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Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 93Z(1), 93ZA(1), 547E
Criminal Code (Cth), ss 80.H(1), 474.45C(1)
Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW), s 10(1)
Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW), ss 4, 10, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29

Cases Cited: New South Wales v White (Final) [2018] NSWSC 1943
State of New South Wales v Dunn (a pseudonym) [2018] NSWSC 1008
State of New South Wales v Naaman (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 328; (2018) 276 A Crim R 30
Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28

Category: Procedural rulings

Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Matthew White (Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
M England SC and C Egan (Plaintiff)
S Fraser SC and S Hedberg (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors’ Office (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid NSW

File Number(s): 2026/311839

Publication restriction: Nil

EX Tempore JUDGMENT

1. HER HONOUR: By summons filed 28 July 2026, the State of New South Wales (the State) seeks an extended supervision order (ESO) for a period of three years against Matthew White (the defendant) under ss 25(1)(a) and 26(6) of the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) (the Act).

2. The defendant is currently in lawful custody subject to a term of imprisonment which is due to expire on 27 October 2026. The defendant’s non-parole period expired on 27 May 2026.

3. At this preliminary stage, the State seeks that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order (ISO) pursuant to ss 27, 28(1) and 29(1) of the Act for a period of 28 days, commencing on 27 October 2026, and that the defendant be directed to comply with the conditions of supervision set out in the Schedule to the Summons. The State also seeks two qualified psychiatrists and/or registered psychologists (or any combination of two such persons) to be appointed to examine the defendant and prepare reports, and that the defendant be directed to attend those examinations under s 24(5) of the Act.

4. For the reasons I will now give, I am satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation, if proved, would justify the making of an extension order and so will make the orders sought in relation to the appointment of two experts to assess the defendant’s potential risk. I will also impose an ISO but, as set out below, I have declined to impose a number of the conditions that the State seeks in relation to that ISO.

Evidence

5. The State relies on:

(a) the affidavit of Penelope Smith affirmed on 27 July 2026 and Exhibit PS-1 to that affidavit; (b) the affidavit of Detective Senior Constable Elise Chalmers affirmed on 3 August 2026 and Exhibit EC-1 to that affidavit; and (c) the second affidavit of Penelope Smith affirmed on 14 August 2026 and annexures A to D to that affidavit.

Index Offences

6. On 19 December 2025, the defendant was sentenced in the District Court of NSW at Orange in respect of the following offences:

| Offence | Seq | Sentence | | Commonwealth Offences | | Use carriage service – possess etc violent extremist material, contrary to s 474.45C(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) | 6 | Aggregate term of imprisonment of 18 months to commence on 28 April 2025 and expiring on 27 October 2026 with a non-parole period of 13 months | | Cause prohibited Nazi symbol to be displayed in public place, contrary to s 80.H(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) | 9 | | New South Wales Offences | | Knowingly display by public act Nazi symbol without excuse, contrary to s 93ZA(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) | 1 | Aggregate term of imprisonment of 11 months to commence on 28 January 2025 and expiring on 27 December 2025 with a non-parole period of 8 months | | Publicly threaten etc violence on grounds of race, contrary to s 93Z(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) | 15 | | Possess prohibited drug, contrary to s 10(1) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) | 4 | Section 10A – no penalty imposed | | Person possess bestiality material, contrary to s 547E(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) | 8 | Taken into account on a Form 1 | | Person disseminates bestiality material, contrary to s 537E(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) | 10 | Community Corrections Order for a period of 3 years to commence on 19 December 2025 and expiring on 18 December 2028 |

7. The index offending occurred between 17 December 2023 and 17 June 2024 and relates to content either posted by the defendant on the Telegram application or otherwise in his possession, including statements made by the defendant advocating support for terrorism or violent extremism**.**

Commonwealth Offences

8. Between 1 April 2024 and 17 April 2024, the defendant spray painted the “Hakenkreuz symbol” on various properties around Orange. An iPhone 15 belonging to the defendant was seized and contained two video files and one PDF file.

9. The first video file, titled “Europa.mp4, was downloaded from the Telegram application (Europa video). The video is a montage of multiple videos depicting people of colour committing violence against Caucasian people, animated images vilifying black and Jewish people and excerpts of speeches delivered at various far-right wing rallies, with overlap of antisemitic text.

10. The second video file, title “B.Tarrant.mov” depicts the Christchurch shooting in 2019 from the point of view of the shooter Brenton Tarrant (the Tarrant video).

11. The PDF file, titled “The Great Replacement.pdf”, is a manifesto authored by Brenton Tarrant and published at the time of the Christchurch shooting (the Tarrant manifesto). The document includes encouragement of murdering political and other public figures perceived to be “Anti-White” and tactics of inciting conflict against immigrants and Muslims.

NSW Offences

12. On 5 May 2024, the defendant posted a photograph onto a Telegram channel online discussion group named “Ministerium” which had 20 members. The photograph depicted a red Nazi flag spread on top of a bed with a book, “Mein Kampf” by Adolf Hitler, laid on the flag. The book had the words “Matt White SS” [resembling two lightning bolt symbols] handwritten on the cover. The centre of the flag displayed the Hakenkreuz symbol and handwritten words and phrases such as “88”, “14” and “Heil Victory.”

