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Cases Cited: State of New South Wales v Mohommed Farhat [2026] NSWSC 19
Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: State of New South Wales (plaintiff)
Mohommed Farhat (defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
T McDonald SC with K Curry (plaintiff)
P Lange SC (defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors Office (plaintiff)
Kings Law Group (defendant)

File Number(s): 2026/35144

Publication restriction: No

JUDGMENT

CONTENTS

| The issue on the hearing of the State’s summons: s20(d) of the Act | 11 | | Orders and principal findings of fact | 17 | | The index offending – 20-21 November 2024 | 20 | | The defendant | 24 | | Jurisdictional and procedural requirements for engagement of the Act | 33 | | The defendant’s explanation that he was recruited to commit the offences | 41 | | Consistency of the defendant’s explanation over time | 41 | | Acceptance of the defendant’s explanation by police of Counter terrorism Command | 50 | | Corroboration from bank transactions | 52 | | Corroboration by CCTV of the co-offender video recoding the offences | 58 | | Corroboration from content of spray-painted slogans | 61 | | Corroboration from similarities to other offences proximate in time | 64 | | The defendant’s susceptibility to recruitment | 71 | | The defendant’s map-searching for locations where the index offending occurred | 73 | | Conclusion: the defendant was a recruit | 74 | | No antisemitic meaning was intended by the plaintiff | 75 | | The curse “Fuk Israel” is not antisemitic | 80 | | The importance to the decision in this case of distinguishing anti-Israel speech from antisemitic speech | 80 | | Wertheim v Haddad | 82 | | Ordinary usage of “antisemitism” in Australia | 84 | | The state of Israel cannot be equated with the Jewish people | 89 | | Many Jewish people criticise Israel | 93 | | Diversity of views on Israel within the Australian Jewish community | 97 | | The IHRA definition referred to in the Crown’s evidence | 105 | | The State’s argument of antisemitic implication from context of offending | 120 | | Conclusion on the antisemitic characterisation of the graffiti | 126 | | Conflation of political comment with antisemitism in proceeding against the defendant | 127 | | Conflation by police and the Magistrate | 127 | | Conflation by the Crown Solicitor and Director of Public Prosecutions | 130 | | The sentence passed in the Local Court and the application to revoke parole | 133 | | The messages recovered from the defendant’s phone | 144 | | Categories of messages: immaterial and potentially relevant | 144 | | Context of messages concerning the Israel-Hezbollah conflict | 148 | | The family chat | 153 | | The Bang Bros chat | 157 | | The defendant’s minimal responses to the news from Lebanon | 161 | | The defendant’s tattoos | 165 | | Downloads from the Internet, images stored on the defendant’s phone | 174 | | Outstanding charges | 183 | | Peripheral and insignificant matters relied upon by the State | 186 | | Expert opinions of Court-appointed and other psychological experts | 197 | | Dr Christopher Lennings | 197 | | Dr Patrick Sheehan | 217 | | Ms Kara Thompson | 229 | | Factors protective against reoffending | 233 | | Conclusion | 235 |

1. HIS HONOUR**:** By an amended summons filed on 28 January 2026 the plaintiff (hereafter referred to as the State) claims an order pursuant to the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (the Act) that the defendant be subject to an Extended Supervision Order (ESO) for a period of one year from, at latest, the expiration of a term of imprisonment that he is currently serving. The State seeks that the ESO be subject to 55 conditions that would be highly restrictive of the defendant’s liberty.

2. On 20-21 November 2024 the defendant committed multiple offences of damaging property and entering private premises with intent to commit an indictable offence (the index offending). He defaced parked motor vehicles and the walls of buildings in Woollahra by spray-painting slogans that included “PKK”, “PKK coming” and “Fuk Israel”. He set alight one vehicle, which was destroyed. The defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced in the Local Court to his current term of imprisonment: 1 year and 8 eight months, commencing 7 February 2025 and expiring 6 October 2026. A non-parole period of 10 months was fixed but the defendant has been denied release on parole.

3. The defendant was aged 20 years at the time of the index offending and is 22 at the date of this judgment. His father was born in Lebanon and immigrated to Australia in 1996. The defendant’s mother was born in Australia. The defendant’s parents married in 1996. They are Australian citizens, have lived in New South Wales for the past 30 years and have raised a family of four children. The defendant was born in Australia in March 2004.

4. The above-mentioned sentence was passed on 18 November 2025 and backdated for time served on remand. The judicial officer in the Local Court was Judge Nash, whose position was at the time designated “Magistrate” under the Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) as then in force. I will refer to Judge Nash as “the Magistrate”, for ease of correlation with the contemporaneous official records. Two weeks after the passing of sentence, on 2 December 2025, the Commissioner of Corrective Services applied to the State Parole Authority to revoke the defendant’s statutory parole order, which otherwise would have entitled him to be released on parole from 6 December 2025: see s 156 of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW). The application was supported by written submissions from the Crown Solicitor. On 4 December 2025, following ex parte consideration, the Authority acceded to the Commissioner’s application.

5. Three weeks after being told that he would not be released to parole, on 25 December 2025 the defendant was informed of a further proposed curtailment of his liberty, namely, that an application might be made for an ESO under the Act, to take effect from expiry of his head sentence.

6. On 14 January 2026 the Commissioner of Corrective Services designated the defendant a “National Security Interest” inmate, giving rise to a complex and time-consuming approvals process for phone calls and visits. Soon afterwards the summons to commence these proceedings was served on the defendant, with the preliminary hearing set down for 28 January 2026.

7. The preliminary hearing, as provided for in s 24(4) of the Act, was duly conducted by Hamill J. His Honour made orders appointing two experts in psychiatry or psychology to assess the defendant and to furnish reports to the Court. Pursuant to those orders, Mr Patrick Sheehan and Dr Christopher J Lennings, forensic psychologists, have provided principal and supplementary reports.

8. As a prerequisite to ordering the reports, Hamill J had to be satisfied that the matters alleged in the documents tendered at the preliminary hearing would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO. His Honour concluded that that threshold was passed: State of New South Wales v Mohommed Farhat [2026] NSWSC 19 at [42]. His Honour noted that the case was “far from straightforward” (at [41]), that a significant volume of material had been tendered on the preliminary application (at [20]-[25]) and that the matter had fallen for consideration by the Court under considerable pressure of time when his Honour was sitting as vacation judge (at [2]).

9. On 30 January 2026 the District Court heard an appeal by the defendant against the severity of his sentence for the index offending. Judge M Williams SC dismissed the appeal.

10. The defendant applied to the State Parole Authority for review of its decision to revoke his statutory parole. A hearing was accorded on 10 February 2026. At the time of hearing the State’s summons, the Authority was still reserved on the review application. Unless the Authority reverses its original decision, the defendant must serve out his entire head sentence in full time custody.

The issue on the hearing of the State’s summons: s 20(d) of the Act

11. At the final hearing of the summons before me on 22, 23 and 27-30 July, the procedural and jurisdictional prerequisites for making an ESO were readily established, as explained at [33]-[39] below. The issue, therefore, was whether pursuant to s 20(d) of the Act, the Court should be:

satisfied to a high degree of probability that the [defendant] poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under supervision.

12. In s 4 of the Act, “serious terrorism offence” is defined as follows:

an offence against Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code for which the maximum penalty is 7 or more years of imprisonment.

13. Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code (Cth) enacts a very large number of offences centred on the defined concept of a "terrorist act". It is an offence against Pt 5.3 to engage in a terrorist act, to provide or receive training connected with preparation for a terrorist act, to possess things connected with terrorist acts, to collect or make documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts, otherwise to prepare for or plan a terrorist act. Those offences – and many more, similarly formulated by reference to a “terrorist act” – carry penalties of imprisonment of between 10 years and life.

14. The definition of “terrorist act” in s 100.1(1) of the Criminal Code is as follows:

"terrorist act" means an action or threat of action where:

(a) the action falls within subsection (2) and does not fall within subsection (3); and

(b) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; and

(c) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of:

(i) coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth or a State, Territory or foreign country, or of part of a State, Territory or foreign country; or

(ii) intimidating the public or a section of the public.

15. Subsection (2) of s 100.1 lists actions such as causing physical harm or death to a person, or endangering the public, or causing damage to or endangering property or infrastructure. Subsection (3) provides for exclusions, including advocacy, protest and/or industrial action, that are not intended to cause physical harm or death to any person or to create a risk of such harm. Critical to the definition of "terrorist act" are the dual intentions of "advancing a political, ideological or religious cause" and of "coercing, or influencing by intimidation" an Australian government or intimidating the public or section thereof.

16. For the State to succeed in its application for an ESO in the present case, the Court would have to be satisfied “to a high degree of probability” not merely that there is an unacceptable risk of the defendant committing an act of personal violence or property damage but that he poses a risk of committing such an act with the dual intentions prescribed in pars (b) and (c) of s 100.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

Orders and principal findings of fact

17. The bulk of the State’s very extensive documentary evidence was delivered to my chambers several days in advance of the hearing and I was able to read much of it before the hearing commenced. As a result of adjournments between hearing days, I was able to absorb the balance of the material and to reflect upon the oral evidence by the conclusion of final addresses. The Court was thus in a position to make dispositive orders immediately following the last session of the hearing, on the morning of 30 July 2026. The orders made were as follows:

18. The plaintiff’s application for an extended supervision order pursuant to the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) is dismissed.

19. The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs.

20. The Court’s reasons are reserved.

21. Having made those orders, I immediately outlined some central findings of fact that would be incorporated in my judgment when published. That was done for the purpose of having the findings transcribed and communicated to the State Parole Authority to be taken into account, to the extent the Authority might see fit, in finalising its reserved decision on the defendant’s application for review of the revocation of his statutory non-parole order.

22. In now providing the reasons that were reserved on 30 July 2026, I commence by summarising my findings on disputed issues of fact that have particular importance to the Court’s determination of the case:

23. The defendant was incited and directed by another person to carry out the index offences. For a payment of $4,000 and an unspecified quantity of drugs, he agreed to spray-paint the vehicles and buildings with slogans that were stipulated by the recruiter. The defendant did not understand the meaning or significance of the acronym “PKK” that he was directed to paint on vehicles and walls. None of the spray-painted slogans reflected any ideology held by the defendant. He did not understand the slogan “Fuk Israel” to convey hostility to Jews as Jews and he did not intend to express hatred of Jews.

24. The “Fuk Israel” slogans were, objectively, crude expressions of political hostility to the state of Israel. Publicly displayed, the words “Fuk Israel” constitute a curse against a foreign state. They are not antisemitic according to the ordinary understanding of that concept in the Australian community. The fact that in this case the slogans were graffitied in a locality where a high proportion of residents may be Jewish does not imbue the curse with an antisemitic character. The circumstance that anti-Israel expressions are presented to Jewish people does not alter their essentially political nature and does not convert them into sentiments of prejudice against or hostility towards Jews as Jews.

25. In October and November 2024 the defendant may have had some degree of sympathy for the cause of Hezbollah, a political and paramilitary organisation of the Shia Muslim community of Lebanon, in so far as he understood that organisation to be defending against Israeli military attacks on Lebanon that commenced in September 2024. The defendant was superficially aware of this conflict during September-November 2024 and knew that two members of his extended family, who lived in Lebanon, had been killed in an Israeli attack in October 2024.

26. There is no evidence before the Court that Hezbollah has ever engaged in any violent conduct in Australia or that any aspect of its political or military program is, or is proposed to be, undertaken in Australia, or could be participated in or materially supported by the defendant so long as he resides in this country. The State has not established that the defendant adopted any aspect of Hezbollah’s belief system. The State has not tendered any evidence from which the Court could conclude that any favourable view the defendant might have of Hezbollah could realistically translate into serious terrorism offending by him.

27. There is no significant risk of the defendant committing a serious terrorism offence, following his release from prison without supervision under the Act.

The index offending – 20-21 November 2024

20. The defendant committed the index offences in company with one Stojanovski. Between 11:42 pm on 20 November 2024 and 12:30 am on 21 November 2024 he spray-painted slogans on nine parked motor vehicles. As a result of the defendant destroying one of the vehicles by fire, a 10th vehicle nearby was slightly damaged by radiated heat. An 11th vehicle was scratched and graffitied but without slogans. In the same time interval and vicinity, four buildings were defaced. Slogans were spray-painted on the external walls of two residential apartment blocks, on an external wall of the Woollahra Fire Station and on the windows and outdoor coffee tables of a restaurant. Three counts of entering lands with intent to commit an indictable offence, contrary to s 114 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), concerned entry onto the common property of the apartment blocks and the outdoor area of the restaurant.

21. The slogans sprayed onto the bodywork of the motor vehicles were as follows:

On one vehicle: “Fuk Israel”.

On 6 vehicles: “Fuk Israel” and “PKK coming” (or “PK” or “PKK C”).

On one vehicle: “Fuk Israel” and “PKK” and “[middle finger symbol] Israel”.

On one vehicle: “PKK coming”.

22. On the external walls of the buildings and at the restaurant the following words were spray-painted:

On the two apartment buildings: “Fuk Israel”, one such slogan on each.

On the Woollahra Fire Station: “PKK coming”, one slogan.

On the restaurant windows: multiple “Fuk Israel” slogans.

On the restaurant outdoor tables: multiple “PKK” slogans.

23. A measure of the objective seriousness of the offences is the monetary value of the property damage. The total was $110,409.72. The destruction of one motor vehicle by fire was the single most serious crime, causing a loss of $86,768.31. The cost of repairing heat damage to one vehicle and removing spray paint from vehicles and buildings made up the balance of $23,641.41.

The defendant

24. The defendant’s personal history was provided to the Court in an affidavit sworn by his mother, Ms Hoda Farhat. He had a normal childhood with no health issues. From primary school he had difficulty with concentration, which led to disruption of his classes and expressions of concern from his teachers. The defendant described his educational difficulties in similar terms to Dr Rowe, a clinical psychologist who prepared a report dated 12 November 2025 for the Magistrate in the sentence proceedings. Dr Rowe concluded that the defendant suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and has done so from very early years. The belated diagnosis explains the defendant’s relative underperformance in primary and secondary school and his lack of success in transitioning to the workforce.

25. Ms Farhat deposed that in high school the defendant was reserved, did not make friends readily and was vulnerable to being pushed around and imposed upon by his peers. Dr Rowe’s report includes the following:

[The defendant] describes himself as “vulnerable and gullible”, consistent with the long-standing pattern identified by both his mother and Dr Furst , who noted that he is easily influenced and seeks acceptance from others. [Dr Furst assessed the defendant from a psychiatric point of view in April 2025]. […]

From a developmental perspective, Mohommed demonstrates a long-standing pattern of emotional and behavioural vulnerability arising from low self-esteem, social insecurity and difficulties with attention, impulse control, and executive functioning consistent with an undiagnosed Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) […].

26. The defendant’s social difficulties were for a time alleviated by a change of school. However, he left school during year 10 to commence an electrical trade apprenticeship. He returned to school after a few months because he was not being taught trade skills and he perceived that he was being mistreated and taken advantage of to perform unskilled work. The defendant thereafter remained at school through to completion of year 12 in 2021, when he was a few months short of 18 years old. Through his final years at high school he remained distractible and disruptive in class, evidently due to his then undiagnosed ADHD.

27. During the defendant’s mid to late teens, he was uncommunicative with his parents. Unbeknownst to them he commenced using cannabis at age 14 (in 2018) and progressed to cocaine at age 15 (2019). The defendant outlined his history of drug use to a Community Corrections Officer, Ms L Mclean, when she interviewed him in October 2025. The defendant continued his use of cannabis and cocaine through his final school years and thereafter up to the date of his arrest. During 2024 he was using cannabis daily and cocaine approximately four times per week.

28. After completing year 12 the defendant worked for a few months in 2022 in the construction industry. Following that he did not work again until the second half of 2023 when he commenced part-time employment as a security guard at entertainment venues. That work continued until mid-September 2024.

29. The defendant was in an intimate relationship during 2022 and up to June 2023. During that time he was mostly absent from his parents’ home, where he nominally resided. The defendant was not forthcoming with his parents about his whereabouts and activities in that period. Signs of drug abuse became evident to his parents and they urged him to cease. The defendant was resistant to all advice. After the intimate relationship ended in June 2023 the defendant moved back into his parents’ home and for a few months he was more engaged with them. However, by late 2023 he had commenced association with a new group of friends whom he had not known during school years. By February 2024 he was again spending a considerable amount of time away from home and did not tell his parents where he was or what he was doing. From the third week of September 2024 the defendant was repeatedly asking his parents for money and had ceased his part-time work as a security guard.

