State of New South Wales v Darryl Luke Smith (Preliminary)

Legislation Cited: Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW)
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Law Enforcement (Power and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW)

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Smith (Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
Bradley Dean (Plaintiff)
Heather Webb (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid New South Wales (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2025/00083098

JUDGMENT

1. The plaintiff, the State of New South Wales, seeks by summons an order that the defendant, Darryl Luke Smith, be subject to an extended supervision order (“ESO”) pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”) for a period of three years from the date of the order.

2. In the interim the plaintiff seeks orders pursuant to s 7(4) of the Act for the appointment of two qualified psychiatrists and/or registered psychologists (or any combination of two such persons) to conduct separate examinations of the defendant and to furnish their reports to the Court, as well as an order directing the defendant to attend those examinations. The plaintiff also seeks an Interim Supervision Order (“ISO”) against the defendant, pursuant to section 10A of the Act, for a period of 28 days from 5 July 2025, as well as an order pursuant to s 11 of the Act, directing the defendant to comply with certain conditions set out in the schedule to the summons during the period of the ISO. The plaintiff also seeks ancillary relief regarding access to the Court’s file.

3. In relation to the matters for determination today, written submissions filed for the defendant and oral submissions at the hearing opposed the making of the orders for assessment and an ISO, and some of the conditions, if an ISO is made. There is no opposition to the restriction to access to the Court’s file sought by the plaintiff.

4. As will become apparent, the defendant is in fact in custody refused bail in relation to serious alleged offending resulting in charges laid in November 2024. It is the joint position of the parties that if an order is to be made, I not order now the date by which expert reports are to be provided. The operation of any ISO will be suspended whilst the defendant remains in custody.

The evidence

5. A substantial volume of material was tendered by the plaintiff. This material included:

6. Affidavit of Penelope Smith affirmed on 28 February 2025 together with Exhibit PS-1 (a number of folders of documentary material);

7. Affidavit of Penelope Smith affirmed on 17 March 2025;

8. Affidavit of Yan Lun Loh affirmed on 19 May 2025; and

9. Affidavit of Kelli Grabham affirmed on 19 May 2025.

10. The defendant tendered a further supplementary body of documentary material. This included:

11. Affidavit of Joseph Harding affirmed on 7 May 2025; and

12. Second Affidavit of Joseph Harding affirmed on 7 May 2025 – both annexing documents.

Background

7. In summarising the background of this application, I am considerably assisted by the parties’ joint statement of agreed facts which summarised the evidence.

8. The defendant was born in 1985 in Goondiwindi, Queensland, so is now 40. He is a Kamilaroi/Gamilaraay man and was raised with his siblings on the Toomelah Aboriginal Reserve before relocating to a mission near Moree at around age 10. The defendant was exposed to serious domestic violence as a young person. He has been described as being raised in abject poverty. He left school at 15 years of age, and commenced using alcohol and cannabis from the age of 16, progressing to amphetamine and methylamphetamine as a young person. At around 30 years old, the defendant also reported intravenous use of morphine/heroin.

9. The defendant has had an on-and-off relationship with his partner and the mother of his 7 children, PB, for most of his adult life. There have been numerous Apprehended Violence Orders (“AVO”s) against the defendant to protect her, and he wounded her with a knife in 2012 and is charged with having done so again in November 2024. She was also the defendant’s co-offender in the index offence that gives rise to the Court’s power to make the orders now sought.

10. The defendant’s intellectual function has been assessed as “Extremely Low” and he has been found to meet the diagnostic criteria for a mild intellectual disability or a moderate intellectual disability. He was granted a one-year National Disability Insurance Scheme (“NDIS”) Plan from 10 January 2024 to 9 January 2025. Records also indicate that the defendant has a hearing impairment and there are some references to mental health issues, specifically depression and anxiety, in his correctional records.

11. The defendant has an extensive history of criminal offending which began from the age of 15 and includes theft, larceny, breaking and entering buildings, affray, assault occasioning bodily harm, assaulting and resisting officers, stalking and intimidation in a domestic context, contravention of AVOs, common assault and reckless wounding.

12. The defendant’s first period of adult custody commenced on 16 April 2005, aged 19 years. The defendant has been in custody for most of his adult life, having engaged in what is described by Community Corrections as an “uninterrupted cycle of imprisonment and release to supervision”. It can be observed that the defendant’s criminal history reveals an escalation in interpersonal violence over time, with increasing severity of harm caused to the victims.

13. The index offence was one of wounding with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. It occurred in the early morning of 5 March 2019 at the victim’s mother’s home in Moree, in the company of other persons and some co-offenders. The defendant (then aged 33 years) stabbed a 4-5cm long pocketknife into the chest of the victim. At the time, the defendant was in the community on parole for a domestic violence offence.

14. The defendant has since noted that he had been using alcohol and drugs for a few days prior to the offence and that he was looking for a drug dealer who had ripped him off. The victim has said that he thought he was going to die, and the evidence of his injuries and lengthy medical treatment indicate that they were life threatening.

15. The defendant was sentenced for this offence on 28 November 2019 at Moree District Court. A total sentence of six years imprisonment commencing on 6 July 2019 and expiring on 5 July 2025 was imposed, with a non-parole period of four and a half years expiring on 5 January 2024. The defendant was released to parole on 23 July 2024, and resided with family in Moree but was arrested on 23 November 2024 and charged with a number of serious offences, for which he is currently bail refused. I refer to the detail of those allegations further below. On 11 December 2024 an order was made revoking the defendant’s parole order, effective from 23 November 2024. The charges laid on 23 November 2024 were listed in the Newcastle Local Court on 4 June 2025 for Charge Certification.

