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[2026] NSWSC 147
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-03-04
Ierace J
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: State of New South Wales v Lunn-Reid (Final) [2026] NSWSC 147
Hearing dates: 03 February 2026
Decision date: 04 March 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Ierace J
Decision: (1) Pursuant to ss 5C and 17(1)(b) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant be the subject of a continuing detention order for a period of 2 years to date from 4 March 2026;
(2) Pursuant to s 20(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the Court to issue a warrant for the committal of the defendant to a correctional centre for a period of 2 years; and
(3) Access to the Supreme Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a Judge of the Court, and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.
Catchwords: HIGH RISK OFFENDER – final hearing – application for continuing detention order (“CDO”) – where the defendant does not oppose the making of a CDO – whether the appropriate period for a CDO is 1 year or 2 years – where the defendant committed offences whilst subject to an interim supervision order – evidence from forensic psychiatrist and neuropsychologist – consideration of Clozapine – mental health diagnoses and use of prohibited drugs – whether 1 year is sufficient to prepare the offender for transition back into the community
Legislation Cited: Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), ss 3, 4, 5A, 5C, 5C(d), 5D, 17(1)(b), 17(2), 17(4), 17(4)(b), 17(4)(c), 17(4)(d), 17(4)(d1), 17(4)(e1), 20(1)
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), Pt 3 Div 10
Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW), s 19
Cases Cited: Lunn-Reid v R [2018] NSWCCA 110
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Jesse John Lunn-Reid (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
K Ng (Plaintiff)
J Wilcox (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2025/176147
HIS HONOUR: By an amended summons filed in court on 28 August 2025, the plaintiff, the State of New South Wales, seeks final relief against the defendant, Jesse Lunn-Reid, under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act) by way of a continuing detention order (CDO) for 2 years or, alternatively, an extended supervision order (ESO) for a period of 5 years. The defendant does not oppose the making of a CDO but submits that the appropriate period to be specified in the order is 1 year rather than 2 years.
On 13 October 2025, Wright J made interim orders to the effect that the defendant be made the subject of an interim supervision order (ISO) commencing on 19 November 2025, for a period of 28 days. At the time of that order, the defendant was on parole which was set to expire on 19 November 2025. His parole was revoked on 22 October 2025. On 18 November 2025, Sweeney J made orders refusing an application by the plaintiff for an interim detention order (IDO), with the effect that the orders made by Wright J continued to operate. The defendant was released from prison on 19 November 2025 and resided at a Community Offender Support Program Centre (COSP). On 5 December 2025, he was arrested and charged with counts of assault and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He was refused bail and remains on remand pending the hearing of those charges which is listed for 10 March 2026.
The defendant is aged 36. The parties have submitted a statement of agreed facts which includes a summary of the defendant’s background, which I summarise, supplemented with some facts taken from the primary judgment in Lunn-Reid v R [2018] NSWCCA 110, the defendant’s bail history and his Corrective Services record.
The defendant has reported that there was a high level of conflict within his parents' relationship and that his father was frequently violent towards his mother. His parents separated when he was 13 years old. He relocated often to live with various family members. His schooling was disrupted, including by being suspended in high school for fighting. He left school at the end of Year 8. He reported being employed as a concreter until he was injured in a motor vehicle accident in 2011. He has a child, presently in their teens, with the victim of the index offence.
On 28 May 2009, when he was aged 18, the defendant assaulted his partner, who I will refer to as AB, while they were in a vehicle by punching her in the face numerous times, dragging her by the hair, threatening to stab and kill her, grabbing her throat and squeezing it, putting scissors to her cheek and pushing her against the dashboard of the car. He asked for her phone and then drove over it twice and punched her again after they returned home. He pleaded guilty to five counts of common assault in a domestic violence context (assault (dv)), assault occasioning actual bodily harm and stalk/intimidate. He received suspended sentences and bonds, the longest being for a period of 18 months.
On 24 October 2011, the defendant broke into the home of a friend to whom, in the months prior, he had threatened harm, accusing him of providing information to the Police. The defendant and another male entered the victim’s home by ripping open the screen door. In the presence of the victim’s partner, the defendant hit the victim with a timber axe handle causing multiple fractures to the side of his face, eye socket and nose that required corrective surgery, and resulted in the loss of his sight in one eye.
The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of recklessly causing grievous bodily harm in company (the October 2011 offences). On 7 August 2013, he was sentenced in the District Court to 5 years’ imprisonment to commence on 24 March 2012 and to expire on 23 March 2017, with a non-parole period of 2 years to expire on 23 March 2014.
