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[2025] NSWSC 1197
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of NSW
2025-10-13
Wright J
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: State of New South Wales v Lunn-Reid (Preliminary) [2025] NSWSC 1197
Hearing dates: 28 August 2025, submissions closed 4 September 2025
Date of orders: 13 October 2025
Decision date: 13 October 2025
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Wright J
Decision: (1) Pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the CHRO Act), one qualified psychiatrist and one registered neuropsychologist, as agreed between the parties, are appointed to conduct separate examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports on the results of those examinations to the Supreme Court of New South Wales on a date, as agreed between the parties.
(2) The defendant is directed to attend the examinations in order (1).
(3) Pursuant to ss 10A and 10C(1) of the CHRO Act, the defendant is made the subject of an interim supervision order commencing immediately after the expiration of the defendant’s sentence on 19 November 2025, for a period of 28 days.
(4) Pursuant to s 11 of the CHRO Act, the defendant is directed to comply with the conditions set out in the schedule to these orders for the duration of the interim supervision order.
(5) The parties have liberty to apply, if the parties are unable to reach agreement for the purposes of order (1).
Catchwords: HIGH RISK OFFENDERS – supervision and other orders under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) – application for extended supervision order (ESO) – ESO not opposed – conditions to be imposed as part of the ESO – no point of principle
Legislation Cited: Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), ss 5B, 5I, 6, 7, 9, 10A, 10C, 11-13, 13B, 15
Cases Cited: State of New South Wales v Hona (Final) [2025] NSWSC 277
State of New South Wales v Shields (Preliminary) [2022] NSWSC 469
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Jesse John Lunn-Reid (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
K Ng (Plaintiff)
K Stares SC / J Wilcox (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2025/00176147
By an amended summons filed in court on 28 August 2025, the plaintiff, the State of New South Wales, seeks final relief against the defendant, Jesse Lunn-Reid, under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 20**06 (NSW) (the CHRO Act) by way of a continuing detention order (CDO) for two years or, alternatively, an extended supervision order (ESO) for a period of five years with the conditions set out in the schedule to the amended summons.
In addition, in the amended summons the State seeks preliminary, interim and ancillary relief by way of an interim supervision order (ISO) for 28 days, an order for compliance with conditions as set out in the schedule to the amended summons for the duration of the ISO, an order for the examination of the defendant by two psychiatrists or psychologists and an order restricting access to the court file.
On 28 August 2025, the matter came before me for hearing as to the preliminary relief, being the order for the examination of the defendant, and the interim relief, being the ISO with appropriate conditions.
There was no dispute between the parties, and in light of the evidence before me I am satisfied, that the statutory requirements for the commencement of the present proceedings for a CDO, or alternatively an ESO, including the requirements in ss 5I(1), 6(1) and (3), and ss 13B(1), (3) and (5) and 14 of the CHRO Act, have been met and that any relevant pre-trial procedures in ss 7 and 15 have been undertaken.
In proceedings which include an application for an ESO, such as the present, if following the preliminary hearing the Court is satisfied that "the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order":
under s 7(4) of the CHRO Act (or under s 15(4) in respect of proceedings for a CDO), the Court must make orders:
(a) appointing either two qualified psychiatrists, two registered psychologists, one of each or two of each, to conduct separate examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Court on the results; and (b) directing the defendant to attend such examinations; and
under s 10A of the CHRO Act, the Court may make an ISO if it also appears to the Court that the offender’s current custody or supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined: s 10A(a).
As to s 10A(a), since the defendant’s current custody or supervision will expire 19 November 2025 and he has not yet been examined under s 7(4) (or s 15(4)) and no date for a final hearing has yet been set, I am satisfied that his current custody or supervision will expire before the present proceedings are determined.
Thus, if, assuming the matters alleged in the supporting documentation are proved, they would justify making an ESO, the Court in this case must: (a) make examination orders; and, (b) may make an ISO.
The making of an ESO is governed by s 5B of the CHRO Act, which provides:
“The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if—
(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and
(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and
(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and
(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.”
The written submissions filed on behalf of the defendant indicated that he did not take issue, for the purposes of the interim hearing only, with the statutory preconditions for the making of ESO in s 5B(a), (b) and (c) being met and I am satisfied that they have been.
Accordingly, in the circumstances of the present case, whether “the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order" turns on whether the Court, assuming those matters are proved, is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under an order, as specified in s 5B(d) of the CHRO Act.
In determining whether or not an ESO should be made, the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration of the Court: CHRO Act, s 9(2). In addition, the Court is required to have regard to the matters set out in s 9(3) of the CHRO Act.
For the purposes of the interim hearing, the defendant did not oppose the position that, assuming the matters alleged in the supporting documentation were proved, the Court could be satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant posed an unacceptable risk of committing a further serious offence if not kept under supervision, so as to satisfy the requirement in s 5B(d).