13. On 6 June 2024, the defendant posted a 50-second voice recording on a publicly accessible Telegram group (of which he was the administrator), in which he publicly incited and promoted violence against persons of Jewish faith as follows:

“Haha, mad its recording. Cool. Everybody who listens to this, like, guess what? It’s a calling today. You know, you gotta go out and do something. I mean proactive. In some little way, shape or form. If you don’t you’re a fucking traitor to your own people. Ball’s in your court. You’se can do whatever the fuck you want. Legal. Illegal. Fuck. Like at the end of the day you should be running over Jews am I right. Shit did I hit the break, I mean accelerator instead of the break. What a poor mistake I just ran over a family of five. Come on Jews aren’t people, man. I know it doesn’t really matter. But unfortunately, they don’t say it like that. And its illegal. Cool. I’ll promote as much violence against them people as absolutely possible. But if you’re an act, I can’t support or encourage you like I wish you the best. And I hope to take out as many as possible. Heil. Victory! Ridicule.”

14. On 17 June 2024, during the search of the defendant’s premises, a small clear resealable bag containing 0.34 grams of cocaine was located in his bedroom.

15. During a review of the defendant’s phone, a video file titled “Dog.mp4” was located, which depicted a woman having anal intercourse with a dog. There were multiple copies of the video stored on the phone. Between 2 April 2024 and 26 May 2024, the defendant sent the video by email to five unknown recipients.

Relevant criminal history

16. In 2007, the defendant was first convicted of possessing an unregistered and unauthorised firearm and ammunition offences, for which he received fines. The defendant was subsequently convicted of drug related and further firearms offences, which were dealt with by way of fines and community service orders.

17. On 5 September 2016, the defendant received his first custodial sentence of 12 months (wholly suspended) for offences including possessing a shortened firearm without authority, not keeping a firearm safely, possessing ammunition without licence and possessing a prohibited drug. In May 2020, he was convicted of possessing prohibited drugs, possessing, supplying or making explosives for unlawful purposes, numerous ammunition offences, a police pursuit and driving while disqualified offences. He was sentenced to community correction orders and a 12-month intensive correction order.

18. On 24 March 2021, the defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 2 years with a non-parole period of 22 months (varied on appeal to 18 months) for possessing a shortened firearm while subject to a prohibition order, ammunition offences, drug possession and deemed supply of a prohibited drug. The offending occurred while the defendant was subject to the intensive correction order noted above. During a search of the defendant’s premises, police located four railway signal detonators and several rounds of firearm ammunition.

19. On 8 February 2023, the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months with a non-parole period of 6 months for three counts of supplying prohibited drugs on an ongoing basis. He was released to parole on 7 August 2023.

Section 20 of the Act

20. Section 20 of the Act provides:

20 Supreme Court may make extended supervision orders against eligible offenders if unacceptable risk

The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of an eligible offender (called an extended supervision order) if—

(a) the offender is in custody or under supervision (or was in custody or under supervision at the time the original application for the offender was filed) –

(i) while serving a sentence if imprisonment for a NSW indictable offence, or

(ii) under an existing interim supervision order, extended supervision order, interim detention order or continuing detention order, and

(iii) (Repealed)

(iv) (Repealed)

(b) an application for the order is made in accordance with this Part, and

(c) the Supreme Court is satisfied that the offender is any of the following—

(i) a convicted NSW terrorist offender,

(ii) a convicted NSW underlying terrorism offender,

(iii) a convicted NSW terrorism activity offender, and

(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under supervision under the order.

21. In terms of the four preconditions contained in s 20 of the Act, I observe as follows. It is common ground that the precondition in s 20(a) is met, as the defendant is currently in custody.

22. In terms of s 20(b), it is common ground between the parties that the State’s application for the orders is made in accordance with the relevant Part of the Act.

23. In terms of the precondition in s 20(c), it is common ground, and I am satisfied, that the defendant is a “convicted NSW terrorism activity offender” as defined by s 10 of the Act.

24. The next precondition arises under s 20(d) of the Act, which provides that I must be satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under supervision under the relevant order. At the preliminary hearing, the question is whether the Court is satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation could, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order.

25. The question of whether the defendant poses an “unacceptable risk” is an evaluative determination. Guidance as to the application of the test in s 20(d) is found in the Court of Appeal decision of State of New South Wales v Naaman (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 328; (2018) 276 A Crim R 30, at [29]:

“(1) First, and no differently from par (c), this precondition to the power to make an extended supervision order turns upon the Supreme Court being of the requisite state of satisfaction.

(2) Secondly, par (d) of s 20, unlike pars (a), (b) and (c), is forward-looking. It asks not whether the State has demonstrated that a person answers certain descriptions because of what has happened in the past; rather, it (alone of the prerequisites to the availability of the power to make an extended supervision order) requires an inquiry to be made of the inherently uncertain future as to whether something will occur.

(3) Thirdly, par (d) requires the Court to be satisfied to a ‘high degree of probability’ of future events. Those qualifying words perform at least two functions. They confirm that the issue posed by the statute is not resolved by mere speculation. They also displace the ordinary position in civil litigation for findings of fact. (Section 50(1) provides that proceedings under the Act, including an appeal, are civil proceedings and are to be conducted in accordance with the law, including the rules of evidence, relating to civil proceedings.) The ordinary civil standard of proof, reinforced by s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), is replaced by the need for the Court’s state of satisfaction to be ‘to a high degree of probability’.