On 8 November 2011, that is, about two weeks after the October 2011 offences, on the same day that he absconded from a mental health facility where he was involuntarily receiving treatment for Schizophrenia and psychotic symptoms, the defendant and his biological father (the co-accused) attended premises where the ex-partner of the defendant’s mother (the victim) was located. The defendant’s father hit the victim on his head with a glass bottle and stabbed him in his shoulder and torso. The defendant used a wooden paling from a fence to hit the victim, causing it to split. He then used a sharp point of it to injure the victim in his groin. The victim spent eleven days in hospital. The defendant was motivated by a belief that the victim had sexually assaulted him as a child and told police that he had “got a bit of justice, I have sorted the problem out”.
The defendant pleaded guilty to recklessly causing grievous bodily harm in company (the November 2011 offence). On 25 March 2014 he was sentenced in the District Court to imprisonment for 4 years 3 months to commence on 24 December 2013 and expire on 23 March 2018, with a non-parole period of 2 years to expire on 23 December 2015. [1]
The defendant and AB were in a relationship from about 2008 until 2013. AB gave birth to their child in January 2011. In January 2013, AB told the defendant that she wished to end their relationship, which he did not accept. At the time of the conversation, the defendant was on bail in relation to the November 2011 offence and on week-end leave from a drug residential rehabilitation facility. It is unclear whether his bail was in respect of the October 2011 offences, but it would appear to be so.
Over the following month the defendant made phone calls to AB and her younger sister, some of which were threatening, and in others he questioned AB about whether she was in a sexual relationship with a person (XY) who they both knew.
On the evening of 13 February 2013, XY stayed at AB’s home overnight. The following day, the defendant entered AB’s house and said to her, “You haven’t been fucking him, hey?” and proceeded to stab her repeatedly to her head, face and throat. She fell to the ground and rolled over and felt another blow to her upper back area. AB suffered at least one defensive wound to her arm.
AB’s sister, who was present, saw the defendant standing over AB and swinging a knife whilst AB had her hands up to protect herself. AB’s sister placed herself between the defendant and the victim and yelled at him. The defendant swung the knife at her, causing a laceration to her face.
AB ran out of the house pursued by the defendant. She reached a shop where men were present. One of them asked the defendant to drop the knife. He eventually did so, told the victim he loved her and ran away.
The defendant pleaded guilty to a count of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. On 18 August 2016, he received an aggregate sentence of 8 years 4 months imprisonment commencing on 17 June 2017 and expiring on 16 October 2025, with a non-parole period of 5 years 8 months commencing on 17 June 2017 and expiring on 16 February 2023.
The sentencing judge, McLoughlin DCJ, was satisfied that the defendant was partially psychotic at the time of the offence, consequent to him having ceased taking medication, ingesting a substantial amount of alcohol and drugs (including methamphetamine) over the preceding three weeks and the effect of seeing XY’s car at the home. His Honour noted that, consequently, general and specific deterrence carried less weight in the sentencing exercise.
Following a successful appeal against his sentence, the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the sentence and resentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment of 8 years 4 months and 21 days to commence on 14 July 2017 and expire on 16 October 2025, with a non-parole period of 4 years 11 months and 9 days to commence on 17 June 2017 and expire on 25 May 2022.
On 8 January 2015 and 8 March 2015, the defendant wrote letters to AB in contravention of the conditions of an apprehended violence order (an AVO). He was fined $200 in the Port Macquarie Local Court for each count.
On 10 April 2015, while in custody, an inmate punched a convicted sex offender of some notoriety Bilal Skaf, causing Skaf to fall to the ground, seemingly unconscious. The defendant then spat on the victim and kicked him with full force to the face several times. Another inmate jumped on the victim’s head several times with his full weight before the victim was dragged to custodial staff who were told by the defendant and the other inmate to “get him the fuck out of here”.
The defendant was sentenced in the Goulburn Local Court for assault occasioning actual bodily harm to imprisonment for 18 months, with a non-parole period of 1 year, and for affray to 20 months, with a non-parole period of 16 months. These sentences were confirmed by the District Court following a severity appeal.
Between 12 and 14 September 2015, the defendant again wrote letters to AB in contravention of the AVO. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months, commencing on 24 August 2016 and expiring on 23 February 2017. I note that both sets of AVO offences were committed while the defendant was serving the non-parole period of his sentence for the November 2011 offence.
On 5 October 2022, having been in prison continuously since 14 February 2013, the defendant was released to parole on his sentence for the index offence. Six weeks later, on 20 November 2022, while on a train with a cousin, he punched another passenger to the back of the head and tried to drag him up some stairs. The victim tackled the defendant and they both fell down the stairs. The defendant then slammed him into the seat and told him to “get another seat”.
The defendant and his cousin moved to another carriage where the defendant punched another passenger, knocking out two of his front teeth. This victim blacked out momentarily. When a police officer approached and informed him that he was under arrest, the defendant drew back his arm and adopted a fighting stance.
