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[2026] NSWSC 785
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-07-07
Richardson J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: State of New South Wales v KW (Preliminary) [2026] NSWSC 785
Hearing dates: 17 June 2026
Date of orders: 7 July 2026
Decision date: 07 July 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Richardson J
Decision: (1) An order pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act):
(a) Appointing two qualified psychiatrists and/or two registered psychologists (or one qualified psychiatrist and one qualified psychologist) to conduct separate psychiatric or psychological examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and
(b) Directing the defendant to attend to those examinations.
(2) An order:
(a) Pursuant to s 10A of the Act, that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order from 20 July 2026 (the interim supervision order);
(b) Pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act, that the interim supervision order be for a period of 28 days; and
(c) Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, directing the defendant for the period of the interim supervision order to comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule attached to this judgment.
Catchwords: HIGH RISK OFFENDER — preliminary hearing — application for interim supervision order
Legislation Cited: Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW), s 15
Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 15A
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 61M, 66C, 578A
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW),
ss 4, 4A, 5, 5B, 5D, 5I, 7, 9, 10A, 10C, 11
Cases Cited: Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57 State of New South Wales v Anderson [2015] NSWSC 1515 State of New South Wales v Ayoub (Final) [2023] NSWSC 963 State of New South Wales v Dickson (Preliminary) [2019] NSWSC 1116 State of New South Wales v Dunn (pseudonym) [2018] NSWSC 1008 State of New South Wales v KW [2023] NSWSC 849 State of New South Wales v Loveridge [2026] NSWSC 533 State of New South Wales v Pacey [2015] NSWSC 1983 State of New South Wales v Shields [2022] NSWSC 469 State of New South Wales v Sines (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 985 State of New South Wales v Wilson (Preliminary) [2017] NSWSC 1367
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
KW (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
K Ng (Plaintiff)
D Carroll (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2026/153727
Publication restriction: Publication or broadcast of names and any information or material that may lead to the identification of the applicant or the complainants is prohibited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 578A; Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 15A
HER HONOUR: By Summons filed 14 April 2026, the State of New South Wales seeks final orders under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act) that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order (ESO) for a period of two years.
The matter currently before the Court is a preliminary hearing under s 7 of the Act. The State seeks orders pursuant to s 7(4) that the defendant be examined by two court-appointed experts, and an interim supervision order (ISO) be imposed in accordance with s 10A of the Act. The State has filed a schedule of proposed conditions that it seeks be imposed on a final basis under an ESO and submits that those same conditions should be imposed as conditions of an ISO.
The defendant opposes the imposition of an ISO and submits that the Court would not be satisfied of the test in s 7(4) of the Act, which requires the Supreme Court to make the proposed orders if, following the preliminary hearing, it is satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO. As set out in detail below, the key basis upon which the defendant submits the Court would not be satisfied of the test, is in relation to the “unacceptable risk” requirement as set out in s 5B(d) of the Act.
In the alternative, the defendant submits that, were the Court to be satisfied of the test in s 7(4) of the Act, the conditions sought by the State ought to be amended to ensure they are appropriately directed to mitigating the relevant risk and do not unduly constrain his liberty.
For the reasons set out below:
I am satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO;
I make the orders sought by the State that the defendant be examined by two court-appointed experts; and
I grant an ISO but vary the conditions sought by the State to which it will be subject. I am not persuaded that the conditions sought in relation to electronic monitoring and drug testing are appropriate.
The following matters of factual background are common ground:
The defendant was born on 28 June 1986 in Orange, NSW and is a 39-year-old male, living in the community, and is currently subject to an ESO.
The defendant experienced an “extremely dysfunctional and traumatic childhood which included exposure to alcohol and substance abuse” and, it is alleged, serious sexual abuse and neglect by both his parents. He is the eldest of five children; however, his younger brother was killed in 1986 when he was run over by a garbage truck.
The defendant was placed in foster care at the age of 13. He left school in Ninth Grade and since, has been employed for short periods doing unskilled work.
The defendant has a mild intellectual disability.
On 28 April 2023, the defendant was released from custody and has resided continuously in the community since.
The defendant was made the subject of an ESO by order of his Honour Justice Weinstein on 7 July 2023: State of New South Wales v KW [2023] NSWSC 849 (current ESO). The current ESO commenced on 20 July 2023 for a period of three years. In the proceedings before Weinstein J, the defendant did not oppose the making of an ESO but rather argued it should be for a shorter duration and that there should be fewer conditions: New South Wales v KW [2023] at [103]-[139].
The defendant has not returned to custody since the imposition of the ESO.
The current ESO, absent any lawful detention of the defendant, will expire on 20 July 2026. Thus, it is clear that the defendant’s current supervision will expire before these proceedings are determined on a final basis.
The defendant is a registrable person under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) (the CPR Act) and has been made subject to the Child Protection Register for 15 years, following his conviction for the index offences (which are described below).
The defendant’s reporting obligations are suspended whilst he is subject to an ESO: s 15(1)(d) of the CPR Act.
In 2001, when the defendant was 14 years old and in foster care, he was convicted of aggravated indecent assault against his sister (who was under the age of 16 years), contrary to (now repealed) s 61M(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The defendant was sentenced to a two-year supervised recognisance order.
In 2013, the defendant was convicted of aggravated indecent assault against his then ex-wife’s 11-year-old daughter, contrary to (now repealed) s 61M(2) of the Crimes Act. On 30 May 2018, the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months with a non-parole period of nine months in relation to this offence.
Although s 61M is now repealed, these offences constitute a ‘serious sex offence’ for the purposes of the Act because at the time they were committed, the offences fell under Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act and were punishable by imprisonment of 7 years or more: ss 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(d) of the Act.
The index offences consist of two counts of sexual intercourse with a child between the ages of 14 and 16, contrary to s 66C(3) of the Crimes Act, and one count of aggravated indecent assault against a person under the age of 16 years, contrary to (now repealed) s 61M(2) of the Crimes Act (the index offences).
