State of New South Wales v Davie (Preliminary)

Decision: (1) An order, pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (the Act):
(a) Appointing two qualified psychiatrists or registered psychologists (or any combination of the two) to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations of the defendant, and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and
(b) Directing the defendant to attend those examinations.
(2) An order:
(a) Pursuant to s 10A of the Act, that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order from 15 December 2025 (the interim supervision order);
(b) Pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act, that the interim supervision order be for a period of 28 days; and
(c) Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, directing the defendant for the period of the interim supervision order to comply with the conditions set out in the schedule to these orders.
(3) I direct that the parties by 5pm on 28 November 2025 provide to my Associate a schedule setting out the conditions in accordance with these reasons.

Catchwords: HIGH RISK OFFENDERS – preliminary hearing – interim supervision order – appointment of experts –orders not opposed – where defendant subject to an extended supervision order – serious sex offences –diagnosis of Paedophilia – significant history of sexual offending – “Well Above Average” risk range – orders made
HIGH RISK OFFENDERS – conditions – schedule of movement conditions opposed – where defendant progressed to “Stage 3” monitoring – compliant – option to regress defendant maintained – conditions imposed as sought

Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 3, 4, 5, 5B, 5D, 5I, 6, 7, 9, 10, 10A, 10C, 11
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), ss 61M, 61O, 66A

Cases Cited: Attorney General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119
State of New South Wales v Donovan (2015) 90 NSWLR 389; [2015] NSWCA 280
State of New South Wales v Jeffrey Wayne Davie [2017] NSWSC 600

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Jeffrey Wayne Davie (Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
K Curry (Plaintiff)
J Wilcox (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2025/00340355

Publication restriction: Nil

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT (revised)

1. HIS HONOUR: By summons filed on 4 September 2025, the plaintiff seeks an order that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order (ESO). Various conditions are sought as part of that order. Prior to any final order being made, the plaintiff seeks interim orders as follows:

“1. An order pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (the Act):

a. Appointing two qualified psychiatrists or registered psychologists […] (or any combination of the two) to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and

b. Directing the defendant to attend those examinations.

2. An order:

(a) pursuant to s 10A of the Act that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order from 15 December 2025 (the interim supervision order):

(b) pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act that the interim supervision order be for a period of 28 days; and

(c ) pursuant to s 11 of the Act, direct the defendant, for the period of the interim supervision order, to comply with the conditions set out in the schedule to this Summons.”

2. An order was also sought restricting non-party access to the Court file. That order, which requires the parties to be notified and given an opportunity to be heard in the event of an application for access to the file by a non-party, has already been made.

3. With respect to the substance of the application, the defendant, while he does not formally concede the statutory test is satisfied to enable the making of an interim supervision order (ISO), and the appointing of experts for the purposes of conducting examinations, makes no submission in opposition to the orders being made. There is, however, opposition to the imposition of a small number of the conditions sought by the plaintiff.

4. On the application, the plaintiff read the affidavits of Jessica Leigh Murty affirmed 4 September 2025, 15 October 2025 and 19 November 2025, together with the associated exhibit and annexures.

5. In the absence of any contest as to the making of the ISO, I can be relatively brief with respect to this aspect of the matter.

6. The legislative scheme, the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act) is designed to address the almost “intractable” problem of how the criminal justice system should respond to the case of the prisoner who represents a serious danger to the community upon release: State of New South Wales v Donovan (2015) 90 NSWLR 389; [2015] NSWCA 280.

7. The objects are set out in s 3 of the Act:

3 Objects of Act

(1) The primary object of this Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community.

(2) Another object of this Act is to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation.

8. On the filing of an application, the Court is required to conduct a preliminary hearing. Following the preliminary hearing, the Court may make an ISO and appoint relevant experts to conduct examinations and provide reports. Section 10A provides:

10A Interim supervision order

The Supreme Court may make an order for the interim supervision of an offender if, in proceedings for an extended supervision order, it appears to the Court—

(a) that the offender’s current custody or supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined, and

(b) that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order.

9. Section 10A(a) is in this case satisfied; that is, it appears to me that the defendant’s current supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined. The defendant’s current supervision under a pre-existing ESO is due to expire, on the plaintiff’s calculation, at the expiry of 15 December 2025. That does not allow sufficient time to obtain relevant reports and conduct the hearing of the matter.

10. Section 7(4) provides that if, following the preliminary hearing, the Court is satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO, the Court must make orders appointing relevant experts to conduct examinations and furnish reports to the Supreme Court and directing the defendant to attend those examinations.

