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Catchwords: HIGH RISK OFFENDER — serious sex offender — application for extended supervision order — preliminary hearing for interim relief — sexual offences committed against young girls — dispute as to conditions — requirement that conditions be appropriate — interim supervision order made

Legislation Cited: Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004 (NSW), s 13
Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW), s 17
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 61K, 61J, 86, 91
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 19AHA
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), ss 3, 4, 5, 5B, 5D, 5I, 6, 7, 9, 10A, 10C, 11
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), ss 474.22, 474.25C, 474.27

Cases Cited: Attorney General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119
Kamm v State of New South Wales (No 4) (2017) 95 NSWLR 179; [2017] NSWCA 189
Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57
State of New South Wales v Archer (Preliminary) [2024] NSWSC 1149
State of New South Wales v Burns [2014] NSWSC 1014
State of New South Wales v O’Hara (Final) [2024] NSWSC 225
State of New South Wales v Paton [2020] NSWSC 1707
State of New South Wales v Steven Single [2019] NSWSC 176
State of New South Wales v Wilkinson (Preliminary) [2020] NSWSC 1813

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Jack McCall (Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
Mr J Moore (Plaintiff)
Mr R Pettit (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor for New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid New South Wales (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2025/487989

JUDGMENT

1. HIS HONOUR: By summons filed on 15 December 2025, the plaintiff seeks an order that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order (“ESO”), pursuant to the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”) for a period of 4 years.

2. In the interim, the plaintiff seeks an interim supervision order (“ISO”) against the defendant for a period of 28 days from 24 April 2026, as well as orders appointing 2 qualified psychiatrists and/or psychologists to conduct separate examinations of the defendant, and to furnish their reports to the Court.

3. The plaintiff has relied on the affidavit of Patrick Mullane affirmed on 11 December 2025. That affidavit is accompanied by Exhibit PM-1, which comprises a substantial portion of the material relied upon by the plaintiff for the purposes of its application. Separately, the defendant has relied on two affidavits of Joseph Harding affirmed on 9 March and 12 March 2026 which annexed 4 documents.

4. For the purposes of this preliminary hearing, the defendant has accepted that the statutory preconditions for the making of an ISO are met. While the defendant does not oppose the making of an ISO, there is a live dispute as to the appropriateness of several of the proposed conditions.

Background

5. The defendant’s background was set out comprehensively by the parties in their joint statement of agreed facts (“Agreed Facts”). The salient features follow.

6. The defendant is a 31 year old man with a history of sexual offending. He grew up in Wollongong, New South Wales, where he enjoyed a relatively stable upbringing with his parents, with whom he consistently attended church during his formative years.

7. The defendant exhibited various behavioural issues throughout his childhood, such as impulsivity, a poor attention span, emotional outbursts, a difficulty relating to others and sensory outbursts. Despite these problems, he commenced secondary education at a selective school in Wollongong, where he attended until year 11 when he left intending to study at a technology college.

8. Regrettably, his plans went awry because he came into conflict with the law and ended up in detention. The defendant’s first set of offences involved very serious sexual violence on three young women. On 26 October 2012, he was sentenced by Judge Conlon SC DCJ in Wollongong District Court for the following offences:

9. 1 count of recklessly inflicting actual bodily harm with intent to have sexual intercourse contrary to s 61K(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW);

10. 1 count of aggravated sexual assault – threat to inflict actual bodily harm with weapon, contrary to s 61J of the Crimes Act; and

11. 1 count of take or detail person with intent to obtain advantage contrary to s 86(1)(b) of the Crimes Act.

12. The defendant was ordered to serve an aggregate term of imprisonment of five years and nine months, with a non-parole period of three years and nine months, all to be served in juvenile detention.

13. Then, on 14 November 2016, the defendant was convicted of and sentenced for possessing child abuse material contrary to s 91H(2) of the Crimes Act for which he received a good behaviour bond for 4 years.

14. While he was subject to the bond, the defendant committed further offending. He was convicted of the following offences on 17 November 2019:

15. 2 counts of failing to comply with reporting obligations contrary to s 17(1) of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (“CPOR Act”); and

16. 1 count of possessing child abuse material contrary to s 91H(2) of the Crimes Act.

17. He was sentenced for these offences at Liverpool Local Court to a term of imprisonment of 12 months, with a non-parole period of 4 months.

The index offending

13. While on parole, the defendant committed the following further offences:

14. 1 count of using a carriage service to plan/procure for sex (person under 16 years of age) contrary to s 474.25C of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth);

15. 2 counts of using a carriage service to groom for sex (person under 16 years of age) contrary to s 474.27(1) of the Criminal Code Act;

16. 1 count of using a carriage service to make child abuse material available contrary to s 474.22(1) of the Criminal Code Act; and

17. 2 offences on a s 166 certificate, namely: 1 count of failing to comply with reporting obligations contrary to s 17(1) of the CPOR Act; and 1 count of contravening a prohibition order contrary to s 13(1) of the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004 (NSW).

18. Notably, the 2 offences against s 474.27(1) of the Criminal Code Act enliven this Court’s jurisdiction. In particular, they constitute a “serious offence” by reference to its meaning in ss 4 and 5(1)(b5) of the Act.

19. The underlying facts of these offences are as follows.

20. In brief, the defendant initiated contact (under an alias) with two children on the online social messaging platform Discord. He discussed sexual topics, requested explicit images and sent an explicit image of his own. The sentencing judge, Haesler SC DCJ, found the defendant made use of a pretence to gain trust and he ultimately offended for the sole purpose of his own sexual gratification.

21. On 24 March 2022, as an adult, the defendant was sentenced to an effective term of imprisonment of 4 years with a non-parole period of 3 years which commenced on 25 April 2021 and expired on 24 April 2024. Following a correction pursuant to s 19AHA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the defendant’s total sentence will expire on 24 April 2026. He will by then have served the entirety of the sentence – having failed to convince the Commonwealth Parole decision makers that he should be released on parole.

