needs as an Aboriginal man, with a strong connection to country. She explains the problems with living in a rural environment in the short term.

Program participation – s 9(3)(e)

42. The defendant completed an introductory session of Managing Emotions and Domestic Abuse Program in 2010. It was noted that he contributed positively to group discussions during these introductory sessions.

43. Whilst in custody, the defendant completed the EQUIPS Foundation Program in 2015, the EQUIPS Domestic Abuse Program and EQUIPS Addiction Program in 2017, and the EQUIPS Foundation Program in 2020.

44. The defendant completed the SRP-VO on 6 November 2023, after being terminated from the program in June 2020 for spitting at a Justice Health nurse and declining an offer to participate in the program in August 2022. He participated in the CSNSW VOTP Maintenance Program during his most recent period of parole, despite the program being discontinued.

45. The defendant subsequently completed the SRP-VO. The defendant was described as attending most of the group-based sessions. He also attended regular individual sessions which focused on enhancing his comprehension of the program content, facilitating his engagement with professional supports and developing skills to manage cravings and urges for substance use. Whilst the defendant generally engaged in a meaningful manner, it was noted that he had difficulty at times regulating his emotions (slamming doors and walking out of rooms, verbally abusing and being aggressive towards staff and threatening to discontinue treatment). To the defendant’s credit, each incident was temporary and usually resulted in him recognising when his perception was inaccurate. Whilst the defendant was described to develop further insight and awareness into his violent offending, he maintained some cognitive distortion and externalised responsibility for his offending towards the victim. He was noted to have deficits in insight in relation to his risk of committing domestic violence, specifically the link between his feelings of jealousy and the commission of domestic violence offences.

Other options for risk reduction – s 9(3)(e1)

46. The evidence indicates no suitable alternatives for risk reduction.

Likelihood of compliance with ESO obligations, and past compliance with orders – s 9(3)(e2), (f) and (g)

47. The material indicates that the defendant’s cognitive limitations will cause difficulty for him in complying with ESO obligations, but that there are steps that can be put in place to ameliorate some of these problems. His recent past compliance with parole orders at the time of the preliminary hearing had been unsatisfactory, as set out above in considering the RMR. His compliance with the ISO between release from custody on 24 February 2026 and the hearing on 1 April 2026 was very positive.

48. Prior to the defendant’s release from custody, he confirmed that he was happy to live in Redfern, where he could get support and services more easily. Since his release from custody, the defendant has demonstrated a willingness to engage with the support available to him. He has attended Community Corrections in compliance with the ISO and has accepted appropriate referrals. He has been assisted in significant respects by Sidnei Pettitt, who is employed as a senior case worker in the Parole and Preventative Orders Legal Service team at Legal Aid NSW. Sidnei Pettitt assisted the defendant to obtain a new birth certificate, arranged for the recommencement of his Centrelink payments, obtained a new set of house keys for him, and engaged with the Work Development Order scheme on the defendant’s behalf to reduce his fines.

49. Sidnei Pettitt applied for a new NDIS service provider on the defendant’s behalf. As a result he has accepted a referral to Mibayn Disability Services which can provide culturally appropriate support to the defendant within the community. Sidnei Pettitt has also helped the defendant to continue with Opioid Treatment in the community, and he has been accepted by Royal Prince Alfred Drug and Alcohol Service for continuation of his monthly dosage of buprenorphine.

50. The defendant attended appointments with Community Corrections as arranged. He has spoken about wanting members of his family to be able to visit him at home, and preventing anyone who misuses alcohol and other drugs from being in his home. He said that he wants to keep his home a safe place for his children. The defendant accepted a referral to Forensic Psychology Services and said that he would attend appointments. Upon communicating that he had no phone or money and was lent a “burner” phone, he was accompanied to JB Hi-Fi and assisted to buy a SIM card. On 2 March 2026 the defendant contacted Community Corrections and asked for help to locate a Bendigo Bank. He said that he was confused, did not know where to go, and did not want to ask people. He was assisted over the phone to find his way to the bank, and mentioned to his case worker that he is hopeful of his children coming to visit him at Easter time.

Criminal history and views of sentencing court – s 9(3)(h) and (h1)

51. The defendant has a lengthy criminal history, all of which I have taken into account (and which had been made available to a number of people whose reports or affidavits are before me). The index offence has been outlined above at [17]-[19].