11. If, on the other hand, I am not satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an order, I must dismiss the application: s 7(5).

12. It can be seen that both the making of an ISO and an order appointing experts are dependent on a finding that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO, although s 7(4) mandates the making of certain orders if the relevant test is satisfied, whilst s 10A is subject to a discretion.

13. The test draws attention to the central provision with respect to ESOs, s 5B, which provides:

5B Making of extended supervision orders—unacceptable risk

The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if—

(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and

(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and

(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and

(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.

14. The expression “supporting documentation” in s 7 and s 10A is defined in s 4 to mean the documentation referred to in s 6(3). That section provides that an application for an ESO must be supported by documentation that addresses each of the matters referred to in s 9(3) of the Act, and a report prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist, or registered medical practitioner that assesses the likelihood of the defendant committing a serious offence.

15. Section 9(2) provides that in determining whether or not to make an ESO, “the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration”. It follows that ESOs are, in their nature, protective and not punitive: Attorney General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119.

16. Section 5D further clarifies the test in providing that the Court is “not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine that there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence”.

17. Sections 5B(a) to (c) all relate to matters of fact, which it is agreed are established by the supporting documentation in this case. The serious offences relied on by the plaintiff for the purpose of s 5B(a) are offences of sexual intercourse with a person under the age of ten years contrary to s 66A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); commit aggravated act of indecency with a person under ten years in contravention of then s 61O of the Crimes Act; and aggravated indecent assault of a person under the age of ten years in contravention of s 61M of the Crimes Ac**t; those offences being alleged to have been committed as part of the one incident in May 2005. Each of those offences constitutes a “serious sex offence” within s 5 of the Act.

18. The defendant is presently under supervision. That is as a result of the imposition of an ESO of 3 years and 9 months on 22 August 2016: see State of New South Wales v Jeffrey Wayne Davie [2017] NSWSC 600. The defendant served periods of imprisonment during the course of the ESO such that the ESO was, on occasion, suspended pursuant to s 10(2) of the Act. As a result of those suspensions, the ESO is calculated by the plaintiff as due to expire at the conclusion of 15 December 2025. Section 5B(b) is satisfied. Without setting out the section, there is no issue that the application has been made in accordance with s 5I such that s 5B(c) is satisfied.

19. Whether the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, satisfy s 5B(d) is a matter involving an evaluative judgment which I must exercise. For this purpose, it is necessary to have regard to the matters set out in s 9(3) of the Act.

The factual background

20. The defendant’s background and criminal history are set out in the plaintiff’s statement of case in the following terms:

“Part B: Background and Criminal History

6. The Defendant (born XX October 1968) is the youngest of two children and was born in Western Australia and raised on the Central Coast of NSW. The Defendant had speech and learning difficulties from around the age of four or five. He had problems with peers and had few close friends however he interacted very well with young children, and they were often attracted to him. The Defendant left school, halfway through Year 11, achieving below average results. He joined the Army and later the Reserves between the ages of 17 to 22. He reported that he was never formally discharged from the Army but was suspended from duty when charged with sexual offences in 1992. [The Defendant] has never had a long-term secure adult intimate relationship.

7. The Defendant has a history of serious sexual offending against unrelated male children between the ages of four and 16 years. The offences were committed [in] [REDACTED] 1992 and in 2005. He has been diagnosed with Paedophilia and is assessed as falling in the Well Above Average risk range for sexual reoffending.

Index offence

8. On 21 September 2006, the Defendant was convicted and sentenced at the District Court in Newcastle, of ‘Sexual Intercourse with person under 10 years’ (count one), ‘Indecent Assault person under the age of 10 years’ (count two) and ‘commit act of indecency towards child under 10 years’ (count three). In relation to count one, he was sentenced to nine and a half years imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years. He received fixed sentences of three years for count two and 12 months for count three, which ran partially concurrently.