It is common ground that the index offences constitute ‘serious sex offences’ pursuant to s 5(1)(a)(i) of the Act in that they are offences under Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act, where the offence is punishable by imprisonment for 7 years or more. As for the offence against s 61M(2), it is common ground that it is a ‘serious sex offence’ for the same reason set out in [14] above.
The index offences were committed on 18 and 19 April 2018. The defendant was charged with the index offences on 1 May 2018. In State of New South Wales v KW [2023] Weinstein J, at [27], described the offending as follows:
“The index offending involved offences against a 14-year old girl whom the defendant met on Facebook. The offending occurred whilst [the defendant] was on bail for the offence committed against his stepdaughter […] He arranged to meet the victim at night at a McDonald’s carpark and assaulted the victim after driving her to a remote grassed area. The offending involved touching the victim’s breast, rubbing her vagina, digital vaginal penetration, and two instances of penile vaginal penetration.”
The State relies on the following material in relation to the preliminary hearing now before the Court:
the reports assessing the defendant’s risk adduced before Weinstein J in the 2023 proceedings that resulted in the imposition of the current ESO (see New South Wales v KW [2023] at [8]-[9]); and
material related to the progress of the defendant in reintegrating into the community since the imposition of the ESO and including updated risk reports, reports prepared by Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW) and treatment and rehabilitation program reports.
That material is listed in Annexure A to the State’s submissions dated 7 May 2026, all of which I have reviewed and taken into account.
As referred to above, the relevant test in s 7(4) of the Act, is whether this Court is satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO. If I am not so satisfied, I must dismiss the application: s 7(5) of the Act.
Section 5B of the Act sets out four preconditions that must be met before the Court may make an order for an ESO:
(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and
(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and
(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and
(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.
Section 5B(d) contains an important concept within the Act, namely whether an offender poses an ‘unacceptable risk’ of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision pursuant to an ESO.
Section 5D provides:
For the purposes of this Part, the Supreme Court is not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine that there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.
By s 9(2) of the Act, the Legislature has provided that in determining whether or not to make an ESO, ‘the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration of the Supreme Court’.
Section 9(3) of the Act then provides for a series of matters the Court must have regard to in determining whether to make an ESO. I take these matters into account as they are relevant to the question whether the defendant poses an “unacceptable risk” of committing a serious sex offence if not kept under supervision: State of New South Wales v Wilson (Preliminary) [2017] NSWSC 1367 at [25] (N Adams J) (and the cases therein cited).
Section 9(4) of the Act provides that ‘[i]n determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order in respect of an offender, the Supreme Court is not to consider any intention of the offender to leave New South Wales (whether permanently or temporarily)’. On the facts of this matter, this does not appear to be an issue. In any event, I do not take this matter into account given the terms of s 9(4).
Here, the defendant accepts that the three preconditions (or “threshold requirements”) in s 5B(a)-(c) are met but contests the State’s assertion that the fourth is made out being, ‘that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order’: s 5B(d).
In relation to s 5B(a), I observe as follows. The offence under s 66C(3) of the Crimes Act was committed by the defendant against a person between 14 and 16 years of age. It follows that this offence meets the description of a “serious sexual offence” within the meaning of s 5(1)(a)(i) of the Act which is, in turn, a type of “serious offence” as defined in s 4 of the Act. It follows that the defendant is an “offender” within the meaning of s 4A of the Act.
In relation to s 5B(b), the defendant is a “supervised offender” as he is presently the subject of an ESO: see New South Wales v KW [2023] at [142] (Weinstein J).
In relation to s 5B(c), it is common ground that the State has made an application for a new ESO in respect of the defendant in accordance with s 5I of the Act.
The key issue in this matter is the fourth precondition; being s 5B(d).
Numerous authorities in this Court have observed that the nature of the assessment to be made on a preliminary hearing seeking orders under ss 7(4) and 10A:
involves taking the plaintiff’s case at its highest: State of New South Wales v Dunn (pseudonym) [2018] NSWSC 1008 at [44];
as the equivalent of an inquiry into the existence of a prima facie case: Wilson at [101] (N Adams J); State of New South Wales v Shields [2022] NSWSC 469 at [12] (Wright J); State of New South Wales v Dickson (Preliminary) [2019] NSWSC 1116 at [43] (Johnson J); State of New South Wales v Pacey [2015] NSWSC 1983 at [44] (Harrison J);
as similar to the task at committal proceedings: State of New South Wales v Loveridge [2026] NSWSC 533 at [24] (N Adams CJ at CL).
The State accepts, correctly, that even where the Court has the power to make an ESO, it nevertheless retains a discretion as to whether an ESO will actually be made: State of New South Wales v Anderson [2015] NSWSC 1515 at [30] (Hamill J); Wilson at [24]; State of New South Wales v Shields [2022] NSWSC 469 at [12] (Wright J). As the defendant submitted, while the impact of an ESO on the offender is not relevant to the determination of whether the unacceptable risk threshold in s 5B(d) is met, the Court may take that into account in the exercise of its discretion under s 9 of the Act: Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57 at [44], [56]-[57] (Beazley P), [126] (Basten JA) and [148] (Gleeson JA).
I accept that these principles are relevant not only to the question whether an order should be made, but also in respect of the conditions to be imposed on any such order: State of New South Wales v Sines (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 985 at [47] (Wright J).
As for what is meant by assuming that the “matters alleged” will be proved, in State of New South Wales v Mustapha (Preliminary) [2025] NSWSC 926 (“Mustapha”), Wright J considered this phrase in the context of s 27(b) of the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW), which is relevantly identical to s 10A(b) of the Act. His Honour observed the following (at [35]-[38], [41]):
“[35] The expression ‘matters alleged’ has been held to refer to facts rather than conclusions. In State of New South Wales v Elomar (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1034, Rothman J said that the test does not require ‘prima facie’ proof of the matters alleged and continued:
‘[7] … I should make it clear that the term ‘matters alleged’ does not refer to a conclusion. It refers to matters of fact that, if proved, would be open to lead to a particular conclusion.