The defendant was returned to custody the following day and ultimately pleaded guilty to two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, common assault and assault police officer in execution of duty. He was sentenced in the District Court to an aggregate term of imprisonment for 2 years 6 months commencing on 20 May 2023 and expiring on 19 November 2025, with a non-parole period of 1 year 6 months expiring on 19 November 2024. He was released to parole on 21 November 2024.
In 2022, while in custody, the defendant completed the Violent Offender’s Therapeutic Program (VOTP). He was observed by facilitators to be task-oriented but relatively externally motivated, for example, by wishing to complete the VOTP so that he could be eligible for parole rather than for intrinsic benefit such as genuinely changing his behaviour. He impressed as personable in his interactions with VOTP psychology staff and consistently engaged appropriately in therapeutic community activities. He was assigned the role as a sweeper and carried out his duties without issue. He was observed to have the capacity to modify his behaviour throughout treatment, but any positive changes tended to be transient and often dissipated when he experienced negative emotions.
In 2019 he completed the EQUIPS (Foundations and Addictions) program. He was described as being intermittently engaged with the program material and “seemingly lacking a motivation for change, ultimately affecting his responsivity to the program”. He was described as “initially lacking insight into his risk and protective factors” but “eventually able to identify them over time”.
The defendant has been under psychiatric care sporadically since the age of 15. He was diagnosed as having a drug induced psychosis when he was an adolescent. He has subsequently been diagnosed with paranoid Schizophrenia and a substance abuse disorder. Treating psychiatrists have considered that he could possibly meet the criteria for Borderline and Antisocial Personality Disorder, as well as more recently, a Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
He has a history of inconsistent adherence to antipsychotic medication since the onset of his Schizophrenia. Some treating psychiatrists have noted that substance use aggravates his paranoid Schizophrenia.
The defendant’s most recent admission to psychiatric care occurred after he was released to parole on 21 November 2024. Although he was initially adapting to being released into the community, on 9 March 2025 the defendant was admitted to Port Macquarie Base Hospital. A drug test was administered and returned a positive result for methylamphetamine. In a breach of parole report dated 11 March 2025, it was noted that he had stated to mental health professionals at this facility that he had been using illicit substances regularly and would cease in the days prior to his parole appointments to ensure negative oral drug wipes.
At the time of that admission, the defendant was homeless after his tenancy was terminated, purportedly due to anti-social behaviour by him, including walking around with large sticks and banging them on random objects and doors. The defendant disputes this.
The defendant remained under psychiatric care at Port Macquarie Base Hospital until his parole was revoked on 19 March 2025. This came after three breach of parole reports prepared by Community Corrections which recommended that his parole be revoked, due to his return to illicit substance use in breach of his parole order, resistance to the administration of medication, threatened violence towards mental health staff (on one occasion physically assaulting a nurse) and threats to harm or kill them.
On 26 June 2025, the Mental Health Review Tribunal (the MHRT) imposed a Forensic Community Treatment Order (FCTO) on the defendant, which requires him to accept the treatment and/or medication as prescribed and/or varied by the treating psychiatrist or delegate. The order expires on 25 June 2026.
On 29 July 2025, the State Parole Authority determined to rescind the revocation of the defendant’s parole and ordered his release, which occurred. On 29 September 2025, the defendant underwent routine weekly drug testing as required under the conditions of his statutory parole order, which returned a positive result for methamphetamine and cocaine.
After spending periods of time living with his mother and cousin, on 9 October 2025, he stated that he could no longer reside with his mother. On 16 October 2025, the defendant’s mother reported to a Community Corrections officer that the defendant’s mental health had declined rapidly since the week before and that he had not been sleeping, had been pacing the house, hearing voices and been paranoid towards herself.
Due to concerns regarding the defendant’s mental state, on 17 October 2025, the defendant was involuntarily admitted under s 19 of the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) to Kempsey Hospital. Later that day he was transferred to the Coffs Harbour Acute Mental Health Unit.
The defendant remained under psychiatric care at the Coffs Harbour Acute Mental Health Unit until his parole was revoked on 22 October 2025. During his admission there, it was reported that he made repeated and explicit threats to harm and kill clinical staff, police and members of the public. He also reportedly asked for personal details from staff concerning their background, their families, where they live and their last names, and attempted to get staff alone, for example by stating that only one particular staff member could come into the seclusion room with him. His parole was revoked due to him posing a serious and immediate risk to the safety of the community.
As noted, the defendant was released from custody on the expiration of his sentence on 19 November 2025 and he took up residence at the Nunyara COSP.
On 5 December 2025, the defendant was arrested and charged with a count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and subsequently a count of assault law officer (not police officer).