22. Even whilst serving this current sentence, he has demonstrated a propensity to breach the gaol’s rules. After pornographic material was found in his cell, he pleaded guilty to failing to comply with correctional centre routine on 3 May 2024, although it is noted that no child abuse material was located as part of that search.

The statutory framework

19. The primary object of the Act, as set out in s 3(1), is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high-risk sex offenders and high-risk violent offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community.

20. The secondary object of the Act is set out in s 3(2), which is to encourage high-risk sex offenders and high-risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation.

21. These proceedings are concerned only with the Act’s application to high-risk sex offenders, not high-risk violent offenders.

22. These two objects of the Act are protective, not punitive. [1]

23. Section 5B of the Act provides when the Court may make an ESO. While this preliminary hearing is concerned with the potential imposition of an ISO, not an ESO, s 5B is still of principal importance for these present purposes. The whole of the provision follows:

5B Making of extended supervision orders — unacceptable risk

The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if—

(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and

(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and

(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and

(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.

24. Within this context, s 4 of the Act defines a “serious offence” as either a “serious sex offence” or a “serious violence offence”. A “serious sex offence” is defined by s 5(1) of the Act to include, relevantly, an offence against s 474.27 of the Criminal Code Act.

25. Additionally, s 5I(1) of the Act provides that an application for an ESO may be made only in respect of a “supervised offender”, which is defined in sub-s (2)(a)(ii) as an offender who, when the application for the order is made, is in custody or under supervision while serving a sentence of imprisonment for an offence of a sexual nature.

26. Then, ss 7(3)-(5) of the Act provides for the procedure at a preliminary hearing such as this one:

7 Pre-trial procedures

…

(3) A preliminary hearing into the application is to be conducted by the Supreme Court within 28 days after the application is filed in the Supreme Court or within such further time as the Supreme Court may allow.

(4) If, following the preliminary hearing, it is satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must make orders—

(a) appointing—

(i) 2 qualified psychiatrists, or

(ii) 2 registered psychologists, or

(iii) 1 qualified psychiatrist and 1 registered psychologist, or

(iv) 2 qualified psychiatrists and 2 registered psychologists,

to conduct separate psychiatric or psychological examinations (as the case requires) of the offender and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations, and

(b) directing the offender to attend those examinations.

(5) If, following the preliminary hearing, it is not satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must dismiss the application.

27. In addition, s 10A of the Act sets out when the Court may determine to make an ISO, as follows:

10A Interim supervision order

The Supreme Court may make an order for the interim supervision of an offender if, in proceedings for an extended supervision order, it appears to the Court—

(a) that the offender’s current custody or supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined, and

(b) that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order.

28. In State of New South Wales v Archer (Preliminary) [2024] NSWSC 1149, Adams J (as her Honour then was) observed (at [20]):

“… the statutory test to be applied at the preliminary hearing in order to make the ISO and order the appointment of court experts is that it must appear to the court that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO. It has been held that the task of the court at a preliminary hearing such as this is similar to the task in committal proceedings” (citation omitted).

29. In order to determine whether the making of an ESO is justified, regard must be had to s 9 of the Act. That provision enables the Court to either make an ESO or dismiss an application for one – while identifying various mandatory considerations when making such a determination. These being the safety of the community, which is the paramount consideration, in addition to the matters identified by ss 9(3) and 9(4) of the Act.

Are the statutory pre-conditions met?

Initial findings

30. As noted, the defendant concedes that the statutory pre-conditions for the making of the interim orders sought by the plaintiff are met. However, this is an evaluative task which cannot simply be resolved by way of consent between the parties.

31. I have considered the tendered material and I am satisfied that the statutory pre-conditions contained within s 5B(a)–(c) have been satisfied. This leaves the issue of unacceptable risk under s 5B(d).

Meaning of “unacceptable risk”

32. It is necessary to consider the meaning of unacceptable risk. While not defined by the Act, s 5D expands upon the concept insofar as it provides:

… the Supreme Court is not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine that there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.

33. The authorities have provided guidance on the meaning of the concept. In particular, its meaning was considered by Beazley P in Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57 at [50]-[51] (“Lynn”), as follows:

“As the respondent pointed out in its submissions, by reference to dictionary definitions, the word ‘unacceptable’ requires context in which, or parameters against which, the ‘unacceptable’ risk can be measured. Thus, according to the Macquarie Dictionary, that which is unacceptable is ‘so far from a required standard, norm expectation, etc as not to be allowed’. The Oxford Dictionary defines the word by reference to its antonym ‘acceptable’. Something is ‘acceptable’ if it is ‘tolerable or allowable, not a cause for concern; within prescribed parameters’.

What the court, therefore, must find to be unacceptable is the ‘risk’ that the offender poses ‘of committing a serious violence offence if … not kept under supervision’. The respondent accepted that the precise parameters or standard or norm against which that determination is to be made are not immediately evident from the text of the provision. That must be so. A determination as to whether something is unacceptable is an evaluative task, and evaluative determinations require a context in which to be made.”

34. Also in Lynn, Basten JA proceeded by stating at [126]:

“The nature of the risk he posed had to be assessed by reference to past conduct, the seriousness of the possible future conduct and the period over which the risk may come to fruition. The assessment must be based on an absence of protective measures. The criterion of unacceptability will no doubt depend upon these matters, together with a comparison, to the extent that the evidence permits, of what may be described as the background level of risk to the community […]”

35. More recently, Chen J summarised the concept of unacceptable risk in State of New South Wales v O*’*Hara (Final) [2024] NSWSC 225 at [34]:

“Unacceptable risk

…

34 The concept of an ‘unacceptable risk’ has, unsurprisingly, been the subject of considerable judicial consideration, which establishes the following:

(1) The phrase is to be given its everyday meaning within its context, having regard to the objects of the Act: Lynn at [55]–[58].

(2) What the Court must find to be unacceptable is the risk that the offender poses of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision; that is, an assessment of the likelihood in the absence of any supervision: Lynn at [51] and [55]; State of New South Wales v Donovan [2015] NSWCA 280 at [24]. That finding provides the basis for imposing control on the offender: Lynn at [127].