16. It is proposed by the plaintiff that no date be allocated for the furnishing of the reports currently sought, and that the orders sit unimplemented until such time as it becomes clearer that the defendant is to be released from custody (acquitted, on bail, parole, or on completion of a sentence). This will mean that the defendant is not ordered to engage with experts while his new charges are outstanding, risking compromise of his right to silence. It also means that if he is found guilty of any of the new offences and serves a sentence of imprisonment, the parties would approach the Court for a date to be fixed for the experts to be appointed and furnish their reports, allowing for up to date assessment for the final hearing. The operation of any ISO I impose will be suspended by virtue of s 10C(1A) of the Act whilst the defendant is in custody. In the event that I make the orders sought by the plaintiff, the defendant agrees with the plaintiff’s proposal as I have outlined it in this paragraph.

Statutory framework

17. The plaintiff’s application for an ESO is brought pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Act. Those sections provide as follows:

5B Making of extended supervision orders—unacceptable risk

The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if—

(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and

(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and

(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and

(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.

…

9 Determination of application for extended supervision order

(1) The Supreme Court may determine an application for an extended supervision order—

(a) by making an extended supervision order, or

(b) by dismissing the application.

…

18. The power to make an ESO pursuant to s 5B is discretionary. In that regard, the Court is guided by the objects of the Act, and the paramount consideration and matters set out in s 9 to which the Court must have regard in determining whether or not to make an ESO. Relevant provisions of the Act in these respects include the following:

3 Objects of Act

(1) The primary object of this Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community.

(2) Another object of this Act is to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation.

…

9 Determination of application for extended supervision order

…

(2) In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration of the Supreme Court.

…

(3) In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must also have regard to the following matters in addition to any other matter it considers relevant—

…

(b) the reports received from the persons appointed under section 7 (4) to conduct examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such examination,

(c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such assessment,

(d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further serious offence,

(d1) any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community,

(e) any treatment or rehabilitation programs in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such programs,

(e1) options (if any) available if the offender is kept in custody or is in the community (whether or not under supervision) that might reduce the likelihood of the offender re-offending over time,

(e2) the likelihood that the offender will comply with the obligations of an extended supervision order,

(f) without limiting paragraph (e2), the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an earlier extended supervision order,

(g) the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004,

(h) the offender’s criminal history (including prior convictions and findings of guilt in respect of offences committed in New South Wales or elsewhere), and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history,

(h1) the views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the offender,

(i) any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will commit a further serious offence.

19. A “serious offence” is defined in s 4 and includes a “serious sex offence” and a “serious violence offence”. A “serious violence offence” is defined in s 5A and includes a serious indicatable offence (relevantly, within the meaning of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)) that is constituted by a person:

(a) engaging in conduct that causes the death of another person or grievous bodily harm to another person, with the intention of causing, or while being reckless as to causing, the death of another person or grievous or actual bodily harm to another person, or

(a1) an offence under the Crimes Act 1900, section 37(1) or (2), or

(b) attempting to commit, or conspiring with or inciting another person to commit, an offence of a kind referred to in paragraph (a) or (a1).

20. Section 37 of the Crimes Act is concerned with serious choking, suffocation and strangulation offences. Section 5D of the Act provides that the Court is not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine that there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.

21. Section 7(4) of the Act provides that if following the preliminary hearing I am satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO, I must make orders appointing two qualified psychiatrists and/or registered psychologists (or any combination of two such persons) to examine the defendant and furnish reports to the Court, and directing the defendant to attend those examinations.

22. Section 10A of the Act is in the following terms:

10A Interim supervision order

The Supreme Court may make an order for the interim supervision of an offender if, in proceedings for an extended supervision order, it appears to the Court—

(a) that the offender’s current custody or supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined, and

(b) that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order.

Whether an order for expert assessments and an ISO should be made

23. It was conceded by the defendant that the statutory preconditions in s 5B(a)-(c) of the Act are met, and I am satisfied that they are. Further, the defendant’s current custody for the index offence will expire on 5 July 2025, before the proceedings for an ESO are determined.

24. The real question for determination is whether the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, satisfy me to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a further serious offence if he is not supervised under an ESO.

25. I will address important aspects of the evidence, by reference to the pertinent factors set out in s 9(3) of the Act. The written submissions of both parties have been of considerable assistance in focusing attention on and summarising this evidence.

Risk Assessments – s 9(3)(c) and (d)

26. On 17 October 2024, Geoffrey D’Hudson, a registered psychologist within Community Corrections, completed a Risk Assessment Report in respect of the defendant. Mr D’Hudson interviewed the defendant by video and reviewed extensive documentation. Mr D’Hudson stated that, “[a]t interview Mr Smith appeared apathetic towards the assessment, seemingly with some underlying irritability.” Mr D’Hudson stated “[m]ost of the questions put to Mr Smith were responded to with ‘Don’t know’ or ‘maybe’” and that “Mr Smith did not elaborate”; however, Mr D’Hudson acknowledged that “low verbal expression is a general presentation for [the defendant].” The interview was cut short by the defendant taking himself out of the camera’s view, refusing to return. He ceased responding when questioned about his behaviour, became angry, walked out of the room and left the Community Corrections office.

27. Mr D’Hudson’s assessment of risk included his statement that, “[b]ased on actuarial measures, Mr Smith falls in the High-risk category for reoffending relative to other adult male violent offenders”, and that he presents with “a high density of criminogenic needs despite receiving specialist intensive intervention.” He expressed the opinion that “[t]he goal of any ongoing case management would be to encourage the development and maintenance of a stable and sustainable lifestyle, so that newly formed habits can be maintained even when Mr Smith is not under any form of legal restraint”.

28. Mr D’Hudson suggested that if the defendant is considered suitable for an ESO, “[he] would be subject to intensive supervision, strict monitoring and case management by [Corrective Services]”, which could include “risk management strategies” such as: electronic monitoring; the provision of a schedule of his daily activities; unannounced home visits; drug testing; and ongoing assessment of social contacts.