In respect of the first sequence, it is alleged that, on the morning of 5 December 2025, the defendant was outside the Emergency Department of Prince of Wales Hospital smoking a cigarette. He saw the complainant, who was another resident at the Nunyara COSP who also happened to be at the hospital. The defendant allegedly used a closed fist to punch the complainant in the mouth, causing a minor cut to his upper lip. When the complainant attempted to walk away, the defendant continued to approach him and allegedly punched him another eleven times to the head and struck him in the abdomen twice with his knee.
As to the second sequence, it is alleged that the defendant assaulted a Corrective Services officer at the Surry Hills Corrective Complex after the officer informed the defendant that he would be strip searched and removed police handcuffs from the defendant.
On 18 December 2025, the defendant entered pleas of not guilty to these charges. The matters are listed for hearing on 10 March 2026 at Waverley Local Court.
“5C Making of continuing detention orders—unacceptable risk
The Supreme Court may make an order for the continued detention of a person (a ‘continuing detention order’) if—
(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and
(b) the person is a detained offender or supervised offender (within the meaning of section 13B), and
(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 13B, and
(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the person poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept in detention under the order.”
The term “serious offence” is defined in s 4 of the Act to mean a serious sex offence or a serious violence offence. The former is defined to mean an offence under Div 10 of Pt 3 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) where the offence is punishable by imprisonment for 7 years or more and, if committed against an adult, is in circumstances of aggravation, as defined in the relevant statutory provision.
A serious violence offence is defined in s 5A of the Act as follows.
“5A Definition of ‘serious violence offence’
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a ‘serious violence offence’ is a serious indictable offence that is constituted by a person—
(a) engaging in conduct that causes the death of another person or grievous bodily harm to another person, with the intention of causing, or while being reckless as to causing, the death of another person or grievous or actual bodily harm to another person, or
(a1) an offence under the Crimes Act 1900, section 37(1) or (2), or
(b) attempting to commit, or conspiring with or inciting another person to commit, an offence of a kind referred to in paragraph (a) or (a1).
(2) An offence that includes the elements referred to in subsection (1) (a) is a serious violence offence regardless of how those elements are expressed, and whether or not the offence includes other elements.
(2A) A reference in subsection (1) (a) to—
(a) conduct that causes the death of another person with the intention of causing the death of another person includes a reference to murder by an act done (by a person or an accomplice) in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission of, a serious crime, and
(b) conduct that causes the death of another person while being reckless as to causing the death of another person includes a reference to manslaughter caused by an unlawful and dangerous act, and
(c) conduct that causes grievous bodily harm to another person includes conduct that causes the wounding of another person, but only if the conduct was engaged in with the intention of causing the death of another person or grievous bodily harm to another person.”
The index offence, which involved the defendant inflicting grievous bodily harm on the victim with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, satisfied s 5A(2A)(c) of the Act. The defendant concedes that the statutory prerequisites for the hearing of the application have been satisfied, and I am independently so satisfied. As noted, the defendant does not oppose the making of a CDO and therefore accepts that the Court would be satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept in detention under the order: s 5C(d) of the Act.
That issue falls to be determined independently be me and, if am so satisfied, the length of the CDO, noting that the defendant submits that the appropriate period is to be 1 year rather than the period sought by the plaintiff of 2 years. Section 5D of the Act provides that the Court is not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not, in order to determine that there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.
Section 17(2) of the Act provides that in determining whether to make a CDO, the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration, which is consistent with the “primary object” of the Act, outlined in s 3(1), being the “safety and protection of the community”. A secondary object of the Act is to encourage offenders who come within the Act to undertake rehabilitation: s 3(2). The Court is not to consider the ability to take action for a breach of the order in relation to whether there is an unacceptable risk of the offender committing further serious offences: s 17(5) of the Act.
Section 17(4) of the Act obliges the Court, in determining whether to make a CDO, to have regard to the matters that are therein set out:
“17 Determination of application for continuing detention order
…
(4) In determining whether or not to make a continuing detention order or extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must also have regard to the following matters in addition to any other matter it considers relevant—
(a) (Repealed)
(b) the reports received from the persons appointed under section 15 (4) to conduct examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such examination,
(c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such assessment,
(d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further serious offence,
(d1) any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community,
(e) any treatment or rehabilitation programs in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such programs,
(e1) if the offender is kept in custody or is in the community (whether or not under supervision)—any options available that might reduce the likelihood of the offender re-offending over time,
(e2) whether it is satisfied that the offender is likely to comply with the obligations of an extended supervision order,
(f) without limiting paragraph (e2), the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an interim supervision order or an extended supervision order,
(g) the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004,
(h) the offender’s criminal history (including prior convictions and findings of guilt in respect of offences committed in New South Wales or elsewhere), and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history,
(h1) the views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the offender,
(i) any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will commit a further serious offence,
(j) in the case of an application made on the basis that the offender has been found guilty of an offence of failing to comply with the requirements of an extended supervision order or interim supervision order—the nature of the failure to comply with those requirements and the likelihood of further failures to comply,
(k) in the case of an application made on the basis that circumstances have altered since the making of an extended supervision order or interim supervision order against the offender—whether circumstances have altered since the making of the order and whether those altered circumstances mean that the risk of the offender committing a serious offence would be unacceptable unless a continuing detention order were made.”