[8] To use an example may better illustrate the distinction. If an application for an ISO and/or ESO were to allege that a person was ‘a terrorist’, that would not, in my view, of itself, satisfy the condition prescribed by s 27(b) of the THRO Act. Whether or not the defendant in any such hypothetical proceeding was ‘a terrorist’ is a conclusion that must be based upon facts that are adduced.
[9] In such a circumstance, it is necessary for the State of New South Wales to allege certain facts, which, if proved, would lead to a conclusion that would justify the making of an ESO…
[10] As a consequence, the ‘matters alleged’ must be facts or based on facts that are, firstly, capable of being proved; and, secondly, such that, if proved, they would satisfy the Court that an ESO should or would be made.’
[36] In my view, Rothman J’s comment that the phrase ‘matters alleged’ refers to facts not conclusions should be understood as distinguishing between facts, including inferences and expert opinions based on other facts, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, necessary or ultimate conclusions as to the issues which the Court has to decide, for example whether a defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence.
[37] Thus, if the supporting documentation included an expert psychiatrist’s or psychologist’s opinion as to the likelihood of the offender committing a serious terrorism offence, as referred to in s 23(3)(b) and (c), that opinion would be a ‘matter alleged’ in the supporting documentation. If other matters alleged in the supporting documentation provided a substantial reason to doubt the validity or correctness of such an opinion, that would be a matter that should be taken into account in determining whether to refuse to exercise the discretion to make an ISO if the power to do so under s 27 is enlivened.
[38] Further, Campbell J held in State of New South Wales v Naaman (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1329 at [48] that in applying the test in ss 24(5) and 27(b):
‘… it is necessary to look at the allegations and the documentation put before the Court through the lens of the plaintiff’s case and to take them at their highest when deciding whether the test articulated in s 27(b) has been made good in all the circumstances of the case.’
…
[41] N Adams J accepted that the test on a preliminary application under the THRO Act is a ‘low one’ in State of New South Wales v Dunn (a pseudonym) [2018] NSWSC 1008 at [44]. Garling J took the same approach in State of New South Wales v Sturgeon [2019] NSWSC 559, when considering substantially the same wording in the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW). His Honour said at [5] - [6]:
‘The Court, in undertaking this exercise, is not involved in weighing up the documentation or resolving any conflicts, inconsistencies or uncertainties which appear in the documentation. It is no part of the Court’s function to predict the ultimate result, or assess the likelihood of the ultimate result. If on the matters alleged in the supporting documentation it is open to the Court at a final hearing to make a CDO or [an] ESO, then a conclusion that the Court would be justified in making the order, is inevitable. The issue is to be resolved without considering what evidence might be called by [the defendant] at a final hearing, and without taking into account any evidence which may be called by a defendant at an interim hearing, because such evidence would not cast light upon what is alleged in the supporting documentation: Attorney-General (NSW) v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119 at [98].’”
“As stated above, the relevant statutory test at this preliminary stage is akin to that at committal proceedings. Although I have set that test out above at [24]- [27], it is worth re-stating. In Attorney-General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119, the Court of Appeal (Mason P, Santow and Tobias JJA) observed the following at [98] regarding this test (noting that what is now s 5B of the Act was previously s 16(1)(b)):
The task assigned by s16(1)(b) is for the Court to look at what is alleged in the supporting documentation to see whether it would, if proved, justify the making of either a continuing detention order or extended supervision order (s16(1)(b)). In determining whether the power to grant an interim order is enlivened, the Court is not involved in weighing that documentation or predicting the ultimate result. The power is enlivened if the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of either category of final order bearing in mind the elevated standard of proof stated in ss17(2) and (3). That threshold question is to be resolved without considering what evidence might be called by the offender at the final hearing. Indeed, it is to be considered without taking into account the evidence (if any) called by the offender at the interim hearing: such evidence may go to (relevant) discretionary matters, but would not cast light upon what is alleged in the Attorney General’s supporting documentation. (Emphasis in original.)”
- An order pursuant to section 7(4) of the [the Act]:
a. appointing two qualified psychiatrists and/or two registered psychologists (or one qualified psychiatrist and one qualified psychologist) to conduct separate psychiatric or psychological examinations of the defendants and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and
b. directing the defendant to attend those examinations.
2. An order:
a. pursuant to s 10A of the Act, that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order from 20 July 2026 “the interim supervision order”);
b. pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act, that the interim supervision order be for a period of 28 days; and
c. pursuant to s 11 of the Act, directing that the defendant, for the period of the interim supervision order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to this Summons.
On 17 October 2025, Sarah Wright, senior psychologist, prepared a Risk Assessment Report (RAR). On 27 March 2026, Ms Wright, prepared a supplementary RAR.
Ms Wright assessed the defendant’s risk of future offending using the following tools:
On the STATIC-99R, the defendant received a total score of 5, “Above Average” risk, or Level IVa (RAR [61]-[63]).
On the STABLE-2007, the defendant received a score of 14 suggesting a high density of criminogenic needs relative to other male sexual offenders (RAR [64]-[65]).
The results of the STABLE-2007 assessment were combined with that of the STATIC-99R to generate a composite assessment of risk/needs and the defendant was assessed as being in the Well Above Average risk level, or Level IVb (RAR [66]).
Using the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol-Version 2 (RSVP-V2), the defendant’s results suggest that he fell in the high risk category for repeat sexual violence. The main risk factors identified were chronicity of sexual violence, psychological coercion in sexual violence, and escalation of sexual violence.
Ms Wright identified the most relevant of the defendant’s criminogenic needs as follows (RAR [69]):
(a) chronicity, escalation and psychological coercion in sexual violence; (b) hostility toward women and negative emotionality; (c) problems with stress or coping, major mental disorder and poor problem-solving skills; (d) problems with minimisation and denial of sexual violence; problems with self-awareness; (e) problems resulting from child abuse; attitudes that support or condone sexual violence and sexual deviance; (f) problems with intimate and non-intimate relationships; and (g) problems with treatment and problems with supervision.