30. During the three months leading up to the index offending the defendant was aware of Israel’s aerial bombing and ground force attacks on southern Lebanon and Beirut. He was aware that Hezbollah was fighting Israeli forces. In late September and early October 2024 the defendant arranged to have tattooed on his neck a symbol associated with Hezbollah, incorporating an image of an assault rifle being held overhead. He also acquired two tattoos that have significance in Shia Islamic tradition: the number “313” around the front of his neck (with the numeral “1” in the form of a round of ammunition) and the word “REJECTOR” across his chest.

31. Following his arrest on 24 November 2024 the defendant was refused bail. That was his first time in custody. At age 20 he understandably found the experience intimidating. The defendant was granted conditional bail by this Court (Weinstein J) on 9 May 2025. The conditions included effective home detention at his parents’ house, requiring that he be accompanied by his mother or father whenever he left the property and that he do so only for the purposes of reporting to police, attending conferences with his legal representatives, attending court and obtaining medical or psychological treatment. Once released on bail the defendant immediately commenced approximately weekly consultations with a psychologist, Mr D’Silva, to address symptoms of depression and other psychological illness.

32. On 24 July 2025 the defendant’s bail was revoked on the ground that he had breached it by leaving his parents’ residence other than for the purposes specified in the conditions. Ms Farhat has deposed that she believed he was permitted to leave the home for the purposes of exercise within a 500 m radius. Upon that understanding the defendant left the residence without permission on seven occasions between 11 July 2026 and 20 July 2025. Six of the breaches were of less than 10 minutes duration, where he appeared to walk around the block in his residential area. The other breach continued for 75 minutes, during which the defendant attended the home of a friend living nearby. A detention application brought by police resulted in the defendant being remanded for approximately a further 4 months, up to 18 November 2025 when sentence was passed.

Jurisdictional and procedural requirements for engagement of the Act

33. By force of s 20 of the Act, an ESO may only be made against an “eligible offender” as defined in s 7. The defendant comes within s 7 because he is over the age of 18 years and is serving a sentence of imprisonment for a New South Wales indictable offence. It is also a prerequisite of s 20 that the person against whom the ESO is sought should fall within one of the following categories, which are respectively defined in further sections of the Act as indicated:

(i) a convicted NSW terrorist offender [s 8];

(ii) a convicted NSW underlying terrorism offender [s 9];

(iii) a convicted NSW terrorism activity offender [s 10].

34. Section 8 is concerned with persons who have been convicted of an offence against s 310J of the Crimes Act (membership of a terrorist organisation). The defendant is not such a person and is therefore not “a convicted NSW terrorist offender”.

35. Section 9 is concerned with persons who have been convicted of a “serious offence”, defined to include serious damage to property. A further prerequisite of the section is that the offence “occurred in a terrorism context”, defined as follows (so far as relevant to the present case):

(3) An eligible offender’s offence occurred in a terrorism context if—

(a) the offender committed the offender’s offence with—

(i) the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, and

(ii) the intention of coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of an Australian jurisdiction or foreign country (or of part of an Australian jurisdiction or foreign country) or of intimidating the public or a section of the public, or

(b) the offender knew, or was reckless as to whether, the offender’s offence would materially assist any other person to commit—

(i) an offence against section 310J of the Crimes Act 1900, or

(ii) a NSW indictable offence that is a serious offence committed by the other person with the intentions referred to in paragraph (a), or

(iii) a terrorism offence within the meaning of the Crimes Act 1914 of the Commonwealth.

36. Section 9 is not engaged because the defendant did not commit the index offences with any of the intentions specified in sub-s (3)(a) or with the knowledge or recklessness specified in sub-s (3)(b). That follows from my finding that the defendant’s motivation for committing the offences was that he agreed to do so for reward, having been approached anonymously by another party. I am affirmatively satisfied that the defendant’s only intention with respect to the index offending was to earn the payment that the recruiter offered him. He did not form a view as to what the recruiter’s intention might have been and was neither aware nor reckless as to whether his conduct might assist any other person to commit any of the offences referred to in sub-pars (i)-(iii) of sub-s (3)(b).

37. So far as relevant to the present case, s 10(1) of the Act deems a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment for a NSW indictable offence to be a “convicted NSW terrorism activity offender” if the following applies:

(c) the offender—

(i) is making or has previously made any statement (or is carrying out or has previously carried out any activity) advocating support for any terrorist act or violent extremism, or

(ii) […].

38. Section 10(1A) expands the meaning of “advocating” in the above provision, as follows:

(1A) Without limiting subsection (1) (c)—

(a) advocating support for a terrorist act or violent extremism includes (but is not limited to) any of the following—

(i) […],

(ii) using or displaying images or symbols associated with a person, group of persons or organisation, or an ideology, that supports terrorist acts or violent extremism.

39. The defendant’s neck tattoo of the Hezbollah symbol, referred to at [30] above, amounts to advocacy for a terrorist act or violent extremism under sub-s (1A)(a)(ii), on the basis that Hezbollah is to be regarded as an organisation that supports terrorist acts or violent extremism. Hezbollah has been designated by the Commonwealth Government as a terrorist organisation pursuant to the Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation – Hizballah) Regulations 2021. By force of s 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth), that designation has the effect that Hezbollah is deemed to be an organisation supporting terrorist acts.

40. Hence, the defendant falls within the criteria specified in s 20(a)(i) and (c)(iii) of the Act. The State’s application has been brought in accordance with procedural requirements specified in Pt 2 of the Act. The issue to be decided by the Court is therefore confined to s 20(d) of the Act, as explained at [11]-[16] above.

The defendant’s explanation that he was recruited to commit the offences

Consistency of the defendant’s explanation over time

41. Detective Senior Constable Michael Coelho of the NSW Police Counter Terrorism Command prepared an Investigators Note dated 23 January 2026 as follows:

On the 12/12/2024, NSW police officers met with Mohammed FARHAT [CNI number inserted]. FARHAT informed police that he was contacted on the encrypted application ‘signal’ by an overseas number via messages. FARHAT recruited an associate, Thomas STOJANOVSKI [CNI number inserted] to take part in the incident which involved causing damage to property and vehicles in Woollahra on 21/11/2024.

FARHAT informed police that the overseas number provided FARHAT clear instructions regarding the damage of property and spray-painting anti-Semitic [1] phrases. Police believe that neither FARHAT nor STOJANOVSKI know what PKK stands for but were instructed to write this. It is believed that STOJANOVSKI had no contact with the persons directing FARHAT and did not receive any direct messages himself.

Police suspect that the person who contacted FARHAT and provided instructions may have some affiliation to the Commancheros OMCG [Outlaw Motorcycle Gang]. This cannot be verified at this stage.

FARHAT informed police that he sent photographs of the damage caused by STOJANOVSKI and himself through to the overseas number. It is believed that these images and the chat have since been deleted (auto delete/disappearing messages setting). It is unknown if the photographs/images were taken whilst committing the offences or they are from news articles reporting the incident.

Police believe that FARHAT was paid $4000 for the job and the money was exchanged via a dead drop at a park within the suburb of Hurstville.

FARHAT provided information regarding himself and STOJANOVSKI without speculation. Police are of the opinion that FARHAT was being truthful and forthcoming with the information they provided.

42. That account from the defendant that he was recruited and paid to commit the offences is consistent with what he told his parents after his arrest. Ms Farhat has deposed that he told her:

I can’t believe what I did. I don’t know what got into my head. I didn’t care what was happening in my life at that point. I was just doing anything to get drugs and money.

43. In October 2025 the defendant was interviewed by Dr Rowe for the purpose of preparing a psychological report that was subsequently tendered to the Magistrate. The defendant recounted to Dr Rowe a description of how he was drawn into committing the offences, in essentially the same terms as he had given to the Counter Terrorism police. The following is extracted from [50] of Dr Rowe’s report:

[The defendant reported that] the nature of the offending behaviour was not his own initiative and he reportedly did not specifically select the targets, or hold strongly ideological motivations for them. Instead, he was approached, offered payment in the form of drugs and money, and followed instructions provided to him during a period of high level mental health impairment relating to clinical depression, chronic substance use, social dependency, and psychological vulnerability.

44. The following is Dr Rowe’s interpretation of the defendant’s compliance with the anonymous recruiter’s request for him to commit the offences:

[It] is best understood as the behaviour of a young man with ADHD-related impulsivity, impaired capacity to resist or question influence, and long-standing need to be accepted, rather than intentional or value-driven harm.

45. On 21 October 2025 Ms Mclean interviewed the defendant at Parklea Correctional Centre for the purpose of preparing her Sentence Assessment Report (subsequently issued on 4 November 2025). The following is her record of what the defendant told her about how he was induced to commit the index offences:

He was unemployed and was using drugs daily. Mohommed advised that he was drug affected and was also suffering from depression. He believes that he was set up by someone who knows him, and knew that he needed drugs.

Mohommed pleaded guilty and acknowledged that he committed the offences - however he reported that he was instructed on what to do, he only did it for the money and drugs.

Mohommed advised that he received an anonymous msg on the ‘signal’ app with instructions on what he needed to do - the streets that he needed to target etc, in exchange for money and a lot of drugs. He advised that he was just thinking about the drugs and thought that it was a good idea.

His co-offender received the same message […] And he advised they committed the offences on the same night.

[…] He reported that he had the spray-paint in the garage. He advised that he did not target specific cars or houses - he was just told what streets to go to.

46. Upon speaking further with the defendant on 28 October 2025 for the purpose of clarifying his account, Ms Mclean made the following note of what he then told her:

Mohommed was able to explain how the signal app works and advised that users had the ability to become anonymous and hide their identity. When I queried how he knew he was going to get his payment he replied that he was paid a mth beforehand when he was originally contacted. He received a msg stating that he would be contacted with instructions on what to do and they made a payment of $2000 via PayID into his bank account and organised a ‘dead drop’ at a park with drugs.

[…]

Mohommed maintains the sender of the anonymous message sent him the details of what to spray-paint. He denied being aware of what PKK refers to at the time of his offence, and has only become aware since his arrest. He did not google what PKK stood for or their beliefs. He did not consider what message he was sending the community. Mohommed stands by his previous account of the details of his offence, stating that it was not his idea to spray-paint the vehicles/buildings and he was instructed on what to do. He advised that he did not want to do it, however did it for the drugs and the money.

47. Ms Mclean summarised the defendant’s narrative in her Sentence Assessment Report of 4 November 2025 as follows:

Attitudes

[…]

He maintains that at the time of his offending, he was ignorant of what the slurs meant, and how they would affect the Jewish community

He advised that he was unaware of the anti-Semitic hate in the media at that time and stated that he “was in his own little world”.

Mr Farhat justified his behaviour by stating “it wasn’t something that I wanted to do, it was for the drugs and the money”.

During discussions, Mr Farhat expressed that he was disgusted with himself, he regretted his actions and felt like he had made himself look like a bad person.

Social influences

Mr Farhat maintains that he received an anonymous message through an encrypted service containing directives on how to perpetrate the crime, in exchange for financial compensation and illicit substances.

He is of the opinion that he has been manipulated by someone who was aware of his drug addiction and has taken advantage of him.

[…]

Violence and aggression

[…] He maintained the idea of the attack was not conceived by him, asserting that he received directives including street names to target and the derogatory terms to use during the commission of the offence.

He refuted any association with an extremist ideology or organisation and asserted that he was oblivious to the implications of the slurs for the Jewish community.

48. On sentence the defendant provided to the Magistrate a letter dated 13 November 2025 expressing remorse and apology for his offences. A Jewish religious education teacher, Ms E R Nagel, provided a letter of support for the defendant. She described his constructive engagement with her, following his arrest, through which he sought to gain an understanding of the Jewish community. An affidavit sworn by Ms Nagel was read in the defendant’s case before me and she gave oral evidence. Ms Nagel explained that she had visited the defendant in prison and spoken to him over the phone. In oral evidence Ms Nagel said the defendant’s letter to the Local Court was his own composition and that she assisted him with grammar and syntax only.

49. The defendant said this in his letter to the Local Court:

At the time of my offending I was lost in my ways, and addicted to drugs. I did not realise gravity of my actions and the effect on others, especially the Jewish and Turkish communities. I was approached to commit these actions in exchange for $2000 and drugs which I regretfully accepted.

[…]

During my time in custody, I have had contact from Ms Ellie Nagel who is a part of the Jewish community. Her and I discussed Judaism and the holocaust and other religions and history. Ellie also spoke to me about the feelings of the Jewish community when people like me commit such acts. This really opened my eyes and allowed me to look at matters from other people’s perspectives.

[…]

At the time of my offending I did not understand the deep meaning of my actions and their impact. My whole life was taken over by drugs and negative influences.

Acceptance of the defendant’s explanation by police of Counter Terrorism Command

50. The Officer in Charge (OIC) of the investigation into the index offences was a Detective Sergeant stationed at Bondi. He examined the roles of the defendant and Stojanovski, only. On about 12 December 2024 he received from Counter Terrorism officers an intelligence alert to the effect that they had information suggesting the defendant had been recruited by an unknown person through messages sent on Signal from an overseas number. The alert was expressed in terms that indicated the Counter Terrorism officers accepted the reliability of the intelligence, including that the defendant had sent to the overseas number photographs of the spray-painted graffiti and that he had received payment of $4000 in cash delivered via a “dead drop” to a park in Hurstville. The alert did not state the source of the information. The OIC only learned at the Local Court sentence proceedings in November 2025 that the defendant himself was the source of that explanation of his involvement in the offending.

51. There is no evidence that the OIC sought to identify the person who, according to the Counter Terrorism intelligence alert, may have recruited the defendant via Signal. On the defendant’s phone there was no electronic record of Signal messages from or to an overseas number. One would expect that to be the case if the app was set to auto-delete messages, as the Counter Terrorism intelligence alert suggested. There is no evidence that the OIC questioned the defendant about the information in the alert. The OIC’s involvement in the matter ended, so far as the defendant was concerned, with the passing of sentence on 18 November 2025.

Corroboration from bank transactions

52. During his investigation the OIC obtained a statement of transactions on the defendant’s Commonwealth Bank account for the period 1 September 2024 to 27 November 2024. Weekly deposits of wages were made to the account on 4, 11 and 18 September 2024. There were no further wage payments after that date, corresponding with Ms Farhat’s evidence that the defendant ceased working as a security guard at about that time. The balance of the account steadily declined from 18 September. The primary source of funds to keep it in credit was the defendant’s father, who made intermittent deposits of $50-$200. Again, that is consistent with Ms Farhat’s evidence. She said that after the defendant ceased work, from time to time he asked his father for money and was given it.

53. The following credits and debits in late October and early November 2024 are notable, the first of them tending to corroborate the defendant’s account that he was paid for the commission of the offences:

23 October 2024: cash deposit of $2000, immediately transferred to A Maricic.

5 November 2024: four deposits by electronic funds transfer totalling $2000, each transaction narrated as “Fast transfer from Nicholas Panagakos - Cousin”. Of the $2000, $1300.90 was immediately transferred to “Trip.com” and the balance of $699.10 was transferred the next day to the defendant’s then intimate partner.

13 November 2024: deposit by electronic funds transfer of $2000 with the narration “Aristides Panagakos - Panel beater”. $1000 of that was immediately withdrawn at an automatic telling machine. Another $1000 was transferred on 14 November 2024 to “pearless smash repair” with the description “Repair payment”.

20 November 2024: the defendant’s father transferred $1000 into the defendant’s account. The next day, $1000 was transferred to Stojanovski.

54. The above transactions were not investigated. The fact that the defendant had $2000 in cash to deposit to his account on 23 October 2024, notwithstanding that he had not worked for the preceding month, is at least consistent with his contention that he was paid to carry out the property damage, by way of a “dead drop”. It is consistent with what he told Ms Mclean on 21 October 2025 about having received an advance payment one month before commission of the offences.

55. The defendant’s mother gave evidence that she was informed by him on about 10 November 2024 that he proposed to take a holiday in Bali. The transfer to “Trip.com” on 5 November 2024 is consistent with payment for travel expenses. A flight to Bali was evidently booked because the defendant was arrested on 25 November 2024 at the Sydney International Terminal, when he was about to board that flight. He had a return ticket. With no employment and a bank account barely in credit, the defendant was in no position to take such a holiday without a significant infusion of funds from some source at that time.