(4) Fourthly, that forward-looking evaluation turns upon the premise that the eligible offender is ‘not kept under supervision under the order’ which the State is seeking. On that premise, the Court is then required to determine the ‘risk of committing a serious terrorism offence’. It will be relevant to the assessment of that risk to consider both the likelihood of the offence being committed, and the relative seriousness of the offending conduct.

(5) Fifthly, the Court is then to determine whether that risk is or is not ‘unacceptable’. It is entirely possible that the Court might be very comfortably satisfied (i.e. to the requisite high degree of probability) that there is a slim probability of an unsupervised offender committing a terrorist act, and that that risk is unacceptable having regard to the consequences of the act, even if the probability of the risk eventuating is less than 50%. That result would readily be reached absent s 21, but that section makes the position clear beyond argument. That said, what is or is not ‘unacceptable’ is not otherwise defined in the Act.

(6) Sixthly, if so satisfied, then the discretion under s 20 is engaged. For example, if the Court were satisfied to a high degree of probability that an offender posed an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under supervision, but were also satisfied that there would be substantially the same risk, or indeed a greater risk, if the offender were kept under supervision, that might ground an exercise of discretion to decline to make an order.”

26. I am not required to determine that the risk of committing a serious terrorism offence is “more likely than not”: s 21 of the Act. Rather, at this preliminary hearing, the question is whether the Court is satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order. The present application concerns the making of interim orders only. It has been noted that the test for making interim orders involves a lower standard than would apply when considering the making of final: Naaman (No 2) and State of New South Wales v Dunn (a pseudonym) [2018] NSWSC 1008.

27. The requisite unacceptable risk must be an unacceptable risk of committing a “serious terrorism offence”. As defined, a “serious terrorism offence” is an offence against Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code, for which the maximum penalty is 7 years’ imprisonment or more: s 4(1) of the Act. Such offences include engaging in a terrorist act; doing acts in preparation for or planning a terrorist act; membership of a terrorist organisation; recruiting for a terrorist organisation; getting funds to, from or for a terrorist organisation; and providing support to a terrorist organisation.

28. Counsel for the defendant accepted that it was open for the Court to be satisfied that the relevant test in s 20(d) is met but properly indicated that the Court should reach its own independent state of satisfaction in that respect. The defendant contended that, in the event I was satisfied of the need to make such orders, the conditions to which the ISO is subject should be narrowed.

29. I have independently satisfied myself to the requisite standard that the criteria in s 20(d) is made out. I will now summarise my reasons for reaching that state of satisfaction with reference to the matters set out in s 25(3) (in addition to the “paramount consideration” of the safety of the community, pursuant to s 25(2)).

Section 25(3)(b)

30. I here consider “the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist, registered medical practitioner or other relevant expert as to the likelihood of the offender committing a serious terrorism offence”: s 25(3)(b).

31. At the request of the State, the defendant participated in an assessment conducted by Katrina Czerkies, forensic psychologist. Ms Czerkies interviewed the defendant on 25 and 29 May 2026 for a total of four hours. Ms Czerkies’ Risk Assessment Report dated 8 June 2026, details the defendant’s background which includes a diagnosis in high school of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder which appeared to have resulted in the defendant experiencing disrupted schooling and associated behavioural issues. There is also an account of the defendant’s drug history which is said to have commenced in his early teens, with cannabis, amphetamines and methamphetamines identified as the most problematic drugs. The defendant’s criminal history was considered, including his attitude to the index offending and Ms Czerkies noted at [101] that:

“Mr White’s attitude towards his index offending remains mixed. Whilst he remains committed to his beliefs (e.g., ‘my personal opinion’), he does appear to be demonstrating an improved insight into the precepting [sic: precipitating] factors. This is evidenced by his willingness to explore factors that may have been present around the time of or that may have contributed to the index offending (e.g., substance use may have impacted on his thoughts and feelings; he was ‘caught up in things online’ and ‘letting off hot air’; ‘If I worded things differently, should have stopped to think about things...how I worded it was incorrect’.”

32. It is accepted by the defendant that while that opinion acknowledges some improvement in the defendant’s beliefs and attitudes and level of insight into his offending, he continues to harbour beliefs which may point to ongoing risk. It is also accepted that Ms Czerkies noted particular statements of the defendant said to be his current beliefs in relation to violence and terrorism generally and which the defendant accepts would weigh in favour of the granting of the interim relief sought.

33. In her Risk Assessment Report, Ms Czerkies relevantly included the following other opinions:

“[116] Mr White was referred to custody based psychology services in 2022 and 2025. He declined contact with psychology services in 2022, and it is noted that in 2025 contact was ‘attempted three times, at which there were lock downs in the centre with the comments stating, “to be seen as access, resources and priorities allow”‘.

…

[173] Mr White has therefore been assessed as likely requiring continuous monitoring and risk management.

…

[177] Mr White has demonstrated his capacity to engage in terrorism related offending. This is evidenced by the index offences.