Otherwise, the defendant’s position was, in summary:
any examination order should specify that the defendant be examined by one psychiatrist and by one neuropsychologist;
if an ISO is to be made, the conditions to be imposed should be as close as possible to those currently applicable while he is on parole.
The principles to be applied in determining whether the matters alleged in the supporting documentation, if proved, would justify the making of an ESO, were summarised by me in State of New South Wales v Shields (Preliminary) [2022] NSWSC 469 at [12] and the principles applicable to a determination under s 5B(d) of the CHRO Act were recently dealt with by Chen J in State of New South Wales v Hona (Final) [2025] NSWSC 277 at [13] – [15]. As noted above, none of these principles was in dispute and I have applied them in the present case.
The defendant was born in Belmont, New South Wales, in 1989 and is currently 35 years old. There was reportedly a high level of conflict within his parents’ relationship and his father was frequently violent towards his mother. His parents separated when he was 13 years old resulting in him relocating often to live with various family members.
The defendant’s education was disrupted and he was suspended in high school for fighting. He left school at the end of year 8.
After he left school, the defendant said that he was employed as a concreter until he was injured in a motor vehicle accident in 2011.
The defendant has a lengthy history of mental health problems dating back to adolescence. He has been under psychiatric care sporadically since the age of 15. He was originally diagnosed with drug induced psychosis but subsequent diagnoses have included paranoid schizophrenia and substance use disorder. Treating psychiatrists have expressed the opinion that the defendant could meet the criteria for borderline antisocial personality disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. He has a history of inconsistent adherence to antipsychotic medication and his psychiatrists have noted that substance use aggravates his paranoid schizophrenia.
On 24 October 2011, the defendant attended the home of a person with whom he had previously been a good friend. Along with another male, the defendant ripped open the screen door and ran into the house. The defendant swung the timber handle of the door which hit the victim to the side of the face. As a result of this injury, the victim underwent corrective surgery for multiple fractures to the left side of his face, eye socket and nose and lost the sight in one eye. The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of recklessly causing grievous bodily harm in company and was sentenced on 7 August 2013 to 5 years imprisonment commencing on 24 March 2012 and expiring on 23 March 2017 with a non-parole period of 2 years.
On 8 November 2011, after absconding from a mental health facility, where he was being treated for schizophrenia and psychotic symptoms, the defendant and his father attended the victim’s premises. The victim was an ex-partner of the defendant’s mother, whom the defendant accused of sexually molesting him when he was seven and whom the defendant believed had also sexually assaulted his mother. The defendant and his father hit the victim with a glass bottle over his head before kicking him and hitting him with a sharp piece of wood targeting the groin. The defendant pleaded guilty to the offence of recklessly causing grievous bodily harm in company. On 25 March 2014, he was sentenced to imprisonment for 4 years 3 months to commence on 24 December 2013 and expire on 23 March 2018 with a non-parole period of 2 years.
Prior to early 2013, the defendant had been attending a rehabilitation facility and one of the workers there had got to know the defendant and his former partner. In January 2013, the former partner, with whom the defendant had had a son in January 2011, informed the defendant that she wished to end their relationship, which he did not accept. On the night of 13 February 2013, the worker had stayed at the former partner’s house and the defendant had seen his car there.
On 14 February 2013, while on bail for other offending, the defendant entered his former partner’s house. He said to the her, “You haven’t been fucking him, hey?” and stabbed her repeatedly to the head, face and throat. She suffered at least one defensive wound to her arm. When she fell to the ground and rolled over she felt another blow to her upper back area. The former partner’s sister who was also present at the time placed herself between the defendant and the former partner but the defendant swung the knife at the sister which caused a laceration to her face.
The defendant pleaded guilty to wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Following a successful appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal in relation to the sentence for the wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, the defendant was sentenced for that offending to imprisonment for 8 years and 4 months commencing on 17 June 2017 and expiring on 16 October 2025 with a non-parole period of 4 years 11 months and 9 days. The defendant had been sentenced on 18 August 2016 for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm to imprisonment for 2 years and 8 months commencing on 17 April 2016 and expiring on 16 December 2018 with a non-parole period of 2 years. Thus, the overall effective sentence for both the wounding with intent and the assault occasioning actual bodily harm was 8 years and 6 months.
In January, March and September 2015, while in custody, the defendant sent letters to his former partner, the victim of the index offending, in breach of an ADVO. For the January and March offences, he was fined and, for the September offending, sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment commencing on 24 August 2016 and expiring on 23 February 2017.
On 10 April 2025, while custody, the defendant together with other inmates assaulted a convicted sex offender. For assault occasioning actual bodily harm the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months commencing on 2 December 2015 and expiring on 1 June 2017 with a non-parole period of 12 months. For affray, he was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 months commencing on 2 December 2015 and expiring on 1 August 2017 with a non-parole period of 16 months.