“… consistent with his previous offending, involving sexual contact with pre-pubescent to post-pubescent females. Potential victims are likely to be known to him through a partner. Alternatively, in keeping with [the index offences, the defendant] could again attempt to groom an unknown pubescent female via an internet/social media site, or phone application with the intention of forming a sexual relationship. He may seek to establish a connection through shared interests and the likely motivation for his behaviour would be for sexual gratification. While he is unlikely to use physical coercion to facilitate an offence, it is likely that his sexual violence may involve a degree of psychological coercion or grooming. Sexual contact may include ’hands-on’ offences including actual penetrative sexual acts.”
Ms Wright opines that, since the imposition of the current ESO, there has not been a significant reduction in the defendant’s overall risk. This view is based on the defendant displaying limited insight into his risk and the limited opportunities he has taken to engage in “behaviour change discussions” or attempts to proactively address his risk factors (RAR [73]).
Ms Wright considers the defendant to be “untreated”. Coupled with his limited insight, her view is that it is possible that any future sexual violence could be “serious” as defined in the Act (RAR [75]).
Ms Wright acknowledges that, despite the defendant remaining at such a high category of risk through the current ESO, he was not formally breached or charged with any offences during the ESO and there have been no indicators of high-risk scenarios or concerns that a sexual offence was imminent (RAR [75]).
As to the impact the defendant’s offence-free period has had on his risk, in her supplementary RAR, Ms Wright clarified that for the period of the current ESO, he has been subject to intensive supervision and has had limited opportunities to offend. Ms Wright opines that although research shows that risk of reoffending declines over time for individuals who remain offence-free in the community for lengthy periods of time, the same research does not support applying time-free adjustments in circumstances where community supervision is intensive and limits or greatly restricts an individual’s degree of personal freedom such that they lack realistic opportunities to offend.
As the defendant emphasised in his submissions, in Ms Wright’s supplementary RAR, she acknowledged that on the STABLE-2007, the defendant received a score of 14 which was lower than the score of 16 at the time of the earlier RAR which, she opined, “does reflect a slight reduction [in risk] over time between the dates of each assessment”.
The defendant submits that an analysis of contemporary CSNSW and National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) material provides a superior basis to assess risk rather than static statistic modelling. It is further submitted that there is a difference between the contemporaneous case notes made by Community Corrections of the progress of the defendant and what is described as the “less sanguine” opinions of the experts contained in the updated RAR and Risk Management Report (RMR) from Community Corrections. It is submitted that the former demonstrates that the defendant has made substantial progress in rehabilitation and reintegration, for example:
The Offender Integrated Management System (OIMS) notes contain material recording the fact that the Department Supervising Officer (DSO) had spoken with the defendant about his “consistent adherence to monitoring requirements, coupled with an [improvement] in his engagement since gaining access to [the new rural property] and his willingness to work with the DSO”. The DSO considered this to be a “positive trajectory”.
The OIMS notes contain material recording the fact that on 1 December 2025, a determination was made that electronic monitoring of the defendant be removed as part of which the defendant was commended for the positive progress he had made while subject to that monitoring.
I also take into account the reports prepared for the previous ESO hearing, namely:
RAR of Holly Cieplucha dated 12 September 2022;
supplementary RAR of Holly Cieplucha dated 7 December 2022;
expert report of Dr Elliott, court-appointed expert dated 25 May 2023; and
expert report of Dr McSwiggan, court-appointed expert dated 2 June 2023.
In his report, Dr Elliot expressed the view that the most prominent features of his assessment of the defendant were his “maladaptive personality traits”, which are “persistent and enduring”, are consistent with a borderline personality disorder. Additionally, he opined that the defendant exhibits a general disregard for the rights of others and externalises responsibilities for his offending behaviour.
In her report, Dr McSwiggan expressed the view that the defendant would likely fulfil the criteria of a paedophilic disorder and has features consistent with Hebephilia that would contribute to his risk of committing another serious sexual offence.
The defendant submits that he has developed protective factors in the community including that he has the support of his grandmother and has been living with her for three years without incident conducive to an increased risk. The defendant further submits that he receives extensive NDIS support which is a relevant support in the community.
However, I observe that Ms Wright was aware of the defendant NDIS’s support and the support given by his grandmother: RAR [24], [37], [52], [70], [83]. Ms Wright took these matters into account in her report when expressing her opinion that there were the following acute risk factors for sexual offending, a combination of which would “signify more imminent risk”: RAR [71]-[72] (emphasis added):
Victim access (e.g., he may meet potential pubescent female victims online, he may attempt to enter into relationships with women who have children, he may take advantage of an opportunity for isolated contact with a child in public, he may deliberately put himself in locations with a high chance of contact with children, such as outside of a school).
Emotional collapse (e.g., he may appear to be distressed, overwhelmed or emotionally immobilised; increase in rumination over perceived grievances, increase in comments portraying himself as a victim, sense of hopelessness).
Change in social supports (e.g., if he were to lose his grandmother’s support, if he were to lose his NDIS supports, or if he were to connect with a negative influence).
Hostility (e.g., increase in overt expressions of anger and hostility, aggressively confrontational, making decisions based on an exaggerated sense of grievance, resistant and aggressive in response to the attempts of others to intervene).
Rejection of supervision (e.g., non-compliant, resistant, evidence of deception to cover up breach behaviour, premature termination from intervention, missing supervision appointments, attempts to manipulate relationships to obtain exceptions to his conditions).
Sexual preoccupation (e.g., he may report a significant increase in sexual thoughts, fantasies or behaviours, he may use sexual thoughts or behaviours as a coping strategy).
I have summarised these matters at [12]-[18] above.
As Ms Wright observed, the defendant is a “recidivistic sexual offender” whose offending has escalated in seriousness over time.
The following matters are common ground in relation to the defendant’s treatment and programs.
In September 2021, while in custody for the index offences, the defendant participated in the EQUIPS Foundations Program.