(3) The interests of the offender in liberty and privacy are not relevant to the assessment of whether there is an ‘unacceptable risk’, but can be taken into account when considering whether to make, under s 9 of the Act, an ESO or to dismiss the application: Lynn at [44], [143] and [148]–[149].

(4) Unacceptability of risk ‘involves considerations of both likelihood of the risk eventuating, and the gravity of the risk that may eventuate’: *State of New South Wales v Simcock (*Final) [2016] NSWSC 1805 at [71]; State of New South Wales v Chaplin [2019] NSWSC 471 at [15]. The nature of the risk ‘posed ha[s] to be assessed by reference to past conduct, the seriousness of the possible future conduct and the period over which the risk may come to fruition’: Lynn at [126].

(5) An offender may pose an unacceptable risk, even where the likelihood of committing another serious offence is low, if the likely consequences of such an offence are very grave: *State of New South Wales v Kamm (Final) [*2016] NSWSC 1 at [41] and [43]; [State of New South Wales v Golding (Preliminary) [2018] NSWSC 1041] at [16]; State of New South Wales v Devaney (Final) [2022] NSWSC 60 at [73].”

Consideration

36. The key issue arises under s 5B(d), namely, whether the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, satisfy the Court to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision.

37. The supporting documentation was provided in accordance with s 6(3) of the Act, which provides that an application must be supported by documentation that addresses each of the matters in s 9(3) and is to include an expert report (prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner) that assesses the likelihood of the offender committing a serious offence.

Section 9(3) matters

38. Keeping firmly in mind that the safety of the community is the paramount consideration (s 9(2)), I have had regard to the additional matters under s 9(3) of the Act. These matters are as follows.

The expert evidence: s 9(3)(c)

39. Exhibit PM-1 includes various expert reports. I have reviewed each of those reports as part of my evaluation. Focussing on the most recent Risk Assessment Report (“RAR”) and Risk Management Report (“RMR”), I set out brief observations below.

Ms Ryan’s RAR dated 4 August 2025

40. Ms Amber Ryan, a senior psychologist, examined the defendant and prepared a RAR dated 4 August 2025. The RAR identified various dynamic factors which were said to be relevant to the defendant’s risk of sexual re-offending, namely, his sexual preoccupation, deviance and violent ideation; difficulties with intimate and non-intimate relationships and capacity for relationship stability; problems with self-awareness and treatment; negative emotionality and challenges with stress; and difficulties with supervision.

41. Of importance, Ms Ryan noted that if the defendant was to re-offend, it may involve “contact” sexual offending. Those most at risk are females aged between 14 and 30 who are either unknown to him, known to him through sexual relations or underage females who he has met online and managed to procure to engage in sexual activity.

42. Such offending, according to Ms Ryan, could result from a romantic relationship breakdown, conflict with a romantic partner or romantic interest or rejection from a romantic person of interest. It would likely involve premeditation and sexual violence, if such offending did materialise. In the context of a current sexual partner, being one of the “at risk” types of people, it would likely occur in the context of him first seeking out consensual avenues to fulfil his sexually sadistic interests.

43. Ms Ryan further identified risks of non-contact offending. The defendant may re-offend by acquiring, or even creating, child abuse material to fulfil his deviant interests.

44. He was, overall, assessed in the well above average risk range for sexual offending – relative to other adult male sexual offenders. He was also assessed as having a high density of unaddressed criminogenic needs.

Ms McCarthy’s RMR dated 3 September 2025

45. Ms Vicki McCarthy, Team Leader of the ESO Team of Corrective Services NSW, prepared a RMR on 3 September 2025.

46. Ms McCarthy identified the following matters with respect to the defendant’s risk:

47. the defendant has expressed concerns as to how an ESO would affect his plans and he has minimal insight into his offending behaviours and associated risk factors. For instance, his post-release plans include university study in computer game development and, although he could identify this would involve participating in online gaming and chat rooms, he was unable to identify this as a potential risk factor;

48. on release from custody, the defendant would be supported by his parents and a community-based psychologist;

49. the defendant has been known to Community Corrections since 2016. On completion of his most recent supervision in 2020, the defendant was considered difficult to engage and communicate with, and as having shown little insight into the impact of his offending;

50. it is noted the defendant intends to continue to engage with his current community-based psychologist post-release, who he has worked with for several years. He appeared reluctant to be referred to the Community Sex Offender Programs and advised that he would only engage if required;

51. if subject to an ESO, the defendant would have weekly contact with his departmental supervising officer (“DSO”) in addition to receiving monthly unannounced home visits. The NSW Police Extended Supervision Order Investigations Team would also be involve in supervising his compliance with the conditions and monitoring his behaviour in the community by means of covert observation and face-to-face contact;

52. the defendant would be encouraged to engage with his community-based psychologist and will be referred to the Community Sex Offender Programs if additional intervention is required; and

53. if imposed, search conditions would enable the defendant’s electronic devices to be searched to monitor his compliance with internet access and non-association conditions and directions. Searches of his residence may occur to monitor for potential undeclared electronic devices, restricted material and weapons.

The results of any statistical testing or other assessments: s 9(3)(d)

47. Ms Ryan assessed the defendant utilising a number of different actuarial risk assessment tools.

48. In the RAR, the defendant was found to be within in the well above average range on the STATIC-99R. He had a high density of criminogenic needs on the STABLE-2007. Finally, a composite assessment of his risk/needs placed him in the well above average risk level.

49. Ms McCarthy noted in the RMR that the defendant was assessed on 16 October 2023 as being a medium risk for general re-offending on the Level of Service Inventory – Revised (LSI-R).

Any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community: s 9(3)(d1)

50. This is addressed in the RMR prepared by Ms McCarthy, which has been summarised above.

Treatment and rehabilitation programs / available courses: ss 9(3)(e) and 9(3)(e1)

51. The defendant participated in the High Intensity Sexual Offenders Program (“HISOP”) between 12 December 2022 and 26 February 2024 while at the Metropolitan Special Programs Centre. An interim HISOP Treatment Report dated 9 February 2024 and an addendum report dated 31 May 2024 described the defendant in quite a positive manner. He was observed as being attentive and engaged, while he also volunteered helpful suggestions, challenged unhelpful perspectives and asked considered questions. Throughout the program, he displayed a continuing understanding of the content.