The defendant was released to parole on 5 October 2022. On 20 November 2022, the defendant was with his cousin on a train in the early hours of the morning. As the train was pulling into Hamilton station at about 2:50 am, the cousin yelled at a passenger that he should move to another carriage because the defendant did not like him. Another passenger stood up to see what was going on and the defendant stood up and punched him to the back of the head. The defendant then grabbed hold of the other passenger and tried to drag him up the stairs to the upper level but the passenger tackled the defendant and they both fell down the stairs. When the cousin pulled the other passenger off the defendant, the defendant slammed him into the seat. The defendant and his cousin moved to another carriage. At Hamilton station at about 3:00 am, police boarded the train to deal with another incident. While the train was waiting at the station, the defendant and his cousin began speaking to different passengers. The defendant then stood up and punched one of those other passengers knocking part of his two front teeth out. The passenger who had been hit blacked out momentarily. One of the police officers on the train then approached the defendant and said he was under arrest. When the defendant took up a fighting stance and drew back his right arm, the police officer deployed his capsicum spray.
The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, one count of common assault and one count of assaulting a police officer in the execution of duty with an offence of hindering or resisting a police officer in the execution of duty being taken into account on a Form 1. On 30 January 2024, the defendant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment for 2 years and 6 months commencing on 20 May 2023 and concluding on 19 November 2025 with a non-parole period of 1 year and 6 months.
On 21 November 2024, the defendant was again released to parole. His initial response to supervision was satisfactory and he engaged with mental health services and an opioid substitution program. The defendant attended all scheduled appointments and was present for all scheduled home visits. The breach of parole report dated 11 March 2025 noted that the defendant had been afforded significant support in the community including a case worker with the Initial Transition Service and a case worker at a local housing organisation as part of their tenancy program. These supports provided the defendant with transport, telecommunication devices, food, clothing, accommodation, fulfilment of scripts, social support and the completion of referrals for other appropriate services such as the National Disability Insurance Scheme. The defendant also engaged with the caseworkers at drug and alcohol and community mental health services.
On 5 March 2025, the defendant, however, complained and became abusive towards Community Corrections staff about the frequency of oral drug wipe testing utilised during his period of supervision.
On 6 March 2025, the defendant, while speaking to the manager at Community Corrections, made a threat to injure or kill someone due to his displeasure at having regular oral drug wipes.
On 9 March 2025 following a rapid decline in behaviour, the defendant was admitted to a mental health facility at Port Macquarie Base Hospital. A blood test produced a positive result for methylamphetamine and the defendant explained that he had been using illicit substances regularly but would cease in the days prior to his parole appointments to ensure a negative oral drug wipe. At the time of his admission, the defendant was homeless after his tenancy was terminated, purportedly due to antisocial behaviour including walking around with large sticks and bang them on random objects and doors but it was recorded that the defendant disputed this.
On 17 March 2025, Kempsey Community Corrections were in contact with Port Macquarie Base Hospital mental health ward where police had been called to assist to subdue the defendant who had become highly aggressive. It was reported that the defendant had damaged his electronic monitoring anklet. Although it remained on his ankle, it was not able to be charged due to the charging device being irreparably damaged. It was also reported that he had physically assaulted a nurse, made direct and specific threats of serious violence to the psychiatrists and other mental health staff, threatened to burn down the ward and had attempted to do so by filling electrical sockets with various materials, tried to break into a female patient’s adjoining room, torn tapware from the sink, utilised a heavy chair as a type of battering ram to try and break down the door, telephoned his mother and made threats of serious violence, instigated conflict with another patient which rapidly escalated to the point of physical threats to their safety, was refusing to comply with medication recommendations, continued to make violent and disparaging comments towards Community Corrections staff and stated his unwillingness to comply with any attempts to provide supervision of his current orders upon discharge from hospital.
On 18 and 19 March 2025, the hospital indicated that the defendant’s behaviour escalated and he caused further property damage to the unit leading them to advise that they struggled to continue to manage the defendant’s behaviour and they were attempting to have him assessed and moved to John Hunter Hospital.
On 19 March 2025, the State Parole Authority revoked his parole and the defendant was required to serve the balance of parole, commencing on 26 March 2025 (the date of his return to custody) and expiring on 26 November 2025.
On 26 March 2025, the defendant returned to custody. He was eventually held at Long Bay Hospital mental health unit. After he refused his depot injections with one medication, the defendant’s treating team recommenced him on Aripiprazole PO, as the defendant requested. By 13 May 2025, their impression was that on that medication his mental state was stable. Even though the defendant reported he was agreeable to continue on depot medication, the treating team noted that, given past risks including significant aggression when unwell in the context of medication non-adherence, they would apply for a Forensic Community Treatment Order (FCTO).
On 26 June 2025, the Mental Health Review Tribunal (MHRT) imposed an FCTO on the defendant which required him to accept treatment and/or medication as prescribed. The FCTO was for 12 months expiring on 25 June 2026.
On 29 July 2025, the State Parole Authority rescinded the decision to revoke the defendant’s parole made on 19 March 2025. The statutory parole order dated 1 August 2025 stated that it would commence on 4 August 2025 and expire on 19 November 2025. Consequently, on 4 August 2025, the defendant was again released to parole subject to the following conditions set out in the order dated 1 August 2025:
“Standard conditions
While you are on parole:
- You must be of good behaviour.