Many of these matters have already been addressed in this judgment. As well, I have read the judgments of the late Judge Toner SC as to the October 2011 offences, Judge Maiden SC in respect of the November 2011 offence and Judge McLoughlin in relation to the index offence. I have also read the reports of Dr Stephen H Allnut, forensic psychiatrist, dated 28 May 2015 and 8 August 2015, the brief report of Dr Adnan Shehzad, psychiatrist, dated 17 November 2021 and the report of Dr Richard Furst, forensic psychiatrist, dated 26 January 2024. Having read the agreed facts, I have read summaries of other reports and a selection of OIMS notes for the period 29 July 2024 to 21 January 2026.
I also take into account the following material.
Dr Elliott interviewed the defendant for one and a half hours via an audio video link (AVL) on 18 November 2025. He diagnosed the defendant as suffering from chronic Schizophrenia, having a Substance Use Disorder, probably a Conduct Disorder (which is a necessary precursor to an adult diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder) and considered it likely he has an Antisocial Personality Disorder, which is independent of his Schizophrenia.
He opined that the defendant poses a high risk of committing a further serious violent offence as a consequence of the brittle nature of his psychotic illness, the probability that he will continue to use illicit stimulants and his entrenched antisocial personality traits. He based this conclusion on his analysis of the defendant using the Historical Clinical Risk Management-20 (HCR-20 v3) tool, which suggested that the defendant falls within a group of offenders considered to pose a high risk of violent recidivism.
Dr Elliott was of the opinion that the defendant's risk of "committing a further serious violent offence will rise precipitously" with methamphetamine use as it has historically been "closely associated with his aggression". He thought the defendant displayed "little real insight or motivation to change his substance using behaviour".
Dr Elliott opined that, while "compliance with treatment and abstinence from illicit substances will reduce his risk":
"[The defendant’s] antisocial personality traits are entrenched features of his personality structure and will remain as a stable background component of his risk of violence operating particularly during times of relationship conflict or when associating with antisocial peers".
"little real change in his presentation despite a lengthy custodial sentence and completion of intensive offender treatment programs, and that he has continued to reoffend and behave aggressively during psychotic relapses and following substance use on each of the three occasions he has been released from custody and within a short timeframe".
If a CDO were to be imposed, Dr Elliott stated that it is difficult to provide a conclusive opinion on what duration is appropriate, but in any event, it is unlikely that a 2 year CDO would make a significant difference to the defendant’s risk.
Dr Elliott opined that the defendant will require lifelong psychiatric care and treatment and that at some point it may be that he is considered for a trial of Clozapine, which is an oral only antipsychotic typically used for people with treatment resistant psychotic symptoms.
On 12 December 2025, Dr Elliott and Ms Zipparo were provided with some updating OIMS notes regarding the defendant’s time in the community following his release on 19 November 2025 and the facts sheet for the charges for which the defendant is presently in custody. They were asked to provide a supplementary report as to their opinions in view of this material.
On 17 December 2025, Dr Elliott furnished the supplementary report. He opined that, on balance, "a CDO is the more assured means of managing his risk of serious violence", as the recent train of events and the speed with which they have occurred suggests that "even the tight conditions of an ESO have been insufficient to manage his risk". He recommended a 2 year CDO "in recognition that such a timeframe may allow him to progress to the point where an ESO could again be considered".
Dr Elliott noted the following matters in reaching this conclusion:
(a) The CSNSW case notes record a rapid deterioration in the defendant's mental state from 3 December 2025. He complained of people following him in the street and of ESO staff hacking his phone and monitoring his social media, which are consistent with paranoid beliefs (even if seen in the context of his monitoring conditions). (b) While the defendant had reportedly been non-compliant with his prescribed oral antipsychotic Seroquel for four days around that time, there is no suggestion he had been non-compliant with his Abilify depot which is the main component of his antipsychotic treatment. Accordingly, Dr Elliott thought that non-compliance with Seroquel would not adequately explain his abrupt deterioration and it is more probable he accessed illicit substances (more specifically methamphetamines) on or about 3 December. However, he acknowledged this is unconfirmed and based only on the defendant's prior history and Dr Elliott's clinical experience with this group of offenders. (c) The defendant is alleged to have again offended violently within a fortnight of his release, which follows the pattern of rapid re-offending described in Dr Elliott's first report. Although the current offences do not meet the standard required to be considered serious violent offences, the alleged assault on his fellow COSP resident ended only with the intervention of hospital security staff and therefore, absent that intervention, may have been more serious.