He was eligible for other programs, including the ‘Self-Regulation Program – Sexual offending’, but was deemed unsuitable to participate due to the limited time remaining on his sentence.
In the final judgment for the current ESO, Weinstein J observed that, “in custody, it was generally accepted that there were challenges in providing treatment that was appropriately tailored to the defendant’s needs, especially in light of his mild intellectual disability”: New South Wales v KW [2023] at [84].
The defendant was directed to engage in psychological intervention but avoided engaging therapeutically with a CSNSW senior psychologist, resulting in the sessions ceasing.
From July 2024, the defendant engaged with an external psychologist to address non-criminogenic needs for his depression and anxiety, however, the defendant attended one session before disengaging.
On 11 March 2025, the defendant was given a verbal direction to engage with psychological support for his non-criminogenic needs and on 28 March 2025, he attended his first session with the external psychologist, Mr William Wainright.
Between May and September 2025, the defendant attended 15 sessions with Mr Wainright.
These sessions have stopped, as NDIS decided to cease funding. Mr Wainright reports that the defendant “demonstrated a positive motivation to discuss trauma from his past and his current negative experiences” and, further, that “he initially struggled to see his own personal responsibility, however made progress as the sessions continued”.
Overall, the defendant “engaged well” and “demonstrated more openness and flexible thinking… [He] was able to identify the effects of his offending on others more clearly but struggled to manage the distress that he felt when talking about the subject”.
The defendant submits that the State’s contention that he remains an unacceptable risk due to lack of treatment ought to be rejected. He submits that the evidence establishes he was unsuitable for the High Intensity Sexual Offender Program (HISOP) due to diagnosed intellectual disability. Further, that he was denied access to the Self-Regulation Program – Sexual Offending due to custodial constraints, not by reason of refusal or non-engagement. In this respect, it is common ground that the defendant was deemed unsuitable to participate in the Self-Regulation Program – Sexual Offending due to the limited time remaining on his sentence.
The defendant submits that he has demonstrated a positive attitude towards appropriate therapeutic treatment and submits that the State failed to provide him with appropriate treatment during his period in incarceration.
The defendant’s counsel emphasised in oral submissions that the adverse view expressed by Ms Wright in the RAR (that “sessions appeared to cease because of [KW’s] avoidance of engaging therapeutically and his attempts at staff splitting”) was not supported by the underlying OIMS notes she had footnoted in support of her view. A review of those notes appears to support the conclusion that the sessions stopped after three sessions due to a mixture of the defendant and the CSNSW Psychologist being unavailable.
In this respect, the defendant also points to the fact that he attended 15 sessions with Mr Wainwright between May and September 2025. He submits that he engaged voluntarily in forensic psychological treatment when funding was available, demonstrating a willingness to address identified risk factors through appropriate therapeutic means. It is submitted that, in the circumstances, he cannot be characterised as untreated; rather that the absence of formal program completion arises from structural and systemic barriers.
Counsel for the State accepted that while the initial purpose of the counselling with Mr Wainwright was to address his non-criminogenic needs such as depression, the counselling appears to have later touched on his criminogenic issues as well. The defendant’s counsel placed emphasis on a 2-page letter from Mr Wainright which concluded that the defendant “was able to identify the effects of his offending on others more clearly but struggled to manage the distress that he felt when talking about this subject”. However, at this stage it is difficult to place much weight on this aspect of the letter from Mr Wainwright given it does not reveal how, and the extent to which, the defendant discussed his sexual offending against minors.
The State relies on two recorded breach warnings given as part the defendant’s ESO. These two breaches were described in the ESO Completion Report as follows:
On 12/08/2024 the defendant was issued a formal written warning for being in possession of more than 100 electronic devices, including mobile phones, laptops and tablets, despite a written direction issued on 07/07/2023 that he is permitted to possess one mobile phone and one other device which is capable of accessing the Internet.
On 24/01/2025 the defendant was issued with a formal written warning for resetting his phone to the factory settings on his mobile phone and deleting all data from his mobile phone without prior consent from his DSO, in breach of condition 27 of his ESO.
The defendant’s submissions about those two breach warnings are as follows:
In relation to the first matter, the defendant submits the possession of the devices was because he was attempting to develop a business of repairing electronic devices and that his intention to do so was the subject of discussions with CSNSW and written correspondence. The OIMS notes record that, while informing his DSO in December 2023 that he was going to request to open a business that repurposed and sold old devices (and that he had 40+ devices in his possession for that purpose), some five months later, his then DSO was considering, but still had not given an answer, as to whether that request would be granted. Then, some 3 months later (in August 2024) the defendant was issued a formal written warning for being in possession of more than 100 electronic devices, including mobile phones, laptops and tablets.
In relation to the second matter, the defendant submits that he was given a breach warning for “resetting his phone after it had been submerged in water” and submits that this explanation should be accepted. In this respect, the OIMS notes record that in November 2024, the defendant wrote to his DSO indicating he had dropped his phone in water and, in order to make it work, had to factory reset it.
While it is correct that the defendant was not formally breached during the three-year period of the ESO, there were two recorded breach warnings given as set out above. Thus, I do not accept the submission that the defendant was “fully compliant” with his conditions during the three-year period of the ESO. That said, I also take into account the observation of Mr Johns, as expressed in the RMR dated 7 November 2025, that the defendant’s compliance with the conditions of his ESO has been “reasonably satisfactory”.
The defendant also points to the fact that during the approximately three years of the ESO, he has not been charged or convicted with any sexual offences; nor have there been reports of findings of contact with children, attempted contact, grooming behaviour or any predatory conduct of a sexual nature during this time. It is submitted that this prolonged absence of sexual misconduct under intensive supervision is an important factor when assessing risk and undermines any conclusion that the defendant presently poses an unacceptable risk of committing a further sexual offence.