- You must not commit any offences.
- You must adapt to normal lawful community life.
When you are first released on parole:
- You must report to a community corrections officer at a time and place directed, or if you have not been given a direction, to a Community Corrections office within 7 days of your release.
While your parole is supervised:
- You must report to a community corrections officer at the times and places directed by the officer.
- You must comply with all reasonable directions from a community corrections officer about:
a) the place where you will live
b) participating in programs, treatment, interventions or other related activities
c) participating in employment, education, training or other related activities
d) not undertaking specified employment, education, training, volunteer, leisure or other activities
e) not associating with specified people
f) not visiting or frequenting specified places or areas
g) ceasing drug use
h) ceasing or reducing alcohol use
i) drug and alcohol testing
j) monitoring your compliance with the parole order
k) giving consent to third parties to provide information to the officer that is relevant to your compliance with the parole order.
- You must comply with any other reasonable directions from a community corrections officer.
- You must permit a community corrections officer to visit you at the place where you live at any time, and permit the officer to enter the premises when they visit you.
- You must notify a community corrections officer if you change your address, contact details or employment.
You must do this before the change occurs if practicable, or within 7 days of the change occurring.
- You must not leave New South Wales without permission from a community corrections manager.
- You must not leave Australia without permission from the State Parole Authority.
Additional conditions
- You must submit to electronic monitoring and comply with all instructions given by your Officer in relation to the operation of monitoring systems.
- You must abstain from alcohol.
- You must not use a prohibited drug or substance, except those that have been prescribed to you.
- You must comply with all directions of the mental health team, including treatment and medication (and if applicable, the conditions of a Community Treatment Order).
- You must not contact, communicate with, watch, stalk, harass or intimidate the victim/sand/or the victim's family.
- You must not contact, communicate or associate with your co-offender/s, without the express prior approval of your Officer.
- You must not frequent or visit: North of Yarravel, or the Nambucca Valley LGA unless prior approval granted by Community Corrections Officer. May attend suburbs of Smithtown and South West Rocks.
Officer directions
You must not frequent or visit: The Salvation Army Hall - 69 Leith Street Kempsey NSW 2440.”
Since no orders for examination of the defendant under s 7(4) have yet been made in these proceedings, there are no reports that fall within the s 9(3)(b) of the CHRO Act.
A risk assessment report dated 21 January 2025, falling within s 9(3)(c), was prepared by Ms Katarzyna Sapula, forensic psychologist. Ms Sapula interviewed the defendant once via AVL and once in person, on 17 September 2024 and 19 September 2022, for a total of about two and a half hours.
In Ms Sapula’s opinion, the defendant presented with limited insight in relation to his offending in that he minimised his decisions to offend and demonstrated little insight into how some of his cognitive distortions may have contributed to his belief that violence is a reasonable response.
The report recorded that the defendant said that he commenced alcohol consumption at the age of 10 and by 12 years of age he consumed large amounts almost every weekend. He said that he commenced cannabis use at about 12 years of age and over the next year it escalated to daily use which continued for a decade. He also said that he commenced amphetamine use at about the age of 14 to enable him to work and he commenced the use of “ice” at about 16, which continued until his incarceration in 2013. It was also noted that he used MDMA, cocaine and Valium sporadically. Ms Sapula noted that the substance misuse appeared to have impacted the defendant’s mental health and featured as a precursor to at least some of his offending. Specifically, it was recorded that, during the interview, the defendant categorically denied relapsing into substance abuse in the lead up to his recent arrest for breach of parole.
Ms Sapula noted the defendant’s diagnosis at 15 years of age with drug induced psychosis and two years later with schizophrenia. She recorded treating psychiatrists’ various opinions that he could meet the criteria for Borderline and Antisocial Personality Disorder as well as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Ms Sapula recorded that the defendant had been seriously assaulted by other inmates in custody in December 2020 and had suffered a traumatic brain injury but said that no neuropsychiatric assessment of that injury had been carried out.
The defendant’s participation in the Violent Offenders Therapeutic Program (VOTP) and the EQUIPS Foundations and Addictions program as well as the fact that the defendant appeared to lack motivation to change.
Ms Sapula assessed the defendant using a number of risk assessment tools. In addition she referred to earlier risk assessments carried out by others in respect of the defendant. Her assessments and the earlier assessments may be summarised as follows:
In November 2022, using the Level of Service Infantry – Revised (LSI – R):- medium/high risk category for general and violent offending;
in December 2024, using the Static Risk Factors (Actuarial Assessment – Violent Offending) – Violence Risk Appraisal Guide – Revised (VRAG – R):- risk is in the high category relative to other violent offenders and 76% of violent offenders in the same risk “bin” reoffended violently within five years;
in June 2021 prior to commencing VOTP treatment and then again at completion of treatment in September 2022, using the Static and Dynamic Risk Factors (Actuarial Assessment – Violent Offending) – Violence Risk Scale (VR S):- although his score reduced marginally due to his gains in treatment, he remained in the high risk category for violent reoffending; and
in December 2024, using the Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (ODARA): - high risk, in that the defendant’s score placed him in the highest category and 74% of the individuals who scored in the same range were found to perpetrate a new assault against a female partner that came to the attention of police within an average of about five years after the index offending.