[178] Numerous vulnerability factors are identified. They are currently present for him and as such may continue to contribute to his susceptibility to engage in further terrorism offending; particularly if left untreated or unmanaged. These vulnerability factors include: early developmental difficulties (e.g., neurodiversity); exposure to adverse childhood experiences (e.g., parental separation; attempted sexual abuse); social and behavioural challenges (e.g., difficulties fitting in, ‘constantly getting into trouble’); interest in military history and access to weapons; poor academic attainment (e.g., due to expulsion) and occupational thwarting (e.g., unable to join the military due to a permanent disability he acquired during an accident); negative peer associations and influences; long-term polysubstance abuse; the presence of psychopathology; and a history of involvement in the criminal justice system.

[179] A number of intersecting criminogenic and offence-specific risk factors are observed to have been present in the immediacy of and during his index offending. They remain untreated and unmanaged.

…

[190] Mr White recently received convictions for state and commonwealth based terrorism related offending. He has not engaged in any non-criminogenic or criminogenic services or programs and has not been afforded the opportunity to engage with offence-specific interventions. This means that his identified vulnerability, criminogenic and offence specific risk factors remain salient.”

…

[240] Mr White’s risk of engaging in terrorism related offending or a serious terrorism offence will likely increase upon his return to the community and particularly if he does not engage or have the opportunity to participate in non-criminogenic and criminogenic services and programs as well as offence-specific interventions and if he is afforded the opportunity to engage with the combined multidisciplinary and multiagency enforcement and case management provided by HRTOU and THROU.”

34. Ms Czerkies subsequently readministered the assessment tool in light of supplementary briefing material, and concluded that the defendant’s risk of committing a serious terrorism offence was “moderate-high”. She also expressed the view that, if the defendant were to be released from custody and not subject to an ESO, “the likelihood of some of the formulated risk scenarios may become more increasingly imminent”.

35. Ms Czerkies considered that multidisciplinary and multi-agency intervention would be most appropriate to assist in mitigating any risks that the defendant poses regarding serious terrorism offending.

Section 25(3)(c)

36. Here I consider “the results of any assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a serious terrorism offence”: s 25(3)(c).

37. Professor Julian Droogan is a professor of terrorism studies at Macquarie University. He provided a report dated 3 June 2026, in relation to various groups and ideologies. He was of the opinion that the material he was briefed with suggested that the defendant’s statements and use of images seemed to convey “support for serious terrorism and violent extremism” and were consistent with the “ideation and violent intent of the profiles of far-right terrorists”. He opined as follows:

“1341. The materials provided across both briefs contain extensive links to several of the groups and ideologies listed at items 1(i) to 1(xxvi), and collectively constitute a body of evidence that, in my expert opinion, indicates and conveys active support for serious terrorism and violent extremism.

…

1355. Having regard to the assumptions provided and the material contained in the brief, it is my opinion that the statements made by Mr White, and his use of images and symbols, convey support for serious terrorism and violent extremism against out groups, and are directly and extensively associated with far-right and Neo-Nazi individuals and ideologies that support and promote terrorism and violent extremism.

1356. Mr White’s statements (including explicit incitement to murder Jewish people, people of colour, and LGBT individuals) reflect expressions of intent to commit mass casualty attacks. There are repeated examples of Holocaust glorification and the use of hateful Neo-Nazi slogans including ‘Heil Hitler’, ‘Heil Victory’, and the Fourteen Words. I do not believe these are likely to be expressions of abstract political opinion. They are consistent with the ideation and violent intent of the profiles of far-right terrorists, including the perpetrators of the Christchurch, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and Halle attacks.”

Section 25(3)(d)

38. I here consider “any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW or the NSW Police Force as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community”: s 25(3)(d).

39. A report dated 15 June 2026 was prepared by the High Risk Terrorist Offenders Unit - New South Wales Police (HRTOU). As with Professor Droogan’s report, that occurred without the defendant being personally interviewed.

40. The report by the HRTOU outlines the conditions proposed to be included in the event an ISO/ESO is made, including the suggested justification for them and how they will be administered, monitored and enforced. I have reviewed and taken into account that report.

41. A Reintegration Management Report dated 18 June 2026 has been prepared by Corrective Services NSW. That report notes the defendant as having had mixed behaviour in custody albeit with few misconduct charges and no instances of being placed in segregation or subject to other behaviour restrictions. His behaviour was noted as having stabilised following a move to Junee Correctional Centre. It was noted that the defendant had not completed any offence specific interventions but that he had been referred to Countering Violent Extremism services and engaged appropriately with the referral process. I have also reviewed and taken that report into account.

Section 25(3)(f)

42. I here consider “any treatment or rehabilitation programs and other programs or initiatives in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs or initiatives, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such programs or initiatives”: s 25(3)(f).

43. The defendant accepts that he has not had access to offence-specific treatment in custody, but submits that the fact that he has engaged in other programs previously, is suggestive of a future willingness and capacity to engage in programs offered to him.

44. However, I observe that, as the State has pointed out, the defendant has an extensive history of poly-substance abuse, including abuse of alcohol, amphetamines, methamphetamines, benzodiazepines, cannabis, ecstasy and cocaine. There is also evidence in the material before me supporting a conclusion that the defendant started drinking alcohol from the age of about 13 or 14, started taking cannabis from about the age of 16 and started taking amphetamines and methamphetamines from the age of 17. The State submits that not only is there a long history of poly-substance abuse, but that it remains untreated. Further, it is submitted that the poly-substance abuse is correlated with the offending and I was taken to material in the reports supporting this conclusion.