52. The defendant’s history of violent offending prior to the commission of the index offence includes the following:

53. Common assault: On 10 July 2002 the defendant punched the victim (his partner) in the jaw causing her to fall to the ground, before punching her several times in the back of the head and pulling her hair. After arriving home, the defendant threatened the victim and punched her again in the face.

54. Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (“AOABH”), armed with intent to commi****t indictable offence: On 2 December 1998 the victim was walking home through a park with his 12-year-old daughter when the defendant asked him for a beer and a cigarette. The victim stated he did not have them and the defendant lunged at him with a broken beer bottle. Following a struggle, the defendant broke a tree branch and threw it at the victim, striking him in the head which cut and bruised the victim’s head.

55. Violent disorder: On 25 November 1999 the defendant and co-accused were present at the scene of an accident caused by the victim. The defendant yelled at the victim, punched him in the nose and mouth, and kicked him in the shin. The offence was committed with a co-accused who also assaulted the victim and damaged his vehicle. The defendant was in breach of bail and of a good behaviour bond when he committed the offence.

56. Intimidate police officer in execution of duty without actual bodily harm: On 20 February 2000 whilst police were placing a person into the rear of a police vehicle, the defendant questioned and swore at police. When asked to cease swearing, he made threats to police including “come out to Nama and I’ll fuck you up” and “You are so dead”. The defendant was not interviewed at the time due to his level of intoxication and aggressiveness.

57. Common assault x 2 counts: On 30 July 2001 the defendant was screaming abuse at the victim whilst she held another victim (a child) in her arms before grabbing her by her hair and shaking her head. The defendant then pushed the victim off the bed, causing the child to fall to the floor. The victim was 36 weeks pregnant at the time of the assault.

58. Common assault and c****ontravene ADVO: On or about 16 November 2001 the defendant told the victim that they would be moving to Tamworth and because the victim feared the defendant, she agreed. In November 2001, the victim and defendant moved to Tamworth and resided in a caravan park. The victim reported daily assault in some form until December 2001 when she was able to speak with police. On 16 December 2001 the victim was nursing her youngest child when the defendant started an argument, picked up a broom, unscrewed the head and struck the victim across the back. The victim put down her child and the defendant punched the victim’s head and spat in her face. On 18 December 2001 the defendant threw the victim to the floor, punched the victim in the mouth and nose, causing them to bleed excessively. On 21 December 2001 the defendant approached the victim and threatened to cut her throat. The victim then approached police and reported the incident. The defendant was arrested on 10 July 2002.

59. AOABH and violent disorder: On 8 February 2002 the defendant and several others were involved in assaulting three victims who were walking home. The defendant was identified as being an agitator by inciting further violence. The victims went into their home where unknown persons attempted to gain access, before more people arrived and fought with the victims. The defendant was observed to punch one of the victims to the mouth in an upper cut type of punch. The defendant left the area and then returned and engaged in a fight with another of the victims.

60. Common assault: On 6 June 2002 the defendant and the victim (his sister) were involved in a heated argument after consuming alcohol together. The defendant broke a stick off a tree and told the victim to “go home” several times. He then used the stick to strike the victim’s arm, back and shoulders several times.

61. AOABH (DV): On 7 July 2005 the victim (his partner) was assaulted by the defendant and his co-accused (his sister) while at a party. The victim and the defendant were in a relationship on and off for nine years and had a child together. The co-accused approached and yelled at the victim “what’s going on between you and Bluey ya fucken slut?...” and punched the victim to the face several times causing her to fall to the ground, before kicking her approximately six times to the face area and three times to the stomach and breast area. The defendant then grabbed the victim by the hair and dragged her on the ground, before kicking her to the face and head area several times. The defendant and co-accused continued to repeatedly kick the victim until she blacked out. After the victim awoke, she stated to the defendant “I need to go to the hospital, I feel sick and my head hurts real bad. I can’t see out of my eyes properly.” The defendant responded “Na, you’ll be O.K. Otherwise the police will have to come out.” A short time later the victim walked to the toilet and vomited blood before walking to another house and calling the police.