56. Ms Farhat gave evidence that the $1000 transferred to the defendant’s account by his father on 20 November 2024 was a sum that the defendant had requested in order to assist with his holiday. Ms Farhat was not aware that the defendant in fact utilised the money to pay Stojanovski for his part in the offence. At sentence the prosecution accepted that it was for his role as a co-offender that Stojanovski received the $1000. The low balances in the defendant’s bank account make it clear that he did not have the means to pay a co-offender from his own resources. His having done so tends to support his claim that he, in turn, was being paid by someone else.

57. In the Local Court the prosecution tendered only the most recent page of the defendant’s bank statements. The Magistrate did not receive evidence of the defendant’s cash deposit of $2000 on 23 October 2024, which aligned with his statement to Ms Mclean that he was paid in advance to commit the offences.

Corroboration by CCTV of the co-offender video recording the offences

58. Evidence collected by the OIC included CCTV recordings from surveillance cameras at the Chiswick Restaurant. The CCTV showed Stojanovski using a mobile phone to film the defendant as he spray-painted slogans on the restaurant’s windows and on coffee tables in the courtyard. It is highly unusual for an offender to allow himself to be filmed by a co-offender in the commission of a joint crime. What is shown on the CCTV is consistent with the offenders having created a video record in order to prove to another person, who had recruited the defendant, that he had performed his side of the bargain.

59. I infer that the OIC did not ascribe sufficient weight to the Counter Terrorism officers’ intelligence alert to consider whether the CCTV evidence of Stojanovski filming the episode tended to corroborate that the defendant committed the offences in performance of an agreement, pursuant to which he needed to be able to prove that he had earned his money. The material tendered by the Director of Public Prosecutions to the Magistrate did not include the CCTV, nor any stills from it, nor any description of Stojanovski’s filming activity. At [23] in the agreed statement of facts it was stated that at the Chiswick Restaurant Stojanovski stood behind the defendant “shining his phone’s torchlight” while the defendant was spraying graffiti. That was directly contrary to the explicit description given by investigating police in their captions to various stills from the CCTV. The captioned stills were served as part of the prosecution brief prior to the sentence proceedings. The investigators described several of those stills in the following terms:

Farhat graffities windows [or tables in courtyard] while Stojanovski records using mobile phone.

60. On 22 January 2026 the OIC swore an affidavit in these proceedings, deposing that the Signal app was downloaded to the defendant’s mobile handset. I infer that the app was installed and could be utilised. The OIC deposed that none of the data retrieved from the defendant’s phone supported his claim that he was contacted and recruited anonymously. However, the Counter Terrorism officers in their intelligence alert of 12 December 2024 and DS Coelho in his investigator’s note of 23 January 2026 and the OIC in oral evidence all accept that any such communications would have been automatically deleted if a setting on the app was activated for that purpose, as appears to have been the case. Any transmission to the recruiter of photographs showing completion of the assigned task, using the Signal app, would also have been automatically deleted. The absence of electronic records on the defendant’s handset is neutral as to whether his version of events may be correct.

Corroboration from content of spray-painted slogans

61. The words of the graffiti sprayed-painted by the defendant support his claim that he received explicit direction from another person as to the slogans to be used. The defendant told the Counter Terrorism officers on 12 December 2024 that he did not know what PKK stood for. He said the same to Ms Mclean on 28 October 2025. There is no reason to doubt that assertion. PKK is an acronym for the Kurdish rendition of the Kurdistan Workers Party. The Crown tendered a report of Dr Shanahan, an expert analyst of middle eastern affairs, according to which the PKK is “considered a Marxist, ethno nationalist movement that seeks to establish a separate homeland the Kurdish people” and to “monopolise Kurdish political power”. The PKK is comprised mainly of Turkish Kurds and maintains several thousand members under arms, focusing its attacks on Turkish security forces.

62. That information may be gleaned from public open sources including the Internet. However, few people in the Australian community would be aware of it. According to Dr Shanahan, some PKK members fought alongside Palestinian groups after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. He says that some PKK supporters were shot and killed after breaking into the Israeli consulate in Berlin in February 1999. Still fewer Australians, even amongst those who pay attention to middle eastern conflicts and alignments, would be aware of that history. Dr Shanahan says that the PKK “has no history of attacking Israeli (or Jewish) targets since [1999], nor does it advocate doing so”. He expressed the following conclusion:

it therefore makes no objective sense that “PKK is coming” would be considered threatening to Israeli or Jewish interests. In addition, [the defendant] is of Lebanese background with no known links to any Kurdish nationalist groups or individuals.

63. Given the defendant’s age, level of education, lifestyle and interests, the Court can readily accept that he knew nothing of the PKK and had no reason of his own to daub the acronym on walls and motor vehicles in Woollahra on 20-21 November 2024. The co-location of the acronym with the curse “Fuk Israel” is incoherent. The defendant’s inclusion of “PKK” in his graffiti strongly indicates that the spray-painted slogans were not his choice and that he was instructed to write them. The spray-painting of this confusion of political messages is inconsistent with the defendant having been actuated by any ideological mindset of his own.

Corroboration from similarities to other offences proximate in time

64. In addition to the offending by the defendant and Stojanovski, there were 13 other episodes of criminal property damage, all with common characteristics, in the period 17 October 2024 to 30 January 2025. The other offences were committed in Bondi, Queens Park, Newtown, Maroubra, Eastlakes and Allawah. The additional 13 episodes included a second attack in Woollahra, by perpetrators unconnected with the defendant: on 11 December 2024, a vehicle was set alight and homes, walls and footpaths were graffitied with slogans that included “Kill Israeil” and “Death 2 Israeil”. The further episodes were all investigated under Strike Force Pearl, established by NSW Police in December 2024. The investigation of the defendant’s index offending remained with the OIC at the office of the Bondi detectives.

65. The other property crimes involved spray-painting of vehicles and buildings with antisemitic symbols and slurs and some anti-Israel slogans. There were also instances of arson of vehicles and buildings. In most cases the direct offenders were instructed by one of several identified instigators. Some of the instigators supplied stolen vehicles with cloned numberplates to be used in the commission of the offences. In some cases fire extinguishers filled with red paint were supplied. Police uncovered evidence of messaging between co-offenders using Signal. Underlings who caused the damage were paid by the instigators, who in turn had arrangements to be paid by unidentified criminals further up the chain of command.

66. Most of the vehicles and properties targeted were clearly associated with the Jewish community. An exception was a failed arson attack on the premises of Curly Lewis Brewing Co on Campbell Parade, Bondi, on 17 October 2024. The arsonists had been engaged to destroy the Lewis Continental Kitchen and Kosher Deli on the corner of Curlewis Street and Old South Head Road, Bondi. They misidentified the Curly Lewis Brewing Co building as their target. The instigator found new recruits and the Continental Kitchen was destroyed by fire on 20 October 2024. Police allege that the instigator had been promised $12,000 by an unidentified superior.

67. On 10 March 2025 Deputy Commissioner David Hudson of the NSW Police announced at a press conference the results of investigations by Strike Force Pearl. At the same time Australian Federal Police Deputy Commissioner Krissy Barrett explained the resolution of AFP Operation Kissinger, namely, that a caravan located in Dural on 19 January 2025 containing explosives and antisemitic material was part of a hoax and was not evidence of a planned mass casualty event. Deputy Commissioner Hudson stated the following:

It is apparent that the incidents being investigated by both Pearl and Kissinger were orchestrated by an organised crime element and conducted to further their own causes. This was alluded to as a possible motive early on in the investigation but, as also alluded to, investigations need to be conducted at their highest before they are diminished. None of the individuals we have arrested have displayed any form of antisemitic ideology.

68. A significant proportion of those whom police have charged in connection with the above offences have pleaded guilty. Rigorous detective work established that this spate of offending was not a spontaneous outbreak of religious hatred by bigots dispersed throughout the community.

69. On 26 August 2025 the Director-General of the Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) announced a conclusion that responsibility for the arson of the Lewis Continental Kitchen at Bondi could be traced to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. However, on 23 October 2025 in response to a question addressed by a member of the NSW Parliament to the Minister for Police and Counter Terrorism, the Minister advised that, with respect to the 14 incidents investigated by Strike Force Pearl, including the arson of the Lewis Continental Kitchen:

The NSW Police Force has nil holdings in relation to foreign agents perpetrating these incidents.

70. On 27 October 2025 the Israeli national intelligence agency, Mossad, publicly claimed to have identified the Iranian connection. The strength or otherwise of the Mossad/ASIO claims makes no difference to the plausibility of the defendant’s account, which derives support from its conformity to the pattern identified by Strike Force Pearl. If Iran was responsible for one of these property crimes, at a level above the local organised crime figures to whom police have referred, the fact remains that all the incidents were organised with promises of payment, direction as to targets and employment of pliable petty criminals and drug users. With or without foreign encouragement, the pattern of offending across all instances was uniform and the defendant’s explanation of how he came to commit the index offences fits the pattern.

The defendant’s susceptibility to recruitment

71. The evidence shows that the defendant is impressionable, suggestible and a shallow thinker. He lacks self-esteem and is inclined to submit to the lead and influence of others in order to fit in. The reports of all the psychologists who have examined him concur in identifying those personality traits. By the time of the offending he had experienced very little of life and would not have been astute to recognise when he was being led into wrongdoing. The defendant was using drugs and was short of money. He was exactly the sort of person who would have been identified by a manipulative organised crime operator to undertake property damage offences for modest reward. His suitability for recruitment as a “useful idiot” could readily have become known to an organised crime recruiter through the circle of antisocial peers with whom the defendant was mixing, including those who supplied drugs for his regular consumption.

72. By submitting that the defendant fabricated his account of having been recruited, the State asks the Court to conclude that, when speaking to Counter Terrorism officers only three weeks after commission of the offences, he concocted a story that by coincidence mirrored the routine modus operandi that Strike Force Pearl later found to have been employed in all comparable property crimes of the period – down to the detail of using Signal, rather than any other encrypted messaging service. I do not regard the State’s submission as realistic.

The defendant’s map-searching for locations where the index offending occurred

73. On the night when the index offences were committed, the defendant undertook searches on his phone to locate the Jewish Wolper Hospital in Woollahra and to find the streets upon which he then carried out the spray-painting and vehicle arson. The State submits that those searches are indicative of him seeking out specific locations where Jewish residents might be located. There is no evidence that the defendant was aware of any concentration of Jewish residents in Woollahra. His search for the particular streets in which the spray-painting was carried out is consistent with his claim that he was directed where to do it. He did not undertake generic searches on the Internet for streets/suburbs where Jewish people reside, or the like.

Conclusion: the defendant was a recruit

74. For all offences of a like kind committed between October 2024 and January 2025, the State has apparently accepted the conclusion of NSW Police that the direct perpetrators were arranged by organised criminals. With respect to the defendant, the Director of Public Prosecutions in the Local and District Courts and the Crown Solicitor on behalf of the State in this proceeding have taken the position that he is the single exception. That is contrary to the assessment made by Counter Terrorism officers at the outset of the investigation of the index offences and contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence. I reject the State’s position. I accept, unreservedly, the defendant’s case that he was recruited to commit the index offences and instructed in detail as to where and how they should be carried out.

No antisemitic meaning was intended by the defendant

75. The contention that the spray-painted words “Fuk Israel” conveyed an antisemitic message has been pressed by the State as a significant element of its case for an ESO. First, it is submitted that because the slogans were antisemitic the Magistrate was right to conclude that the index offending was aggravated by the factor specified in s 21A(2)(h) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW): “motivated by hatred for or prejudice against” Jews. Secondly, it is submitted that the antisemitic character of what was written indicates an ideological outlook of the defendant that predisposes him to commit a future serious terrorism offence.

76. The State’s submissions depend upon the further proposition that any antisemitic meaning conveyed by the graffiti was intended. There is considerable evidence to the contrary. The defendant told Ms Mclean that his use of the curse “Fuk Israel” was directed by his recruiter. He said he “was ignorant of what the slurs meant, and how they would affect the Jewish community”. Ms Mclean reported that the defendant;

refuted any association with an extremist ideology or organisation and asserted that he was oblivious to the implications of the slurs for the Jewish community.

77. The defendant said much the same in his letter to the Magistrate:

I did not understand the deep meaning of my actions and their impact.

Similarly, in the defendant’s letter of apology to the Sydney Jewish community, which was tendered in the Local Court, he said this:

I have never held any hatred towards the Jewish people and in fact, until recently, I had never even met anyone Jewish. At the time that I engaged in this despicable behaviour, I did not realise the gravity of my actions and the effect it would have on others, especially the Jewish community.

78. The defendant did not pretend that he was unfamiliar with the expression “fuck [anything]” as a curse, only that he did not understand or intend that the words he wrote would convey hatred for or prejudice against Jews. Dr Lennings’ evidence that the defendant has relatively low intelligence and that his thinking is very shallow, combined with the defendant’s narrow life experience and poor general knowledge, tend to support a conclusion that when he spray-painted “Fuk Israel” as directed by a person who paid him to do so, he would not have given consideration to whether or not those words might be understood as hostile to Jews. The possibility would not necessarily have occurred to him.

79. Prior to the offending the defendant exchanged numerous messages with associates and family members on WhatsApp and other applications. He also downloaded many images to his phone. That material has been tendered in evidence and is considered below. I find in it no basis for concluding that the defendant held any hostility to Jews as a religious, cultural or ethnic group. Neither the messages, the downloads nor any conduct of the defendant at any time persuades me that he was hostile to Jews in November 2024 or that he has been so hostile at any time since.

The curse “Fuk Israel” is not antisemitic

The importance to the decision in this case of distinguishing anti-Israel speech from antisemitic speech

80. The State argued that the defendant should not be believed about his lack of ideological Jew hatred because “Fuk Israel” is self-evidently antisemitic and therefore must have been understood and intended as such. I do not accept that contention. A curse in those terms is not antisemitic, either self-evidently or by any degree of analysis or construction. It is a crude political expression of contempt and dismissal of a foreign state. In spray-painting the words on vehicles and buildings in Woollahra the defendant did not act as an antisemitic bigot, or even as a genuine political protester. He was a vandal for hire.

81. From the commencement of the investigation of the index offences through to the final hearing of the summons before me, police officers and legal representatives of State agencies have repeatedly and uniformly characterised the defendant’s graffiti as antisemitic. That has led to the defendant being treated under the criminal law and in the administration of his sentence very differently from how he would have been dealt with if the graffiti had not been so labelled. The label has been wrongly applied, injustice to the defendant has followed and the misconception has led to the State bringing these proceedings. Those conclusions require that I should explain fully the basis upon which I distinguish between antisemitic statements and anti-Israel political statements and why I find that the defendant’s graffiti was in the latter category – while recognising its abusive and intimidatory form.

Wertheim v Haddad

82. Stewart J explained the distinction succinctly in Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720, a case concerning s 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). In the course of an Islamic sermon the respondent had said that “certain media outlets owned ... by the Zionist entities are trying to sway public perception” and that “right-wing politicians have stepped into backing Israel because Israel holds their leash”. He had referred to “the terrorist state of Israel and its mass murdering machine, the IDF”. The applicants claimed that delivering the sermon was an act “reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate and intimidate Jewish people in Australia and [it was] done because of the race or ethnic origins of Jewish people in Australia”.

83. Stewart J said this at [107] (omitting his Honour’s reference to another speech by the respondent):

I do not consider that the ordinary, reasonable listener would understand Mr Haddad in these passages, either in isolation or in the context of the sermon as a whole, to be saying anything about Jews generally or about all Jews. He is quite specific in the sermon. He is critical of Israel, the IDF and Zionists. As mentioned, Jews are only mentioned in relation to the Holocaust, and not in a critical or disparaging way. […] The ordinary, reasonable listener would understand that not all Jews are Zionists or support the actions of Israel in Gaza and that disparagement of Zionism constitutes disparagement of a philosophy or ideology and not a race or ethnic group. Needless to say, political criticism of Israel, however inflammatory or adversarial, is not by its nature criticism of Jews in general or based on Jewish racial or ethnic identity: see South African Human Rights Commission on behalf of South African Jewish Board of Deputies v Masuku [2022] ZACC 5; 2022 (4) SA 1 (CC) at [4]- [6] and [161]-[166] per Khampepe J for the Court. Indeed, the applicants did not submit that it is. The conclusion that it is not antisemitic to criticise Israel is the corollary of the conclusion that to blame Jews for the actions of Israel is antisemitic; the one flows from the other.