29. Mr D’Hudson also suggested the defendant be referred to “a community based CSNSW senior psychologist to assist … in managing any acute risk issues, and for individual risk management intervention aimed at maintaining treatment gains from the SRP-VO and improving Mr Smith’s emotion regulation and behavioural stability”. Mr D’Hudson acknowledged that the defendant could engage with a private psychologist in the community but noted that “given Mr Smith’s previous ambivalent attitude towards intervention he would likely not be motivated to do so without direction from Community Corrections.”

30. The available statistical assessments support a finding that the defendant is in a “High risk” or “Medium-High risk” category for violent reoffending when compared to persons with similar histories and characteristics. For instance:

31. Before and after his participation in the Self-Regulation Program – Violent Offenders (“SRP-VO”) the defendant was scored using the Violence Risk Scale, and, on both occasions, was placed in the high risk category for violent reoffending, noting that it appeared his score / risk level decreased between 17 July 2023 and 4 June 2024.

32. On 30 August 2024, shortly after his release to parole, Community Corrections assessed the defendant to be in the medium-high risk category for general and violent offending using the Static and Dynamic Risk Factors (Actuarial Assessment – General Offending) Level of Service Inventory – Revised.

33. On 15 October 2024, Mr D’Hudson assessed the defendant to be at a high risk of violent reoffending using the Static Risk Factors (Actuarial Assessment – Violent Offending) noting that, according to this instrument, 58% of violent offenders in the same risk “bin” as the defendant reoffended violently within five years, and 78% of violent offenders reoffended violently within twelve years.

34. In addition, using a “structured professional judgment” tool, Dynamic Risk Factors (Structured Professional Judgment) - Violence, Mr D’Hudson assessed that the defendant will require a moderate-high level of effort to prevent further violence.

35. Risk factors identified include substance abuse, violent lifestyle, antisocial attitudes and criminal peers, interpersonal aggression, emotion control and impulsivity, weapon use, (in)stability of relationships, violence cycle and insight into violence, intellectual disability and problems with self-awareness, and problems with supervision. Mr D’Hudson opined that the most likely scenario for future violent offending would involve the defendant impulsively/emotionally reacting to a person known to him whom he perceives is being disrespectful, dismissive, untruthful or threatening towards himself and his family and that an intimate relationship could trigger the defendant’s use of reactive or expressive violence. Mr D’Hudson considered that the defendant could also violently reoffend if he were to return to an antisocial lifestyle involving ongoing drug use with criminal peers.

36. Other expert reports in the evidence include discussion of the defendant’s intellectual disability and the difficulties this causes. I deal with this further below in relation to s 9(3)(i).

Corrective Services reports regarding the extent to which the defendant can be managed in the community – s 9(3)(d1)

34. The 20 November 2024 report of Susan Page of the Metropolitan ESO Team set out a plan for the defendant’s supervision in the community. It will be addressed again in relation to the conditions sought by the plaintiff. Relevantly to the determination to appoint experts and make an ISO, Ms Page outlined a “supervision plan” that would involve the defendant having at least one instance of face-to-face contact per week with Community Corrections, most often in the form of field and home visits; access to an Aboriginal Community Engagement Culture Officer; monitoring by the NSW Police ESO Investigation Team, including by way of covert observation and face-to-face contact; and weekly contact with the defendant’s “third parties and stakeholders”.

Program participation – s 9(3)(e)

35. The defendant participated in, and completed, the SRP-VO between 20 June 2023 and 4 June 2024. He engaged meaningfully during group activities, made active efforts to remain attentive, and shared openly when prompted. He was assessed as having typically comprehended program content, although he struggled to retain learned material and he required significant individual support (assistive prompting and scribing) in completing written taskwork. His engagement with the SRP-VO decreased his risk according to the assessments provided by Mr D'Hudson.

36. Although the defendant was reported to have engaged in some “therapy interfering behaviours” (including a refusal to participate in urinalysis on one occasion, a positive result for methylamphetamine on another, and some poor compliance with correctional centre routine), those behaviours almost exclusively did not relate to violence, and decreased in frequency as he progressed through treatment. In particular, following his agreement to a Therapeutic Commitment on 19 October 2023, he responded well and returned appropriate urinalysis testing results.

37. Although limited in his verbal expression, the defendant was able to demonstrate appropriate understanding about his offending within the limits of his cognitive ability and presented as open-minded towards engaging in the treatment process. He appeared to see value in treatment as a means to develop the knowledge and skills required to change his behaviour and maintain an offence free lifestyle.

38. Additionally, the defendant completed EQUIPS Foundation and EQUIPS Addiction courses in 2020. He showed signs of good participation and it was noted that he could link activities to offending behaviour and demonstrated a willingness to change through self-management planning, and that he participated and understood the impact of his addiction on his life and others.

39. Employment in custody was positively influenced in September 2022 by the defendant’s placement within a Koori mentoring unit.

40. The defendant was a participant in the Buvidal program while in custody and was compliant with that treatment regime as prescribed.

Other options for risk reduction – s 9(3)(e1)

41. The evidence does not suggest that structures based on family, friends, employment or social groups offer any prospect of risk reduction.

42. The defendant is an NDIS participant, but the plaintiff relies on evidence suggesting that during his most recent period of parole the defendant was not receiving support under his NDIS Plan because he would not engage with the provider. Similarly, the plaintiff points to the defendant’s pattern of poor engagement during his most recent period of supervision by Moree Community Corrections, referred to below.

43. In her Risk Management Report dated 20 November 2024, Ms Page stated that “[t]he reliance on Mr Smith engaging in intervention with his drug and alcohol counsellor and pharmacotherapy treatment was determined to be an alternate way to case manage him; however, as noted above, he was … exited from the Buvidal program due to lack of engagement and inconsistently in contact with his drug and alcohol counsellor.”