52. Having said that, the defendant continued to justify some of his offending patterns and deviant interests during the HISOP. As noted previously, items of a sexual nature were found during searches of the defendant’s cell – this occurred whilst he was participating in the HISOP. The defendant noted some of that seized material was “for the purpose of future research and sexual gratification”.

53. The defendant has expressed an interest in continuing sex offending focussed intervention. As of December 2024, he was engaged with a community psychologist and continued to review the HISOP content. On 14 March 2024, he was placed on the Forensic Psychology Service Maintenance Waitlist, and, in May 2024, it was recommended that he be referred to the Treatment and Rehabilitation Clinic facilitated by NSW Community Forensic Mental Health Services and Forensic Psychology Services in the Community Maintenance Program when he is released from custody.

The likelihood that the offender will comply with the obligations of an ESO: s 9(3)(e2)

54. The plaintiff submitted that there is a real prospect that the defendant may not comply with the obligations of an ESO. However, in saying that, the plaintiff has acknowledged this factor ultimately operates neutrally between the parties and is more relevant to the issue of conditions, if applicable. The defendant has emphasised that the defendant will be living with his pro-social parents and will continue his course of therapy with the well-regarded psychologist, Graeme Randall. His clinical relationship with Dr Randall was established when the defendant was in custody and continues.

The level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an earlier ESO: s 9(3)(f)

55. The defendant has not been subject to an ESO before. However, he has breached his parole on previous occasions, which operates in favour of an order being made, as does the defendant’s record of breaching prison discipline.

The level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he is or has been subject under the child protection legislation: s 9(3)(g)

56. As noted above, the defendant has been convicted and sentenced in relation to breaches of his obligations under both the CPOR Act and the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW).

The offender’s criminal history and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history: s 9(3)(h)

57. I have addressed the defendant’s offending history earlier in these reasons: see “Background” above.

Views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed: s 9(3)(h1)

58. The plaintiff’s submissions and the Agreed Facts both referred to selected remarks of Haesler DCJ when he sentenced the defendant for the index offending.

59. The remarks of Conlon DCJ from sentence on 26 October 2012 were tendered as Tab 10 to Exhibit PM-1. While the plaintiff relied on these remarks, it was simultaneously acknowledged that they provided limited assistance to this Court given the paucity of material available from the time of that offending. The seriousness of the aggravated sexual assault is illustrated by his Honour’s following observation:

“… the offences committed against [the victim] on 14 December demonstrated the escalating nature of his offending. There was now some degree of planning as he had armed himself for the purpose. The knife was not only produced but placed against her throat. It appears the victim managed to calm the offender and he placed the knife in his pocket although he made sure the victim remained aware of its presence. She was detained for a prolonged period, and the offender placed his penis into her mouth on three separate occasions.”

Determination

60. I have reached the requisite state of satisfaction to make an ISO in accordance with s 10A of the Act. In particular, I am satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO (s 10A(b)) and that the defendant’s current custody will expire before the proceedings are finally determined (s 10A(a)).

61. It follows that an ISO should be made. The next question is how that order should be appropriately conditioned; an issue which remains in dispute between the parties.

Conditions of the ISO

62. The plaintiff has proposed conditions for the ISO, which are identified in the schedule to the summons. The defendant opposes some but not all the conditions.

63. In determining which conditions should be imposed, the necessary starting point is the Act itself. Section 11 enables the Court to impose such conditions as it considers appropriate when making an ISO.

64. To understand what an “appropriate” condition may be, it is convenient to consider the observations of Beech-Jones J (as his Honour then was) in State of New South Wales v Burns [2014] NSWSC 1014. There, his Honour said (at [59]):

“[i]n determining whether it is appropriate to include a particular condition, it is necessary to have regard to the fact that the effect of their inclusion is to expose the relevant offender … to criminal sanctions if they are breached. It follows that a proper basis needs to be demonstrated for including the conditions in the first place (see State of New South Wales v Ali [2010] NSWSC 1045 at [88] per Johnson J). Usually it will be necessary for such a condition to be related to the mitigation of the unacceptable risk that led to the formation of the conclusion of the relevant offender as a high risk sex offender.”

65. In State of N**ew South Wales v Wilkinson (Preliminary) [2020] NSWSC 1813, Hoeben CJ at CL (as his Honour then was) provided a short summary of the principles which need to be considered when imposing conditions (at [43]-[44]):

“[43] Section 11 of the Act allows the Court to impose such conditions under a supervision order as the Court considers appropriate. This power is constrained by the scope of the Act: *Winters v Attorney General of NSW [*2008] NSWCA 33 at [19]. Assistance can be drawn from the purpose and statutory objects of the Act. The primary object of the Act, as provided for in s 3(1) is to provide for the extended supervision of such offenders ‘so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community’. Subsection (2) provides that another object of the Act ‘is to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation’.

[44] Important principles to be considered in relation to the imposition of conditions are:

(i) having served a sentence of imprisonment for their offences, an offender has a right to personal liberty, however, this right is not absolute: State of New South Wales v Donovan at [83];

(ii) in imposing conditions, the Court needs to strike a balance between competing considerations: Attorney General for NSW v Tillman at [68];

(iii) a relevant consideration in imposing conditions is that a breach gives rise to a criminal penalty: State of New South Wales v Ley Thomas Baker (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 483 at [36];

(iv) conditions do not have to have a demonstrated link to past offending, but they should address the risk of future offending based on the scope, purpose and objects of the Act: Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28 at [53].

(v) conditions should not be designed toward future general criminal conduct, but instead focussed on mitigating the risk of a serious offence: State of New South Wales v Green (Final) [2013] NSWSC 1003 at [36]-[38].

(vi) conditions must not be unjustifiably onerous or punitive, “nor should they simply be an expression of State paternalism or imposed to meet what might be thought to be in the public interest in some generalised sense or because they might be a convenient or resource efficient means of the Department exercising supervision”: State of New South Wales v Bugmy [2017] NSWSC 855.