9. As outlined in the Remarks on Sentence by Judge Coolahan, the Defendant was a member of the State Emergency Service (SES) at Tighes Hill. On 25 May 2005, the victim, a nine year-old male, and his mother (also a member of the Tighes Hill SES) attended a social function at the SES headquarters. The Defendant spoke briefly with the victim’s mother, in the presence of the victim. This was the first time the victim had met the Defendant. During the course of the evening, the Defendant provided the victim food, showed him kung-fu type moves, reprimanded him for calling his mother ‘mean’, discussed the Defendant’s age and placed a jacket over the victim when he was on a lounge. The victim went to the toilet. As he was leaving, he was met by the Defendant at the door. He said, ‘come with me because I want to tell you a secret...it’s another way to play a game of pool’. The Defendant grabbed the victim by the arm and pulled him into a cubicle. The Defendant spoke to the victim about the need to clean his genitalia and about trying to get ‘white pee’ coming out of his ‘rude part’. He then pulled down the victim’s pants and placed his fingers onto the victim’s penis pushing back his foreskin before performing oral sex on the victim. This act ceased when the victim’s mother opened an anteroom door and called out to her son. The Defendant then exposed his own penis to the victim before telling the victim to keep what happened a secret. The victim exited the toilet, and his mother noticed the victim ‘had a funny look on his face’. One minute later, the Defendant exited the toilet and had a brief conversation with the victim’s mother. The victim’s mother asked her son about his facial expressions and once in their car disclosed what happened in the toilet. He became physically ill and vomited. The victim’s mother reported the offences to Senior SES Officers immediately; the Police were contacted and attended the Tighes Hills Headquarters.

10. At the same time, the Defendant was charged with Fail to Comply with Reporting Obligations for failure to notify Police that he had engaged in volunteer work for the Newcastle Knights (Rugby League) and Newcastle United (Soccer) teams at the Energy Australia Stadium from mid-2003 to 21 May 2005. This charge was dismissed on 1 July 2008.

Other relevant offending

11. The Defendant has a significant history of sexual offending which includes the following offences:

a. [REDACTED]

b. Act of indecency on person under 18; Indecent assault x 15; Possession of firearm; Aggravated indecent assault; Possession prohibited weapon; Sexual intercourse without consent x12 (23 January 1992; 5 February 1992): On 22 June 1992, the Defendant entered a plea of guilty to three counts of ‘Homosexual Intercourse with Child Under the age of 16 Years’. A further 29 offences were taken into account on a Form 2 (as it was called at the time). These included two offences related to possession of prohibited items including a replica pistol and an air pistol whilst unlicenced; along with 27 counts relating to indecent sexual conduct with young boys. This included several acts of homosexual intercourse with boys ranging in age from four to about sixteen or seventeen. It was noted that victims were predominantly in the lower end of that age range. The offences involved the Defendant performing sexual acts on children he was babysitting and, on another occasion, while he was a guest of the family for dinner. He also met the victims through voluntary involvement in organisations such as Scouts, church groups and Air Cadets. In the remarks on sentence Judge Freeman noted in each of these cases the Defendant had been placed in a position of trust by parents who allowed him to care for their children.

On 19 August 1992, the Defendant was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight years and a fixed sentence of six years, to be served concurrently. The sentence was upheld on appeal.

12. On 3 July 2015, his Honour Justice Button made a continuing detention order (CDO) in respect of the Defendant for 12 months from 16 July 2015.

13. On 22 July 2016, Rothman J made a CDO for a period of one month (expiring at midnight on 21 August 2016) followed by an ESO for a period of 3 years and 9 months. Following periods of suspension pursuant to s. 10(2) of the Act, that order expires on 15 December 2025.” (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted)

Risk assessment

21. I turn to the assessment of risk. In determining whether the matters in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO, I am required to have regard to the (not exhaustive) list of matters set out in s 9(3) of the Act:

9 Determination of application for extended supervision order

…

(3) In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must also have regard to the following matters in addition to any other matter it considers relevant—

(a) (Repealed)

(b) the reports received from the persons appointed under section 7 (4) to conduct examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such examination,

(c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such assessment,

(d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further serious offence,

(d1) any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community,

(e) any treatment or rehabilitation programs in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such programs,

(e1) options (if any) available if the offender is kept in custody or is in the community (whether or not under supervision) that might reduce the likelihood of the offender re-offending over time,

(e2) the likelihood that the offender will comply with the obligations of an extended supervision order,

(f) without limiting paragraph (e2), the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an earlier extended supervision order,

(g) the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004,

(h) the offender’s criminal history (including prior convictions and findings of guilt in respect of offences committed in New South Wales or elsewhere), and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history,

(h1) the views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the offender,

(i) any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will commit a further serious offence.