Likelihood of compliance with ESO obligations, and past compliance with orders – s 9(3)(e2), (f) and (g)

44. The defendant has breached parole and bail conditions on many occasions, and contravened prohibitions and restrictions placed on him by AVOs. He was on parole for domestic violence offending when he committed the index offence, and he was on parole for the index offence when he allegedly committed the serious domestic violence offences on 23 November 2024, which I describe in greater detail below. Mr D’Hudson described the defendant as having demonstrated a persistent pattern of poor compliance and cooperation during multiple previous supervision orders, and this is borne out by breach reports and records in the evidence.

45. The breach of parole report dated 26 November 2024 identifies details of alleged breach of parole which are not limited to the fresh allegations, although that was the primary focus. For example, the defendant was required to comply with all reasonable directions from a Community Corrections officer about the place he would live, and he was reported to have failed to comply with this because he was unable to provide the address that he was residing at.

46. The evidence is not straightforward regarding the defendant’s compliance with parole, otherwise than in relation to the allegation of new offending, after release from custody in July 2024. The defendant was broadly compliant with his parole and attended scheduled appointments. Although his engagement became less consistent, he remained in contact with Moree Community Corrections by telephone.

47. The defendant attended three appointments for mental health and alcohol and other drug counselling between September and November 2024. Although his attendance was inconsistent, he was reported to have been building a positive relationship with his counsellor. He failed to attend three telehealth appointments for the purpose of obtaining a prescription for Buvidal and was exited from the Hunter New England Buvidal program; however he had been prescribed a monthly injection of Buvidal while in custody and was compliant with that program. There was an administrative problem with the transfer of his prescription from Justice Health to NSW Health in Moree, which required him to attend the further appointments. He was initially compliant until this problem arose, and did not express any opposition to Mr D’Hudson to the Buvidal program. The evidence includes reports of motivation to remain abstinent from drug use and a willingness to continue with Buvidal. On 25 September 2024 he told his supervising officer that he did not want to be exited from the program. At the time of his return to custody on 23 November 2024, he had agreed to attend upon the relevant medical service in Moree in order to obtain a new Buvidal prescription.

48. The interaction with Community Corrections on parole allegedly included aggressive behaviour following receipt of a verbal warning for refusing drug testing.

Criminal history and views of sentencing court – s 9(3)(h) and (h1)

49. The defendant has a lengthy criminal history, all of which I have taken into account (and which has been available to a number of people whose reports or affidavits are before me). It involves violent offences, both against an intimate partner and against a person who was not well-known to him. It is important however that the index offence is the only conviction on the defendant’s record which amounts to a serious violence offence as defined in the Act.

50. The index offence has been outlined above at [13]-[15]. In this case there were no views expressed in sentencing the defendant in 2019 that add to my consideration of the relevant test. There was also a conviction for reckless wounding of PB in 2011, which although not a “serious violence offence” within the meaning of the Act, involved a violent attack by the defendant resulting in reasonably severe injuries to PB, involving the use of a knife, as with the index offence.

Other matters relevant to s 9

51. Two further matters are highly relevant in my view to the determination I am required to make. One is the defendant’s intellectual disability, and the other is the detail of the alleged offending in November 2024.

52. Many of the reports refer to a previous diagnosis of moderate intellectual disability. The defendant tendered a custodial case note detailing the original assessment resulting in this diagnosis that was conducted by Ms Joanne Bell.

53. A report was prepared by Arity Dickerson, psychologist, on 19 April 2023. She explained some consequences of the defendant’s disability, such as the fact that he experiences difficulty using timetables and struggles with how to get to a location on his own. The defendant has difficulties working out what time he needs to catch public transport or make appointments. He finds it difficult to plan out how to get to a location and will rely on others to help him to get to a destination. The defendant will often become lost and distressed.

54. Ms Dickerson explained that the defendant has difficulty with motivation to attend appointments or planned activities. He has difficulty remembering when to attend appointments. The defendant has limited literacy and requires assistance interpreting written information. He has difficulty understanding what others are telling or instructing him to do and becomes easily confused. He needs assistance with managing money. The defendant will often misinterpret information and instructions and requests from others.

55. The evidence of the defendant’s NDIS plan is important because it outlines support that is available to him in the community, but which has not been previously productively utilised. The plaintiff’s evidence from Kelli Grabham explained aspects of how an ESO (or ISO) would be worked through for someone with the defendant’s vulnerabilities.

56. The pending charges were laid on 23 November 2024 and relate to events alleged to have occurred that day. The Court Attendance Notices and police Facts Sheet are before me. These documents allege that the defendant and PB had recently resumed their relationship, having been separated for some time. They were on a Country Link Train which departed Broadmeadow in the early afternoon, destined for Moree. The defendant is alleged to have become agitated with PB about an hour into the journey, and she is said to have attempted to walk away from him. He is alleged to have followed her, with their interaction coming to the notice of witnesses. PB asked a passenger support supervisor aboard the train to contact police to meet them at the (presumably next) train station. The supervisor endeavoured to calm the defendant by giving him a coffee but he is alleged to have thrown it at PB, narrowly missing her and with it spilling on the floor. The defendant is alleged to have then advanced upon PB and punched her around the head and body as she cowered on the floor, screaming.