(vii) conditions “must be understood as having substantial work to do; a mere speculative possibility that it could be useful will not suffice”: State of New South Wales v Ley Thomas Baker (No 2) at [36].

(viii) to ensure a balance between the community interests and personal liberty, the Court should impose conditions that are the least intrusive possible (Lynn v State of New South Wales at [129]-[131][)].”

Appropriate conditions

66. The parties are in agreement as to the appropriateness of most conditions. I consider that the parties’ agreement is well founded and that all of the agreed conditions are, in fact, appropriate in all of the circumstances.

67. Of the small number of conditions which remain contested, I have determined that some are unnecessary and some are appropriate.

68. The conditions I am imposing will, of course, only bind the defendant until a decision is made in the final proceedings. The defendant is currently in custody and is due to be released on 24 April 2026. Sometime in the next few months there will be an opportunity to consider, first, whether or not to make an ESO and, second, if an order is made – which conditions should ultimately be imposed. The Court will undoubtedly be in a better position to assess the defendant at the time of the final hearing. Indeed, some of the conditions that are appropriate at this point in time may not be necessary or appropriate by the time of the final hearing.

69. What follows is my consideration and resolution of all the conditions proposed in the plaintiff’s schedule to the summons.

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

Conditions 1 to 8 inclusive

70. The defendant agrees with conditions 1 to 8. I find that those conditions are appropriate and they will be imposed in the schedule to this judgment (as conditions 1 to 8).

Part B: Accommodation

Conditions 9, 10 and 12

71. The defendant agrees with conditions 9, 10 and 12. As above, these conditions are also appropriate. They will be imposed in the schedule to this judgment as conditions 9, 10 and 12.

Condition 11

72. Condition 11, as proposed by the plaintiff initially, would allow a DSO to visit and enter the defendant’s address at essentially, any time.

73. The defendant argues that the proposed condition would impose significant and unwarranted intrusions on his own daily life and also his parents’ lives (with whom he will be living when he is released from custody). In contrast, the plaintiff supports the imposition of the condition by arguing that it facilitates thorough and necessary supervision of the defendant’s movements and enables a DSO to detect any potential breach of conditions related to the relevant risks.

74. More recently, both parties proposed variations to condition 11. First, the plaintiff advanced the following wording:

“You must allow a DSO to visit you at your approved address at any time and to enter the premises at that address where the DSO has reasonable grounds to believe that it is necessary in order to ensure compliance with the supervision order.”

75. Against that, the defendant proposed the following revised condition 11:

“You must allow a DSO to visit you at your approved address at any time and to enter the premises at that address, if the DSO has reasonable grounds to believe that you in breach of a condition of the supervision order.”

76. Both proposals incorporate a particular necessary belief on the part of a DSO before entry into the premises was permitted, addressing a concern I articulated at the hearing. The original version of this condition would have in effect allowed unimpeded entry whenever a DSO chose to check on the defendant’s presence and activities within the premises. That was a heavy-handed approach allowing for an inappropriate incursions into the residence of the family’s home.

77. Of the two current proposals, I prefer the plaintiff’s version. It is, in my view, sufficiently proportionate and conducive to ensuring the safety and protection of the community, which better aligns with the primary object of the Act. Entry can only take place if a DSO has reasonable grounds to believe that entry is necessary to ensure compliance with the ESO conditions. The plaintiff’s version will be imposed as condition 11, as set out in the schedule to this judgment.

Conditions 13 and 14

78. Conditions 13 and 14 were once contested but were agreed by the time of the hearing. The two conditions, as they were proposed by the plaintiff initially, provided that the defendant must notify a DSO of any visitor who enters and remains at his approved address, while it prohibited him from permitting any person to stay overnight, other than persons who ordinarily reside there (such as his parents), without prior approval from a DSO.

79. The defendant opposed the two conditions because they were said to be overly restrictive and unworkable. This was argued in the context of the defendant living with his two parents, where it was said he would have limited control over who may or may not attend the residence. The defendant also argued that, by virtue of living with his parents there was a sufficient safeguard about the risks attaching to visitors and rendered the protective nature of these conditions unnecessary.

80. In my view, real risks arise if people remain at the defendant’s residence, especially overnight, without a DSO knowing about their presence. The defendant’s parents may find it difficult to override his desire to have people stay overnight; he is, after all, a grown man with cognitive and personality traits which often leave him unmoved by arguments that call into question his own opinion. He also has the capacity to be irrational. As these conditions cannot bind his parents, he must take responsibility for who remains in the residence.

81. In any case, the plaintiff accepted that it would be appropriate to amend the two proposed conditions. Specifically, the plaintiff proposed that the defendant’s obligation to notify a DSO should only arise where a person under the age of 18 intends to visit the residence. That is a balanced approach, which is conducive to compliance, and it is certainly not overly restrictive.

82. Accordingly, I will impose the following two conditions (as per conditions 13 and 14 in the schedule to this judgment):

“[13] You must promptly notify a DSO of any visitor under the age of 18 who enters and remains in the residence for any period of time where you are also present in the residence.”

“[14] You must not permit any person under the age of 18 to stay overnight at your approved address (other than persons who ordinarily reside there) without the prior approval of a DSO, where you are also present in the residence.”

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

Condition 15

83. Condition 15 was at first contested but had also been resolved between the parties by the time of the hearing. Originally, it required the defendant to surrender any passport he held, while it prohibited him from possessing any passport or applying for a new one.

84. Quite appropriately, the plaintiff revised its position on condition 15 so that it would only apply to non-expired passports. That is more appropriate, and I intend to impose it as follows (see also condition 15 in the schedule to this judgment):

“You must surrender any non-expired passports held by you to the Commissioner, must not be in possession of any non-expired passports and must not attempt to apply for any passports.”

Conditions 16 and 17

85. The defendant agrees with conditions 16 and 17. They are both appropriate and will be imposed as conditions 16 and 17 as per the schedule to this judgment.