62. Common assault (DV**)****:** The defendant had a history with the victim and her boyfriend. On 9 August 2008 the defendant walked up to the victim and stated “Where is your bloke… tell him I am going to kill him”. The defendant then proceeded to empty out a stubbie of beer over the victim’s head.

63. Affray: On 1 December 2008 several children were playing in Namatjira Avenue, Dareton when some of the children started throwing rocks at each other. One of the children told his mother who then went to the house of the defendant. A group subsequently gathered arming themselves with sticks, rocks and bottles. The defendant gathered in another group, and both groups (a total of 15 people) began fighting each other by throwing rocks, sticks and bottles. Police witnessed the defendant walk towards the other group with a blade, which he was asked to drop but he refused.

64. Common assault (DV): On 26 December 2012 the victim was laying down and playing with her son. The defendant came into the room and kicked her in the head multiple times. The victim left the house and went to the police station to report the incident.

65. Reckless wounding (DV), c****ommon assault (DV), AOABH (DV) and contraven****e prohibition/restriction in AVO (domestic): On 13 April 2013 an AVO was served on the defendant to protect his partner of two years, with whom he shared a child (the victim). On 27 April 2013 the defendant located the victim and took her to his mother’s house. He threatened to kill the victim, pulled her by her hair and shirt which caused her to fall to the ground, before repeatedly striking the victim with a hammer to her head and face. The victim attempted to get in the shower and immediately felt dizzy. As she was in the shower the defendant stood near her saying “You was down there chatting up boys and laying around with your own cousins” and “just tell me what happened or I*’*ll hit you with the hammer again.” The defendant then poured a bottle of cleaning liquid over the victim’s wounds. On 3 December 2014 the defendant was sentenced to 5 years and 6 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years and 3 months. The defendant was on parole for this offence at the time of committing the index offence.

66. There is nothing in the views of the sentencing judges which adds meaningfully to my consideration of whether the statutory test is met, nor my consideration of the conditions which should be imposed.

Other matters relevant to s 9

54. There is other evidence in the material before the Court supportive of the defendant’s extremely low level of intellectual functioning, such as historical assessments, and the psychological report of Danuta Banachowicz prepared for the National Disability Insurance Agency.

55. At the time I made the interim orders I expressed the view that the facts of the outstanding charge, if proved, supported the existence of the risks identified in the RAR and other material before me. There was no endeavour to prove the truth of the outstanding charges at the final hearing. I do not regard the existence of the charges as relevant to any issue for my determination. I have taken into account the way in which this issue has been addressed by Dr McSwiggan and Dr Elliott in reaching this view.

Determination

56. It was not disputed by the defendant that the statutory preconditions in s 5B of the Act are met. The Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

57. The question for determination is whether I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a further serious offence if he is not supervised under an ESO. As noted, the defendant does not oppose such a finding being made. On the basis of the evidence I have set out, I am so satisfied. I am not of the view that there is any discretionary reason for not imposing an ESO.

Conditions

58. Section 11(1) of the Act provides that “[a]n extended supervision order or interim supervision order may direct an offender to comply with such conditions as the Supreme Court considers appropriate” and includes a non-exhaustive list of conditions that may be imposed.

59. Various conditions proposed by the plaintiff are agreed to by the defendant, and I am also satisfied those conditions are appropriate and should be imposed. To the extent that conditions are opposed, I have assessed their suitability by reference to the evidence outlined above and as follows.

60. Some further observations arising from the recent expert evidence should be recorded. Both doctors adhered in their oral evidence to their reported views about the desirability of electronic monitoring. Regarding schedules of the defendant’s movements, Dr McSwiggan stated that the defendant’s risks lie in long term domestic or intimate relationships, rather than either going out looking for victims, or engaging opportunistically in “blitz” offending, and he has no mental health problems, such that scheduling is not as important in this case as it is in others. Both doctors agreed that a schedule to encourage pro-social routine and assist with discussion between the defendant and his DSO could be helpful. Dr Elliott’s view regarding the merits of a schedule, when asked to assume that the defendant would not be breached for non-compliance with one, was more amenable to the inclusion of such a condition than had been expressed in his report, which focused on concern for inability to comply and breach proceedings. He agreed that the positive aspects of discussions between the defendant and his DSO regarding movements and pro-social activities could also be achieved without schedules being submitted.