Ms Zipparo interviewed the defendant for two and a half hours via AVL on 13 November 2025. She found that the defendant met the diagnostic criteria for chronic Schizophrenia and Substance Use Disorder. Ms Zipparo also considered his tendency towards disregarding rules since early adolescence and his "continued lack of remorse for his many seemingly unprovoked acts of aggression and violence" as being "highly suggestive" of an Antisocial Personality Disorder, which is generally chronic in nature.
Ms Zipparo found that the defendant has Low Average intellectual abilities. His cognitive functioning was generally intact with some specific areas of dysfunction suggesting frontal lobe dysfunction.
Utilising the HCR-20 v3 tool, Ms Zipparo concluded that the defendant poses a high risk of violent reoffending, noting:
"Most significantly [the defendant] shows a treatment resistant Schizophrenia and poor compliance with antipsychotic medications. When coupled with his continued abuse o[f] substances, this results in repeated episodes of relapse into psychosis during which [the defendant] shows a tendency to unprovoked aggression and violence."
She stated that his risk of future violence is "significantly increased by his poor insight into his mental illness and need for treatment, together with the exacerbating effects of illicit substances upon his mental state".
Ms Zipparo considered a CDO for a duration of 2 years to be appropriate, to facilitate his safe and gradual transition back into the community. She observed that the defendant's psychiatric symptoms are currently not well controlled and that he will require a period of stabilisation of symptoms under medical supervision. Once this is achieved, his transition back to the community should be "gradual and carefully planned and managed". She concluded that, "[g]iven the current significantly elevated risk, the most appropriate option for risk management is in a custodial setting under a CDO while further risk management strategies are considered".
On 18 December 2025, Ms Zipparo furnished her supplementary report. She stated that the further material provided to her as to the defendant’s post-release developments did not alter her opinions in her previous report.
Ms Zipparo noted Dr Elliott’s recommendation that the defendant be treated with Clozapine and suggested that a CDO would provide an opportunity for the defendant to participate in a trial of Clozapine. Ms Zipparo acknowledged that the defendant has refused Clozapine in the past, but considered that a compulsory trial of Clozapine is “the only therapeutic option”. If as a result he developed some insight into his treatment needs, it might minimise the risk of the defendant repeating the cycle of treatment non-compliance and of a rapid deterioration of his mental state within weeks of his release.
Ms Zipparo noted that as of 9 September 2025, [2] there was no evidence of an NDIS application or plan for the defendant, however, remarked that the defendant is eligible for NDIS support based on his cognitive and psychosocial impairments. Ms Zipparo also observed that NDIS support will provide an additional layer of community support for the defendant to assist with implementing daily routines, with the hope that this might minimise the risk of increasing stress when he returns to the community. A CDO would provide an opportunity to put community supports in place prior to his release, including NDIS funding and stable accommodation through the Department of Community Justice's Supported Independent Living (SIL) program.
Should an ESO be imposed, Ms Zipparo agreed with Dr Elliott's recommendation that it be for 5 years in view of the complexity of the defendant's mental health presentation, his poor track record of being able to make good decisions whilst unsupported and his very high risk of reoffending.
As noted, the only issue subject to dispute between the parties is the length of the CDO to be made in respect of the defendant. The State seeks an order for a period of 2 years, whereas the defendant seeks an order for 1 year.
Dr Elliott and Ms Zipparo gave concurrent oral evidence on this issue. Dr Elliott confirmed the defendant’s diagnosis of treatment-resistant Schizophrenia and was questioned about his recommendation of Clozapine. He said it is not available in depot (slow-release) form; it must be taken daily, either by injection or orally, by tablet or liquid. It is available in prison and in the community, although he considered it is easier to supervise the taking of Clozapine in prison.
He agreed with counsel for the defendant that if the defendant were compliant with taking Clozapine in custody and responded well, this may lead to improved insight and further compliance with medication, which could extend to him taking it unsupervised in the community. Dr Elliott stated this was ‘the ideal’. He explained that improvements from taking Clozapine can be expected from anywhere between 6 months to 2 years.
Dr Elliott said that patients often resist taking Clozapine because it has significant side effects, such as sedation and drooling, and that as a treatment of last resort, it is often used where there is a lack of insight by patients into their illness. Whilst blood tests are undertaken to monitor the side effects, this is difficult where patients come from a drug-using background which often comes with problems obtaining weekly blood samples. The following exchange occurred:
“HIS HONOUR: With patients who resist it, does that tend to be an initial resistance only? In other words, where there's an obvious improvement in their insight, does that behaviour change so that they're less reluctant to continue to take it?