The defendant submits that he would have reporting obligations to the Child Protection Registrar upon the expiration of the current ESO (were a new ESO not to be imposed) under the CPR Act. The defendant also points to the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004 (NSW) which allows for NSW police to apply to the Local Court to make orders prohibiting a person from engaging in conduct which poses a real risk to the sexual safety of children. In relation to the second of these Acts, the defendant points to OIMS notes which he says support an inference that a prohibition order is likely to be made by local police and a further inference that he will be fully compliant with such an order. The defendant submits that these matters, together with family and NDIS supports, are sufficient to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level.
The State submits that there is no evidence supporting a conclusion that an order under the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act would be made. Further, in relation to the defendant’s obligations under the CPR Act, the State relies on the following analysis in State of New South Wales v Ayoub (Final) [2023] NSWSC 963 at [87]-[89]:
“Whilst the power to prohibit the defendant from engaging in particular conduct, such as having contact with persons under 16 years of age, or attending areas designed for children’s play, is useful, an order under the [Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004 (NSW) (CPOP Act)] cannot require the defendant to attend upon the FPS for example. Nor does the CPOP Act give a supervising officer powers of monitoring that go beyond ordinary techniques of police investigation. An officer supervising a person subject to an ESO, depending upon the conditions of it, will ordinarily have the power to search an offender’s home or electronic devices for example; police have those powers only if there is a legitimate basis for a warrant to issue which permits such searches. That is, enforcement of a [child protection prohibition order] is retrospective, following the suspected commission of a breach; monitoring of an ESO is preventative, and aims to intervene before a criminal offence is committed.
The same limitations are broadly true of orders made pursuant to the [CPR Act]. Section 2A(b) of the [CPR Act] gives as one of the objects of the Act the ‘early detection of offences by recidivist child sex offenders’. The intention of monitoring a recidivist child sex offender such as the defendant under an ESO is to prevent offences from being committed and rehabilitate the offender to prevent continued criminality. The reporting obligations under the [CPR Act] are a useful tool for police in monitoring child sex offenders, but the Act does not provide for the same intensive personal scrutiny and support that an order under [the Act] does.
For an individual posing a low or minimal risk supervision under the [CPR Act] and / or the CPOP Act is adequate; for an individual posing a higher risk, it is not.”
I observe at the outset that, under s 9(2) of the Act, the safety of the community is the paramount consideration that I must take into account.
Taking all the above matters into account, together with the parties’ submissions, I am satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO.
The defendant is a recidivistic sexual offender whose offending has escalated in seriousness over time. The State has adduced evidence, if proved, that the defendant falls in the high risk category for repeat sexual violence, with the main risk factors identified as chronicity of sexual violence, psychological coercion in sexual violence, and escalation of sexual violence.
In relation to the weight that should be given to the three-year period during which the defendant has been offence free, the State has adduced evidence that, if proved, supports the view that a longer time for assessment is required before it can be said that the level of risk has been ameliorated, in the absence of dynamic protective factors. First, Dr Elliot and Dr McSwiggan – each a court-appointed independent expert who gave evidence at the hearing for the current ESO – have expressed opinions to the effect that the defendant has various disorders that are relevant to the future risk of serious sex offences. Second, Ms Wright has opined that, because the defendant has been subject to intensive supervision under the ESO, he has had limited opportunities to offend. Third, the State has adduced evidence that there has not been a significant reduction in the defendant’s overall risk since the imposition of the ESO three years ago because he displays limited insight into his risk and because of the limited opportunities he has taken to engage in “behaviour change discussions” or attempts to proactively address his risk factors.
Given the state of satisfaction I have reached, I make the orders sought by the State under s 7(4) of the Act that the defendant be examined by two court-appointed experts.
Other matters in the supporting documentation that have been emphasised by the defendant in written and oral submissions do not, in my view, provide a substantial reason to doubt the validity of the opinion evidence adduced by the State (as summarised in these reasons) and, as such, do not persuade me to conclude that the test under s 7(4) is not met or cause me to refuse to exercise the discretion to make an ISO. The matters emphasised by the defendant include:
the particular circumstances of the two breach warnings given in relation to his current ESO;
the reasons why he was not provided appropriate therapeutic treatment while incarcerated and why the post-incarceration treatment came to an end;
that he engaged voluntarily in forensic psychological treatment when funding was available, demonstrating a willingness to address identified risk factors through appropriate therapeutic means and that he should not be characterised as “untreated”;
the significance of the 15 therapy sessions he had with Mr Wainwright;
the nature and significance of protective factors in the community he has developed, and the protective effect of NDIS supports; and
the nature of his obligations that arise independently of the Act, such as obligations to the Child Protection Registrar.
None of these matters, or these matters taken collectively, persuade me to refuse to exercise the discretion to make an ISO. I am persuaded, at least at this stage, there has not been a significant reduction in the defendant’s overall risk since the imposition of the current ESO because he displays limited insight into his risk. Further, as set out below, the terms of the ISO will be very similar to, but less restrictive than, the current ESO.
Given the current ESO will expire on 20 July 2026, it is clear the defendant’s current supervision will expire before these proceedings are determined on a final basis. Thus, I also make an order for an ISO under s 10A of the Act.
The defendant submits that the conditions sought by the State ought to be amended to ensure they are appropriately directed to mitigating the relevant risk and do not unduly constrain his liberty.
In respect of the conditions that are not disputed, I am persuaded they are appropriate. I only address below the conditions that are disputed by the defendant.
The defendant must comply with any direction given by his DSO, or their delegate from CSNSW, which is reasonably necessary for the enforcement of any of the conditions of the ESO to which he is subject.
The defendant contests the appropriateness of condition 1 on the basis that it is overly broad and lacks sufficient clarity. The defendant further argues that ‘any conditions imposed should be precise and clearly defined, so as not to create a risk of inadvertent non-compliance’. The defendant seeks the removal of this condition, submitting that the remaining conditions are already adequate, appropriate and proportionate in the circumstances.
I allow condition 1. In my view, it is not overly broad or lacking in sufficient clarity. As the State submits, it is a general condition facilitating oversight and supervision of the defendant in accordance with the ESO. In my view, it continues to be appropriate to manage the defendant’s risk, at least at the stage of considering the terms of the ISO.