Ms Sapula’s assessment of the defendant’s overall risk level was that his risk of recidivism fell in the high risk category of committing a violence offence.
After noting the dynamic risk factors in the defendant’s case and positing two potential pathways to violence, Ms Sapula opined:
“[The defendant] participated in offence specific interventions and was reported to have demonstrated some intellectual understanding of the necessary skills to prevent further offending. The extent to which he has internalised this knowledge and any associated skills is questionable. Given [the defendant’s] history and progress in the community, his capacity to independently implement and maintain adequate long-term change to mitigate his risk appears limited. Consequently, it is possible that [the defendant] could commit another offence and that it could be of a serious nature…. [The defendant’s] propensity to use or threaten the use of weapons raises serious concerns about the potential level of harm.”
Ms Sapula provided a supplementary risk report dated 24 April 2025 in which it was noted that the defendant had not been interviewed for the purposes of the supplementary report. Ms Sapula recorded various matters including accounts of what occurred at Port Macquarie Base Hospital mental health unit in March 2025 and his response to reincarceration. She was of the view that her risk assessments detailed in her earlier report remained valid and her assessment of the risk of recidivism had not changed. Indeed, it was her opinion that those events provided further validation of the link between the defendant’s poor insight, illicit substance use and mental health decompensation.
More generally, Ms Sapula opined in her supplementary report:
“According to the available records, [the defendant] does not appear to have relapsed and sought assistance but rather aimed to avoid detection by engaging in deliberate acts to conceal the elected behaviour. Whilst his capacity for insight and acceptance of responsibility may very well be impacted by his psychiatric diagnoses, it seems that his antisocial personality traits have considerable influence upon his decision-making in terms of abstinence, compliance with conditions of community orders and seeking to establish a law-abiding life.”
The other reports available included that of Dr Richard Furst, forensic psychiatrist, dated 26 January 2024 prepared in relation to the defendant for the purposes of the sentence proceedings in respect of the 2022 offending.
Dr Furst was of the view that the defendant met the criteria for diagnoses of the following mental disorders:
schizophrenia;
substance use disorder (methamphetamines, opiates);
complex post-traumatic stress disorder; and
borderline/antisocial personality traits.
In respect of the 2022 offending, Dr Furst noted that the defendant was taking his medication and was not psychotic at the time. He opined, nonetheless, that the defendant’s schizophrenic illness, complex post-traumatic stress disorder, unstable personality structure and the effects of difficulty adjusting to life in the community most likely had an adverse effect on his emotional state and decision-making at the time of the offending on the train and towards arresting police, including making him more prone to overreact to perceived and/or real provocations from the victims towards himself and his cousin.
Dr Furst considered that in the medium to long-term the defendant required treatment including ongoing psychotropic medication, drug and alcohol counselling, opioid replacement therapy and psychological counselling aimed at improving his coping skills in addressing his childhood trauma. It was also said that in the event of any signs of relapse into drug use, early entry into a drug and alcohol rehabilitation facility would be appropriate as drug use would be a significant risk factor in relation to future reoffending.
A number of earlier psychiatric and psychological reports dating from 2022 back to 2012 provided additional insights. The opinions expressed in those reports, in large measure, confirmed or were consistent with, the opinions of Ms Sapula and Dr Furst and there was nothing in them which caused me to reject the opinions expressed in the most recent reports.
If the matters alleged in the supporting material are assumed to have been proved, in my view the making of an ESO would be justified because, having regard to the relevant factors in s 9(2) and (3) of the CHRO Act, it would be open to be satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant posed an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision by way of an order. In that sense and in those circumstances, the making of an ESO would be justified.
Accordingly, under s 7(4)(a) and (b) I am required to make an order appointing qualified psychiatrists or psychologists to examine the defendant and an order directing him to attend those examinations. Furthermore, since the defendant was assaulted by other inmates in custody in December 2020 and suffered a traumatic brain injury, I accept that it appropriate to specify, as the defendant submitted, that the defendant be examined by a neuropsychologist and a psychiatrist. Consequently, orders to that effect will be made.
Furthermore, the conclusion that the making of an ESO would be justified in the circumstances also means that the discretion to make an order for the interim supervision of the defender is enlivened in this case. Since there were no considerations raised by the parties as to why an ISO should not be made and there did not appear to me to be any factors which would militate against the exercise of the discretion to make an ISO in the present case, I propose to make an ISO for a period of 28 days in respect of the defendant as sought by the plaintiff.
The remaining issue for determination is the conditions with which the defendant should be directed to comply in respect of the ISO. In respect of that issue, there were areas of significant dispute.