57. A senior passenger attendant is said to have approached the defendant and attempted to calm him at that point. The defendant is alleged to have grabbed his hand and twisted it, causing pain. PB is alleged to have at this time run to the buffet section, with the passenger support supervisor locking the door. The defendant is alleged to have then accessed a steak knife from a bag he was wearing, jumped into the buffet section and reached PB, being observed to make stabbing motions towards her. The passenger support supervisor escaped, and the defendant is alleged to have dragged PB to their initial location. It is alleged that PB was thrown by him on the seat, and that he made verbal threats to the witnesses of stabbing or killing them if they came closer. The defendant is alleged to have used the luggage of multiple passengers to set up a barricade, and demanded that the passenger support supervisor give him her telephone so he could call his mother. It is alleged that she provided it, and unlocked it when he screamed at her to do so, but that he could not call his mother because of lack of service. PB was said to be slumped in the seat crying out in pain at this point. The defendant is alleged to have continued to turn to her and poke her with the knife during this attempt to contact his mother.

58. Police boarded the train but were hampered by the barricade that had been set up. It is alleged that the defendant said he would kill PB if they came closer. When one police officer attempted a different path of contact the defendant is alleged to have faced her, whilst holding PB with a knife to her throat, threatening to stab PB and kill the officer if she came closer. The defendant was incapacitated by deployment of tasers by police, and PB was dragged to safety, and the defendant disarmed and handcuffed.

59. The police Facts Sheet states that the train was declared a crime scene, and was driven to Muswellbrook train station where passengers disembarked. It is stated that there were numerous witnesses to the events described, and that a number of them recorded the incidents on their mobile phones. At the time the Facts Sheet was completed PB was stable in hospital, with an injury to her right hand (possibly a defensive wound) and two stab wounds to her torso, one to the right side of her back and one to her chest, which had potentially punctured her lung.

60. The charges laid against the defendant include wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, detaining with intent to obtain an advantage with actual bodily harm occasioned, multiple counts of common assault, intimidation intending to cause fear of physical or mental harm, and intimidation of a police officer in the execution of her duty. Interim apprehended domestic violence orders for the protection of PB were made.

61. An intake assessment form created on 25 November 2024 after the defendant’s return to custody suggests that he indicated that his current offences relate to domestic violence, and were contributed to by illicit drugs; namely “a lot” of ice and half a gram of heroin a day.

The parties’ submissions

62. The Court received detailed written submissions, and further oral submissions were advanced on the hearing date. The plaintiff relies upon the totality of the evidence, but places particular importance upon the Risk Assessment Report of Mr D’Hudson and the fact that subsequent to that assessment, the defendant is alleged to have acted in a very violent way on 23 November 2024, in circumstances that echo the concerns previously raised by Mr D’Hudson.

63. Ms Webb for the defendant emphasised that although criminal offending in the future can be said to be a realistic prospect if the defendant is unsupervised, the Court should be slow to be satisfied to a high degree of probability that, if proved, the matters relied upon would demonstrate an unacceptable risk of the commission of a serious offence, as defined. This was particularly so when there was only one “serious offence” on the defendant’s criminal record. It was also submitted, correctly, that the risk assessment tools are not discerning as to the level of seriousness of future violent conduct predicted. Care was urged to avoid reasoning that more structure and supervision may be of benefit to the defendant, rather than focusing on whether the legislative test is met.

Determination

64. Given the conclusion and reasoning of the Risk Assessment Report of Mr D’Hudson, and the subsequent alleged offending, I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that, if proved, the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under an order. I must accordingly make orders for expert assessment. Taking into account the matters I have referred to, giving the safety of the community paramount consideration, I am not of the view that there is a discretionary reason to not make an ISO. I will accordingly make the orders sought by the plaintiff in those two respects.

65. However, this is a case where the defendant has committed significantly less “serious offences” than many applications of the kind that come before this Court. His intellectual disability and other vulnerabilities are also highly relevant in understanding his history of non-compliance with orders and apparent disengagement with services. Both these matters will have a bearing on the conditions to be imposed. The defendant has shown positive signs regarding engaging in treatment, and the negative signs in this regard warrant close consideration of his intellectual disability and lack of adequate support at times of disengagement.

Conditions

66. Section 11(1) of the Act provides that "[a]n extended supervision order or interim supervision order may direct an offender to comply with such conditions as the Supreme Court considers appropriate" and includes a non-exhaustive list of conditions that may be imposed.

67. As I indicated earlier, the 20 November 2024 Risk Management Report of Susan Page of the Metropolitan ESO Team outlined her suggestions on the proposed conditions that should be imposed on the defendant while he is reintegrating into the community.

68. The plaintiff relies on a number of Ms Page’s proposed conditions – such as electronic monitoring; the weekly provision of a schedule of the defendant’s activities; permission to enter the defendant’s home at any time and assess and approve his accommodation and co-residents; search and seizure permissions; place and travel restrictions, including that the defendant remain in New South Wales; drug testing; a prohibition on the use of illicit substances; a limitation on the defendant’s alcohol use; the ability to direct the defendant into drug or alcohol intervention; the ability to monitor and/or limit the defendant’s contact with some associates; a requirement for the defendant to notify the ESO Team within a day of commencing or changing any employment; the ability to monitor the defendant’s financial situation; the ability to monitor the defendant’s electronic communication and internet access, and to be able to set parameters around such use; a prohibition on the defendant changing his identification information or significantly changing his appearance without prior approval; the ability to direct the defendant to engage with psychology services; the ability to obtain information from his treatment and service providers; and a prohibition on the defendant possessing any weapons.

69. I also take into account the evidence of risk more generally, such as Mr D’Hudson’s identification of dynamic risk factors judged as relevant or potentially relevant when considering the defendant’s risk of violent reoffending.

70. Ms Grabham, in her affidavit of 19 May 2025, does address some of the resources that are available for people with impaired intellectual functioning. Ms Grabham explains how the defendant would be managed, including how breaches might be managed. She has already referred the defendant to the Aboriginal Community Engagement and Culture Officer for cultural support. Paragraph 15 of Ms Grabham’s affidavit addresses specifically the issue of people with intellectual disabilities. The defendant will have access to several support systems in addition to the Aboriginal Community Engagement and Cultural Officer.