Condition 18

86. Condition 18 is still in dispute. In brief, the proposed condition prohibits the defendant from attending various designated places without the prior approval of a DSO. Such places include cinemas, libraries, camping grounds, amusement parks and a range of other locations.

87. The defendant seeks an amendment, or in essence a carve-out, to permit his attendance at various educational facilities without the prior approval of a DSO, so long as he is enrolled in a course at a university, TAFE campus or other recognised tertiary and veterinary educational facility. In fact, the defendant has already enquired about the feasibility of attending the University of Newcastle to study engineering or robotics.

88. The plaintiff is, for obvious reasons, against this variation. The plaintiff argued that such an amendment would facilitate the defendant’s contact with people aged under 18, especially teenage females who are most at risk in light of his past offending. Further, the plaintiff submitted there are real risks relating to the defendant’s access to and use of technology at these types of institutions – particularly where the courses themselves are directly related to technology and reliant upon its use. In reply, the defendant argued that other conditions will be imposed that will adequately guard against the defendant’s risk of inappropriately using technology.

89. There is an obvious desirability in allowing the defendant’s proposed amendment. It would be advantageous to the defendant if he could participate in tertiary education. Indeed, he is an intelligent young man who obtained his Higher School Certificate while in juvenile detention. I consider it likely that his eventual participation in some kind of academic pursuit would assist his rehabilitation.

90. However, presently there is not enough information before the Court about which course, or which institution, he might be able to attend. This, combined with the real risks posed by the defendant in the period immediately following his release from custody if the carve-out is allowed, gives rise to serious concerns.

91. In these circumstances, I regard it is currently inappropriate to make the alteration sought by the defendant. Condition 18 should be imposed as the plaintiff originally proposed (see condition 18 in the schedule to this judgment). I note that it is still open to the defendant to study at a university or TAFE, so long as he seeks and obtains permission from a DSO. It may well be that, by the time the Court comes to consider any final order, the defendant will be in a better position to provide the exact details of any course in which he wishes to enrol and the plaintiff will have been able to gauge the level of risk involved in the defendant’s attendance at the course.

Condition 19

92. The plaintiff has accepted the defendant’s proposed revision to condition 19, which prohibits him from attending any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material, or for providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment, or engage the services of a sex worker – without the prior approval of a DSO. The only change pressed by the defendant was to import the words, “or engage the services of a sex worker”. The condition as revised and agreed is appropriate (and it has been imposed as set out in condition 19 in the schedule to this judgment).

Part D: Employment, finance and education

Conditions 20 and 21

93. The defendant agrees with conditions 20 and 21. They are appropriate and should be imposed (see conditions 20 and 21 in the schedule to this judgment).

Condition 22

94. Condition 22 is still contested. As proposed, it provides that the defendant must share information relating to his financial affairs, including income and expenditure, if directed by a DSO.

95. The plaintiff argued that this condition supports the monitoring of any activity that could indicate an elevation of risks, such as the defendant’s expenditure on illicit drugs. It was also argued that the condition may assist in the defendant’s rehabilitation by assisting the DSO to encourage the defendant to develop sound budgeting and a stable approach to money. This was said to help the defendant avoid any failure to pay rent which would in turn put his accommodation at risk.

96. The defendant submitted that this condition does not align with the defendant’s risk profile and it is not appropriate. It was noted that Ms McCarthy did not identify this condition in her RMR dated 3 September 2025. In addition, the powers conferred on the DSO via condition 32, which will be imposed, were said to be sufficient. Condition 32 will allow the DSO to obtain a range of material such as aliases, electronic identities, login details, email addresses, telephone numbers, SIM cards, instant messaging services and passwords.

97. I agree with the defendant’s position. The condition proposed by the plaintiff is not appropriate. It is not sufficiently linked to the defendant’s risk profile. Further, I accept that condition 32 (condition 30 in the schedule to this judgment) provides the DSO with an appropriate and sufficient lens through which to monitor the defendant’s financial activity. It is difficult to envisage how the defendant could possibly transact online without being traced or detected. Proposed Condition 22 is not necessary or appropriate.

Part F: Non-association

Condition 23

98. Condition 23 remains contested. It provides that the defendant is not to associate with anyone who he knows or reasonably should know is under 18, other than via incidental contact in a public place or with the written permission of a DSO.

99. The defendant advanced a revised condition 23, consistent with his position with respect to condition 18 (that is, he be allowed to mix with others without the approval of a DSO if attending an educational campus where he is enrolled).

100. Ultimately, for the same reasons I expressed in relation to condition 18, I will not amend this condition 23 as sought by the defendant. The proposed condition advanced by the plaintiff is appropriate for the purposes of an ISO and should be imposed. This is condition 22 in the schedule to this judgment.

Conditions 24 to 28 inclusive

101. The defendant agrees with conditions 24 to 25 and 27 to 28. They are appropriate and are set out in the schedule to this judgment as conditions 23 to 26.

102. The originally proposed Condition 26 does not need to be imposed – it is encompassed by condition 19 already. In any case, it was opposed by the defendant but not pressed by the plaintiff.

Part H: Weapons

Conditions 29 and 30

103. The defendant agrees with conditions 29 and 30. They are appropriate and are set out in the schedule to this judgment as conditions 27 and 28.

Part I: Access to the internet and electronic communication

Conditions 31 to 38 inclusive

104. The defendant agrees with conditions 31 to 38. They are appropriate and are set out in the schedule to this judgment as conditions 29 to 36.

Part J: Search and seizure

Condition 39

105. Condition 39 is, as currently proposed, essentially an unbridled search and seizure condition. It remains contested. It originally proposed:

“You must submit to the search by a DSO (or any other person as directed by the DSO) of your person or residence, or any vehicle in which you are travelling or which is under your control, or any item, computer, electronic or communication device, storage facility, garage, locker or commercial facility in your possession or under your control; and to the seizure of any object located during the search.”

106. In my view, the defendant correctly argued that this proposal is effectively an unconstrained search power. The condition as proposed by the plaintiff is simply not appropriate. However, that is not to say that it cannot be amended. In fact, it is capable of amendment so as to render it “appropriate” by limiting its engagement to circumstances where a DSO believes on reasonable grounds that search is necessary to ensure that the ISO is being complied with.