By the commencement of the preliminary hearing, the parties had reached an agreed position as to some of the proposed conditions which would be appropriate for inclusion in any ISO.
After the conclusion of the hearing on 28 August 2025, the parties sought the opportunity to confer further with a view to reaching further agreement, if possible, in relation to the conditions to be imposed as part of any ISO. As a result on 4 September 2025, the parties provided an updated schedule of conditions which identified which conditions were agreed, which were in dispute and, where there were contending alternate versions of a proposed condition, the alternate versions.
The agreed conditions were identified in the updated schedule as conditions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5A, 6, 12, 13, 14, 22, 24, 25, 29, 30, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44. In that schedule, it was also noted that conditions 18, 19 and 20 had been “Removed”, apparently by agreement or without opposition. In addition, in relation to conditions 28 and 31, in the column headed “Plaintiff’s position post preliminary hearing”, the plaintiff’s position was said to be “Do not press” and in relation to condition 38, the position was said to be “Withdraw”.
In my view, the conditions proposed by the State and agreed to by the defendant are appropriate in the circumstances disclosed in the supporting material, some relevant portions of which have been referred to in more detail above. Accordingly, I propose to include the agreed conditions. In addition, I do not propose to include conditions 18, 19, 20, 28, 31 and 38, on the basis that they are no longer sought by the State.
The conditions in dispute were as follows and may be grouped into the following categories:
Conditions 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 – required residence, curfew and visitor conditions;
Conditions 15 and 16 – training and employment conditions;
Condition 17 – information concerning financial affairs condition;
Conditions 21, 23 and 26 – alcohol and drug related conditions;
Condition 27 – disclosure of criminal history condition;
Conditions 32 and 33 – search and seizure conditions; and
Condition 35 – appearance condition.
In relation to the conditions in dispute, the defendant’s general position was said to be that:
the conditions of the ISO “should be as close to the parole conditions to which he is currently subject as feasible”; [1] and
the conditions to be imposed “should provide a support network for the defendant to stabilise his mental health, which thereby reduces his risk of committing a serious offence”. [2]
In addition, it was submitted more generally that the ISO as sought by the State had “the potential, because of the strict and inflexible conditions, to exacerbate the defendant’s illness and thereby return him to custody because of the onerous nature of the conditions sought”. [3]
| 7 | You must be at your approved address between 10 pm and 6 am unless other arrangements are approved by a DSO | | 8 | You must allow a DSO to visit you at your approved address at any time and to enter the premises at that address. | | 9 | You must not spend the night anywhere other than your approved address or any alternative approved addresses without the approval of a DSO. | | 10 | You must promptly notify a DSO of any visitor entering and remaining at your approved address. | | 11 | You must not permit any person who you have invited to your approved address, to stay overnight at that address (other than persons who ordinarily reside there) without the prior approval of a DSO. |
Conditions 7 and 9 can usefully be considered together. Ms Stares of Senior Counsel, who appeared with Mr Wilcox, for the defendant, submitted that there was no significant aspect of the risk posed by the defendant that was linked to his being out of his residence during the hours of darkness or the specified curfew hours. In addition, it was submitted that, since there was no curfew in his parole conditions and this had caused no apparent problem since his release in August 2025, a curfew should not be added when he becomes subject to the ISO. It was noted that, if circumstances changed, the conditions relating to an ISO may be varied under s 13(1) of the CHRO Act. Mr Ng of counsel who appeared for the State maintained that the curfew was appropriate in all the circumstances.
In my view, there is some sense in keeping the parole conditions and subsequent conditions on the ISO relatively consistent. I also accept that the defendant’s offending does not appear to have been specifically related to the hours of darkness, although the 2022 offending did occur in the early hours of the morning. The risk posed by the defendant is also mitigated in the present case by the fact that he will be subject to electronic monitoring. Furthermore, if condition 9 is imposed requiring that the defendant spend the night at his address except with the approval of a DSO, the benefit of a curfew would be largely achieved without the rigidity of the specified timeframe. Accordingly, I do not propose to include condition 7 but shall include condition 9.
As to condition 8, this is in effect the same as the parole condition which specifies, “You must permit a community corrections officer to visit you at the place where you live at any time, and permit the officer to enter the premises when they visit you”. This type of condition permits monitoring of the defendant’s living arrangements and assists in reducing the risk posed by the defendant, especially the risk associated with use of prohibited drugs. In addition, including condition 8 is in line with the defendant’s preference for consistency between the parole conditions and the conditions of the ISO. For these reasons, I shall include condition 8 in the ISO.