71. Counsel for the plaintiff confirmed that although the level of support is a matter for the agency administering the NDIS, the management that is proposed in this case by an ISO or ESO would include assisting with coordination for the defendant of his access to his NDIS plan and a support coordinator. The ESO team has access to a project coordinator for those with co-existing disorders who gives advice on how to manage people in circumstances such as the defendant’s.

72. I am mindful also of the psychological report of Ms Arity Dickerson regarding the practical issues that will face the defendant in attempting to comply with certain conditions that are proposed by the plaintiff. These difficulties include understanding and adhering to schedules, interpreting transport timetables and the like, as referred to earlier.

73. In written submissions, the plaintiff contended that the proposed conditions strike an appropriate balance between managing and mitigating the risk that the defendant poses to the community while ensuring the imposition of the conditions do not impede on his personal liberty after being released to the community.

74. The defendant did not oppose many of the proposed conditions, in the event that an ISO is made. However the defendant contended that some of the plaintiff’s proposed conditions do not strike a balance between the competing considerations; namely the defendant's right to personal liberty and the safety of the community. The defendant highlighted the significant penalties that are associated with breaches of the proposed conditions, which may arise in cases where the defendant has been ordered to comply with a condition which cannot be complied with easily or practically.

75. The defendant contended that the ISO conditions should mostly mirror his most recent Parole Order (dated 19 July 2024). These conditions were submitted to be “clear, comprehensible, and not likely to place the defendant in a position where he may be subject to an inadvertent technical breach”. The defendant submitted that this will ensure that there are no further restrictions to his freedoms in the community.

76. It was accepted by counsel for the plaintiff that if the defendant’s NDIS support is facilitated by the State’s supervising officer under an ISO, this would help implement his capacity to do the types of things he had not done on parole – such as providing correct residential addresses, and so on.

77. I will consider the contentious proposed conditions in the categories advanced by the parties.

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

78. The plaintiff proposed that the defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a Departmental Supervising Officer (“DSO”) and must not tamper with or remove such equipment. The plaintiff contended that electronic monitoring would allow Community Corrections to monitor the defendant’s movements and any attempts the defendant makes at contacting the victims of his offending. It was submitted that electronic monitoring would be a feasible way to detect when the defendant has entered any “exclusion zone”, which would undeniably give rise to a risk. Further, it was submitted that electronic monitoring would assist the ESO Team to identify any concerning patterns in the defendant’s behaviour which may stem from his identified risk factors and help locate the defendant promptly if he were to be found breaching one of the conditions. Given the defendant’s past non-compliance with conditional liberty, the plaintiff proposed that this condition would also assist in monitoring the defendant’s compliance with the other conditions to be proposed. The plaintiff submitted that if the defendant is not electronically monitored, Corrections staff would find it more difficult to de-escalate such situations if they were to eventuate.

79. The defendant opposed the electronic monitoring condition. The defendant contended that his previous offending was not committed in a specific location. Thus, in considering the other conditions sought by the plaintiff, electronic monitoring was submitted to be excessive in the circumstances. The defendant also submitted that electronic monitoring is not a condition of the defendant's parole which supports the contention that electronic monitoring should not be required.

80. The plaintiff proposed that if the defendant is directed by his DSO, he is to provide a summary of his anticipated movements each week including his reason for attendance at the particular place and his means of travel there. The plaintiff submitted that providing a weekly summary of his activities would reinforce structure in the defendant’s life and assist in limiting his impulsivity – which has been identified as a core criminogenic risk factor. The plaintiff contended that this condition, coupled with electronic monitoring, would place the ESO team in the best position to respond to any behaviour which is in breach of the conditions imposed. Further, the plaintiff submitted that as the defendant has intellectual difficulties, this condition would assist with scheduling the defendant’s daily activities and ensure they are risk appropriate and prosocial.

81. The defendant opposed the condition requiring the defendant to plan his weekly activities in advance and reporting his schedule. The defendant drew attention to the defendant's most recent parole conditions which did not require the defendant to comply with a similar condition. Given the defendant's difficulties with scheduling due to his intellectual disability, it is likely that the defendant will breach this condition which would expose him to criminal sanctions and could amount to penal consequences.

82. I am of the view that the Part A conditions which are opposed are excessive, and not appropriate for the circumstances of this case. The ISO will impose a high level of supervision and control of the defendant’s life, past a point of his sentence having been served. Despite the tailored support he will receive, the risk of his not being able to complete and comply with schedules and timetables is high, and not necessary. Electronic monitoring is not justified in the circumstances. There is a realistic prospect that once more significant support and assistance is provided, the defendant’s level of engagement with those supervising him will increase.

Part B: Accommodation

83. The plaintiff proposed a curfew condition – requiring that the defendant be at his approved residence between 9 pm and 6 am unless approved by a DSO. The plaintiff referred to the index offence being committed in the early hours of the morning, such that a curfew would mitigate the risk of similar offending. The plaintiff also submitted that the curfew will ensure the defendant is not engaging with antisocial individuals, exposing himself to situations where he is likely to reoffend.

84. The defendant noted that an offence within these curfew hours has not been committed since 2016. The defendant opposed the curfew condition relying on the same rationale as for some other conditions – that a curfew was not imposed on the defendant in his parole conditions.

85. The plaintiff proposed that the defendant promptly notify a DSO of any visitor that enters or remains at his approved residence, allowing the DSO to exempt certain individuals, such as prosocial family members and/or associates who visit regularly. The plaintiff submitted this was necessary to protect the safety of the defendant’s partner/former partner, and argued that this condition would allow for proper management of the defendant’s home environment, which is particularly important due to the defendant's history of offending with antisocial peers and his romantic partner who was a co-offender in the index offence.

86. The defendant opposed this condition due to it being overly restrictive. The defendant submitted this condition would likely be too difficult to comply with considering the terms “enter and remain” are of a broad nature.