The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with, or remove, the equipment.
The defendant opposes the imposition of condition 4 and points to the fact he has not been subjected to electronic monitoring since early December 2025. The defendant submits that he has not encountered any issues since the removal of the electronic monitoring and that, in those circumstances, there is no demonstrable utility or justification for reintroducing this condition. However, it was accepted by the defendant’s counsel at the hearing, that condition 4 is discretionary and does not require the State to direct that the defendant wear electronic monitoring equipment. Rather, it is framed so that the defendant must comply with a direction to wear such equipment, if it is given.
The State submits that the electronic monitoring ‘permits [a] DSO to monitor [the] defendant’s compliance with schedule and risk-related behaviours as well as any exclusion zones (including near child related facilities)’.
While condition 4 confers a discretion on the DSO, I am not persuaded it is appropriate. Electronic monitoring of the defendant was removed in early December 2025, and no evidence was adduced as part of the preliminary hearing to the effect that this created difficulties or increased risk. I am not persuaded in the circumstances that this condition is appropriate, particularly given the nature of other conditions that will be imposed and given the intrusiveness of electronic monitoring.
Although conditions 5 to 8 were opposed by the defendant, his Counsel accepted that if the Court were not to impose condition 4 (electronic monitoring), this would increase the appropriateness of conditions 5 to 8. Conditions 5 to 8 relate to the defendant’s place of residence including that the defendant:
must notify his DSO of the address at which he is residing within 24 hours of taking up residence there (condition 5);
must allow a DSO to visit him at his address at any time and, for that purpose, allow them to enter the premises (condition 6);
must not spend the night anywhere other than his address or any alternative approved address without the approval of the DSO (condition 7); and
must notify the DSO of the name of any person who ordinarily resides in the same accommodation as himself within 48 hours of such person commencing to reside there and must notify the DSO of any person who stays overnight within 24 hours of such person doing so (condition 8).
In summary, the State seeks the imposition of conditions 5 to 8 on the basis that these conditions allow a DSO to monitor any change in accommodation, co-inhabitants or visitors of the defendant and ensure such circumstances do not give rise to any risk-related scenarios, such as the potential for the defendant to reside with someone who has children. The State submits that the conditions facilitate supervision of the defendant’s movements, allow detection of any potential breaches and have been conditions of the current ESO that have been applied without issue for the last three years and remain appropriate to manage the defendant’s risk.
In my view, the imposition of conditions 5 to 8 is appropriate, particularly given I have refused to impose condition 4 (electronic monitoring).
The defendant is to undertake any non-invasive drug testing at the direction of his DSO who believe on reasonable grounds that the testing is necessary to confirm that the defendant is not using prohibited drugs.
The defendant opposes condition 11 on the basis that there have been no breaches of the existing drug and alcohol condition since the ESO was imposed and on the basis that the existing conditions (such as those in Part E and Part F) remain appropriate and sufficient to manage the defendant’s risk.
The State submits that in circumstances where there is a documented history of drug and alcohol misuse, this condition empowers the DSO to conduct non-invasive testing where there are ‘reasonable grounds that the testing is necessary and that this condition is appropriate to manage the defendant’s risk’. The State further submits that this condition has been applied without issue for the last 3 years.
During oral submissions, the State was unable to point to any updated evidence in relation to the alleged drug and alcohol issues of the defendant and conceded that drug tests taken by the defendant, pursuant to a direction during the three years of the current ESO, had all returned as either negative or false positive. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that this condition is appropriate.
The defendant must undergo ongoing psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) as directed by a DSO, including any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction.
The defendant must undergo ongoing psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling (or any combination of these), including any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs as directed by his treating psychologist, psychiatrist or counsellor and not as directed by a DSO. If the defendant does not have sufficient funding through NDIS or his own private means, he should not be considered in breach for failing to participate.
I do not accept that the alternate drafting of condition 29 is appropriate, in particular because it would introduce uncertainty. It is not generally in the remit of medical professionals to direct their patients to undergo treatment. Further, during oral submissions, counsel for the State confirmed that condition 29 would not extend to a direction to the defendant to participate in any treatment at his own expense.
I accept the State’s submission that condition 29, as proposed by it, is appropriate as it enables the enforcement of the defendant’s attendance at therapeutic programs or counselling to seek to monitor and reduce his risk over time.
In addition to opposing condition 29 generally, the defendant further submits that the condition should be amended to ‘clarify/confirm that the defendant [is not] compelled to take medication’. I reject this contention. Condition 29 is drafted so that the DSO has a discretion to direct that the defendant undergo psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling, which would include, relevantly, “treatment programs” the subject of the direction. That would include the defendant complying with taking medication that is included as part of a treatment program. Given the defendant's mental health history, and the expert opinions adduced by the State regarding the defendant’s personality disorder, I am persuaded that condition 29 is appropriate.
The State seeks the imposition of four conditions which, it submits, facilitate the monitoring of the defendant’s mental health, his compliance with medical intervention and treatment conditions, and ensures any change in the defendant’s risk can be monitored in the event of a change in medication.
The conditions proposed by the State are that the defendant must:
notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that he consults (condition 30);
attend, upon the direction of a DSO, any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction (condition 31);
take medications that are prescribed to him by his healthcare practitioners for any alcohol or drug programs or for any mental health conditions and only in the manner prescribed (condition 32); and
notify a DSO immediately if he cease[s] to take or declines to commence taking any medication as referred to in condition 32 above (condition 33).
The defendant opposed each of the above conditions on the basis that he does not want to be compelled to take medication, and that in some circumstances, he may not be able to comply with the conditions due to a lack of medical funding or otherwise, and that this could act as a deterrent to him seeking medical treatment.
I consider the concerns raised by the defendant in relation to adequate medical funding to be ameliorated by the State’s concession at the hearing that the conditions do not allow it to issue a direction to him to participate in any such treatment at his own expense. As set out above, given the defendant's mental health history and the expert opinions adduced by the State regarding the defendant’s personality disorder, I am persuaded these conditions are appropriate.