22. Section 9(3)(b) has no application. As this is a preliminary hearing, no such persons have yet been appointed.

Section 9(3)(c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such assessment

23. A risk assessment report was prepared by Ms Holly Cieplucha, a senior psychologist working within the Department of Corrective Services, dated 2 June 2025. Ms Cieplucha applied a number of risk assessment tools, they being the STATIC-99R, the Risk of Sexual Violence Protocol – Version 2 (RSVP-V2), and the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide – Revised (VRAG-R). Ms Cieplucha also had regard to the defendant’s history of sexual offending which, on any view, is significant. She reviewed the various expert reports that had been prepared and the treatment undertaken by the defendant over his history within the criminal justice system.

24. Ms Cieplucha observed that the defendant had never completed a high intensity sex offender program. While he had commenced the Custody Based Intensive Treatment program (CUBIT) in 1999, he was discharged before completion. He has since declined referrals to similar programs, although he has shown a willingness to engage in individual management with Corrective Services psychologists. The defendant has previously undertaken anti-libidinal treatment, that being around the time of his release on the ESO. He did not, however, continue with that treatment.

25. With respect to the defendant’s response to supervision whilst on the ESO, Ms Cieplucha noted that he had offended just two months after the ESO was imposed. That offending was constituted by him searching for and viewing child pornography over the internet. The offences resulted in a sentence of 4 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 2 years and 9 months.

26. After serving that sentence, he was released to parole and continued serving the ESO. Subsequently, between June and December 2022, the defendant engaged in conduct in breach of his ESO. The conduct involved him obtaining a laptop computer without the prior approval of his supervisor on the ESO and having telephone contact with a known sex offender, also no doubt without approval.

27. In relation to this offending, the defendant received a sentence of imprisonment of 20 months with a non-parole period of 10 months, commencing on 16 December 2022, resulting in his release to parole on 15 October 2023.

28. I note that since that time, the only offence on the defendant’s record is a single offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm for which he received a sentence of 3 months. This offence had no sexual component. It appears to have been the result of a dispute within the group home in which the defendant was living. It can be said that this offending is not in keeping with the defendant’s prior offending, being the only non-sexual assault on his record.

29. Ms Cieplucha otherwise described the defendant’s response to supervision as “mixed”, although a recent “dramatic improvement” was described. With respect to the defendant’s criminogenic needs, Ms Cieplucha reported that the defendant has been diagnosed with Paedophilic disorder, that he has problems with intimate and non-intimate relationships resulting in isolation, and that he has problems with supervision together with problems with denial, treatment and self-awareness. Ms Cieplucha assessed the defendant’s risk of sexual reoffending as in the “Well Above Average” range.

Section 9(3)(d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further serious offence

30. I have had regard to the results of statistical and other assessments. These matters were taken into account in the risk assessment report of Ms Cieplucha.

Section 9(3)(d1) any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community

31. I have had regard to the risk management report prepared by Mr Steven Potter dated 30 June 2025. Mr Potter notes that the defendant was, at least at the time of the report, living with his mother. I understand that situation to have continued. Mr Potter also noted that the defendant was engaged in fortnightly appointments with a Corrective Services psychologist to address his offending behaviour and was additionally engaged in at least some age appropriate activities.

32. The defendant was, at the time of the report, subject to “Stage 1” monitoring. That level of monitoring required the defendant, in addition to wearing an electronic monitor, to comply with a strict weekly schedule of conditions. Mr Potter reported that the defendant had established a routine and was strictly complying with his schedule.

33. I note that in July 2025, shortly after the report was written, and presumably in response to the defendant’s level of compliance, he was progressed to “Stage 2” monitoring. This is a level of monitoring which, whilst maintaining the requirement for electronic monitoring and scheduling, is less restrictive than stage 1 monitoring. In effect, as I understand it, it allows the person subject to the conditions a greater degree of latitude in terms of the level of restriction imposed by the schedule, including allowing some pre-approved locations that a person may attend.

34. The defendant has since progressed beyond stage 2 and on to “Stage 3” monitoring. While stage 3 monitoring maintains the requirement for electronic monitoring, it does not require that the defendant provide a schedule of movements in advance. The defendant’s progression to stage 3 was approved on 7 November 2025.

35. Returning to the report, Mr Potter records that the defendant has indicated that he enjoys his sessions with the Corrective Services psychologist and he is motivated to continue with those sessions. It seems likely that the positive rapport established with the psychologist is related to the “dramatic improvement” described by Ms Cieplucha with respect to the defendant’s response to supervision.

36. The improvement has been to the point that Mr Potter reported that the defendant has indicated a desire to continue with the current level of supervision, regardless of the existence of an ESO. The report of Mr Potter goes on to discuss a number of potential conditions which might be placed on the defendant in the context of an ESO and the potential benefits of such conditions.