107. In this context, I note Hamill J’s following remarks with respect to a condition of this kind in State of New South Wales v Steven Single [2019] NSWSC 176 (at [51]):

“I have concluded that the principle of legality does not operate to prohibit the imposition of conditions of the kind sought by the State. It will be a matter for Mr Single whether he is prepared to accept conditions which require him to consent to occasional searches of his person and home. Nevertheless, in exercising this power and in formulating the appropriate conditions, it is important to bear in mind the common law’s zealous protection of the citizenry against arbitrary search and seizure, the absence of any specific power under s 11, the kinds of limitations that exist in other statutory contexts including the Registration Act, and the practical impact of the imposition of such conditions or as Allsop CJ put it, ‘what is being done to people’.”

108. In State of New South Wales v Paton [2020] NSWSC 1707, Garling J also noted (at [49]):

“In assessing the respective arguments of the State and the defendant concerning the appropriate form of Condition 38, the protection afforded to individuals against arbitrary search and seizure by the common law is a significant consideration.”

109. As I see it, the real problem with the originally proposed search condition was that it would operate as a general power to search without any suspicion of potential breach. In my view, it is appropriate to frame the condition in the following way (consistent with how the plaintiff revised its position at hearing with respect to this condition; and as set out in the schedule to this judgment as condition 37):

“You must submit to the search by a DSO (or any other person as directed by the DSO) of your person or residence, or any vehicle in which you are travelling or which is under your control, or any item, computer, electronic or communication device, storage facility, garage, locker or commercial facility in your possession or under your control; and to the seizure of any object located during the search, provided the DSO has reasonable grounds to believe that the search is necessary in order to ensure compliance with the supervision order.”

Condition 40

110. The defendant agrees with condition 40. I also find that it is appropriate and it is set out as condition 38 in the schedule to this judgment.

Part K: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material

Condition 41

111. The defendant agrees with condition 41. I also find that it is appropriate and it is set out in the schedule to this judgment as condition 39.

Part L: Personal details and appearance

Conditions 42 to 44 inclusive

112. The defendant agrees with conditions 42 to 44. They are appropriate and are set out in the schedule to this judgment as conditions 40 to 42.

Condition 45

113. Condition 45 was initially contested but has since been agreed. It was originally proposed so that, if the defendant changed the details of any current form of identification or obtained further forms of identification, then he needed to provide a DSO with such details.

114. It was opposed by the defendant on the basis that it was restrictive and vague. In response, the plaintiff suggested a variation requiring the defendant to provide the DSO of any such details, but within 48 hours.

115. This added specificity ensures the condition is reasonable and appropriate. It is certainly no longer vague, nor particularly restrictive. The revised condition is set out as condition 43 in the schedule to this judgment.

Part M: Medical intervention and treatment

Conditions 46 and 47

116. The defendant agrees with conditions 46 and 47. They are appropriate and are set out in the schedule to this judgment as conditions 44 and 45.

Condition 48

117. Condition 48 was initially contested but has since been agreed. The condition, as proposed originally, required the defendant to allow his treatment and service providers, healthcare practitioners and DSO to share information amongst themselves about his progress, attendance and any information he told them.

118. The defendant submitted that the proposal is unnecessary and inappropriate. The plaintiff revised its position and suggested an amendment, which was ultimately accepted by the defendant. The wording is as follows, which I find is appropriate and should be imposed (see also condition 46 in the schedule to this judgment):

“You must agree to your treatment and service providers and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on your progress and attendance, and information you have told them, with each other and with a DSO provided the treatment is reasonably capable of being related to the risk of committing a serious offence.”

Condition 49

119. The defendant agrees with condition 49. I also find that it is appropriate and it is set out in the schedule to this judgment as condition 47.

Condition 50

120. Condition 50 was originally contested but has since been agreed. It required the defendant to disclose his criminal history to any healthcare professional treating him.

121. The parties have both agreed that the condition should be amended in a similar fashion to condition 48 (being condition 46 in the schedule to this judgment) – that is, limiting the requirement to only where the treatment is reasonably capable of being related to the commission of a serious offence. I find this to be appropriate, and it is set out as condition 48 in the schedule to this judgment.

Orders

122. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

123. Under s 7(4) of the Act:

(a) I appoint two qualified psychiatrists and/or two registered psychologists (or a combination of such persons) to conduct separate examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and (b) I direct the defendant to attend those examinations.

2. Under s 10A of the Act, the defendant be subject to an ISO commencing on 24 April 2026 for a period of 28 days.
3. Under s 11 of the Act, I direct that the defendant, for the period of the ISO, comply with the conditions specified in the schedule to this judgment.
4. I order that access to the Supreme Court file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application of access.

schedule of conditions

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

(1) You must accept the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.

(2) Where a direction maybe given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service.

(3) You must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising you, about:

(a) where you are or have been;

(b) where you are going;

(c) who you are with or have been with;

(d) what you are doing or have been doing; and

(e) the nature of your associations.

(4) You must agree to any information relating to your risk, supervision or rehabilitation being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

(5) You must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with or remove the equipment.

(6) If directed, you must provide a schedule of movements.

(7) If you want to change anything in your schedule of movements once it is approved by a DSO, you must seek approval from a DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless a DSO approves a shorter period.

(8) You must not deviate from your schedule of movements except in an emergency.

Part B: Accommodation

(9) You must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change your approved address or living arrangements.

(10) You must be at your approved address between 9pm and 6am unless other arrangements are approved by a DSO.

(11) You must allow a DSO to visit you at your approved address at any time and to enter the premises at that address where the DSO has reasonable grounds to believe that it is necessary in order to ensure compliance with the supervision order.

(12) You must not spend the night anywhere other than your approved address or any other alternative approved addresses without the approval of a DSO.

(13) You must promptly notify a DSO of any visitor under the age of 18 who enters and remains in the residence for any period of time where you are also present in the residence.