Ordinary usage of “antisemitism” in Australia

84. Although Stewart J’s analysis was made in relation to s 18C, which does not use the term antisemitic, his Honour’s reasoning applies equally to the issue in the present case. The Court is here concerned with whether the ordinary reasonable reader of the graffiti would understand the words “Fuk Israel” as antisemitic. The answer is dictated by what “antisemitic” means according to established common usage in Australia.

85. The Oxford English Dictionary shows that the word “antisemitic” has been part of the language since the mid-19th century and that its usual sense is as follows:

Characterized by prejudice, hostility, or discrimination against Jewish people; anti-Jewish.

86. The Macquarie Dictionary definition is simpler:

Prejudiced against Jewish people.

87. Those definitions accord with how the term has ordinarily been used and understood in Australia in living memory. An antisemitic statement, according to the established and accepted meaning, is one that would reasonably be taken, by an ordinary member of the public, to express hostility to or prejudice against all Jewish people and/or against one or more individual Jews by reason of their Jewishness.

88. The history of exclusion and disability of Jews in medieval times is probably obscure to most Australians. However, it is common knowledge here as in other Western societies that persecution of Jews has had a centuries long history in Russia and Europe and that the phenomenon descended into depravity in Nazi Germany during the early 1940s, with the systematic mass murder of an estimated 6 million Jews, 2.7 million of whom died in industrialised death camps. Against that background, antisemitism according to its established and well understood meaning is an attitude reviled in Australia. An allegation that a person is antisemitic is a grave imputation on character. Misapplication of the term to statements and attitudes concerning political subjects, such as disapproval of the state of Israel or disagreement with the ideology of Zionism, has the effect of unfairly damaging the person so accused and weakening the abhorrence that the word “antisemitic” should properly evoke.

The state of Israel cannot be equated with the Jewish people

89. Disparagement of Israel is not antisemitic in the accepted sense of the term firstly because the Jewish people, who as a whole are the object of antisemitism, are not coextensive with or in any sense equivalent to the state of Israel. The world’s total population of Jews is approximately 15.8 million. About half of that number are members of minority communities in the populations of many countries, including Australia. Israel’s population accounts for only the other half the world’s Jews and includes about 1.6 million Palestinian Arabs.

90. Israel is a nation state, the product of the Zionist movement that began in the late 1800s. The openly stated objective of Zionism, at least from early in the 20th Century, was the establishment of a state in Palestine with demographic Jewish dominance. On 29 November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 181 concerning partition of Palestine. The inception of Israel was declared from 15 May 1948. It achieved demographic Jewish dominance during that year and into 1949 by forcible expulsion of 750,000 indigenous Palestinians from the territory of which it took control and by the demolition of over 500 of their villages. Those events are uncontroversially established in extensive historical literature, much of it compiled by professional Israeli and other Jewish historians, drawing upon Israeli and British archives. [2]

91. The Jewish people, an entire group spread around the globe and identified by their common faith and culture, are distinct from Israel, a state comprising a localised population in a small territory (the borders of which have never been declared by Israel), living under a constitutional legal structure applicable only to that population. The Jewish people are not a political or juridical entity capable of adopting or carrying out policies in the name of the whole. Israel, as a state, is such an entity: it adopts policies and takes unified action to implement them.

92. As objects of possible hostility or prejudice, the Jewish people and the state of Israel are in every material respect different things. Logically, conceptually and empirically, hostility or prejudice towards Israel cannot be equated to hostility or prejudice towards the Jewish people.

Many Jewish people criticise Israel

93. For decades Jewish people have been amongst the most forceful critics of Israel’s conduct towards the Palestinians and have been the source of insistent pleas for the rights of the Palestinians. Those positions align with the moral convictions of many Jews, based upon universal humanitarian values and understanding of the essential humanism of Jewish faith. How can it be antisemitic – in the established sense of the word – to disparage Israel when doing so accords with the words and beliefs many Jews? How can censure of Israel in those circumstances amount to hostility towards, or prejudice against, Jews on the basis of their Jewishness?

94. The premise that Jews in significant numbers are critical of Israel for its treatment of the Palestinians can be substantiated by a cursory survey of the authorship of scholarly literature on the question of Palestine in the fields of history or politics, or by reading the opinion pieces of Jewish contributors to the mainstream press and to online political discourse. Even in Israel itself a small minority of Jews make trenchant criticism of their own country’s violence and cruelty to the Palestinians, for example through B’Tselem (The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) and Physicians for Human Rights Israel (PHRI).

95. Both organisations were established by Jewish Israeli citizens in the late 1980s. B’Tselem, on its website, publishes data, position papers and “reports on human rights violations committed by Israel in the Occupied Territories”. [3] In July 2025 B’Tselem announced its conclusion that since October 2023 Israel has been committing genocide in Gaza, according to definitions that correspond with the United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). [4] PHRI describes its activism as based “on principles of human rights, medical ethics, and social justice”. It publishes on its website frequent and blunt criticisms of Israel’s conduct towards the Palestinians, particularly from a medical point of view. PHRI has alleged systematic targeting by Israel of medical infrastructure across the Gaza Strip, involving attacks on 33 of Gaza’s 36 hospitals and the killing or detention of 1800 medical staff. On 28 July 2025 PHRI, also, concluded that Israel was by that date committing genocide in Gaza. [5]

96. In the United States of America, where approximately 7.5 million of the Jews of the diaspora reside, Jewish Voice for Peace is an organisation through which a significant number of American Jews advocate for the rights of Palestinians and criticise Israel’s policies and actions in uncompromising terms. [6]

Diversity of views on Israel within the Australian Jewish community

97. Criticism of Israel from within the Australian Jewish community has been given prominence by the Jewish Council of Australia (JCA) established on 5 February 2024. [7] The JCA’s membership includes Jewish scholars, historians, human rights lawyers, writers and teachers. It represents Australian Jews who endorse the following “Core Principles”, proclaimed on the organisation’s website:

We provide an independent expert Jewish voice supporting human rights and opposing antisemitism and racism.

We support Palestinian freedom and justice and are united in our opposition to Israel’s continued policies aimed at the destruction of Palestinian life.

[…]

We reject the assertion that Jews and the State of Israel are one and the same, or that all Jewish people support, without criticism, the actions of the Israeli government and military.

Pro-Israel Jewish organisations, that do not recognise the diversity of views among Australian Jews, do not speak for us.

While we have diverse views on many issues, we are united in our opposition to Israel’s continued policies aimed at the destruction of Palestinian life. We are opposed to the Israeli occupation and the prioritisation of the rights of Jewish people over the rights of Palestinians.

[…]

We are all proud Jewish people. We include graduates of Jewish high schools, lifelong members of synagogues, and members of Jewish cultural institutions. Many of us are the descendants of Holocaust survivors, refugees and the survivors of pogroms.

98. On 16 June 2026 the JCA published a submission it made that day to the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, claiming to represent “the voices of over 2,500 progressive Jewish people in Australia”. The following are extracts from the submission:

4. This submission is grounded in an understanding of antisemitism as a form of racism encompassing discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews. [footnote: This understanding is drawn from the definition of antisemitism set out in the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (25 March 2021)]. Two important contemporary drivers of antisemitism in Australia include the growth of far-right, neo-Nazi and conspiracist movements, which represent a significant and often overlooked threat to Jewish communities, and the aggressive actions of the State of Israel and conflation of Jewish identity with Israel — a conflation that the State of Israel itself has long cultivated and which causes direct harm to Jewish people worldwide when they are blamed for Israel’s actions. History consistently shows us that Jewish people’s safety is indivisible from the safety of other racialized communities and cannot come at their expense.

7. Central to the politicisation of antisemitism is the conflation of Jewish identity with the State of Israel and Zionism [footnote omitted] — to cast criticism of Israel as antisemitic and to use this to silence pro-Palestinian voices. […] There is a diversity of views among Australian Jews. Globally, Jewish communities are moving away from support for Israel and Zionism. […]

9. […] [The Royal Commission] should not recommend approaches that conflate antisemitism with criticism of Israel, restrict lawful protest, or treat any one section of the Jewish community as speaking for all Jews. Such approaches cause direct harm to Palestinians and their allies and also limit the democratic rights and political agency of Jewish people.

13. The Jewish Council represents many Australian Jews whose views have been denigrated and marginalised by legacy pro-Israel Jewish organisations. Most of our members are not affiliated or represented by the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ), the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies or the Jewish Community Council of Victoria — bodies that have themselves repeatedly made clear they do not represent Jews who are critical of political Zionism […]

18. Any inquiry into antisemitism must engage with the full diversity of Jewish cultural, religious and political life and resist flattening Jewish communities into a stereotypical and politically uniform community. Jewish people, like all ethnic communities, have political agency and complex and contested internal divisions. In recent years Jewish communities have become increasingly polarised around the State of Israel. Israel’s genocide in Gaza has led thousands of Australian Jews and much of the global Jewish diaspora [footnote omitted] to question the ethics of Israel’s policies as well as Israel’s founding state ideology and connection to Jewishness.

[Emphasis added].

99. At the opposite end of the spectrum of Australian Jewish opinion regarding Israel is the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ). It describes itself as “the peak body of the Australian Jewish community, representing and advocating for the community to government, in the community, and around the world”. The ECAJ’s website description of its work and policies [8] shows that in addition to advancing religious, cultural and community concerns of Jews in Australian domestic politics, it lobbies the Commonwealth government in the interests of Israel and Zionism.

100. Section 3 of the ECAJ’s stated “Policies” is entitled “Israel and International Affairs”. Sub-section 32, “Israel”, includes the following:

This Council:

32.2A URGES Australia to join the US, Canada, Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic, among other democratic nations which have announced their opposition to the Palestinian bid for recognition by the United Nations of a unilaterally declared Palestinian State, in voting against any such proposal in the General Assembly, rather than merely abstaining;

32.5 REAFFIRMS Australian Jewry’s strong and unshakeable solidarity with Israel and her people … .

101. Other subsections of the ECAJ’s Policies contain numerous “calls upon the Australian Government” to adopt foreign policy positions favourable to Israel. Those subsections are all addressed to political issues of Australian foreign policy, in relation to which the ECAJ is, transparently, a pro-Israel lobbying organisation. The titles of some of the subsections indicate the tenor of the ECAJ’s advocacy on foreign policy. The content to be found under those headings confirms the impression:

33 Opposition to Premature Recognition of a Palestinian State

37 Iran

38 United Nation’s Human Rights Agenda

40 United Nation’s Bias

40A Politicisation of the International Criminal Court

102. The ECAJ website lists things that it works on “day-to-day”, one of which is described as follows:

Advocating for the national rights of the Jewish people and encouraging support for Zionism in Australia.

103. By clause 32.5 of its policies the ECAJ endeavours to portray the Australian Jewish community as unified in support of Zionism and Israel. That is at odds with the contrary perspective expressed by the JCA on behalf its membership. On the basis of the contention that all Australian Jews support Zionism and Israel, the ECAJ has been at the forefront of endeavouring to characterise criticism of Israel or support for the Palestinian cause as antisemitic. An example was the claim of Co-CEO Alex Ryvchin in June 2024 that by introducing a motion in Federal Parliament to debate, as a matter of urgency, “the need for the Senate to recognise the state of Palestine”, the Greens Party had “brought antisemitism into the mainstream”. [9]

104. The diversity of views expressed by Jewish representative bodies in Australia shows the fallacy of treating the defendant’s spray-painted curse “Fuk Israel”, as antisemitic. The graffiti was unaccompanied by argument or justification for holding Israel in contempt. That makes no difference. A statement of hostility to Israel, reasoned or unreasoned, does not express prejudice against Jews as Jews.

The IHRA definition referred to in the Crown’s evidence

105. In an expert opinion report tendered by the Crown, Dr Shanahan states that “the definition of exactly what constitutes antisemitism is debated”. There is no debate, to my knowledge, about the established meaning that I have identified above as ordinarily accepted in Australia. Dr Shanahan’s reference to debate is followed by quotation of the formulation adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). That formulation appears to be an attempt to repurpose the term “antisemitism” as the name of an amalgamated concept of “hatred toward Jews” and/or criticism of Israel.

106. The IHRA formulation comprises a core text followed by “examples” that “may serve as illustrations”. The core text is as follows:

Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.

107. The 11 examples appended to that text include the following:

6 Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.

7 Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour.

8 Applying double standards by requiring of it a behaviour not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.

9 Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.

10 Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.

108. The IHRA formulation does not reflect the established usage and understanding of the term “antisemitic” in Australia. It does not assist the Court in its present task of determining whether the slogans spray-painted by the defendant were antisemitic according to that common understanding.

109. The IHRA core text is so verbose and imprecise that it could not realistically be attributed to the ordinary, reasonably informed member of the Australian public. What is the “certain perception”? If antisemitism “may be expressed as hatred toward Jews”, how else “may” it be expressed so as still to fall within the definition? Would the “certain perception” be present in the expression of some other, less egregious, sentiment towards Jews and, if so, what? The proposition that antisemitism may “be directed towards … non-Jewish individuals [etc]” appears counterintuitive to the central concept of Jew hatred. In what circumstances and within what limits would “rhetorical [or] physical manifestations” of the “certain perception of Jews” be antisemitic if “directed toward … non-Jewish individuals [etc]”?

110. I am not the first to have criticised the inept drafting of the IHRA formulation. [10] In the words of Sir Stephen Sedley, it “fails the first test of any definition: it is indefinite”. The JCA submission to the Royal Commission criticises the IHRA wording and cites a number of detailed critiques by others. Discussion of the IHRA wording and adoption of it by some institutions does not change the established meaning of a word that has been in use in the English language for 150 years. The IHRA formulation propounds a concept different from that which “antisemitism” has long been understood to describe and appropriates that word to the novel concept.

111. Parliament from time to time may enact that a term in common use shall, where used in specified legislation, be deemed to mean something different from what is usually understood by it. No such deeming with respect to the IHRA formulation has been enacted by either the Parliament of the Commonwealth or the Parliament of New South Wales in any legislation applicable to this case.

112. The Commonwealth executive government has adopted the IHRA core wording as a matter of policy and has directed that it is “applicable in Australian Public Service workplaces”. [11] That requires Commonwealth public servants to try to understand the formulation and to apply it in the performance of their duties. It does not appear that the IHRA examples have been adopted as part of the Commonwealth policy. The policy makes no difference to the established meaning of antisemitism as ordinarily understood in the community, which is the matter with which the Court is concerned here.

113. The IHRA “examples” are, on the face of them, directed to embracing within the IHRA’s formula criticisms of Israel that could not be regarded as hostile to Jews as Jews, applying the distinction that Stewart J identified in Wertheim v Haddad and that is recognised in these reasons. The examples indicate that the IHRA wording is not intended to give effect to the extant common understanding of antisemitism but is directed to a quite different end. Its tendency, and the apparent purpose of promoting it, is to graft onto the community’s abhorrence of antisemitism, understood as hostility to Jews for their Jewishness, a parasitic rejection of protest against Israel. Seen in that light, the IHRA proposal is detached from the reality of the common usage and understanding of antisemitism in this country.

114. The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee received 669 written submissions relevant to its October 2024 report on the Commission of Inquiry into Antisemitism at Australian Universities Bill 2024 (No. 2). [12] Many of the submissions criticised the IHRA definition on the ground that it conflates political criticism of Israel with antisemitism. The names of the people who lodged submissions to that effect have in most cases been withheld but many of them identified themselves as Jewish in the body of their arguments.

115. The disconnect between the IHRA formulation and the established meaning of antisemitism is brought home by the results of opinion polls. On 3 June 2024 the Washington-based Pew Research Center published the results of a poll it conducted in 24 countries, showing that 74% of Australian respondents registered an unfavourable view of Israel. [13] On 4 June 2026 Pew reported that in a more recent poll of 36 countries there was an increase to 79% of Australian respondents who view Israel unfavourably. [14] The surveys show similar rates of disapproval in many other countries.