Other mandatory considerations

37. I have had regard to the matters set out in s 9(3)(e2) to (h1). These matters have largely been canvassed in the risk assessment report and risk management report.

Section 9(3)(i) any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will commit a further serious offence.

38. I am also entitled to have regard to “other information”, as available, as to the likelihood that the defendant will commit a further serious offence. In that regard, the plaintiff points to the judgment of Rothman J in deciding to impose an ESO rather than a CDO in 2016. His Honour did so, at least in part, on the basis that the risk was ameliorated by the defendant undertaking treatment with anti-libidinal medication. He is, as I have indicated, no longer subject to that treatment and has not been for some years, a matter which I accept is informative of his risk.

Determination

39. I approach the test on the basis I have already set out. I have already indicated that the formal requirements are satisfied. I am of the view that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation are capable of satisfying the Court to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order. This is largely based on my view that the risk as described by Ms Cieplucha, viewed in the context of the defendant’s history, and the other considerations in s 9(3) of the Act, is unacceptable. As I have already observed, the defendant did not argue against this conclusion.

40. It follows that I am satisfied that the material in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO. The orders for the appointment of experts must be made. The imposition of an ISO is subject, as I have indicated, to a discretion. There is, having regard to the risk proposed by the defendant, nothing that would cause me to exercise my discretion so as not to impose the ISO.

Conditions

41. I turn then to the conditions. The plaintiff has set out in a schedule to the summons the various conditions which were, at that time, sought. The defendant raised an objection to a number of the conditions in his written submissions. The plaintiff has responded modifying its position with respect to some conditions. The result of that process is that the area of dispute is very narrow. The parties are to be commended for their sensible and helpful approach in this regard.

42. I am of the view that the conditions that are not in dispute should be imposed, largely for the reasons advanced by the plaintiff. They are, in my view, appropriately responsive to the risk posed by the defendant.

43. The only area of dispute is with respect to the conditions relating to a schedule of movements. The proposed conditions 6, 7 and 8 are in the following terms:

“6. If you are asked to, you must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start.

7. If you want to change anything in your schedule of movements once it is approved by a DSO, you must seek approval from a DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless a DSO approves a shorter period.

8. You must not deviate from your schedule of movements except in an emergency.”

44. As I have indicated, the defendant has progressed to stage 3 monitoring with the result that he is not required to provide a schedule of movements and, it follows, not required to comply with any such schedule of movements. The dispute is, as a result, really about whether the conditions should be framed to provide the option to the plaintiff to regress the defendant if it is considered necessary.

45. As I have indicated, it appears that the defendant has been, since his release to parole in October 2023, compliant with his ESO with the exception of the assault occasioning actual bodily harm offence in November 2024, which I accept is an aberration in the context of the defendant’s criminal history.

46. Indeed, the defendant has in recent times been punctilious in his compliance with the ESO. His conduct in that regard, together with his engagement with psychological services provided to him, has no doubt been the reason for his progression to his current stage of monitoring. That progression is, however, very recent. It is, of course, hoped that the defendant will continue in the same positive vein as he has in recent times. In the light of the defendant’s history, and the recency of that progression, however, I am of the view that the option to impose a schedule, if required, should remain.

47. My view with respect to the maintenance of this condition is, I should add, significantly informed by the evidence that those responsible for the defendant’s supervision appear to be working cooperatively with him in order to establish him safely in the community, and in doing so, are advancing both the defendant’s interests and that of the community.

48. For the purposes of the orders I will now make, it will be necessary for the parties to provide my Associate with a schedule setting out the conditions to be imposed in accordance with these reasons. That schedule will be annexed to the orders I now make. I make the following orders:

49. An order, pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (the Act):

(a) Appointing two qualified psychiatrists or registered psychologists (or any combination of the two) to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations of the defendant, and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and (b) Directing the defendant to attend those examinations.

2. An order:

(a) Pursuant to s 10A of the Act, that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order from 15 December 2025 (the interim supervision order); (b) Pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act, that the interim supervision order be for a period of 28 days; and (c) Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, directing the defendant for the period of the interim supervision order to comply with the conditions set out in the schedule to these orders.

3. I direct that the parties by 5pm on 28 November 2025 provide to my Associate a schedule setting out the conditions in accordance with these reasons.

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State of NSW v Davie - Schedule of conditions - 27 November 2025 (182 KB, pdf)