61. Dr McSwiggan was otherwise generally supportive of the conditions pressed by the plaintiff (other than one regarding his personal appearance, which is not opposed by the defendant), and elaborated upon her reported opinion in her oral evidence. Dr Elliott agreed with many of these but does not believe it is necessary to impose certain conditions such as those pressed regarding possession of weapons, access to the internet, and search and seizure. Dr Elliott provided persuasive elaboration in his oral evidence of his view regarding the importance of not overloading the defendant with difficult conditions. He regarded there to be a real risk of the defendant becoming overwhelmed and stressed upon difficulty in complying with conditions, leading to complete disengagement.

62. Erica Mulligan’s evidence indicates measures that will be implemented to address concerns as to the defendant’s cognitive impairment. She states that the ESO Team would implement a variety of communication strategies to ensure the defendant understands the conditions. These will include verbal explanations of each condition by the supervising officer using practical examples, reinforced at every reporting appointment. Audio recordings or visual aids of conditions and any directions or warnings will be created and saved to the defendant’s most frequently used device, to enable him to review them at any time. The team will prepare a tailored easy to read guide promptly after the conditions are imposed, this based on a previous collaboration with the Council for Intellectual Disability. It uses simplified language and graphics to serve as a reference tool for the defendant.

63. In considering the appropriate conditions I have also taken into account the cultural report prepared by Aunty Glenda Stubbs, particularly in relation to mistrust of authorities and professionals amongst First Nations people, the defendant’s shame in wearing an electronic bracelet (fearing he will be viewed as a sexual deviant), and the difficulty for the defendant in not sharing or giving away his phone, and in scheduling closely his time with others.

64. It is important to bear in mind the purposes of the legislation, and consider proposed conditions by reference to the demonstrated risks. Breach of a condition gives rise to the potential imposition of a criminal penalty with the prospect of imprisonment.

65. I will address the contentious conditions in accordance with the headings in the schedule to the summons.

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

66. The plaintiff proposed a condition that the defendant be electronically monitored and not tamper with or remove the electronic monitoring equipment. The plaintiff relied on the recommendations of Doctors Elliott and McSwiggan, and the affidavit of Ms Mulligan affirmed 21 November 2025 which suggested that electronic monitoring would enable the ESO team to have “real-time” oversight of the defendant’s movements and be in a better position to mitigate high-risk scenarios. It was further submitted that electronic monitoring assists with timely detection of non-compliance with exclusion zones, curfews and scheduled activities, and assists the DSO to identify patterns of risky behaviour. The plaintiff further pointed to: the defendant’s poor history of compliance with supervision orders, including his alleged commission of a further domestic violence assault on a new partner with whom he was residing, contrary to a direction he reside with his sister in another township; his being at large for three months; and his using heroin and “ice” during his period on parole.

67. The defendant opposed electronic monitoring on the basis it was unnecessary in light of other conditions to be imposed, and in circumstances where his prior offending had not consistently occurred in one location or type of location. Counsel for the defendant submitted that the Court should have regard to the opinion expressed by Aunty Glenda Stubbs in her report annexed to Ms Salman’s affidavit relating to feelings of shame engendered by the wearing of an ankle bracelet. It was the defendant’s submission that for that reason, electronic monitoring would ultimately be counterproductive. Dr Elliott’s evidence in respect of the capacity for an onerous set of conditions to contribute to the defendant’s stress levels and hence increased risk of recidivism was referred to.

68. The plaintiff proposed a condition that, if required by a DSO, the defendant must provide an advance weekly schedule of his anticipated movements. The plaintiff also proposed that, only in the event that I do not impose an electronic monitoring condition, the defendant must inform the DSO if there are any changes to those movements prior to or immediately after his plans change. The plaintiff did not press a condition which prevented the defendant deviating from his schedule of movements except in an emergency. Scheduling was submitted to permit a DSO to conduct proactive risk assessments, limit exposure to high-risk environments, encourage pro-social activities and reduce impulsive decision-making. Referring to Ms Mulligan’s affidavit of 21 November 2025, a “dry schedule” was said to be appropriate, which is a simplified, low-detail structure of movements, to provide the defendant with some flexibility given his cognitive impairments and cultural needs.