116. It may reasonably be inferred that the results of polling Australian respondents reflect humanitarian reaction to Israel’s genocide of the Gazans since 7 October 2023 [15] , the live streaming of which to mobile handsets would be difficult to ignore. Assuming the reliability of the June 2026 poll, it would be preposterous to suggest that 79% of Australians are antisemitic because they disapprove of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. If the 79% or any proportion of them should express outrage, or march in protest, it could not be said that their words or conduct would be antisemitic according to the long understood meaning of that term. It would not occur to any ordinary reasonable member of the public to think of criticism or protest in these circumstances as hostility towards or prejudice against Jews on account of their Jewishness.

117. The State’s case on the present application has not been advanced by tendering the IHRA formulation through the report of Dr Shanahan.

118. Criticism of Zionism, the movement that established Israel and continues to support it, stands in the same position as criticism of Israel itself. Universities Australia, a body representing 39 institutions, has described antisemitism in a long form of wording [16] that includes the following:

For most, but not all Jewish Australians, Zionism is a core part of their Jewish identity.

119. As an ideology of Jewish nationalism, Zionism is open to political discussion and criticism, notably on grounds concerning the rights of the Palestinians. It may well be correct that “most, but not all Jewish Australians” regard Zionism as “a core part of their Jewish identity”. That does not mean that anti-Zionists are hostile to that majority of Jews on account of their Jewishness; only that they hold a negative view of a political ideology with which the majority of Jews have chosen to identify. A contestable political question does not lose its political character upon a large proportion of a particular confessional group taking one side of the issue and feeling that it is closely associated with their religious identity. Further, the words “most, but not all” are important. How can disparagement of Zionism be hostile or prejudiced towards Jews as Jews when it is only “most, but not all” Jews who support the ideology, with whatever degree of fervour?

The State’s argument of antisemitic implication from context of offending

120. After the State’s case was questioned, early in the hearing, for its reliance on the Local Court finding that the graffiti was antisemitic, senior counsel for the State did not attempt to support that characterisation on the basis of the inherent meaning of the words used. Rather, the State submitted that because the slogans were spray-painted in an area with a concentration of Jewish residents and because the medium used was criminal damage to property, the words “Fuk Israel” took on an antisemitic meaning in context. I do not accept that submission. The political nature of the curse was not changed by the circumstances.

121. Dr Shanahan stated the following in his principal report:

The phrase “Fuck Israel” is self-evidently derogatory towards the state of Israel however it is not, on the face of it, antisemitic.

122. Dr Shanahan added this opinion:

[It] is reasonable to conclude that the use of the term sought to conflate the State of Israel with Sydney’s Jewish community.

123. That opinion is based upon Dr Shanahan’s view that the defendant selected “what he believed to be identifiably Jewish targets” and that the damage was done to “what he would reasonably have believed, in whole or in part, to be Jewish property”. There is no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the defendant knew or believed anything about the Jewishness of the locality or the property.

124. Even if the defendant had chosen the location, which he did not, the Court has no evidence, only assumption, about the demographics of the area. Nor is there evidence about the defendant’s belief in that regard. He appears to have known that there was an institution named the Jewish Wolper Hospital in the near vicinity but it was not defaced. It cannot be imputed that he must have understood the owners of nearby vehicles and the occupants of nearby residential buildings would be Jews because they were near to a Jewish hospital.

125. I do not accept Dr Shanahan’s opinion that the defendant “sought to conflate the state of Israel with Sydney’s Jewish community”. The conflation has been entirely in the minds of those who have placed upon the graffiti an antisemitic construction that it does not bear. Dr Shanahan’s assumption that the defendant was capable of such subtlety as to spray-paint a curse against Israel with the purpose of conflating Israel with Sydney’s Jews is in my view not plausible. It does not fit with the evidence before me of the defendant’s low intellect and lack of sophistication.

Conclusion on the antisemitic characterisation of the graffiti

126. Australians who strongly disapprove of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians have freedom to express their views. Others, who support Israel, have the right not to listen, not to read, or to address the critics’ arguments about Israel’s conduct or not to engage. When, as in the present case, words of contempt for Israel are conveyed by defacing vehicles and buildings, thereby damaging property contrary to s 195 of the Crimes Act, the objective seriousness of the crime is increased by its wantonness, vulgarity and intimidatory effect but not by any antisemitic implication. The words “Fuk Israel” were not transformed, by the circumstances in which they were written, from a political curse into religious hostility.

Conflation of political comment with antisemitism in proceedings against the defendant

Conflation by police and the Magistrate

127. Police statements and intelligence reports uniformly described all the defendant’s spray-painting as antisemitic. That was taken up in the prosecution’s submissions to the Magistrate, without reflection or analysis so far as the records show. While the defendant denied that he understood or intended ill will toward Jews, for the purposes of his plea he acquiesced in the view taken by police and sought to make amends by apology.

128. The following extracts from the Magistrate’s remarks on sentence illustrate that his Honour did not see the difference between the explicit anti-Israel sentiment of the graffiti and hostility to Jews:

[…] the damage involved writing various antisemitic phrases, including “Fuck Israel”, albeit at times without including the letter “c” […]

There is, and was, no doubt that the slurs were antisemitic, and when understood in isolation reflective of hatred and prejudice towards Jewish people and the state of Israel.

The very nature of the spray-painted slurs, which obviously reveal their target audience, and the fact that those slurs involved repeated vandalism and property damage, including in the form of fire, is that they undoubtedly convey a message of hatred and prejudice towards Jewish people and the State of Israel.

[…] noting the otherwise overt nature of the religious and racial overtones of the slurs.

129. With respect, the Magistrate erred in finding that “Fuk Israel” is an antisemitic phrase and that it was “reflective of”, or “undoubtedly convey[ed] a message of”, “hatred and prejudice towards Jewish people”. The spray-painted curse was not antisemitic in the sense of the word that matters, namely, the understanding of a hypothetical ordinary reasonable person reading the graffiti.

Conflation by the Crown Solicitor and Director of Public Prosecutions

130. After the Magistrate’s decision, the Crown Solicitor’s submissions to the State Parole Authority of 2 December 2024 continued to conflate contempt for Israel with antisemitism. Next, when the defendant’s severity appeal to the District Court was heard on 30 January 2026, the merging of the two concepts was carried to an extreme in the Director of Public Prosecutions’ submissions.

131. The advocate for the Director put to Judge M Williams SC the following arguments, which in my opinion were extravagant and untenable:

[…] objectively these offences involved vilifying the Jewish community. You’d accept that and you would also accept, contrary to what the appellant claims, that he knew when he committed these offences that they involved the vilification of the Jewish community.

Okay, maybe there’s a decent argument about him not knowing about the meaning of “PKK” but “Fuck Israel” is in a different category. You’d think it might’ve clicked at some point on one of those vehicles that this is vilifying the Jewish community […].

132. At the latest, from February 2024, when the JCA was established, the differences of political opinion about Israel and Zionism amongst Jewish Australians have been apparent. February 2024 was more than 21 months before the defendant’s sentence proceedings. Yet, throughout those proceedings and right up to the conduct of the hearing of the State’s summons in this Court in July 2026, the State’s various legal agencies have either been unaware of the division of Jewish opinion, or they have not perceived it as incongruous to characterise as antisemitic a curse that reflects, albeit in unreasoned terms, strong disapproval of Israel as felt by many Australian Jews.

The sentence passed in the Local Court and the application to revoke parole

133. The Magistrate passed sentence on 18 November 2025 as follows:

The aggregate sentence will be one year eight months or 20 months in total.

I find special circumstances. This is Mr Farhat’s first time in custody and the implementation of the supervision plan in the Pre-sentence Report authored by Community Corrections would, in my view, be better served with an extended period of supervision on parole, particularly around drug and alcohol and mental health interventions.

The non-parole period will be 10 months.

Mr Farhat has spent some time bail refused on this matter, a total of 9 months and 14 days as at today, which I calculate to be 284 days.

On my calculations, therefore, the sentence will be backdated to 7 February 2025. Mr Farhat will be released to parole on 6 December 2025 with a balance of term of 10 months.

134. The Commissioner of Corrective Services’ application for revocation of the defendant’s entitlement to release on parole from 6 December 2025 was made pursuant to Pt 6, Div 3A (ss 159A-159D) of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act. By the operation of ss 158A and 159B, the Authority’s power to revoke was engaged in this case only because the defendant had displayed the Hezbollah symbol, in the form of his neck tattoo, bringing him within the very wide definition of a “terrorism related offender”.

135. Section 159C(2) provides as follows:

159C Limitation on release on parole of terrorism related offenders

(2) The grounds on which the Parole Authority may revoke the parole order of an offender who is known to the Parole Authority to be a terrorism related offender include that the Parole Authority has become aware that the offender may engage in, or incite or assist others to engage in, terrorist acts or violent extremism.

136. The Commissioner invoked that section and also s 130(1)(a) of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act, which empowers the Authority to revoke a parole order if it is satisfied that, if released, the offender “would pose a serious identifiable risk to the safety of the community”.

137. I infer that the Commissioner or his officers did not consult with the Counter Terrorism Command within NSW Police, whose investigators had interviewed the defendant on 12 December 2024 and accepted that he had been recruited. I infer that the Commissioner did not consult with the investigators of Strike Force Pearl, whose well-publicised conclusions showed that the whole spate of property crimes, of which the defendant’s offences formed a consistent part, were driven by organised crime figures and not actuated by religious ideology or political extremism such as would be the hallmarks of terrorism.

138. If those inferences about non-consultation are correct, then there was a serious failure of communication between agencies. The conclusions of the Counter Terrorism officers and the resolution of Strike Force Pearl were directly against an assessment that the defendant had exhibited religious or political radicalisation by his index offending. It would have been unsound for the Commissioner to assess the defendant’s propensity for terrorism afresh and make submissions to the State Parole Authority about revocation of parole without having weighed up the opinions of specialist police who investigated the same subject matter.

139. In support of both statutory grounds for revocation the Commissioner contended the following:

74 The State contends that Mr Farhat may engage in, or incite or assist others to engage in, terrorist acts or violent extremism during the balance of his sentence and that parole should be revoked pursuant to the discretion arising under s 159C(2) … .

140. At pars 75 and 76 of the submissions, that contention was supported by reference to the circumstances of the index offending, in particular that the graffiti was characterised as antisemitic, that the defendant was said to have been motivated by antisemitism, that he had associations with others “who seemingly support the extremist beliefs held by the Hezbollah terrorist organisation” and that the risk of him committing “a further extremist act is exacerbated by his substance addiction”.

141. Everything that the Commissioner placed before the Authority had either been placed before the Magistrate in the sentence proceedings or was available at the time of sentence so that it could have been tendered in the Local Court. That included information regarding the defendant’s conduct in prison while he was bail refused. It is commonplace for custodial history during remand to be placed before a sentencing court. Information about risk of future serious offending would also usually be placed before the sentencing court, to demonstrate a need for specific deterrence. In this case that could have included evidence or submissions regarding the nature of the defendant’s tattoos and their alleged ideological significance.

142. The prosecution placed before the Local Court such material as it considered relevant to that Court’s decision about whether to impose full-time custody and, if so, whether it should be a fixed term or a term subject to a specified non-parole period. The sentence proceeding having been conducted in the usual way, the Magistrate then exercised judicial power within his lawful jurisdiction and formulated what he considered an appropriate head sentence and non-parole period. The Commissioner’s application to the Authority was made almost immediately after sentence was pronounced, without the occurrence of any fresh intervening event that could not have been the subject of the Local Court’s consideration.

143. I am not aware of any other case in which the Commissioner has, by means of such an application, secured an ex parte decision of the Authority to prevent the operation of a sentencing decision of a court, thereby depriving an offender of the opportunity to serve part of his sentence in the community on parole. The State’s case in the proceeding before me has not disclosed any circumstance that explains or justifies this most unusual manner of the Commissioner seeking to alter the intended effect of a regularly passed sentence. The adverse consequences for the rehabilitation of the defendant have been noted by the two Court appointed expert psychologists, as referred to at [215] and [218] below.

The messages recovered from the defendant’s phone

Categories of messages: immaterial and potentially relevant

144. The State tendered hundreds of messages recovered from the defendant’s phone, many of them entirely irrelevant or merely confirming circumstances that are not in issue. In the latter category, there are messages from July and August 2024 suggesting that the defendant may have engaged in drug transactions. The defendant has freely admitted that he was a regular user of illicit drugs up until his arrest. It inevitably follows that he would have had dealings in the drug world.

145. From July to October 2024 there are messages between the defendant and Adam Hawi in terms that bespeak a personal bond. The defendant has not disputed that he has been close to both Adam Hawi and his younger brother Isaac. Whilst in prison the defendant made 251 phone calls to Isaac Hawi during two periods of his custody, from 29 November 2024 to May 2025 and from 27 July 2025 to 6 January 2026. Over the same periods he called Adam Hawi 29 times, although only four calls connected. He made 54 calls to Ali Younes, a person whom the State alleges “has been linked to the Alameddine Organised Criminal Network”. The defendant’s counsel accepts that the Hawi brothers are antisocial influences and it is likely that Ali Younes is as well.

146. The defendant’s background of drug use and his undesirable connections are factors relevant to the risk of him re-offending in some manner. The State has not adduced evidence to suggest that the Hawi brothers or Ali Younes have ideological or radical political commitments that might motivate any of them to carry out acts of violence with the intentions necessary to constitute serious terrorism offences. The defendant’s association with those individuals is therefore not a significant indicator of risk that he might be drawn into offending of that type.

147. From amongst the recovered messages the State relies principally on those in which the defendant and others referred to the military conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon during 2024. Messages touching that topic were exchanged in two group chats. The first was a family group chat comprising the defendant, his parents and his three siblings. The State has tendered family chat messages dated between 31 July 2024 and 21 November 2024. The second group was self-styled “Bang Bros”. Its members were the defendant, the Hawi brothers, a person identified as “Butch”, another with the username “moeyabd707” and 9 others. The date range of tendered messages between the Bang Bros is 28 September 2024 to 29 October 2024.

Context of messages concerning the Israel-Hezbollah conflict

148. In its endeavour to attach ideological and radical significance to some of the messages in the family and Bang Bros chats, the State adduced evidence from Dr Shanahan about the history of Hezbollah. The organisation was formed as an armed militia within the Shia Muslim community of southern Lebanon not long after Israel invaded the country in June 1982. Since then it has conducted military operations against Israel, both across the border and in opposition to Israeli forces invading and occupying parts of Lebanon. Hezbollah participates in the political system of Lebanon, fielding candidates in municipal and national elections.

149. According to Dr Shanahan, Hezbollah has conducted terrorist attacks outside Lebanon. He identifies only two, in 1994 and in 2012. There is no evidence before the Court that Hezbollah has ever carried out a terrorist attack within Australia or that it has undertaken any training, fundraising, propagandising or other activities in Australia, at any time. The material before the Court indicates, consistently with open source information so far as I am aware, that for more than a decade Hezbollah’s political and military activities have been conducted in Lebanon and have been concerned with the governance and security of the Lebanese people, particularly the Shia community, which is a substantial confessional group within the population.

150. Dr Shanahan states that “Hezbollah is clearly an antisemitic organisation”. The only justification given for that statement is that a television station operated by Hezbollah was “banned by France for its antisemitic content” and that the same television station and also a Hezbollah radio station were designated by the United States as “Foreign Terrorist Entities”. The Court has no evidence of the broadcast content that attracted those decisions of France and of the United States. Nor is it known on what criteria France applied the classification of “antisemitic” or what definition of “Foreign Terrorist Entity” was used by the United States. Hezbollah is undoubtedly “anti-Israel”. It may be that France conflates “anti-Israel” with “antisemitic”, as others do. It may be that the United States uses the designation “Terrorist Entity” loosely in relation to organisations that militarily oppose its ally, Israel. Nothing in the evidence before the Court or from open sources demonstrates that Hezbollah is inherently antisemitic, as opposed to being militantly hostile to Israel.

151. As the State has formulated its case, the Court must determine what are Hezbollah’s ideological beliefs and objectives, in order to examine whether there is evidence that the defendant has embraced them. The question is whether he has become such an adherent that he poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence in furtherance of the Hezbollah belief system. In determining those questions the Court cannot simply accept at face value the designation of the organisation as “terrorist” by a foreign state. For its own political or rhetorical purposes, that state may use “terrorist” more broadly than is required under the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act. The Australian government’s designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation does not relieve the Court of having to determine what ideology is associated with Hezbollah and whether the defendant has adopted it.