WITNESS ELLIOTT: There's a very rough rule of thirds, your Honour. Around a third will do very well on clozapine and will recognise that themselves. And although they'll grumble about side effects, they'll be insightful at what the medication has afforded them. There's another third that will acquiesce to the treatment, if you like, and every clinic, they will ask you to stop it and can I go on to something else, and another third will just simply refuse to take it. Alternatively, they may have serious side effects to the drug and they're forced to stop taking it.”
Despite the side effects, Dr Elliott described Clozapine as a “good drug” which commonly leads to a reduction of psychotic symptoms. If a patient is responding well, it is usually a lifelong drug. Those patients who come from a more stable background – a supportive family, housing – are more likely to come within the first two categories described by Dr Elliott.
Ms Zipparo and Dr Elliott agreed that the form of support envisioned by Corrective Services for the defendant while he is subject to a CDO would be more intensive than that afforded to most inmates. Ms Zipparo gave evidence that her “very optimistic estimate” of the required time for a CDO was 18 months, which would take into account delays in the NDIS approval process, noting the defendant will require support through NDIS for day-to-day functioning when he is re-introduced back into the community.
Ms Zipparo considered that the defendant should have a period of time to build a working relationship with carefully selected NDIS coordinators. Locating program managers, coordinators and support people will take time, as will locating appropriate housing and organising the defendant’s finances; he will be dependent upon his disability support pension to pay his rent.
Ms Zipparo did not believe that all of this could be achieved in 1 year, recognising that there are often delays and other issues which arise in such processes. She gave evidence that:
“So, there's lots of things to plan and when all of that is done, then I would really like to see [the defendant] go through a process of, you know, gradual release where, you know, there's an opportunity for weekend release where he can go check out, you know, his - his new home, get to meet with his, you know support coordinator and people so that when he is eventually, you know, reintroduced back into the community, there's less stress, there's less, you know, instability and, you know, lack of predictability which will hopefully help with his stress levels.”
If a 1 year CDO were ordered, Ms Zipparo agreed any further application for a CDO or ESO at the end of that period would allow the Court to review the defendant’s circumstances and make appropriate orders. However, she maintained a concern that if the defendant is not released back into a “perfectly planned” community setting and instability results, it could lead to a repetition of his offending behaviour.
Dr Elliott shared Ms Zipparo’s concerns that the process of formulating a release plan for the defendant will involve delays, in view of the number of people involved.
Dr Elliott was taken to the following extract from his supplementary report:
“I repeat the concern I expressed in my original report that [the defendant’s] presentation is unlikely to change appreciably for some years but recommend a two year CDO in recognition that such a timeframe may allow him to progress to the point where an ESO could again be considered.”
He was asked whether he had a view on whether 18 months was an appropriate period. Dr Elliott echoed Ms Zipparo’s sentiments that it was crucial that the defendant have somewhere to live when he is reintroduced into the community. He thought that an expectation that the required planning and NDIS approvals would occur within 18 months was optimistic.
Dr Elliott also echoed Ms Zipparo’s concerns regarding counsel’s suggestions that if a 1 year CDO is made, in effect ‘a review’ could take place at the end of the period and an application for a further CDO or ESO could be made by the State. Dr Elliott stated that whilst a 1 year order may add impetus to the application process, the correctional system places greater concern on managing inmates when they are ultimately released, as opposed to working within court timeframes. From the defendant’s perspective, he may view the 1 year order as the time he ‘gets out’, as opposed to a check-in point to monitor his compliance with the program for his release. Any further application brought would cause the defendant to undergo the assessment process again which inevitably will cause stress and uncertainty for him. Dr Elliott stated these matters may potentially affect the defendant’s level of risk; uncertainty surrounding a possible extension tends to cause inmates to become more unstable. Ms Zipparo agreed.
Counsel for the defendant raised the issue of institutionalisation with both experts. Their views slightly differed.
Dr Elliott agreed that there is a concern of institutionalisation in respect of detention orders and that the defendant already shows signs of it: having been cemented in the custodial environment, the defendant will likely “fall out of practice” with tasks such as paying his rent and attending appointments in the community. He will also have no exposure to pro-social people in the community. It follows that a shorter detention order with appropriate planning for his release will minimise the detriment of institutionalisation.
Ms Zipparo also thought the defendant is already suffering from institutionalisation, having spent a large part of his adult life incarcerated. She continued:
“A. …So, what we've seen when he has been released is, you know, a big stress response because I believe he has lost a lot of those, you know, adaptive functioning skills, in addition to the fact that he actually has a disorder that impairs, you know, those skills as well, you know, decision making, planning and so forth.