69. The defendant opposed a scheduling condition, even without the prospect of penal consequences flowing from its breach, having regard to the opinion expressed by Dr Elliott in his report that it was likely beyond the defendant’s capacities, and his evidence regarding the importance of not overloading the defendant with conditions.

70. Although electronic monitoring and schedules of movements often go hand in hand, I accept the submissions for the plaintiff regarding electronic monitoring and those of the defendant regarding a schedule of movements, as I did at the preliminary stage, noting of course that the evidence has developed since then.

71. Accepting that the primary object of the Act is to ensure the safety and protection of the community, it is vital that the defendant’s whereabouts can be known. I am aware of the high level of dislike the defendant had for electronic monitoring which was in place for a short time when he was released on parole, and his perception that people would wrongly think him to be a sex offender. However given the significant difficulties which eventuated in supervising him, I regard electronic monitoring as necessary at this stage in light of the identified risks. As noted by Dr McSwiggan and Ms Mulligan, there is considerable capacity for relaxing and removing this condition depending on the defendant’s progress and compliance with other conditions.

72. The impact of the defendant’s cognitive impairment on his daily living indicates that the schedule of movements, even as modified, is likely beyond his capacity. There are other ways of encouraging structure and prosocial activity in the defendant’s life, for example by the guidance that will be provided by his DSO and the requirement to answer questions as to his movements.

Part B: Accommodation

73. The plaintiff proposed an amended curfew condition, condition 10 in the parties’ schedule, in the following terms:

“If directed by your DSO because they consider it necessary to address the commission of a serious offence, you must be at your approved address between 9PM and 6AM unless other arrangements are approved.”

74. This was opposed on the ground the defendant’s offending was not tied to a particular time of day or night. In so submitting, the defendant referred to the report of Dr Elliott in which he opines a curfew would be unnecessary as it does not relate to the defendant’s pattern of violence and appears redundant if he is subject to electronic monitoring. The plaintiff nonetheless continued to press this condition, relying on Ms Mulligan’s evidence and Dr McSwiggan’s report expressing support for a night curfew, her reasoning being that prosocial activities do not generally take place after 9:00 pm and in the event that one does, alternative arrangements can be approved. The plaintiff submitted the curfew will ensure the defendant is less likely to engage in late-night alcohol or drug use, which are said to be matters suggested by Dr Elliott as relevant to risk.

75. The condition concerning unannounced visits by a DSO to the defendant’s approved address (condition 11 in the parties’ schedule) was also a topic of dispute. The defendant suggested an amendment that he be notified prior to the DSO’s attendance. The plaintiff submitted that providing advance warning of a home visit is likely to diminish the DSO’s ability to make observations truly reflective of risk, including because it gives the defendant opportunity to hide or remove evidence of risk factors such as intimate partners and drug paraphernalia.

76. The plaintiff also pressed conditions 13 and 14 requiring the defendant to promptly notify a DSO of any non-approved visitors or overnight guests at his approved address. The plaintiff relied on Ms Mulligan’s evidence that such conditions are critical given the defendant’s pattern of intimate partner violence. The defendant sought to confine the application of these conditions to intimate partners of the defendant. During the hearing both counsel agreed that a workable alternative may be notification of visitors who are women who are unrelated to the defendant. I propose to impose these conditions as reworded.

77. I am not of the view that the curfew is needed. There is to be imposed, without opposition, a requirement that the defendant not spend the night anywhere other than his approved residence without the approval of a DSO, and I have agreed to impose an electronic monitoring condition. I accept the plaintiff’s argument regarding the need for permitting unannounced visits.

Part E: Drugs and alcohol

78. Opposed conditions 20 and 21 would prohibit entry into licensed premises without prior approval, and attendance at drug and alcohol rehabilitation courses as directed, with prior approval required for discharge. There are to be imposed by agreement drug and alcohol abstention conditions, and the requirement to submit to testing in relation to these.

79. In light of the conditions that are to be imposed, I accept the submission for the defendant that proposed condition 20 prohibiting entry into licensed premises is excessive. I acknowledge the oral evidence of the experts that if the defendant starts spending great periods of time at licensed premises this could enhance the risk of alcohol consumption, and contact with potentially vulnerable women. The defendant is required to provide information to his DSO regarding his movements, and any meaningful problem can be addressed by directions to him.