The State seeks a condition that the defendant must agree to the disclosure of his criminal history to any healthcare professionals that are treating him, so far as it is relevant to his risk (condition 36).
The defendant opposes this condition on the basis that it may operate to deter him from seeking medical treatment.
I accept the State’s submission that this condition is appropriate as it allows agencies involved in the supervision of the defendant to be appropriately informed as to the defendant’s risk and to ensure his criminogenic needs are being appropriately and consistently addressed.
I make the following orders:
An order pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Ac**t 2006 (NSW) (the Act):
(a) Appointing two qualified psychiatrists and/or two registered psychologists (or one qualified psychiatrist and one qualified psychologist) to conduct separate psychiatric or psychological examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and (b) Directing the defendant to attend to those examinations.
(a) Pursuant to s 10A of the Act, that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order from 20 July 2026 (the interim supervision order); (b) Pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act, that the interim supervision order be for a period of 28 days; and (c) Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, directing the defendant for the period of the interim supervision order to comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule attached to this judgment.
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SCHEDULE OF CONDITIONS
PART A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations
1 The defendant must comply with any direction given by his DSO, or their delegate from CSNSW, which is reasonably necessary for the enforcement of any of the conditions of the ESO to which he is subject.
2 Where a direction may conveniently be given in writing, it may be given electronically, including by SMS or other messaging service.
3 The defendant must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going, who he is with, what he is doing and the nature of his associations.
4 There is no condition 4.
PART B: Accommodation
5 The defendant is to notify his DSO of the address at which he is residing within 24 hours of taking up residence there.
6 The defendant must allow a DSO to visit him at his address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.
7 The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his address or any alternative approved addresses (if relevant) without the approval of a DSO.
8 The defendant must notify a DSO of the name of any person who ordinarily resides in the same accommodation as himself within 48 hours of such person commencing to reside there with the defendant and must notify a DSO of any person who stays overnight at the residence at the invitation of the defendant within 24 hours of that occurring.
PART C: Place and travel restrictions
9 The defendant must surrender any passports held by him to the Commissioner, must not be in possession of any passports, and must not attempt to apply for any passports.
10 The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner of CSNSW.
PART D: Drugs and Alcohol
11 There is no condition 11.
PART E: Non-association
Associate with Children
12 The defendant must not associate with anyone who he knows or reasonably should know is under 18, other than incidental contact in a public place in the course of the duties of the minor; or with the written permission of a DSO and in accordance with any requirements reasonably determined by a DSO.
Associations with Others (not children)
13 The defendant must not associate with any person or persons specified by a DSO. The DSO will only specify such a person in response to a risk of the defendant committing a child sexual offence.
14 If the defendant starts a romantic relationship with any person, has a sexual relationship with any person or commences a friendship with any person, he must tell a DSO within 24 hours from the start of the relationship or friendship the name of that person and truthfully answer any questions that a DSO asks regarding that relationship or friendship.
15 The defendant must agree to a DSO disclosing his criminal history to another person if the disclosure is reasonably necessary. Before any disclosure is made, the defendant will be given the opportunity to make the disclosure himself within a timeframe identified by a DSO.
16 The defendant must obtain written permission from a DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation.
PART F: Access to the internet and other electronic communication
17 The defendant must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about communication, internet access and use of electronic devices (including, but not limited to, approval of devices used, method of communication, access to the internet and restrictions on deleting information).
18 The defendant must not use any alias, electronic identity, log-in name, name other than the name by which he is known at the date of these proceedings or any email address other than those known to a DSO. The defendant must give a DSO a list of all devices, services and applications he uses to communicate with or to access the internet and advise a DSO of any change to the list immediately. This includes phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers.
19 The defendant must only use an electronic device which has the ability to access the internet after the device has been disclosed to a DSO and the device has been seen and approved for use by a DSO.
20 The defendant must provide the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user names as well as any relevant passwords, pin codes and pass codes used by the defendant and the nature and details of the internet connections, as directed.
21 The defendant must provide a DSO with all passwords, pin codes and pass codes used to access all electronic devices, electronic applications, internet sites and communication platforms of any kind.
22 The defendant must not use any coded or encrypted messaging application or service.
23 The defendant must provide any code or encryption for any electronic data or any electronic communication if discovered on the defendant’s electronic devices or accounts as a result of a or a remote inspection.
24 The defendant must not access, join and/or connect to any social networking service or application without the prior approval of a DSO, including, but not limited to, use of internet based email, instant messaging services, online community services, multi-player video games and other telecommunications-based services including text and voice services.
25 The defendant must provide consent for a DSO (or any other person requested by a DSO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including any internet service provider account, email accounts and social media accounts, in monitoring compliance with this Order.
26 The defendant must not delete or alter any applications, email, text messages, any electronic message, call history, any data, internet search, internet or application search history, any application chat or communication history from his phone, computer, tablet or any other electronic device without the prior consent of a DSO.
27 The defendant must provide consent for his telephone provider and internet service provider to share information about his accounts with a DSO.
PART G: Personal details and appearance
28 The defendant must not change his name from the name by which he is known at the date of these proceedings or use any other name without notifying a DSO.
PART H: Medical intervention and treatment
29 The defendant must undergo ongoing psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) as directed by a DSO, including any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction.
30 The defendant must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that he consults.
31 The defendant must attend, upon the direction of a DSO, any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction.
32 The defendant must take medications that are prescribed to him by his healthcare practitioners for any alcohol or drug programs or for any mental health conditions and only in the manner prescribed
33 The defendant must notify a DSO immediately if he ceased to take or declines to commence taking any medication as referred to condition 32 above.
34 The defendant must agree to his treatment and service providers and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on his progress and attendance, and information he has told them, with each other and with a DSO.
35 The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.
36 The defendant must agree to the disclosure of his criminal history to any healthcare professionals that are treating him, so far as it is relevant to his risk.
State of New South Wales
KW (Preliminary)