Section 25(3)(h)

45. I here consider “the likelihood that the offender will comply with the obligations of an extended supervision order”: s 25(3)(h).

46. It is submitted on behalf of the defendant that his history demonstrates a generally positive response to supervision with the community and the support of his family, including by stable accommodation, suggesting that he is likely to comply with the conditions of an ICO/ESO if granted. I am unable to draw a conclusion about the exact likelihood of this occurring, but accept at this stage that he is a person who has the capacity to comply if he puts his mind to it.

Section 25(3)(j)

47. I here consider the defendant’s “criminal history… and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history”: s 25(3)(j).

48. The defendant accepts that his criminal offending commenced when he was 20 years old and that his offending primarily involves drug matters, driving matters, and firearm offences. He submits that he does not have a history of violent offending. However, he accepts that there are a number of offences relating to illegal possession of firearms which his counsel accepts is “troubling”. However, it is submitted there is no suggestion that the possession of those firearms is related to his support of far-right extremist ideology.

49. I accept the submission of the State that an assessment of the seriousness of the harm, should the risk manifest, should have regard to the fact that the defendant’s criminal record includes firearm offences over a period of 13 years up to 2020 (which includes unauthorised possession of explosives and the unauthorised possession of firearms and ammunition). The State also points to the fact that the defendant has a driving record that indicates drink-driving, a police pursuit and driving dangerously, each of which it submits is relevant to the seriousness of the potential harm, where the index offending includes an active incitement to “run over Jews”.

Section 25(3)(k)

50. I here consider “the views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed” on the defendant: s 25(3)(k).

51. The sentencing Judge, Musgrave DCJ, made the following findings:

52. The possession of violent extremist material offence fell below the midrange, noting the number and nature of the videos. While noting that, “deterring and punishing those who provide an audience and implicitly support [sic] for serious violence by accessing material of this nature”, the sentencing Judge also noted that it is “not said it was difficult to obtain; it was not concealed or hard to find and was held on his personal phone”.

53. In relation to the display Nazi symbol offence, the sentencing Judge found that the seriousness of the offence was in the symbol displayed, namely a swastika (Hakenkreuz). Her Honour noted that these were, “placed on walls where they could be seen by others and some were prominent, being on commercial premises”. She found the display of these symbols would have caused harm to the owners of those businesses. She found that this offending, whilst crude and unsophisticated, was nevertheless deliberate and intended to attract attention. Her Honour found it fell within the midrange of objective seriousness.

54. In relation to the display of a Nazi symbol, it was noted that the offending involved a single image posted to an online group of 20 like-minded people. Her Honour noted that the “post was not seen by persons who could be offended by it” nor was it “posted to a group whose views might change”. Nevertheless, her Honour found that the “fact that the material was shared amongst potentially likeminded people serve[d] to perpetuate and entrench harmful and antisocial viewpoints and attitudes”. Her Honour also noted that the defendant had created a new image rather than distributing an existing image.

55. In relation to the publicly threaten or incite violence offence, her Honour noted that the recording to which this offence related was “relatively short and was unsophisticated” but noted that the gravamen of the offence is its nature”. The recording called for “significant harm to a specific group of people” and “referred to running them over and comments to the effect that Jews are not people”. Her Honour found that while “unsophisticated it is the publication of unequivocal support and incitement of violence and falls in the midrange”.

56. In respect of the defendant’s views, the sentencing Judge noted that:

57. He “has an affiliation with neo-Nazi ideology, is antisemitic and racist to minority groups. He endorses acts of terrorism describing it as a tool that worked”.

58. He was assessed by psychologist, Ahu Kocak, who described his “white supremacist and neo-Nazi views as ‘entrenched’” and noted his antisemitic views are “strongly held”.

59. In relation to the count of publicly threaten or incite violence (being his voice recording), that recording was relatively short and was unsophisticated, but the gravamen of the offence is its nature. It called for significant harm to a specific group: Jewish people. It referred to running them over and comments to the effect that Jews are not people.

60. The defendant had limited insight, “continued to excuse his behaviour” and his remorse was limited to the “consequences felt by himself and his father due to him being incarcerated”.

61. Ms Kocak identified his risk factors as “resumption of substance use, re-emersion in online extremism ecosystems without monitoring, deterioration of his focus on caring for his father, a salient triggering event that he sees as confirming his worldview, and the future convergence of intoxication, grievance escalation and easy access to weapons”.

Conclusions in relation to s 20(d)

53. At this preliminary hearing, the Court must consider whether the matters alleged in the supporting documentation, if proved, would justify the making of an extended supervision order. The Court is not required to find that the matters alleged have been proved. I have reached the requisite state of satisfaction and, thus, I will make the orders sought in relation to the appointment of two experts to assess the defendant’s potential risk.

54. Further, it is accepted that the matter cannot proceed to final hearing before the expiry of the defendant’s sentence. Accordingly, the defendant does not oppose the making of an ISO as sought by the State. However, the issue is the scope of the conditions imposed as part of that order. In taking that approach, I expressly record that the concession the defendant has made is limited to this preliminary hearing and is not taken to be any type of agreement as to the assessment of any unacceptable risk in any final hearing, or as to the appropriateness of making an extended supervision order at such final hearing.