152. On 30 July 2024 Israel bombed the densely populated southern part of Beirut, known as al-dahiyeh, killing a woman and two children. Israel announced that it had sought to kill a Hezbollah commander. On 23 September 2024 Israel commenced a campaign of airstrikes on thousands of sites in Lebanon, killing 800 people in the first week and forcing over 100,000 to flee their homes. The Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, was assassinated by Israel by means of a bomb dropped on southern Beirut shortly after 2:30 am Australian Eastern Standard Time on Saturday 28 September 2024 – Friday evening in Beirut. Israel commenced a ground invasion of Lebanon from 1 October 2024. The Lebanese government subsequently reported that over the next two-months more than 2000 Lebanese citizens, mostly civilians, were killed by the Israeli invading forces. All of the above events were widely reported, including in Australian media. Judging by the content of the messages referred to below, at least some of those events came to the notice of the defendant’s family members and associates.

The family chat

153. On 31 July 2024 the defendant’s sister sent a message to the family chat referring to the bombing of Beirut on 30 July and enquiring whether her father’s family members were safe. On 1 August 2024 one of the defendant’s brothers posted a link to a videoed sermon from a Hezbollah leader, the message of which was that attacks by Israel on Shia Muslims in Lebanon would be met with equivalent retaliation against Israel.

154. On 24 September 2024 the defendant’s sister posted the following message:

They’ve killed 500 people and injured thousands from the bombing.

The defendant’s mother responded, expressing the hope that “hezb doesn’t stop bombing and killing those bastards”.

155. The defendant’s paternal uncle and his cousin were killed in Lebanon on some date in the first half of October 2024, apparently as combatants. Condolence gatherings for the uncle and cousin were held at a Shia mosque in Arncliffe on 17, 18 and 19 October 2024. The notification for the gathering identified the bereaved as the Farhat family and the residents of Barashit, a village in the Nabatieh Governate of southern Lebanon.

156. From 20 October to mid November 2024, various family members sent news to the family chat concerning the conflict in Lebanon, referring to the destruction of buildings by Israeli bombing, the deaths of Hezbollah leaders and the statistics of combatants killed on each side. Responses within the chat indicated the family’s hostility to Israel and sympathy for Hezbollah in relation to this conflict, and their concern for the communities of southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut, where the brunt of the Israeli attacks were being felt. The defendant made no significant contribution to or comment upon that exchange of news and views.

The Bang Bros chat

157. The first post that has been tendered from the Bang Bros chat is dated 28 September 2024, from a person with the username “moeyabd707”. It reproduces a statement from Hezbollah announcing the assassination of Secretary-General Nasrallah.

158. On 29 October 2024 Butch posted messages that his family’s village in southern Lebanon, Aytaroun, was being destroyed by the Israelis using bulldozers. He referred to the Israelis as “dogs”. The participant with username moeyabd707 responded:

I don’t get it but why can’t hezb just go spray them or drop a bomb then and there.

To that, Butch added;

Should wipe them the fuck out.

159. The defendant’s lack of engagement with this discussion is demonstrated by his reply: “Who brother?”. Butch found it necessary to explain:

The Israeli kleb [dog] who the fuck else.

160. Another message from Butch stated that he had told his mother “fuck Lebanon”, plainly referring to his frustration with the lack of decisive retaliation against the Israeli forces. The defendant responded with a question mark, causing Butch to reply, in Arabic, “What is wrong with you”.

The defendant’s minimal responses to the news from Lebanon

161. The defendant’s family and at least some of the members of the Bang Bros chat have strong ties to the Shia Muslim community of Lebanon. Whatever judgment others might make of right and wrong in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, it is understandable that people of Lebanese Shia Muslim heritage would follow closely the military conflict that commenced in late September 2024 and that they would have sympathy for Hezbollah. It is understandable that such people would feel hostility towards Israel, based on the long communal history of disruption to their society since Israel was established. That history commenced with the influx of 110,000 Palestinian refugees in 1948, being those of the total of 750,000 Palestinians forcibly expelled by Israel who fled northward into Lebanon. The history of disruption continued with an Israeli invasion in 1978, a further invasion in 1982 followed by 18 years of Israeli military occupation and another war waged by Israel on Lebanon in 2006.

162. In that setting, the tone of the messages exchanged in the two chats is mild. Australian citizens with less connection to Lebanon than the defendant’s family and his Bang Bros associates might reasonably express similar upset at the loss of human life and the destruction of villages. I can find in the messages in the two chats no element of extremism, fanaticism, fixation or ideology on the part of any participant. There is no intimation that any of them planned or contemplated any action to vent his or her distress at the events.

163. Those assessments apply to the defendant with the additional observation that he did not contribute any message of substance in either chat. In the Bang Bros group, his messages revealed that he was not following events in Lebanon and was not absorbing or registering his associates’ discussion of those events. Far from being politicised or radicalised, he was not even engaged.

164. The defendant exchanged messages with J Dirani on 17 October 2024 referring to the loss of his uncle and cousin. Also on that date an associate of the defendant sent him a message, “Inshallah [God willing] Israel is finished after this war bro”, to which the defendant responded “Inshallah bro”. There are no messages from the defendant that suggest he was inspired or enraged politically or ideologically by the loss of his relatives.

The defendant’s tattoos

165. The defendant’s tattoo of the numerals “313” around the front of his neck appears to have been done sometime before 28 September 2024. In Dr Shanahan’s opinion, the significance of 313 in Shia Islam is that, according to hadith (traditions of sayings and events) “the occulted Imam (Imam al-Mahdi) will be joined by 313 men from distant parts of the world on his reappearance, and they (along with others) will help kill the enemies of Allah”. Dr Shanahan states that the number has been used to denote several armed Shia groups.

166. The defendant contacted a Sydney tattoo artist on 27 September 2024 by message sent at 11:59 am local time, attaching an image of a flag bearing the Hezbollah symbol – an assault rifle raised overhead. He said that he wanted a tattoo of “something similar to that”. The time is significant because it preceded the announcement of the assassination of Secretary-General Nasrallah. The State submitted that in seeking this tattoo the defendant was inspired by Nasrallah’s martyrdom, as Hezbollah proclaimed it. The submission does not accord with the sequence of events and I reject it. Further images of the Hezbollah symbol and a photograph showing where the defendant wanted it tattooed on his neck were sent on 28 September 2024. The work appears to have been done that day.

167. On 8 October 2024 the defendant had the word “REJECTOR” tattooed across his chest. Dr Shanahan states that the Arabic equivalent of the word is used by radical Sunni Islamists to deprecate Shia adherents. He states that some Sunnis believe that the Shia rejected the Prophet Muhammad’s designated successor and therefore dissented from the true path of Islam.

168. The defendant has tattooed on the back of his neck symbols representing the phrase “an eye for an eye”, which is a common expression of the concept of retributive justice, apparently expressed in Islamic law. The evidence does not disclose when he acquired that tattoo.

169. Dr Shanahan’s report contains the following opinions about the significance of the defendant’s tattoos for the issues before the Court:

[The tattoo of the Hezbollah logo] displays support for Hezbollah and by association with the violent extremism it has practised and the terrorist attacks it has conducted.

Given the significance of the number “313” to some Shia extremist groups, the addition of the tattoo “313” with the number 1 in the shape of a bullet (hence giving it a martial aspect) in addition to the Hezbollah tattoo, it is reasonable to conclude that Mr Farhat is supportive of Hezbollah’s religious and political cause.

170. In the context in which the tattoos were acquired I do not accept that they show “support” for Hezbollah in any stronger sense than sympathy for its resistance to the aerial and ground-based assault on Lebanon commenced by Israel in late September 2024. There is no evidence that the defendant knew in 2024 or knows now anything about Hezbollah beyond such of the chat group messages as he read, with limited engagement, and what he saw in materials he downloaded from the Internet to his phone (described below). It has not been proved that he has known at any time the content of Hezbollah’s ideology, policy or objectives as stated in its open letter of 1985 and in its manifesto of 2009 (referred to in Dr Shanahan’s first report). There is no evidence that the defendant knew in 2024, or knows now, of any terrorist activity carried on by Hezbollah outside Lebanon, as distinct from its combat activities on Lebanese soil resisting the Israeli invasion in 2024. I can find no hint in the material before the Court that the defendant has ever been aware of the background to that invasion, such as Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on northern Israel.

171. An educated, intelligent individual with family ties to Lebanon might acquire a reasonable grasp of the country’s history and might learn of the political and historical underpinnings of Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel. The defendant is not such a person. In my view, his acquisition of the Hezbollah logo and 313 tattoos does not reveal adoption of that organisation’s ideology, objectives or militancy. When interviewed by Ms Mclean on 28 October 2025 the defendant denied that he had any connection to Hezbollah and said he does not understand what the organisation stands for. Those assertions are plausible, although I conclude that he did know at the time of acquiring his tattoos that Hezbollah was fighting Israel.

172. The defendant told Ms Mclean that people he associated with had a similar tattoo and he simply liked the design. I consider that there is a measure of truth in that. I find that he acquired the Hezbollah logo tattoo, the number 313 and the word REJECTOR as a demonstration to his friends in the Bang Bros chat group that he sympathised with the same side of the Hezbollah/Israel conflict as they did, so far as he understood that conflict. The only other element of his choice of tattoos was a desire to make himself look strong and intimidating.

173. On 15 December 2025 the defendant’s solicitor, on instructions, wrote to Corrective Services advising that the defendant wished to have his neck tattoos removed and inquiring whether he could arrange for that to be done while in custody. The answer was “No”. The request in my view tends strongly against the inference that the State asks the Court to draw, that the tattoos reflect adoption of an ideology or political creed in furtherance of which the defendant might act violently in the future. His wish to remove the tattoos is inconsistent with him harbouring sincere or deeply held beliefs associated with the symbols.

Downloads from the Internet, images stored on the defendant’s phone

174. Many of the downloads from the Internet to the defendant’s phone are of religious texts or sermons in Arabic, in some cases accompanied by images. I have reviewed the English translations. They appear to be spiritual, without recitation of belligerent scripture and without preaching of intolerance or violence towards unbelievers. This is in marked contrast to the type of material that the Court sees on electronic devices of proven terrorists who have plotted attacks in furtherance of the fanatic ideology of ISIS, for example.

175. Some of the other downloads are of news from the conflict between Israel and Lebanon in September, October and November 2024. Stored images include boots trampling an Israeli flag, weapons, including in people’s hands, and the defendant walking a dog that has been dressed in a yellow T-shirt printed with the Hezbollah logo. None of this imagery conveys to me any sense of the defendant having embraced an ideology or a fanatical political viewpoint that he might try to advance by the commission of a terrorist act. The images on the defendant’s phone are a random disorganised collection of material that does not display any theme of fixed, or even coherent, ideological thinking. The material is all consistent with him having taken a passing, superficial interest in the Hezbollah-Israel conflict and following along with what his friends in the Bang Bros chat group sent messages about.

176. Some of the images show that on 29 September 2024 the defendant attended a protest against Israel’s bombing of Gaza and Lebanon outside the Sydney Town Hall. Contemporaneous media reports stated that there were “thousands” of attendees, without any more specific estimate. Similar protests took place in other cities and towns around Australia on the same day. The attendance of the defendant at this protest is again consistent with the limits of his engagement with the Hezbollah-Israel conflict that I have mentioned. The material stored on the phone includes a video clip of the defendant at the protest carrying a flag and repeating some words that were responded to by the crowd. There are about five seconds of sound recording. The words are not discernible. The video is not significant.

177. I accept the State’s submission that in determining whether it may be inferred that the defendant has become radicalised or politicised, the strength of any circumstantial evidence must be evaluated by taking it as a whole. However, it is also appropriate to examine whether any of the propounded basic facts tend to support the inference at all and, if so, how strongly and how many such basic facts there are.

178. I do not find that any of the defendant’s messages, stored material or tattoos provide any material support for an inference that the defendant has fallen under the influence of an ideology or is likely in future to do so. The Crown has not expounded the content of any ideology that the Court could plausibly infer has been or will be taken up by the defendant. Significantly, the evidence is devoid of any ideological or political utterance by the defendant, in writing or in speech, on any occasion. I put aside the spray-painted slogans of the index offences because they were someone else’s slogans, painted for a price.

179. In a supplementary report Dr Shanahan states that a number of the images and symbols recorded on the defendant’s phone “are consistent with ideological support for the listed terrorist group Hezbollah” and/or “could reasonably be expected to express support for violent terrorism” or “may be consistent with support for violent terrorism”. Having examined each of the images about which Dr Shanahan has expressed those opinions and taking into account the defendant’s limited intellect and general lack of engagement with understanding Hezbollah and its struggles, I do not consider that his recorded and downloaded images show any “support” except, as already mentioned, possible passing sympathy for Hezbollah’s side in the fight with Israel. Even then, the storing of the images does not dispel my impression that such sympathy is, or was, very superficial and not associated with the development or adoption of an ideological outlook.

180. The defendant had a Gmail account from at least 3 July 2024, on which date his sister sent him a message advising him that the Gmail address was his username for his Apple ID. In the same message she advised him of the password for that Apple ID. There is in evidence a data extract from his phone showing particulars of the Apple ID, according to which 13 July 2024 is the “date created” and 1 August 2024 is the “date modified”. The password on that extract is “Fuckisrael313”, which is different from what it had been when the defendant’s sister messaged him on 3 July 2024.

181. The evidence does not clarify which of those dates relates to the new password. If it was adopted on 1 August 2024, it may have been associated with the defendant having learned that Beirut was bombed by Israel on 30 July 2024. If the password was adopted on 13 July 2024 I am not able to relate it to any contemporaneous event. Either way, the password indicates no more than that the defendant felt hostility towards Israel in about July or early August and by some thought process he connected that hostility with the number 313, which he likely associated with his religion.

182. The State adduced evidence that when interviewed by Dr Lennings the defendant denied operating a Gmail account. The State contended that the denial was deliberately untruthful and that from that circumstance I should infer that he has adopted some ideological position and has endeavoured to conceal it. I find that submission strained and unacceptable. The defendant has at times been inconsistent, evasive and/or untruthful under minute scrutiny whilst in custody, including during interviews by the Court appointed psychologists. Evidence of his lack of uniform frankness is not a substitute for affirmative proof that he has become ideological, a point on which the State’s case falls well short.

Outstanding charges

183. The defendant has been charged with intimidation on the basis of phone calls he made from prison in late December 2025 and early January 2026, in which he abused his former girlfriend, threatened her directly and expressed to others violent intentions towards her. Transcripts of the calls show that he considered his girlfriend to have been disloyal to him by attending a party on a boat while he was serving time. The calls reveal a controlling approach to the relationship and an aggressive manner. The content and tone was unacceptable, even when allowance is made for the pressure and frustration experienced by a 21-year-old man of limited psychological resources in full time custody. However, the defendant’s conduct on that occasion and the resultant charge, are matters of no significance in my assessment of whether the defendant poses a risk of committing a serious terrorism offence.

184. An image recorded on the defendant’s phone on 1 October 2024 depicted a gelblaster, in the configuration of a handgun, lying on a kitchen bench. Location data suggested that this was in the home of Adam Hawi. Two other images showed a hand holding a handgun. On the basis of the latter photographs the defendant has been charged with possession of a firearm. The evidence before me does not disclose whether it can be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the person holding the handgun was the defendant, or whether it was capable of discharging a projectile, or whether it was the same item as seen in the gelblaster photograph.

185. Notwithstanding the gravity with which firearms offences are regarded by the courts, there is not sufficient information in the photographs to permit me to place significant weight on the charge that has been laid, when assessing the risk that the defendant may commit a violent offence in the future. The possession of an operable handgun would be significant to such an assessment. It would not of itself suggest an unacceptable risk that any such crime might be accompanied by intentions to advance an ideological or political cause and to intimidate an Australian government or the public.

Peripheral and insignificant matters relied upon by the State

186. At an early stage of the hearing I indicated to senior counsel for the State that the evidence and outline of opening submissions included numerous alleged instances of minor criminal conduct by the defendant, or breaches of prison discipline, that did not appear relevant to an assessment of whether he would pose an unacceptable risk of serious terrorism offending upon release. I sought to narrow the focus of the case to material that would be capable of discharging the high burden of proof prescribed under s 20(d) of the Act. Senior counsel’s response was that the State’s case is circumstantial and that the Court would have to assess all the circumstances of which evidence would be given, as a whole. In deference to counsel’s submission I have considered it all.