80. The defendant’s opposition to condition 21 was predicated upon it being overly punitive for failure to attend such courses to constitute a breach, and Dr Elliott’s opinion that mandating such courses is rarely successful. Dr McSwiggan agreed with this in her oral evidence. Both witnesses stated that an initial encouragement to attend could be positive. I note that the defendant has during the short term of the ISO engaged positively in relation to drug rehabilitation (albeit when there was a condition that he comply with directions regarding such programmes). I am not of the view that this condition is appropriate.

Part F: Non-association

81. There is to be imposed, without opposition, a condition prohibiting the defendant from associating with any person specified by a DSO. The plaintiff additionally sought, without limiting that condition, that the defendant must not associate with any person he knows is consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs. This was submitted to help prevent relapse, with drug use being one of the defendant’s primary risk factors. The defendant took issue with the condition on the bases it is restrictive, difficult to comply with and unnecessary, having regard to the other conditions to be imposed.

82. I do not propose to impose this condition as pressed. Although I accept the plaintiff’s submission regarding the importance of reducing the risk of relapse into drug usage, this condition is very difficult to implement, and not necessary. The defendant is to have by agreement a general requirement to truthfully answer questions from a DSO or any other person supervising him about issues such as where he is or has been, who he is or has been with, and the nature of his associations. In the absence of more particular evidence, this condition, and the obligation to not associate with any person the subject of the direction by his DSO, is adequate to deal with any perceived risk of association with people who may negatively influence the defendant.

Part H: Weapons

83. The defendant opposed a condition proffered by the plaintiff that prohibits his unapproved use of weapons such as knives (other than for domestic and other residential use), machetes, swords and other implements made or adapted for causing injury, and anything intended to be used to injure, menace or damage property. It was submitted to address the defendant’s history of using or carrying weapons whilst committing criminal offences, including the index offence. The plaintiff noted the RAR identified the use of weapons as a risk factor, and Dr McSwiggan’s report noted the defendant has a history of using makeshift weapons during the commission of offences and her opinion that he should not be permitted to carry a knife. The basis of the defendant’s opposition to this condition was its lack of sufficient connection to his offending.

84. The defendant’s violence has historically involved his own body or items opportunistically to hand – bottles, tree branches, a blade from a handsaw in 2008, a hammer and axe in 2013, a pillow in the commission of the index offence. The RAR and affidavit of Erica Mulligan do not in my view identify weapon carrying as a particular risk factor. Further, as the defendant submits, possession of the types of weapons the plaintiff seeks to prohibit would generally amount to criminal offences. I noted earlier Dr Elliott’s view that this condition is not necessary.

85. Given the likely significant difficulties for the defendant in understanding the conditions to be imposed because of his cognitive impairment, it is important to have no more than are necessary. Conditions 25 and 26 are not necessary, and should not be imposed.

Part I: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

86. Condition 27 as sought by the plaintiff requires the defendant to at all times carry a specified approved mobile phone and remain available to answer calls from a DSO, or as soon as reasonably practicable return calls unable to be answered. There is a history of very significant unreliability in ability to contact the defendant, in part based on his habit of giving away or not carrying mobile telephones, then relying on others.

87. In support of this condition, the plaintiff noted Community Corrections has experienced significant difficulties in being able to contact the defendant, including during his recent parole period, and submitted recent OIMS notes disclose the defendant is presently using a mobile phone, and that both experts consider it an appropriate condition. The defendant opposed the condition, citing his history of losing mobile phones and changing phone numbers, in the context of his background and institutionalisation. It was further advanced for the defendant that, in light of his cognitive and communication difficulties, it would be inappropriate to expose him to up to 5 years imprisonment in the event of a breach.

88. In my view this condition is essential for maintaining supervision of the defendant, and will need to be explained very clearly and strongly to him.

89. Proposed condition 28 relates to the defendant obeying a DSO’s directions about internet access and the use of electronic devices and was also contentious. It was said to enable the DSO to monitor communications with intimate partners, previous victims and persons protected by non-contact ADVOs. It was pressed, despite opposition, given that recent OIMS notes demonstrate the defendant’s ability to make calls and send and receive text messages, and that he is not always forthcoming about the status of relationships. The defendant resisted the condition, relying on Dr Elliot’s opinion that it is not sufficiently connected with his offending and the defendant’s limited IT skills make it redundant.