Proposed conditions

Principles relevant to the imposition of conditions

55. Section 29(1) of the Act empowers the Court to direct that the defendant complies with such conditions as part of an ISO as it considers appropriate, including but not limited to, those directions listed in subs (a) to (t). In addition, section 29(1A) mandates that the conditions specified in subs (a) to (r) of that subsection must be included “[u]nless the Supreme Court orders differently”.

56. I gratefully adopt a summary by N Adams J of the considerations relevant to imposing conditions under s 29 of the Act, in *New South Wales v Whit**e (*Final) [2018] NSWSC 1943 at [165]-[168]:

“[165] Section 29 of the THRO Act provides that I may direct the defendant to comply with such conditions as I consider appropriate some of which are set out under in s 29(1). The conditions that I impose must be specifically designed to address issues relevant to the currently identified risk factors in relation to the commission of a serious terrorism offence, rather than general offending. Moreover, such conditions cannot be unjustifiably onerous or simply punitive. I have had regard to the relevant legal principles extracted at [37]-[46] of Wilde v State of NSW [2015] NSWCA 28 in this respect.

[166] In imposing supervision conditions, the Court must be mindful that it is an offence to breach a condition of an ISO. Accordingly, the State must demonstrate that there is a proper basis for the making of the conditions in the first place. It is also important that the conditions are in clear terms so that the defendant knows what he must do and what he must refrain from doing.

[167] As Beech-Jones J observed in State of New South Wales v Burns [2014] NSWSC 1014 at [59]: ‘[u]sually it will be necessary for such a condition to be related to the mitigation of the unacceptable risk that led to the formation of the conclusion of the relevant offender is a high-risk … offender.’

[168] Senior counsel for the defendant relied upon the observations of Wilson J in State of New South Wales v Sines (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 985 at [47] where her Honour observed:

‘The imposition of particular conditions, and the assessment of the duration of the order, must be determined in light of the general principle that the defendant’s liberty should be constrained to no greater extent that is warranted, having regard to the purposes of the act of the evidence of his personal circumstances.’

57. A large number of the conditions are not in dispute, and I do not address those in my reasons. I only addressed the matters that were the subject of contest in submissions before me this morning.

Condition 14

58. Proposed condition 14 is a curfew condition in the following terms:

The defendant must be at their approved address between 10.00pm to 6.00am unless other arrangements are approved by an Enforcement Officer.

59. The State submits that this condition complements the schedule of movements, electronic monitoring and travel restrictions which will be mandated by various conditions that are not in dispute. It submits that a curfew ensures that any risk-indicating behaviours are confined to daytime activities, unless approved. The State in this respect points to Exhibit 3, an email whereby police have instructed that there was an instance where the defendant graffitied a Swastika, as evidenced in a video taken at 5.07am on 1 March 2024. The State also points to online activities in terms of the defendant posting relevant material online in the early hours of the morning. The State also submits that because the curfew starts at 10pm at night, there is room for “a fair bit of socialising”. I was taken to various material in the reports dealing with the defendant’s longstanding poly-substance abuse issues and views of experts that the defendant’s risk in relation to the relevant offences increases with drug use.

60. Senior Counsel for the defendant submits that while, as a general matter, it may be accepted that a person may use the “cover of night” to seek to engage in relevant offending, that this condition is not appropriate. I accept that submission for the following reasons.

61. As Senior Counsel for the defendant submitted, a key risk appearing from the materials appears to be communication and interaction with online far-right communities, being something that would happen presumably at any hour of the night or day and would be likely to be happening from home. As such, a curfew does not relevantly ameliorate that risk.

62. Also, as the defendant points out, there are a suite of other conditions designed to ameliorate this type of risk, including condition 1 which imposes a broad obligation to provide a schedule of movements whereby the defendant must indicate all of his movements in advance to the enforcement officer. Condition 10 is also pointed to as the defendant will be the subject of electronic monitoring night and day. The effect of the schedule of movements and the electronic monitoring is that the enforcement officer will effectively know where the defendant is at all times.

63. There are also conditions 3 and 4. In summary, the effect of conditions 3 and 4, taken together, include that the defendant must have his mobile phone with him at all times, he must answer a call from an enforcement officer as soon as is reasonably practicable and so on, including that he must truthfully answer, as part of any such call, questions about who he is with and where he is and so on.

64. I take into account that the conditions I impose should not be unjustifiably onerous and I have regard to the relevant principles as set out in the decision of N Adams J in White, by reference to the decision of Wilde v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 28. Further, I have regard to the fact that it is an offence to breach a condition of an ISO. I also take into account, as Senior Counsel for the defendant has pointed out, that one of the risk factors identified in respect of the defendant is social isolation. In the circumstances where there are other conditions ameliorating the relevant risk, a condition which increases his social isolation ought to be avoided at this stage. Therefore, I do not impose condition 14.

Condition 15

65. Condition 15 is in the following terms:

The defendant must not permit any person to enter and remain, or to stay overnight, at their approved address, without the prior approval of an Enforcement Officer. If another person that the defendant is approved to reside with permits a third party, who does not reside at the address to stay overnight as soon as the defendant becomes aware of such third party’s presence in the home he must notify an Enforcement Officer.

66. The State points to the fact that a Mr Cockerill lived with the defendant in 2010 to 2011 and that prison calls up to November 2025 between the defendant and Mr Cockerill show that they remain close. There is also a reference to a Mr Eltis. Both of those persons are said to be people the defendant has been associated with who have similar ideology.