187. Amongst the messages recovered from the defendant’s phone are exchanges with J Dirani on 26 August 2024, in which he said that he was going to “crack” or “bash” or “shoot” someone. There is no context for the messages, no evidence to identify who the defendant may have been referring to and no basis for discerning whether the threats reflected serious intent or were empty bravado. There is no evidence that the defendant committed any act of personal violence at about the time the messages were sent. I place no weight on the J Dirani messages of 26 August 2024.

188. On 28 November 2024, when first in custody on remand, the defendant applied to be transferred from Metropolitan Remand and Reception Centre to Parklea Correctional Centre. He said he was associated with the Alameddine Organised Criminal Network and wished to be housed with inmates of that group. Before the transfer application could be processed the defendant withdrew it, saying that he had no such connection. This tentative attempt to manipulate his placement took place when the defendant was in prison for the first time, aged 20 years. He apparently acted on the advice of someone who suggested he could be “looked after” at Parklea. Given the consensus of psychologists’ opinions about the defendant’s suggestibility and immaturity and having regard to the insecurity he would have felt upon his first exposure to a prison population, this naive and inept conduct is of no significance in assessing his propensity for future criminality of any kind.

189. On 27 August 2025, after the defendant was returned to custody for breach of bail, he was charged with fighting. He received a prison disciplinary penalty although Corrective Services accepted that he had not initiated the conflict. Corrective Services allege that on 22 September 2025, when he was being escorted to his cell following a search, the defendant became abusive towards staff, physically threatened them and resisted being restrained. The defendant gave a different version of events during a psychological interview but I take the incident into account on the basis of the prison staff allegations at their highest. Minor physical conflicts of the type that occurred on those two occasions, involving an inexperienced young male inmate, are commonplace in remand centres. They are not to be excused. However, in assessing their significance allowance must be made for the pressure of the environment. I place no weight on these incidents in assessing the defendant’s risk profile with respect to serious terrorism offending.

190. In some of the defendant’s gaol calls to family members during late December 2025 he spoke of an intention to assault Corrective Services staff and said he would kill the Governor of the centre where he was then located. On 5 January 2026 he was spoken to by the Governor who was satisfied that the defendant had no serious intent. This occurred shortly after sentence had been passed when his statutory parole order had been revoked and the defendant was in a highly emotional state as a result of the acrimonious breakdown of his relationship with his former female partner. The defendant’s intimations of violent intent can fairly be characterised as venting in frustration. The fact is, there is no evidence that the defendant has ever committed any act of interpersonal violence except for the two scuffles in prison in August and October 2025. The absence of violent deeds speaks louder than the defendant’s words.

191. After the defendant became subject to a National Security Interest classification from 14 January 2026 his only permitted phone contact was, initially, his father. Corrective Services noted that during late January and early February 2026 other people joined the calls at the receiver’s end, mostly the defendant’s mother and siblings. During February 2026 the defendant’s mother was added as a permitted contact and thereafter during some calls to her she permitted others to participate, usually the defendant’s sister. Such “three-way calls” were contrary to Corrective Services regulations. The participants broke into Arabic at times during these calls, which was a further breach.

192. Extensive Corrective Services notes of the breaches have been tendered in evidence. Whilst the Court does not trivialise disregard of present regulations, the instances proved in this case are of no consequence to the issues that fall for decision. The State submitted that the defendant’s parents effected the breaches and that I should treat that as an adverse reflection upon their capacity to guide the defendant towards prosocial conduct following his release. I am satisfied that the defendant’s parents are a strongly prosocial influence. The breaches of the regulations occurred due to the pressure the parents felt in the face of their son’s extreme isolation in prison. When Arabic was spoken, it was usually a few brief words from the defendant’s father. Arabic is his first language. I attach no significance to any of this evidence.

193. During April 2026 the defendant made gaol calls to his mother that Corrective Services officers thought may have related to the defendant trying to purchase illicit drugs for use in custody, by directing family members to make payments outside the prison environment. The State referred the Court to Corrective Services officers’ notes paraphrasing the relevant calls and expressing their suspicions. The evidence does not enable me to make findings about the purpose of the suspect calls. I draw no conclusion adverse to the defendant or his parents from this inconclusive material. If the defendant was trying to buy contraband drugs for consumption in custody, that would be reprehensible and would signify that he is not out of the grip of drug misuse and may continue on an antisocial course after release. The risk of that occurring is of course present because the defendant’s drug habits were, as admitted by him, entrenched before he entered custody. The evidence of these gaol calls and of Corrective Services’ interpretation of them adds nothing to the State’s case about the risk of serious terrorism offending.

194. The State submits that the defendant has failed to engage in rehabilitative programs whilst in prison. The evidence as to whether the defendant has been offered participation in a Countering Violent Extremism program is unclear. With respect to drug rehabilitation, in March 2026 he said he was reluctant to undertake a custody based program for fear that it would interfere with his prospects of having his parole reinstated. In April 2026 he agreed to commence the program but he declined to attend a session on 4 June 2026.

195. In April 2026 the defendant declined to engage with a Corrective Services psychologist “due to the case noting of sessions”. The defendant also withheld consent for a Corrective Services caseworker to contact his family. He referred the request to his solicitor. I draw no inference against the defendant for his tepid approach to custody-based programs and caseworker contacts. The Corrective Services case notes do not give the impression that his reluctance springs from defiance or entrenched criminality. The defendant was required to take part in multiple intensive interviews, over several hours in total, with three expert psychologists, as recounted below. He could reasonably wish to avoid further psychological interactions, particularly where he has plainly indicated to Corrective Services his suspicion about how things may be noted and used against him.

196. As I anticipated when the State opened its case on the above points, they have each individually proved to be of no consequence and the sum of all of them is no greater than its parts. The demanding test in s 20(d) of the Act is not advanced in a case of this type by presenting the Court with a litany of relatively minor, non-violent prison misdemeanours.

Expert opinions of Court-appointed and other psychological experts

Dr Christopher Lennings

197. Dr Lennings interviewed the defendant in person at Lithgow Correctional Centre for one hour and 40 minutes and conducted a further interview by Audio Visual Link for 45 minutes. Several tests were administered. Dr Lennings was satisfied with the defendant’s cooperation in the assessment process. His report shows that he carefully reviewed approximately 1100 pages of material that was submitted to him, corresponding with the State’s documentary tender at the final hearing before me.

198. The results of a full scale intelligence quotient (IQ) test placed the defendant “in the mild intellectual handicapped range, or better than only the bottom 1% of the population”. Another test placed him “in the borderline ability range, no better than the bottom 3% of the population”. Dr Lennings concluded that “his overall ability is low and likely falls into the borderline region”.

199. Tests were also administered to ascertain executive function, defined as follows:

The ability to demonstrate self-regulatory capacities: that is to regulate one’s emotions and feelings, and also to regulate behaviour. It is involved with the control of impulsivity, the capacity for planning and organisation behaviour and the ability to inhibit unhelpful responses.

200. Those tests “revealed severe disruption of executive function processes”. Dr Lennings concluded the following:

He has difficulties in inhibiting unhelpful responses, planning and organising his behaviour, problem-solving and sustaining working memory (attention and concentration). Such a pattern of severely impaired executive function is consistent with his very low achieved intelligence quotient and [possibly] supportive of Dr Rowe’s supposition of an underlying ADHD type disorder. His pattern of responses further supports the notion he is highly suggestible and dependent on others for direction and lacks critical appraisal abilities.

201. Dr Lennings advanced two alternative characterisations of the defendant, the choice between them depending upon findings of fact to be made from conflicting evidence. At [166] of his principal report the first alternative is set out in the following terms:

166 Thus the first characterisation is that Mr Farhat is a man of quite limited cognitive ability who lacks planning and organisation skills, who is reactive and impulsive, a shallow thinker (poor metacognitive capabilities) who mostly lives in the moment and is immature, approval-seeking, and oriented to a drug using and antisocial lifestyle but without any particular grievance or ideological persuasion. His engagement in the offence occurs out of his need for money and drugs, antisocial companions and as a lack of consequential thinking. He is not generally violent and is capable of some empathy but only in a limited way for people he knows rather than empathy as a trait which acts to inhibit harmful acts. On the other hand he has no generalised hatred to any particular group, he is largely indifferent to politics and he parrots opinions rather than forms his own. His neediness is such that he is more adolescent than adult like in the way he relates to conflict and frustration. His behaviour is amenable to supervision providing the demands on [him] are clear, simple, explained often to him, and leave no “wriggle room” for re-interpretation. He is in need of case management and mentoring more so than monitoring or surveillance.

202. The second possible characterisation is postulated at [167] of the report, incorporating a list of findings upon which this more adverse assessment of the defendant would depend. In the following extract I have inserted numbers for ease of reference in addressing the various integers of Dr Lennings’ analysis:

167 The second characterisation is of an immature and impressionable young man who has been (1) groomed and radicalised through the reward of drugs, money and (2) approval from antisocial others he admires. There is (3) a resting level of antisemitic thought, (4) partly encouraged by his family and culture and (5) at least some casual acquaintance with Shia religious themes, and (6) by the media scrutiny on the actions of Israel in both Gaza and Lebanon. As such he remains vulnerable to further grooming or radicalisation into antisemitic or extremist violence. In this view he was primed to engage in the offence, not only because of an immediate reward of drugs and money, but (7) because it fitted within an established antisemitic schema which dehumanised potential victims and allowed him to act in hateful way without conscience. In this characterisation he is shallow and callous in his regard for others, seeing people only as a means to an end. In this characterisation, (8) especially if the account he gives of a second phone, or not having viewed and sought out antisemitic and pro-Hezbollah imagery is false then he is more deceptive and deliberate in his actions than he otherwise appears and as a result monitoring and surveillance of his future activities when released, at least for the medium term appears necessary.

203. The elements that would have to be found as facts to sustain Dr Lennings’ second postulated assessment are not present. As to point (1), I have found that the defendant was recruited, or “groomed”, by the promise of payment in money and drugs but he was not “radicalised”. There is no evidence that encounters with his recruiter involved any element of persuasion or indoctrination to a cause. The defendant was simply hired to paint slogans and damage property.

204. As to point (2), the evidence suggests that the defendant’s closest associates at the time, Adam and Isaac Hawi, knew that the defendant was going to commit the offences and assisted by lending him a car. The inference that he may have hoped to gain their approval by committing the offences is reasonable. However, while I accept that the Hawi brothers were an antisocial influence on the defendant, I find no evidence that he was “radicalised” to antisemitism, or to any other ideology, in connection with carrying out crimes that he thought might gain their approval and respect.

205. As to point (3), the evidence does not persuade me that the defendant has any antisemitic thought. Antisemitism has been wrongly attributed to him, first, because evidence clearly showing that the spray-painted words were dictated to him and were not his own was not fully investigated by the OIC and was not placed before the Local Court or the State Parole Authority. Secondly, the words of the offending graffiti were erroneously classified by police and lawyers as antisemitic and were treated as having been inspired by the defendant’s personal bigotry as a result of evidence to the contrary not having been brought forward. The unfounded allegation that antisemitic attitudes were exhibited in the defendant’s index offending has been repeated, officially, over and over for nearly two years.

206. I dismiss the State’s contention, referred to by Dr Lennings in point (4), that the defendant was encouraged towards antisemitism by his family and culture. The evidence before me shows that the defendant’s parents and siblings are decent, tolerant people, respectful of others’ religions. There is no hint in the evidence that any member of the family has religious hostility towards anyone. It was the defendant’s father who arranged for him to engage with Ms Nagel after the charges had been laid, for the purpose of the defendant learning about Judaism and gaining insight into the way in which his actions had been interpreted by the authorities and by the Jewish community.

207. I have explained in connection with the family WhatsApp chat that the defendant’s parents have ties with Lebanon through heritage and extended family connection. In the context of experiencing distress about the Israeli military campaign that commenced in September 2024, the family members’ messages at times refer to “the Jews” as the aggressors, against whom they hope there will be retaliation. Such references are, self-evidently, to the Israeli Defence Force and/or to the people of Israel. The messages say nothing about hostility to all Jews or to Australian Jews. The comments are not directed to Jews as Jews but only to those Jews who, as the people of Israel, have undertaken yet another invasion of the country of their forebears.

208. As to point (5), Dr Lennings accepted the defendant’s account that his family practised religious observance in their home but were not regular attendees at a mosque. The defendant had ceased almost all observance prior to the index offending and his renewed interest after he was remanded in custody was “by way of reaching out to his family”. Dr Lennings made the following assessment:

Religion is neither a vulnerability nor a protective factor for him. In my view he has not become ideologically radicalised on the basis of religion, at best he was a fellow traveller with the prejudice of others.

209. I accept that view. It is consistent with the defendant’s pre-offence WhatsApp messages and his post-offence intercepted gaol calls, which do not reveal any substantial expression of Shia religious thought. Nowhere in his communications is there any record of the kind of religiosity that might be indicative of radicalisation to an ideology, antisemitic or otherwise. I have stated my reasons for finding that neither the “313” and “REJECTOR” tattoos nor the downloaded material on the defendant’s phone signify that he has embraced a fanatic understanding of Shia Islam.

210. I refer to point (6), the proposition that the defendant may have been encouraged to hold a “resting level of antisemitic thought” by “media scrutiny on the actions of Israel in both Gaza and Lebanon”. It is correct that for a year prior to the index offending there was extensive media coverage of Israel’s bombing of Gaza and detailed coverage on the Internet. The latter would more likely have been a source for the defendant, via his phone. I find no evidence of the extent to which the defendant may have followed that reporting or given it any serious consideration. If he did, he may have been influenced to hold an unfavourable view of Israel, like many other Australian citizens. There is no evidence that he was thereby led to antisemitism. The WhatsApp messages show the degree to which the defendant was aroused by Israel’s bombing and invasion of Lebanon, which he appeared to learn of from WhatsApp messages and the Internet. As earlier mentioned, his reaction to the Israel-Lebanon conflict did not convert to any manifestation of antisemitism.

211. With respect to an “antisemitic schema which dehumanised potential victims” postulated by Dr Lennings in point (7), the matters I have outlined in relation to the first six points sufficiently explain why I find that there has never been any such “antisemitic schema” in the defendant’s thinking. There still is not to this day.

212. It follows that I accept Dr Lennings’ first characterisation of the defendant. That assessment is inconsistent with the defendant posing any significant risk of committing a serious terrorism offence. In his supplementary report of 14 July 2026, issued after he had reviewed some additional material, Dr Lennings’ said he was “more inclined” to the first characterisation and added this:

7 … I have less confidence in my second characterisation that has, as its central tenant, the belief that Mr Farhat was radicalised and his actions were out of a genuine support for the aims of Hezbollah. Thus I maintain my view that Mr Farhat’s risk of committing a further serious terrorist act remains in the low to moderate range.

213. Further conclusions in the supplementary report are as follows:

9 A critical issue in my first report was the extent to which Mr Farhat’s behaviour represented the outcome of a process of radicalisation. It remains my view that Mr Farhat very likely had at best only a superficial engagement with radical ideas. […] To my mind, having read Dr Shanahan’s reports, the extracts provided in Mr Wright’s CIG [Corrective Intelligence Group] analysis, the telephone calls and my reflection on the material provided in my first report, it appears to me that Mr Farhat’s engagement in the offence was motivated by criminal opportunism rather than being terror focussed.

10 Realistically, it is to be expected that there is a strong negative reaction to Israel’s invasion of Gaza and Lebanon by people in Lebanon and indeed internationally. The issue is to what extent does the opposition to the actions in Gaza and Lebanon lead to support for Hezbollah and provide a fertile ground for recruitment into grievance focussed ideology? In the WhatsApp message stream, for instance, Mr Farhat’s engagement with that stream is limited and indeed it is his sister who appears the more strident and concerned, but also the more sceptical of Hezbollah than some of the other participants. Mr Farhat’s intervention in the stream only becomes prominent after his friend Adam Hawi is arrested.