So, that's one of the reasons why I would like his next release to be really well planned with lots of support so that a lot of that, you know, that decision making and that planning that he's having a lot of trouble with is not going to be a stressor for him. So, I don't believe that a year or 18 months will make a great deal of difference to what is already an issue.
WILCOX: That issue being institutionalisation?
WITNESS ZIPPARO: Yes, correct.”
Katarzyna (Catherine) Sapula, a psychologist in the Countering Violent Extremism team of Corrective Services, prepared a Risk Assessment Report (RAR) dated 21 January 2025.
Ms Sapula interviewed the defendant via AVL in September 2024, having previously interviewed him in person in 2022. She noted his limited level of insight into his offending and reluctance to accept responsibility for it. The defendant confirmed an extensive history of substance misuse. Ms Sapula confirmed the defendant’s mental health history as outlined earlier in this judgment. Ms Sapula noted that in December 2020 the defendant was seriously assaulted by other inmates in custody, requiring hospitalisation. She stated: “He reportedly suffered a traumatic brain injury as a result. At the time he passed ‘a simple brain injury assessment for post traumatic amnesia and was discharged’.” In June 2024 the defendant claimed he had an acquired brain injury from a prison assault. There is no record of a neuropsychiatric assessment having been conducted.
As to the defendant’s level of risk, Ms Sapula administered four tests: the Level of Service Inventory – Revised (LSI-R); the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide – Revised (VRAG-R); the Violence Risk Scale (VRS); and the Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (ODARA). She assessed the defendant’s overall risk as falling in the high range, suggesting that his risk of recidivism falls in the high category of committing a violent offence, including in an intimate relationship, and that it could be a serious violence offence, as defined in the Act.
As noted at [22] and [24] above, the defendant was re-admitted to prison on 21 November 2022 following the assaults he committed the day before. In a supplementary report dated 24 April 2025, Ms Sapula noted that the defendant was released to parole on 21 November 2024. His parole was revoked on 19 March 2025 following a deterioration in his mental state in February and March 2025 and his admission to a mental health facility on 9 March 2025. Ms Sapula’s assessment of the defendant’s risk of committing a violent offence remained the same as in her earlier report.
Ms Sapula noted the availability of a program in prison that would be suitable for the defendant to address his propensity for violent offending: the Real Understanding of Self-Help program (RUSH). As well, he would benefit from completing the VOTP a second time and participating in more of the EQUIPS suite of programs.
A report by Benjamin Markson, a Community Corrections officer addressing the risk management of the defendant, dated 28 November 2024, was tendered. It was signed and endorsed by John Banton, an officer of the Intensive Rehabilitation Directorate of Corrective Services.
At the time of the report, as noted at [2] above, the defendant had been on parole for a week and was living in the community at a COSP. The report is of limited utility in view of the defendant’s current circumstances since it was primarily concerned with the management of the defendant’s risk in the community. I note that the author referred to the defendant disclosing that he had previously affiliated with his local chapter of a white nationalist movement that the author considered had the potential to elevate his risk of violent offending.
A more recent risk management report, by Kelli Grabham, dated 7 November 2025, was tendered, although it was prepared as the defendant awaited his re-release again into the community. Ms Grabham outlined some programs that she considered could assist the defendant’s reintegration.
Having considered all the material, I have regard to the paramount consideration of the safety of the community: s 17(2) of the Act. I am independently satisfied, to a high degree of probability, that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if he is not kept in detention. There are no circumstances that warrant an exercise of the statutory discretion to not make the order.
I find the evidence of Dr Elliott and Ms Zipparo to be persuasive to the effect that a CDO for period of 1 year is insufficient. I take into account the defendant’s long history of missteps due to a combination of his mental health diagnoses and his use of prohibited drugs which, to my mind, suggests that the defendant needs an extended period in detention to ensure that when he is next released back into the community, he has transitioned with the benefit of the RELP program and ideally, a history of more effective drug therapy treatment (using Clozapine) while in prison to enable him to gain insight into the need to maintain mental health treatment in the community. The defendant’s prosects of a successful transition to the community will benefit from there being more time to put in place community support mechanisms, particularly NDIS services. I am of the view that these measures cannot be achieved in under 2 years. The order I make will reflect that period.
I make orders as follows:
Pursuant to ss 5C and 17(1)(b) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant be the subject of a continuing detention order for a period of 2 years to date from 4 March 2026;
Pursuant to s 20(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the Court to issue a warrant for the committal of the defendant to a correctional centre for a period of 2 years; and
Access to the Supreme Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a Judge of the Court, and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.
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I note that the sentence, as handed down by Maden DCJ, is recorded differently in the defendant’s Bail Report.
I note that the agreed facts dated 2 February 2026 referred to this being the situation as of 9 December 2025. However, Ms Zipparo’s Supplementary Report stated that the relevant date was 9 September 2025.
State of New South Wales
Lunn-Reid