67. The State accepts that conditions 47 and 48 ameliorate the relevant risk in this respect, because condition 47 gives, in short, an enforcement officer a power to specify any person, persons or groups or organisations that the defendant must not contact or attempt to communicate with or otherwise associate with or affiliate with by any means. Further, condition 48 imposes a positive obligation on the defendant to inform an enforcement officer of the identity of any person with whom he does or is likely to regularly associate. Senior Counsel for the State submits that while conditions 47 and 48 go some way to ameliorating the risk, in the absence of condition 15 there would still be a “gap” (in the sense that the defendant could start associating with someone and there would be a delay via the positive obligation to notify that person under condition 48).

68. The defendant submits that condition 15 is not appropriate in the circumstances. I accept that submission for the following reasons.

69. The defendant is proposed to reside with his father at the approved address. Condition 15 as proposed has a number of difficulties. I accept the submission on behalf of the defendant that the scope of the condition is uncertain or, at the very least, becomes difficult to enforce, noting that breach of an ISO is a criminal offence. I refer in this sense to the principle that it is important that conditions are in clear terms so that the defendant knows what he must do and what he must refrain from doing. For example, condition 15 would involve uncertainty as to whether it is the defendant or his father who is the person “permitting” a person to stay overnight at the premises such that the obligation to notify the enforcement officer is engaged. There is also the ambiguity where a person enters and remains at his father’s house (i.e., is that happening under the permission of the defendant or his father).

70. Senior Counsel for the defendant submits that the situation must be workable in practice, including that maintaining the defendant’s relationship with his father at a stable address is also a matter relevant to addressing risk. In my view, the uncertainty as to the scope of operation of condition 15, the burden that it would place on the defendant’s father, and also the strain that it might pose on the defendant’s relationship with his father mean that condition 15 is not appropriate at this stage.

71. I also accept the submission that if, as appears to be the case, the real concern of the State is that certain known persons who are former associates of the defendant not be permitted to enter or stay overnight at the house, those persons can be the subject of, for example, a specification by the enforcement officer under condition 47 that the defendant not contact, associate or affiliate with those persons. While it is a matter for the enforcement officer, the defendant’s Senior Counsel submitted that he would expect that Mr Eltis and Mr Cockerill would presumably be on any “banned list” that would be the subject of a specification under condition 47.

72. The defendant also points to condition 3 which requires the defendant to answer truthfully any questions from an enforcement officer as to who he is currently with or who he was with in circumstances where he must have a mobile phone on him and answer that in reasonable circumstances and so on. Thus, I do not impose condition 15.

Condition 25

73. Condition 25 is in the following terms:

The defendant must not possess or consume alcohol without the approval of an Enforcement Officer.

74. The State points to the fact that the defendant was the subject of infringement while in prison in relation to brewing alcohol. I do not place much weight on that. The State also refers to various statements in the material of the defendant accepting that he does “dumb shit” when affected by alcohol, and also to the material that he has been using alcohol from a young age. The State also points to the view of Ms Kocak in relation to the risk presented by a combination of use of alcohol and the defendant’s sense of grievance. Mr Fraser on behalf of the defendant, refers to the fact that the material supports a view that poly-substance drug abuse is a primary risk driver for the defendant, not alcohol, and also points to the fact that there will be conditions allowing drug testing to monitor compliance with that condition.

75. In reply, Senior Counsel for the State points to the fact that in the decision of Wilde it is stated that it is not necessary to demonstrate a link to past offending but the relevant question is forward looking in terms of the relevant risk of committing a serious terrorism offence: Wilde at [52]-[54].

76. I accept that it is appropriate to impose condition 25. In short terms, while I accept that the material supports the view that a greater risk arises from poly-substance drug abuse, there is material before me substantiating a risk in relation to alcohol. I also take into account the fact that the use of alcohol may be a gateway towards the use of drugs that then increases the risk of offending. Therefore, I will make condition 25.

Condition 26

77. Condition 26 is in the following terms:

The defendant must not enter any licensed premises without the approval of an Enforcement Officer, except licensed restaurants and cafes.

78. The State pressed condition 26 in what was said to be the “same basis” as condition 25. It is submitted that condition 25 is not a “bar on socialising” because the defendant can attain approval of an enforcement officer to attend the relevant licensed premises.

79. I accept the submission of Senior Counsel for the defendant that it is not appropriate to impose condition 26.

80. Condition 26 is different in its effect to condition 25. In circumstances where condition 25 will be imposed, the defendant will not be able to drink. However, the absence of condition 26 will mean he can still attend licenced premises, noting that social isolation of the defendant has been identified as a risk factor.

81. I also accept the submission of Senior Counsel for the about the potential ambiguity about the scope of the condition in the sense of what is a “licensed premises” (examples were given in terms of football stadiums, the Opera House and the Hordern Pavilion and so on).

82. I also accept the submission that a suite of other conditions that will be imposed will relevantly address the risk, for example powers to conduct drug and alcohol testing, the schedule of movements condition, the electronic monitoring condition and so one. These would allow, for example, the enforcement officers to test the defendant in real time to check compliance with the alcohol condition. Thus, I do not impose condition 26.