12 I view Mr Farhat’s position as fellow-travelling behaviour, and being part of the crowd, much as Mr Farhat has consistently claimed, rather than a genuine radicalisation experience. It does mean of course, when asked to undertake the crimes he did, he had no censor or inhibition to desist. His ongoing perplexity of why the State saw his behaviour as so serious reinforces the view he gave no thought to the consequences of his actions. (That is, he is focussed on what he did – burning cars for money and drugs, rather than the consequences of his actions of causing fear in Jewish people. Even when that consequence is explained to him by Ms Nagel and he seems to genuinely apologise for it, he retains a dissonance between understanding that is how others experienced his actions and his understanding of what he did). If truly radicalised I do not believe his perplexity would be the case. […] On the 7th of December 2024 in a conversation with his sister [gaol call early in the defendant’s remand] he expresses a preference for watching Harry Potter rather than a report on the political events in Syria and the overthrowing of the government there by a former sanctioned terrorist. To my mind his indifference to Middle Eastern affairs in comparison to Harry Potter reinforces my belief he has not experienced any genuine radicalisation. To that end, I see little likelihood of ongoing risk of radicalisation in his behaviour and both the other experts appear to accept that Mr Farhat’s engagement with Ms Nagel was genuine, which is inconceivable to me if he was truly radicalised.

214. I find the reasoning and conclusions in those passages compelling. Without meaning to diminish the expertise in psychology that Dr Lennings has applied, his assessment of the defendant appears to be sound commonsense, based on the material that the State presented to him and to the Court.

215. At the conclusion of [166] of his principal report, Dr Lennings opined that the defendant “is in need of case management and mentoring more so than monitoring or surveillance”. The opportunity for case management and mentoring would have arisen if he had been released to parole. That opportunity has been lost. Instead, as Dr Lennings states at [8] of his supplementary report, the present position is as follows:

8 … In reviewing the additional material it seems the almost two years Mr Farhat has spent in gaol has had the effect of consolidating the antisocial elements of his personality. He entered gaol as a young man still developing his identity and personality and seemingly gaol has provided opportunities for deviance training, and especially so in the absence of any programs relevant to his diagnostic status and behaviour being offered to him. […]

13 As a consequence of my reflection it remains my view that the first characterisation I suggested of Mr Farhat is more likely than that of a man radicalised into genuine antisemitic intent such that he is at risk of further intentional antisemitic terror activity. However, my reflection has also led to a view that Mr Farhat is significantly more antisocial than I initially suggested in my first characterisation […] . I accept that there remains a risk that Mr Farhat has become so embittered by his imprisonment to date, and unfortunately had his criminal connections expanded, that he will leave gaol more antisocial than he entered. Application of an ESO in that circumstance will then only aggravate his grievance. […]

216. Dr Lennings perceives a likelihood that upon his release the defendant will return to a drug related lifestyle and engage in further acts of antisocial behaviour that will bring him back before the courts. On that score I do not share Dr Lennings’ pessimism to the same degree. His forecast represents a possible outcome. However, it is a possibility of criminal conduct of a general nature, rather than serious terrorist offending with the dual intentions of advancing an ideological cause and intimidating an Australian government or the public. Accordingly, the risk referred to by Dr Lennings falls far short of what would be required to satisfy me “to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not kept under supervision under the order” (s 20(d) of the Act).

Mr Patrick Sheehan

217. Mr Sheehan interviewed the defendant in prison at Lithgow for 2.5 hours and read the same documentary material as Dr Lennings, with similar thoroughness. Although Mr Sheehan did not carry out any psychometric testing he formed the opinion, from the documentary records and the interview, that the defendant is of “low-average intellectual functioning”. Mr Sheehan is “inclined to agree” with Dr Rowe’s diagnosis of ADHD. He stated the following in his principal report of 19 April 2026:

26. In my view Mr Farhat’s history suggests interruption of personality development, with poor self image and insecurity being key features. He had conduct problems in school sufficient for multiple suspensions and expulsion but it remains a little unclear whether he had diagnosable conduct disorder. His vulnerabilities played a role in his rejection of authority and his alliance with groups that would make him feel strong and fearless (both to himself and others). To some extent his manner of cultural and religious identity (which he displays conspicuously on his neck) through imagery of guns and bullets would also seem to play into his attempts to overcompensate for deep-seated insecurities embedded in childhood. Mr Farhat’s disturbing communications with his girlfriend in late 2025 reveal how easily his insecurities are exposed when he feels threatened or aggrieved. He does have several hallmarks of Antisocial Personality Disorder (impulsive, irritable, irresponsible, exploitative, repeated rule violation) and has identified with a criminal lifestyle as he entered adult life, but it will be difficult to know whether these features will persist deeper into adulthood until he has the opportunity to return to community life.

218. The reference to “disturbing communications with his girlfriend in late 2025” is to the gaol phone calls that have given rise to the charge of intimidation referred to at [183] above. In oral evidence Mr Sheehan emphasised the difficulty of assessing the risk of the defendant continuing to associate with antisocial peers, in circumstances where there has been no opportunity to monitor his progress on parole. The following answers were given:

A. […] we'd be in a much better position now to make a judgment on this [ie the likelihood of the defendant continuing with antisocial associates] if he had been released and supervised--

HIS HONOUR

Q. Pursuant to his parole?

A. Yes as was intended by the sentencing judge and structuring that sentence in the first place.

Q. Quite.

A. That, you know, that, that is a - it's quite frustrating to, to that that has happened because we would be in a better position […]

219. In Mr Sheehan’s principal report he referred to the death of the defendant’s paternal uncle and cousin in early October 2024 and drew the following conclusions:

In my view this event is likely to have been of significance in Mr Farhat’s politicisation in 2024 and I formed the view that he underplayed this during interview.

220. Elsewhere in the report Mr Sheehan repeated his view about “politicisation”, for example the following:

In my view, regardless of whether the account on an external instructor is accepted, the evidence does not support Mr Farhat’s account that he followed such instructions in an ideological vacuum. In my view the evidence suggests a reasonably rapid process of religious politicisation during the months prior to the offences.

[…] The images extracted from the phone reveal an escalation of political and paramilitary imagery focusing on the Middle East.

[…] I would hypothesise that the death of extended family members likely played a role in the escalated political engagement and anti-Israeli focus that precipitated Mr Farhat’s index offences in November 2024

I note that Mr Farhat’s political engagement occurred at a time of increased social discourse in Middle Eastern politics in the Australian community broadly, particularly focused on Israeli occupation in Palestine and the suffering of Palestinians.

221. I respectfully disagree with those conclusions. For reasons stated above concerning the phone messages and recorded images, I do not see that the defendant has at any time adopted a body of religious or political opinion. I do not consider that he has undergone “politicisation” or “religious politicisation” or “political engagement”, either up to the time of the index offending or subsequently. The defendant has never shown, either by words or action, that he has adopted any political or religious ideas with a continuity that could amount to the embrace of an ideology.

222. More specifically, Mr Sheehan has interpreted the evidence as indicating that:

… during 2024, Mr Farhat became committed to the proscribed terrorist group Hezbollah, a group that justifies the use of violence to achieve ideological goals. Mr Farhat does not say he is or has been committed to Hezbollah but his actions in late 2024 (his body art, communications and online history) showed that at that time he was keenly interested. This is not to say that he has remained committed. Mr Farhat subsequently expressed the intention to remove his tattoos. His lack of openness about his past fealty to Hezbollah makes unclear what his current thoughts are.

223. Respectfully, I do not accept those assessments either. He was not “keenly interested” in Hezbollah at any time. For reasons already given, his negligible contributions to chat groups are the antithesis of commitment or keen interest. The tattoos and the images recovered from the defendant’s phone bespeak superficiality. The absence of any verbal expression by the defendant of political or religious ideas, in the phone messages or otherwise, shows that he never got beyond liking, collecting and adorning himself with the pictures.

224. In my view, the defendant had no “past fealty to Hezbollah” about which he could have been “open”. Further, Mr Sheehan’s characterisation of Hezbollah as “a group that justifies the use of violence to achieve ideological goals” has led him to attribute to the defendant an acceptance of a type of criminality that is actually no part of what the defendant would have understood about Hezbollah from the chat group messages of September, October and November 2024. So far as the defendant absorbed those messages at all, they conveyed that Hezbollah was using military force to defend the people and territory of southern Lebanon against the military force of Israel. The chat group members discussed Hezbollah as a defence force at war with Israel, defending the Shia Muslims of the South in circumstances where the official Lebanese government was either not able or not willing to do so.

225. If approval and support for Hezbollah were to be imputed to the defendant at all, it would be essential to be clear about what the defendant understood Hezbollah was engaged upon. The enquiry as to whether the defendant embraced criminal terrorism goes off the rails if there is ascribed to him a perception of Hezbollah that comes from Western narrative, rather than the perception that the defendant, with his lack of independent enquiry or knowledge, took from the more righteous view of Hezbollah that his fellow chat members expressed.

226. In my view the lack of clarity about “his current thoughts” is consistent with him never having had any clear thoughts. The defendant’s wariness is understandable. By the time the defendant was interviewed by Mr Sheehan he knew that the Hezbollah tattoo had excited the attention of authorities, which is expressly why he wanted to have them removed (according to his solicitor’s correspondence with prison authorities five months before Mr Sheehan interviewed him). The defendant also knew that his frank, early explanation to the Counter Terrorism officers of how he became involved in the index offending had done him no good: they believed him but their acceptance was never passed on to the Magistrate or to the State Parole Authority.

227. In his principal report Mr Sheehan tentatively concluded that the defendant has now moved away from the “politicisation” that was said to have motivated him in November 2024:

[…] I note that since the index offences and Mr Farhat’s arrest there has been no real evidence of ongoing interest in political violence or race-based grievance, beyond Mr Farhat’s perception that he is being persecuted unfairly (personal injustice and grievance).

[…] I do not believe the evidence suggests that Mr Farhat could accurately be described as a high risk or an imminent risk of violent extremism. There is very little evidence of ongoing engagement with ideological based violence or anti-Jewish sentiment. In fact he has made steps towards redressing the fear and distress he caused to the Jewish community. […]

At the same time Mr Farhat has not done enough to extinguish the other correlates of his risk, namely his antisocial thinking, links to antisocial peers, language of violence and grievance based thinking. These factors form a foundation of behaviour detached from community values and permissive of violence, secrecy/use of encrypted apps, through which ideas of ideological extremist violence or criminal opportunism are more easily adopted. Until Mr Farhat overcomes these factors there remains a potential pathway to terrorism activity and I could not estimate his risk is low or insignificant.

228. Contrary to Mr Sheehan’s ultimate conclusion, I do regard the level of risk that the defendant will commit a serious terrorism offence as insignificant. Mr Sheehan’s starting point is different from my own in that I do not consider the defendant was ever politically radicalised. His “grievance based thinking” does not foretell terrorist offending. It relates to the defendant’s protracted incarceration in the circumstances described in these reasons, probably aggravated by the State’s endeavour to place him under extended supervision. I regard the “potential pathway to terrorism activity” construed from the defendant’s antisocial attitudes and peers as a theoretical construct in this case. The only risk of which I am satisfied is that the defendant may regress to use of illicit drugs and lower order crime.

Ms Kara Thompson

229. The State tendered three reports of Ms Kara Thompson, a clinical psychologist. Ms Thompson also gave oral evidence. Her initial report dated 13 January 2026 was based upon review of documentary material and 2.5 hours of personal interviews in early January 2026. That report was prepared for the purposes of the preliminary hearing before Hamill J. Ms Thompson made the following relevant assessment:

[A] moderate risk of violence and low to moderate risk of general recidivism, predominantly as a function of his antisocial attitudes, substance use, negative peer associates and untreated mental health conditions. Mr Farhat has also been assessed as being a low to moderate risk of violent extremism, religiously motivated violence, or serious terrorism when substance free, engaged with professional supports and estranged from criminal associates. This risk escalates to moderate should he disengage from a prosocial trajectory.

230. After reviewing additional material, including transcripts of the defendant’s gaol calls, Ms Thompson issued a supplementary report on 24 January 2026. The above assessments were repeated except that Ms Thompson thought the further material was evidence of “disengagement from a prosocial trajectory”. She updated the risk of serious terrorism offending to moderate.

231. A second supplementary report dated 7 April 2026 was issued after Ms Thompson had examined yet further gaol calls and messages and images recovered from the defendant’s phone. She also read the affidavits filed in the current proceedings. The assessments of risk level did not change relative to the immediately preceding report.

232. I note the diligence with which Ms Thompson reviewed the same large volume of material that has been tendered to the Court. I will not lengthen these reasons with detailed consideration of the basis upon which Ms Thompson arrived at a risk rating that I consider too high. Shortly stated, Ms Thompson is of the view that the defendant was exposed to “extremist narratives through family, online content and his broader social environment” prior to the index offending whereas I do not accept that anything the defendant’s family or friends communicated to him, in evidence before the Court, constituted “extremist narratives”. Ms Thompson considers that there was “likely some degree of radicalisation prior to the index offence” whereas, for reasons I have earlier given in relation to Mr Sheehan’s reports, I do not accept that view.

Factors protective against reoffending

233. Amongst the material recovered from the defendant’s phone are a message from an aunt on 27 July 2024 and others from his sister during July and August 2024, all urging the defendant to stay out of trouble, not to engage in drug misuse and to cease causing worry to his parents. Having heard the defendant’s mother give evidence under cross examination I am impressed by her devotion to her son and by her firm and realistic approach to the challenges of trying to manage him back to a law-abiding and productive life. Gaol calls early in the defendant’s first remand, during December 2024, show that his father is fully engaged in directing the defendant to take the lesson from his punishment. The defendant has strong support from his family to leave the “pathway” that Mr Sheehan and Ms Thompson suggest might give rise to some risk of more serious crime.

234. Ms Nagel assessed the defendant’s engagement with her as genuine. The Court has been given no reason to doubt his sincerity in that regard. In a gaol call of 7 December 2024 the defendant referred to news of an arson attack on a Melbourne synagogue and expressed apparently sincere disapproval. Very promptly after the December 2025 shooting of Jewish community members at Bondi Beach the defendant phoned Ms Nagel to express his horror and to ascertain how closely the event might have affected her. Again, there is no indication of insincerity in that call. The defendant’s interactions with Ms Nagel generally are inconsistent with him holding any residual ideological hostility that could inspire a serious terrorism offence in the future.

Conclusion

235. The Court is not persuaded that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence if not subject to extended supervision. The order sought by the State is not warranted.

**********

Endnotes

Variations of the spelling of antisemitism in quoted text are retained as in original.

Leading works include Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities (Pantheon, 1987); Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge, 2004); Ilan Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oneworld, 2010); Jean-Pierre Filiu, Gaza (2d Ed) (Hurst, 2012).

https://www.btselem.org/about\_btselem.

https://www.btselem.org/publications/202507\_our\_genocide.

https://www.phr.org.il/en/genocide-in-gaza-eng/ .

https://www.jewishvoiceforpeace.org/.

https://www.jewishcouncil.com.au/.

https://www.ecaj.org.au/about/our-policies/.

https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/article/2024/jun/25/fatima-payman-risks-labor-membership-after-crossing-floor-to-support-greens-motion-on-palestine.

Examples are the opinions of Sir Stephen Sedley, a judge of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales from 1999 to 2011, and Geoffrey Robertson AO QC, both reproduced in Karl Sabbagh (Ed), The Antisemitism Wars (Skyscraper, 2018).

https://www.apsc.gov.au/resources/circulars-guidance-and-advice/circular-202601-working-together-combat-antisemitism-aps#FN1.

https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary\_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal\_and\_Constitutional\_Affairs/AntisemitismBill/Report/Appendix\_1\_-\_Submissions\_and\_Additional\_Information.

https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/06/03/most-people-across-24-surveyed-countries-have-negative-views-of-israel-and-netanyahu/.

https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/06/04/most-people-across-36-countries-have-negative-views-of-israel-and-little-confidence-in-netanyahu/.

United Nations reports on Israel's genocide in Gaza include Conference Room Papers prepared by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry for the United Nation's Human Rights Council (UNHRC) dated 16 September 2025 (concerning Israel’s conduct in Gaza) https://www.un.org/unispal/document/commission-of-inquiry-report-genocide-in-gaza-a-hrc-60-crp-3/ and 18 June 2026 (concerning Israel's deliberate targeting of Palestinian children in the Occupied Palestinian Territory since 7 October 2023).

https://universitiesaustralia.edu.au/media-item/statement-on-racism/.

Amendments

18 August 2026

Contents

19 August 2026

[85] ; replaced with : [110] Spedley replaced with Sedley

01 September 2026

para 131 - delete the word "He"