Conditions 10 and 11 relate to visitors at the residence where the defendant is required to live and does not relate to other persons who ordinarily reside there. The defendant submitted that these conditions are onerous and invasive and are not ones currently applying under the parole order. There is the ability under the parole order to prohibit the defendant from associating with particular persons should that be necessary. Consequently, it was said that these conditions 10 and 11 should not be imposed. In my view, the defendant’s relapsing into prohibited drug use is a significant factor which would elevate the risk posed by him. In addition, his record involves serious domestic violence offences. Conditions 10 and 11 do not involve outright prohibitions on visitors but only require the prior approval of a DSO. As a result, they allow a risk assessment to be carried out before the defendant is permitted to have a visitor and in this way the risk of drug relapse or domestic violence could be better managed than by merely depending on a non-associate direction after a DSO became aware of a problem. In all the circumstances, in my view, conditions 10 and 11 serve a significant purpose and are not overly onerous or restrictive. I shall include those conditions.
| 15. | You must take all reasonable steps to participate in programs as recommended by a DSO, including the development of a case management plan which may include employment, education, training or participation in personal development activities. | | 16. | You must not start or change any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of a DSO. |
“must comply with all reasonable directions from a community corrections officer about:
…
b) participating in programs, treatment, interventions or other related activities
c) participating in employment, education, training or other related activities
d) not undertaking specified employment, education, training, volunteer, leisure or other activities
…
”… must notify a community corrections officer if you change your address, contact details or employment”.
| 17. | If a DSO suspects on reasonable grounds that you are purchasing or selling drugs, and directs that you provide any information relating to your financial affairs, including income and expenditure, you must comply with that direction. |
| 21. | You must not: a. Possess, purchase or consume alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO; b. Possess or use prohibited drugs; or c. Abuse prescription drugs which are not prescribed to you. | | 23. | You must not enter any licensed premises (including hotels, bars, racecourses and licenced clubs, but excluding cafes and restaurants) without the prior approval of a DSO. | | 26. | Without limiting condition 25, you must not associate with any person: a. who you know is consuming or under the influence of alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO; b. who you know is consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs; or c. held in custody without prior approval of a DSO. |
“a. Consume alcohol such that the concentration alcohol in your breath or blood exceeds … 0.05 grams of alcohol in 210 litres of breath or 100 millilitres of blood, without the prior approval of a DSO;”.
In addition, it was submitted that the conditions relating to drug and alcohol testing would allow the risk to be monitored adequately without further restrictions.
In my view, the form of condition 21(a.) proposed by the defendant would be difficult for the defendant to comply with. It would require him to be aware of his blood alcohol concentration, which can only be accurately ascertained with sophisticated testing equipment, and to seek prior approval from a DSO when he proposed to consume any alcohol which would take him over the specified limit. Furthermore, drug and alcohol testing might not be effective as a sufficient risk mitigation measure in the defendant’s case, given his attitude to oral drug swipe testing while on parole, and the fact that it might not be an effective deterrent if not administered frequently and without notice.
The defendant’s general position that the ISO conditions should be consistent with his present parole conditions does not assist his submission in regard to condition 21(a.). His parole conditions presently include that he “must abstain from alcohol”.
The form of the sub-condition proposed by the State does not involve an outright prohibition on the consumption of alcohol but rather that the defendant is to seek the prior approval of a DSO for possessing, purchasing or consuming alcohol. In my view, this is less onerous than his present parole conditions and still permits risk assessment and management by a DSO without undue restriction on the defendant. In these circumstances, I shall include condition 21 in the form proposed by the State.
Condition 23 seeks to restrict the defendant from attending places where alcohol will be available without the prior approval of a DSO, excluding cafes and restaurants. Dr Furst was of the view that the defendant required alcohol counselling, among other forms of counselling, and I accept that significant alcohol consumption would tend to elevate the risk posed by the defendant. Prohibiting the defendant from entering licensed premises without prior approval would allow that aspect of the risk to be managed without undue restriction, especially since approval could be given on a one-off basis or on a blanket basis if the appropriate management of risk so permitted. In addition, the exclusion of restaurants and cafés from the prohibition also renders it less restrictive but in a way which would not lead to any likely significant elevation of risk. I shall include condition 23.
As to condition 26, this complements the other conditions relating to alcohol and drug consumption and adds a restriction on associating with persons held in custody without prior approval of a DSO. Prohibited drug use and consumption of alcohol have been directly related to deterioration in the defendant’s mental health, accordingly, management of the defendant’s exposure to drugs and alcohol is an important aspect of mitigation of the risk posed by him. A prohibition on associating with persons consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs is appropriate and proportionate. A similar prohibition in relation to alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO achieves a similar end but with the ability to allow one off or blanket approvals where appropriate. These conditions in my view are justified and suitable.
Similarly, a restriction on associating with those held in custody without prior approval is likely to mitigate risk without undue restriction.
For these reasons, I propose to include conditions 21, 23 and 26 as sought by the State.
| 27. | You must agree to a DSO disclosing your criminal history to another person with whom you commence an intimate relationship. Before any disclosure is made, you will first be given the opportunity to make the disclosure yourself within a timeframe as identified by a DSO. |
This condition arises out of the fact that the defendant has been convicted of violence towards an intimate partner and he poses a high risk of violent offending. The defendant opposed this condition on the bases that an intimate relationship might be short lived, that a requirement for disclosure, at the commencement of an intimate relationship, might discourage the defendant from any long term relationships, that there is no similar condition attaching to parole and that the risk can be adequately managed by the remaining conditions.