Condition 27

83. Condition 27 is in the following terms:

The defendant must not contact, attempt to communicate with, or otherwise associate or affiliate with people who the defendant knows, or reasonably ought to know or suspect are consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol unless an Enforcement Officer approves the defendant to do so.

84. In response to a question from the Court as to whether or not there is any evidence that the defendant has engaged in previous offending in effect “in company”, I was taken to a couple of evidentiary references in the material. Both of these references involved the defendant with Mr Cockerill, however, it is not a natural inference from those materials that he was actually doing drugs with Mr Cockerill.

85. I accept the submission that there is a potential for ambiguity in terms of the way that condition 27 is framed. For example, it requires the defendant to form a view about what it means for someone to be “under the influence”. As Senior Counsel for the defendant points out, “under the influence” is inherently ambiguous and is not by reference to any measurable criteria. There is also ambiguity in terms of what the defendant “ought reasonably to know” about whether other people are consuming drugs or alcohol or are under the influence and so on.

86. In circumstances where it is an offence to breach a condition of an ISO, I do not accept that it is appropriate to make a condition in these terms. I could not be satisfied that the condition is in clear enough terms so that the defendant would know what he must do and what he must refrain from doing.

87. I also accept the submission that the relevant risk is of the defendant consuming illegal drugs or alcohol have both been addressed by the other conditions that will be imposed (noting that there are separate conditions for the monitoring of his compliance with drug and alcohol abstinence).

88. Thus, I do not impose condition 27.

Condition 41

89. Finally, in respect of condition 41, only subsection (i) is in issue, which relevantly provides:

41. The defendant must not access or use, or cause another person to access or use on the defendant’s behalf, any of the following items, unless approved by their Enforcement Officer:

…

(i) any websites, applications or computer programs other than those specified as approved by their Enforcement Officer.

90. There was some discussion between the bench and Senior Counsel about how condition 41(i) might be framed. Senior Counsel for the State framed it in terms of the practical “onus”, that is, whether the condition should be in the form —

91. as proposed by the State, which is in effect that all websites, applications and computer programs are prohibited unless they have been explicitly allowed by the enforcement officer; or alternatively

92. in the reverse form, whereby all such websites, applications or computer programs are allowed, unless they have been specifically specified by the enforcement officer to the defendant as being prohibited.

93. It is plain on the material before me that a significant part of the index offending of the defendant relates to use of the internet and electronic devices.

94. I also note expert opinion in relation to the fact that the risk of the defendant in relation to relevant offending will increase with his “re-emersion in an online extremist ecosystem”. There is also the fact that the defendant has in effect been limited in his ability to communicate with that ecosystem while he has been in custody.

95. The defendant has made some indication to Corrective Services that he plans to “avoid online forums”. While that may be the case, there is no doubt that there is a long history of him engaging in these types of forums in relation to relevant offending.

96. Given the suite of other conditions that will be imposed on the defendant, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to impose the condition 41(i) in the terms as sought by the State.

97. I accept the submission on behalf of the defendant that other conditions will relevantly address this risk, noting that they give enforcement officers extremely broad powers. For example, the defendant is limited to only having a single/identified phone and condition 42 requires him to notify the enforcement officer if his device has changed. Under condition 44, there is a broad power requiring the defendant to consent to the enforcement officer or other relevant person “remotely” inspecting all his electronic devices.

98. I also note condition 45, which compels the defendant to provide any details in relation to the long list of phones and electronic devices and laptops and so on, including usernames, passwords, pincodes and passcodes as directed by the enforcement officer.

99. I also note condition 21, which gives broad powers to an enforcement officer to require the defendant to submit to search and seizure of any items in their possession, which includes relevantly the electronic devices and so on.

100. I accept the submission of Senior Counsel for the defendant, that the combination of these broad types of powers conferred under other conditions allows the extensive monitoring of the defendant’s use of websites, applications and computer programs. I also note in this respect that condition 41(d) separately prohibits in effect all chat groups and section 41(h), separately prohibits all social media accounts and social networking accounts, unless expressly approved by an enforcement officer.

101. Thus, I decline to make condition 41(i) in the form as sought by the State. Rather, condition 41 will finish at 41(h) and there will be a new 41(A), which will be in the terms that the defendant proffered, namely the defendant must not access or use or cause another person to access or use on the defendant’s behalf any website applications or computer programs that have been specified by the enforcement officer as prohibited.

Orders

100. For the reasons given above, I make the following orders:

101. An order pursuant to s 24(5) of the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) (THRO Act):

(a) appointing two qualified psychiatrists and/or registered psychologists (or any combination of two such persons) to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations (as the case may be) of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; (b) directing the defendant to attend those examinations.

2. An order pursuant to ss 27 and 28(1) of the THRO Act, that the defendant is subject to an Interim Supervision Order (ISO) commencing on 27 October 2026 (being the date of the expiry of his current sentence of imprisonment) for a period of 28 days thereafter, expiring on 24 November 2026.
3. An order pursuant to s 29(1) of the THRO Act, directing that the defendant comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule attached to this Judgment (Schedule A) for the duration of the ISO.
4. An order restricting access to the Court’s file in this proceeding such that access will be permitted to a non-party only with the leave of a Judge of the Court, and with prior notice to the parties so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in respect of the application for access.

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Schedule A - Conditions of Supervision (403 KB, pdf)