87. The plaintiff contended that the defendant should not be permitted to have anyone stay overnight at his residence without a DSO’s approval. The plaintiff submitted that a DSO will be allowed to exempt certain individuals who are prosocial and/or associates who visit the defendant regularly, but the condition mainly serves to monitor the defendant’s home environment and prevent the defendant from associating with antisocial peers. The plaintiff proposed an amendment to clarify that if the defendant were approved to live in a shared accommodation, the defendant would not be permitted to have anyone stay overnight in his bedroom.

88. The defendant opposed the imposition of this condition on the basis that it was extremely broad and restrictive. The defendant contended that compliance with this condition could potentially be impractical depending on where and with whom the defendant is approved to live.

89. I accept the submissions for the defendant regarding the Part B conditions that are opposed. As I have indicated, by the making of the ISO and the impositions of the conditions that are to be imposed, the defendant, whose sentence for the commission of one serious offence will have expired, will be subject to a high degree of supervision and control. This should not be expanded beyond what is necessary to protect the public, bearing in mind his disability and the additional purpose of promoting his rehabilitation.

Part D: Employment, Finance and Education

90. The plaintiff contended that the defendant should be required to provide details regarding his financial affairs, including his income and expenditure, if directed to do so by a DSO. The plaintiff proposed this condition as a means to ensure the defendant is managing his finances appropriately, to mitigate his impulsivity and the risk of committing further offences to obtain money. In response to the defendant’s opposition, the plaintiff proposed the use of the direction only if a DSO reasonably believes that receiving that information would assist in mitigating the defendant’s risk of committing a serious violence offence or breaching his ISO/ESO.

91. The defendant opposed this condition on the basis that the defendant’s risk profile did not require the imposition of such a condition.

92. I am of the view that the condition sought by the plaintiff, amended as it proposes, is appropriate and addresses the protection of the community and the rehabilitation of the defendant.

Part E: Drugs and Alcohol

93. The plaintiff proposed that the defendant be banned from entering licenced premises including hotels, bars and clubs, but excluding cafes and restaurants, without the approval of a DSO. This was based on alcohol being a risk factor for the defendant. The plaintiff referred to the defendant’s long history of polysubstance abuse and his reasonably poor engagement with drug and alcohol intervention programs, supporting the need for conditions that limit the defendant’s access and exposure to drugs and alcohol. The plaintiff contended that in order to ensure the defendant is not possessing, purchasing or consuming alcohol or prohibited substances (a condition which is not opposed by the defendant), it is necessary to prevent the defendant from entering premises in which he may be provoked to do so or triggered to act violently or engage with antisocial peers.

94. The defendant opposed this condition on the basis that it was overly restrictive, given the defendant has agreed to comply with the other conditions which relate to abstinence and testing for drugs and alcohol. The defendant contended that the history of his offending does not warrant such a condition being imposed. Further, the defendant submitted that he lives in a small town in which there are few places to socialise.

95. I accept the argument for the defendant that the opposed conditions in this category are overly restrictive, and not necessary in light of other conditions and the prospect of better engagement with drug and alcohol treatment once given more support, in light of his demonstrated willingness. The conditions risk interference with the defendant’s rehabilitation, which in turn is not in the interests of protection of the community.

Part F: Non-association

96. The plaintiff proposed that the defendant refrain from associating with any person who he knows to be under the influence of alcohol or prohibited substances or held in custody without the approval of a DSO. The plaintiff noted that the defendant would still be able to associate with relatives who may be incarcerated; but the central purpose of this condition is to deter the defendant from associating with persons with similar offending history and those who may facilitate the defendant’s access to illicit substances. It was submitted that if the condition was not imposed, the defendant could associate with persons who may influence him to relapse which in turn could provoke the defendant to commit further offences.

97. The defendant opposed the imposition of this condition given its restrictive nature. The defendant contended that such a condition would be difficult for him to comply with and, when considering the repercussions of breaching such a condition, namely a penalty of up to five years imprisonment, it is inappropriate.

98. I agree with the submissions for the defendant.

99. Additionally, the plaintiff proposed that the defendant must agree to a DSO disclosing his criminal history to another person when determined to be reasonably necessary by the DSO having regard to community safety. The plaintiff noted that the defendant would first have an opportunity to disclose his criminal history before a DSO makes the disclosure. The plaintiff contended that the imposition of this condition would promote community safety and allow the individuals who are associating with the defendant to be aware of the defendant's risk level.

100. The defendant did not oppose this condition, however sought an amendment which essentially stated that disclosure would only be required where a DSO considers the disclosure reasonably necessary to address the commission of a serious offence.

101. The plaintiff pressed this condition in its original form. The plaintiff contended that the proposed amendment would create confusion for the defendant and not sufficiently promote the primary purpose of the condition, namely, to protect the victims.

102. I accept the plaintiff's submissions as to the original proposed condition being appropriate to address community safety, and the difficulty of interpretation of the proposed alternative.

Part H: Access to Internet and Other Electronic Communication

103. The plaintiff proposed a condition that the defendant give consent to his telephone and internet service provider to disclose information about his personal accounts to a DSO. The plaintiff submitted that this would allow effective monitoring of the defendant’s access to the internet and other electronic communications and appropriate monitoring of the defendant’s communications, in particular any attempts to contact his intimate partners, associates who may give him access to illicit substances or antisocial peers in general.

104. The defendant opposed this condition on the basis that it has not formed part of his parole conditions and is not connected with his past offending, making the asserted risk too remote.