(14) You must not permit any person under the age of 18 to stay overnight at your approved address (other than persons who ordinarily reside there) without the prior approval of a DSO, where you are also present in the residence.

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

(15) You must surrender any non-expired passports held by you to the Commissioner, must not be in possession of any non-expired passports and must not attempt to apply for any passports.

(16) You must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner.

(17) You must not go to any place specified by a DSO.

(18) Without limiting condition 17 above, you must not go to any of the following places without the prior approval of a DSO:

(a) Day-care centres, pre-schools and schools;

(b) Amusement parlours, amusement parks and theme parks;

(c) Cinemas;

(d) Libraries and museums;

(e) Camping grounds and caravan parks;

(f) Children’s playgrounds, parks, and areas with play equipment provided for the use of children;

(g) Pools, playing fields and sporting facilities;

(h) Activities intended for the entertainment of children;

(i) Residences where you know that persons aged under 18 years ordinarily reside; and

(j) Internet cafes or other places which provide public access to devices connected to the internet either for payment or for no charge (other than employment agencies).

(19) You must not attend any place used solely or mainly for the sale or display of sexually explicit material, or for providing sexual services or sexually explicit entertainment, or engage the services of a sex worker without the prior approval of a DSO.

Part D: Employment, finance and education

(20) You must take all reasonable steps to participate in programs as recommended by a DSO, including the development of a case management plan which may include employment, education, training or participation in personal development activities.

(21) You must not start or change any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of a DSO.

(22) You must not associate with anyone who you know or reasonably should know is under 18, other than:

(a) incidental contact in a public place in the course of the duties of the minor; or

(b) with the written permission of a DSO and in accordance with any requirements reasonably determined by a DSO.

(23) You must not associate with any person specified by a DSO.

(24) Without limiting condition 23, you must not associate with any person:

(a) who you know is consuming or is under the influence of alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO;

(b) who you know is consuming or is under the influence of illegal drugs; or

(c) held in custody without prior approval of a DSO.

(25) You must agree to a DSO disclosing your criminal history to another person. Before any disclosure is made, you will first be given the opportunity to make the disclosure yourself within a timeframe as identified by a DSO.

(26) You must obtain written approval from a DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation.

Part H: Weapons

(27) You must not possess or use any of the following:

(a) a firearm, firearm part of ammunition within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996; or

(b) a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998.

(28) Without limiting or altering condition 27, you must not possess or use any of the following, without a DSO’s prior approval:

(a) a knife, machete, sword or any other device that consists of a single-edged or multi-edged blade or spike that is designed or adapted to inflict violence, whether actual or threatened;

(b) any other implement made or adapted for use for causing injury to a person; or

(c) anything intended, by the person having custody of the thing, to be used to injure or menace a person or damage property.

NOTE: Condition 28 does not apply to knives for ordinary domestic use.

Part I: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

(29) You must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about the use of electronic devices and access to the internet.

(30) You must disclose the following information to a DSO if directed:

(a) Aliases, electronic identities and other log-in names;

(b) Email addresses;

(c) Telephone numbers;

(d) SIM cards;

(e) Applications used (including any social networking service);

(f) Online gaming services;

(g) Instant messaging services;

(h) Service provider account numbers; and

(i) All passwords and log-in details.

(31) You must not use any of the following unless approved by a DSO:

(a) Social networking applications or services (including dating services or applications);

(b) Encrypted messaging applications or services;

(c) Online gaming applications or services;

(d) Instant messaging applications or services.

(32) You must give a DSO a list of the electronic devices you use to communicate with or access the internet. This includes computers, phones, tablet devices, data storage devices and gaming devices. You must advise a DSO of any change to the list immediately.

(33) You must only use an electronic device to access the internet after the device has been disclosed to a DSO and the device has been seen and approved for use by a DSO.

(34) You must provide consent for a DSO (or any other person requested by a DSO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by you, including any internet service provider account, email accounts and social media accounts, in monitoring compliance with this Order.

(35) You must not delete or alter any of the following from your electronic devices without prior approval of a DSO:

(a) Applications;

(b) Emails;

(c) Text messages;

(d) Electronic messages;

(e) Call history;

(f) Files or documents;

(g) Photographs, images and videos; or

(h) Internet or application usage and search history.

(36) You must provide consent for your telephone provider and internet service provider to share information about your accounts with a DSO.

Part J: Search and seizure

(37) You must submit to the search by a DSO (or any other person as directed by the DSO) of your person or residence, or any vehicle in which you are travelling or which is under your control, or any item, computer, electronic or communication device, storage facility, garage, locker or commercial facility in your possession or under your control; and to the seizure of any object located during the search, provided the DSO has reasonable grounds to believe that the search is necessary in order to ensure compliance with the supervision order.

(38) You must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to this Order.

Part K: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material

(39) You must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified as Refused Classification, X18+ Restricted, Category 1 Restricted and Category 2 Restricted as defined under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth), or any other material as directed by a DSO with respect to concerns related to risk of committing a serious offence.

Part L: Personal details and appearance

(40) You must not change your name from Jack McCall or use any other name without notifying a DSO.

(41) You must not significantly change your appearance without the approval of a DSO.

(42) You must let a DSO photograph you, dressed, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant change to your appearance.

(43) If you change the details of any current form of identification or obtain further forms of identification, you must provide a DSO with such details within 48 hours.

Part M: Medical intervention and treatment

(44) You must undergo ongoing psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) as directed by a DSO, including any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction.

(45) If directed, you must undergo an assessment for the purposes of a Mental Health Care Plan or Community Treatment Order.

(46) You must agree to your treatment and service providers and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on your progress and attendance, and information you have told them, with each other and with a DSO provided the treatment is reasonably capable of being related to the risk of committing a serious offence.

(47) You must agree to any information obtained under condition 46 being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

(48) You must agree to the disclosure of your criminal history to any healthcare professionals that are treating you provided the treatment is reasonably capable of being related to the risk of committing a serious offence.

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Endnote

Attorney General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119 at [5]; Kamm v State of New South Wales (No 4) (2017) 95 NSWLR 179; [2017] NSWCA 189 at [147].