The State submitted that the condition was the least invasive version given the risk posed by the defendant.
In my view, the defendant’s history and previous offending renders intimate partners at risk of violence. This is a serious matter and the ability for a DSO to disclose his criminal history to an intimate partner, if the defendant chooses not do so, is an appropriate way to manage the relevant aspect of the risk posed by the defendant. The way in which the condition comes to apply, if the defendant does not make disclosure himself, means it is proportionate to the risk involved. I shall include condition 27.
| 32. | If your DSO forms a reasonable suspicion that you have breached one of these conditions of your supervision or have committed a further criminal offence, you must submit to the search by a DSO (or any other person as directed requested by the DSO) of your person or residence, or any vehicle in which you are travelling or which is under your control, or any item, computer, electronic or communication device, storage facility, garage, locker or commercial facility in your possession or under your control; and to the seizure of any object located during the search. During a search, you must provide any pass codes or passwords to your computer, electronic or communication device if directed to do so. | | 33. | You must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to this Order. |
Condition 33 is ancillary to condition 32 and depends on whether condition 32 is imposed.
Initially, condition 32 was an absolute requirement to submit to a search without the need for any reasonable suspicion on the part of a DSO. This has been addressed in the introductory words to the condition in the form now proposed by the State.
The defendant opposed condition 32 (and consequently condition 33) on the basis that it was far reaching and that none of the offending was said to have involved computers, laptops, iPads, anything of that nature. It was submitted that this was a particularly onerous condition especially for a man who has offended because of his mental health and was not directed at risk. It was said that no such condition was included in his parole conditions and it was unnecessary and inappropriate.
There was some force in the defendant’s submissions when the condition permitted search and seizure without the need for there to be any reasonable suspicion that the defendant had breached one of the conditions of supervision or committed a further criminal offence. Once, however, the form of the condition was revised in the terms now sought by the State, the condition appears to me to be sufficiently related to the mitigation of risk and ensuring compliance with the conditions of the ISO as to be appropriate, especially given the defendant’s index offending, his more recent offending and his conduct in March 2025 at the Port Macquarie Base Hospital mental health unit.
Conditions 32 and 33 will be included in the ISO.
| 35. | If he changes his appearance significantly, he must notify a DSO within 12 hours. |
Even in this modified form, this condition was opposed by the defendant on the bases that it was unclear as to what a significant change to his appearance might be and that the defendant would be subject to electronic monitoring so that, whether or not he changed his appearance, he could be located.
The State contended that this condition facilitated general monitoring and mitigated the risk for avoiding monitoring by use of a disguise. In my view, the proposed condition also assists in mitigating the continuing risk posed to previous victims or others known to the defendant by ensuring that he is recognisable by them or the DSO is aware of any significant change to his appearance and can take steps to manage any consequential increase in risk.
While I accept that when he is subject to electronic monitoring, the defendant’s location will be ascertainable, he has previously damaged his ankle bracelet and rendered the monitoring device unable to be charged. I also accept that the defendant’s appearance was not directly relevant to any of his offending. Nonetheless, the risk of him reoffending or subverting the conditions imposed on him would, in my view, be increased if he changes his appearance. While there is some lack of clarity in the meaning of “significant change” in the proposed condition, the timeframe in which the defendant is required to notify the DSO provides some clarity in that it indicates that the change must have occurred within the previous twelve hours and, in any event, it must be a change which would affect the ability of others to recognise the defendant. The condition is not particularly onerous.
In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that condition 35 is sufficiently related to mitigation of the risk posed by the defendant and ensuring compliance with the terms of the ISO such as to make it appropriate and reasonable to impose it as a condition of the ISO. Accordingly, I shall include condition 35.
For these reasons, the orders of the Court are:
Pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the CHRO Act), one qualified psychiatrist and one registered neuropsychologist, as agreed between the parties, are appointed to conduct separate examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports on the results of those examinations to the Supreme Court of New South Wales on a date, as agreed between the parties.
The defendant is directed to attend the examinations in order (1).
Pursuant to ss 10A and 10C(1) of the CHRO Act, the defendant is made the subject of an interim supervision order commencing immediately after the expiration of the defendant’s sentence on 19 November 2025, for a period of 28 days.
Pursuant to s 11 of the CHRO Act, the defendant is directed to comply with the conditions set out in the schedule to these orders for the duration of the interim supervision order.
The parties have liberty to apply, if the parties are unable to reach agreement for the purposes of order (1).
**********
SCHEDULE TO THE ORDERS MADE 13 OCTOBER 2025 (20.5 KB, docx)
Defendant’s Written Submissions filed on 18 August 2025 (DWS), par 4.
DWS, par 57.
DWS, par 56.
Schedule of Conditions included as an attachment.
Format amended.
Format amended.
State of New South Wales
Lunn-Reid