90. I am not of the view that proposed condition 28 is sufficiently connected with any risk the defendant poses, and it will not be imposed.

Part J: Search and seizure

91. Two conditions relating to search and seizure were opposed, namely: condition 29 requiring the defendant to submit to extensive powers of search, including of his person, residence, vehicle, any item, computer, device, storage facility and so on in his possession or under his control; and condition 30 prohibiting him from destroying or interfering with any objects the subject of such searches.

92. The plaintiff submitted the condition enables a DSO to monitor general compliance with the ESO, particularly to ensure no drug paraphernalia or intimate partners are present at his address. The plaintiff highlighted that Dr McSwiggan considered this condition necessary in order to look at his communications devices, any drug paraphernalia, unprescribed medications or alcohol containers. The defendant opposed these conditions because of their significant incursion into his liberty, and the availability of alternate search warrant powers.

93. I accept in the main the submissions for the defendant on this issue. The evidence does not support the need for these conditions. However both Court-appointed experts gave evidence about the benefits of the capacity to view the defendant’s phone. I will impose a condition permitting this, and also proposed condition 30 (limited to the phone).

Part L: Medical intervention and treatment

94. Condition 35 as sought by the plaintiff requires that the defendant undergo any psychological or psychological assessment or counselling as directed by a DSO. The plaintiff confirmed in response to a concern raised by the defendant that the condition would not have the effect of compelling the defendant to take medication. Nonetheless, I do not regard this condition as suitable, for reasons similar to those for not imposing a condition requiring compulsory attendance at drug and alcohol courses, outlined above at [80].

95. The plaintiff abandoned condition 37, and sought in lieu thereof an amended condition 38, requiring the defendant to notify a DSO upon being prescribed medication for mental health or substance abuse, and upon ceasing or declining to take such medication. The crux of the defendant’s opposition to this condition was the same concern that he not be involuntarily placed on a medication regime. The amended condition does not require the defendant to take medication, and I regard it as appropriate.

96. Conditions 36, 39 and 40 relate to the defendant notifying a DSO of any healthcare practitioners he consults, and the sharing of his information between practitioners, DSOs, NSW Police, CSNSW and other agencies. These are opposed. Issues raised on behalf of the defendant include his capacity to comply, and the prospect that such conditions may operate to deter him from seeking medical treatment. The plaintiff referred to OIMS notes indicating the defendant has acted in an aggressive manner towards Justice Health nurses whilst in custody, the importance of facilitating information exchange between persons involved in his supervision to ensure his criminogenic needs are being addressed, and to allow a DSO to make appropriate enquiries should a physical or mental health concern arise.

97. Proposed condition 41, in its amended form, requires the defendant to agree to disclose his criminal history to a healthcare provider if a DSO considers it necessary to address the risk of commission of a serious offence, and was also opposed by the defendant.

98. With the exception of condition 41, I am of the view that these conditions are necessary to ensure the defendant receives treatment appropriate to his risk factors. He engaged very poorly with such supports whilst last on parole. Condition 41 should permit disclosure of the defendant’s criminal history to a healthcare provider only if a DSO considers the disclosure necessary to address the risk of the commission of a serious offence.

Duration of the ESO

99. The plaintiff sought an ESO for three years. The report of Dr Elliott suggested at minimum a three year period was necessary for the defendant’s safe transition, and that of Dr McSwiggan expressed the view that three years would be a reasonable period to monitor the defendant’s stability in the community, in particular his attempts to form intimate partnerships. Notwithstanding those opinions, counsel for the defendant asked the Court to consider an order of a duration less than three years, in light of the challenges the defendant faces regarding compliance.

100. I am satisfied on the basis of the evidence of the experts that the order should be for approximately three years, but that as the defendant has been subject to an ISO with similar conditions for close to three months, the appropriate duration is two years and nine months from today.

101. Dr McSwiggan elaborated in her evidence upon the desirability of the three year period in light of the ongoing risk posed by the defendant, such that it would be highly beneficial for him, and the safety of the community and any intimate partners, that he be supervised for three years. She also spoke about the desirability of stepping down from electronic monitoring in a gradual way if such a condition is imposed. She was of the view that two years could be sufficient if the defendant was highly compliant with the ESO. Dr Elliott explained that his recommended time frame was partly based on an assumption that the defendant will want to move back to country, which should be attended to gradually and not until significant progress has been made; but that even if this was not the defendant’s wish, the enduring nature of the risks in this case made the three year period appropriate.

102. It should be recognised however that much of the work of the initial stages will have been undertaken since the defendant’s release from custody in February this year in terms of developing routine and relationship between him and a DSO, endeavouring to reinforce his understanding of the conditions, working out approved visitors to the defendant’s home and so on.

ORDERS

103. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

104. An order pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006, that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 2 years and 9 months from today.

105. An order pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 directing that the defendant, for the period of the extended supervision order, comply with the conditions set out in the schedule to this judgment.

106. An order that access to the Supreme Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application of access.

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Schedule of Conditions of Supervision

In these conditions:

“Associate” includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or communicating with by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication).

“CSNSW” means Corrective Services NSW.

“Commissioner” means Commissioner for Corrective Services.

“Defendant” means Aaron MOORE, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.

“DSO” means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order.

“NSWPF” means NSW Police Force.

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

Monitoring and Reporting

1. You must accept the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.

2. Where a direction maybe given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service. Written directions will also be given and explained verbally.

3. You must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising you, about:

(a) where you are or have been;

(b) where you are going;

(c) who you are with or have been with;

(d) what you are doing or have been doing; and

(e) the nature of your associations.

4. You must agree to any information relating to your risk, supervision or rehabilitation being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

Electronic Monitoring

5. You must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with or remove the equipment.

Part B: Accommodation

6. You must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change your approved address or living arrangements.

7. You must allow a DSO to visit you at your approved address at any time and to enter the premises at that address.

8. You must not spend the night anywhere other than your approved address or any alternative approved addresses without the approval of a DSO.

9. You must promptly notify a DSO of any visitor who is a woman and is not related to you, other than approved visitors, entering and remaining at your approved address.

10. You must promptly notify a DSO of any person, who is a woman and is not related to you, staying overnight at your approved address (other than persons who ordinarily reside there).

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

11. You must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner, with the exception that you may visit Mildura, Victoria for an approved reason provided you give a DSO at least 24 hours’ notice of your intention to visit.

12. You must not go to any place specified by a DSO.

Part E: Drugs and alcohol

13. You must not:

(a) Possess, purchase or consume alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO;

(b) Possess or use prohibited drugs; or

(c) Abuse prescription drugs which are not prescribed to you.

14. You must submit to drug and alcohol testing.

Part F: Non-association

Association with Others

15. You must not associate with any person specified by a DSO.

16. You must agree to a DSO disclosing your criminal history to a person with whom you are in a domestic or intimate relationship, if a DSO considers the disclosure is reasonably necessary to address the commission of a serious offence. Before any disclosure is made, you will first be given the opportunity to make the disclosure yourself within a timeframe as identified by a DSO.

Part I: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

17. You must carry at all times a specified approved mobile phone and ensure that you are available to answer any call from a DSO or, as soon as reasonably practicable, return the call that you were unable to answer.

Part J: Search and seizure

18. You must submit to the search by a DSO (or any other person as directed by the DSO) of your phone, and to the seizure of it.

19. You must not attempt to destroy or interfere with the phone that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to this order.

Part K: Personal details and appearance

20. You must not change your name from Aaron MOORE or use any other name without notifying a DSO.

21. If you significantly change your appearance you are to notify the DSO within 24 hours of that change.

22. You must let a DSO photograph you, dressed, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant change to your appearance.

23. If you change the details of any current form of identification or obtain further forms of identification, you must provide a DSO with such details.

Part L: Medical intervention and treatment

24. You must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that you consult.

25. You must notify a DSO within 24 hours if you cease to take or decline to commence taking any medication prescribed for management of your mental health and/or substance use.

26. You must agree to your treatment and service providers, including NDIS providers, and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on your progress and attendance, and information you have told them, with each other and with a DSO.

27. You must agree to any information obtained under condition 26 being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

28. You must agree to the disclosure of your criminal history to any healthcare provider if a DSO considers the disclosure necessary to address the risk of the commission of a serious offence.

Amendments

18 May 2026

Schedule of Conditions - correct paragraph numbering.

20 May 2026

20 May 2026 - Correct paragraph numbering.