105. I accept the defendant’s submissions, and do not regard the Part H conditions that are opposed as appropriate.

Part I: Search and Seizure

106. The plaintiff proposed that the defendant must submit to search conducted by a DSO or any other person nominated by a DSO, of his person, residence, vehicle or any item including computer, electronic or communication device, storage facilities, garage, locker or commercial facility, and seizure of any object located during this search. It was submitted this would assist in monitoring the defendant’s compliance with the other proposed conditions and ensure he does not possess any illicit substances or weapons. It was submitted that searching devices could monitor for elevation in violence related behaviours with intimate partners. A further condition was sought preventing the defendant from attempting to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, including attempting to delete any information from electronic or communication devices without the approval of a DSO.

107. The defendant strongly opposed these conditions as a very significant incursion into his personal liberty. The defendant brought to the Court’s attention the Law Enforcement (Power and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (“LEPRA”) and the availability of search with warrant pursuant to LEPRA, or on specified reasonable grounds.

108. Subject to one matter, I accept the submissions for the defendant. The qualification arises from the risk of the commission of a serious offence by virtue of the defendant carrying a weapon; which realistically means a knife. I am of the view that there should be a condition imposed that the defendant must submit to search conducted by a DSO or any other person nominated by a DSO of his person for the purposes of checking he is not unlawfully in possession of a weapon, and seizure of any object located during this search. This cannot be done at his residence, as it would not be unlawful for the defendant to be in possession of a knife (or multiple other items it may be unlawful to carry in public) at his residence. I am of the view that a condition in these terms is appropriate to address the risks established by the evidence, and will additionally act as a deterrent from carrying a knife in public. As the wording of the condition I propose to impose is not precisely the same as suggested by either party, I am content for the parties to agree upon the wording of the condition, to reflect my reasons for imposition of the order; or contact me in chambers if this is not able to be achieved.

Part J: Personal Details and Appearance

109. The plaintiff proposed that the defendant must not: change his name from “Darryl Luke Smith” or use any other name without first notifying a DSO, nor significantly change his appearance without prior approval from a DSO. The plaintiff sought a condition that the defendant must let a DSO take his photograph within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant changes made to his appearance. The conditions were submitted to be warranted for facilitation of general monitoring of the defendant and to ensure he is easily identifiable in the community.

110. The defendant opposed all these proposed conditions, other than notifying a DSO if he changed his name – which the plaintiff did not accept as adequate. The other two conditions were opposed by the defendant on grounds that they were not necessary.

111. I am of the view that the Part J conditions opposed by the defendant are appropriate to implement other conditions and enhance protection of the community.

ORDERS

112. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

113. Pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the Court:

(a) Appoints two qualified psychiatrists, two registered psychologists, or any combination of two such persons, to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court of New South Wales on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and (b) Directs the defendant to attend those examinations.

2. Pursuant to ss 10A and 10C(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant is subject to an Interim Supervision Order commencing on 5 July 2025 for a period of 28 days, known as the "Interim Supervision Order".
3. Pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), the defendant is, for the period of the Interim Supervision Order, to comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule of Conditions of Supervision.
4. By 4:00 pm Friday 4 July 2025 the parties are to forward to my chambers a Schedule of Conditions of Supervision in accordance with the conditions already agreed upon, and as otherwise reflecting my reasons for judgment, to be annexed to this judgment.
5. Access to the file of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a Judge of the Court and if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.

Schedule of Conditions of Supervision

In these conditions:

“Associate” includes, but is not limited to, being in company with, or communicating with by any means (including by post, facsimile, telephone, email or any other form of electronic communication).

“CSNSW” means Corrective Services NSW.

“Commissioner” means Commissioner for Corrective Services.

“Defendant” means DARRYL LUKE SMITH, the defendant in these proceedings and the subject of the order.

“DSO” means Departmental Supervising Officer, that is, any Corrective Services Officer supervising the defendant under the order.

“Electronic Identity” means each of the following:

(a) an email address, (b) a user name or other identity allowing access to an instant messaging service, (c) a user name or other identity allowing access to a chat room or social media on the internet, (d) any other user name or other identity allowing access to the internet or an electronic communication service.

“Material” includes:

(e) any written or printed material; (f) any picture, painting or drawing; (g) any carving, sculpture, statue or figure; (h) any photograph, film, video recording or other object or thing from which an image may be reproduced; (i) any computer data or the computer record or system containing the data; and (j) any other material or object on which an image or representation is recorded or from which an image or representation may be reproduced.

“NSWPF” means NSW Police Force.

“Search” includes:

(k) A garment search, being a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant’s possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person’s body; and (l) A pat-down search, meaning a search of the defendant where the defendant’s clothed body is touched.

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

Monitoring and Reporting

1. You must accept the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.

2. Where a direction maybe given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service.

3. You must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising you, about:

a) where you are or have been;

b) where you are going;

c) who you are with or have been with;

d) what you are doing or have been doing; and

e) the nature of your associations.

4. Condition not pressed.

5. You must agree to any information relating to your risk, supervision or rehabilitation being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

Electronic Monitoring

6. Condition not made.

Schedule of Movements

7. Condition not made.

7A. Condition not made.

7B. Condition not made.

Part B: Accommodation

8. You must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change your approved address or living arrangements.

9. Condition not made.

10. You must allow a DSO to visit you at your approved address at any time and to enter the premises at that address.

11. You must not spend the night anywhere other than your approved address or any alternative approved addresses without the approval of a DSO.

12. Condition not made.

13. Condition not made.

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

14. You must surrender any passports held by you to the Commissioner, must not be in possession of any passports, and must not attempt to apply for any passports.

15. You must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner.

16. You must not go to any place specified by a DSO.

Part D: Employment, finance and education

17. You must take all reasonable steps to participate in programs as recommended by a DSO, including the development of a case management plan which may include employment, education, training or participation in personal development activities.

18. You must notify a DSO before you start or change any job, volunteer work or educational course within 24 hours of you having done so.

19. You must provide any information relating to your financial affairs, including income and expenditure, if directed by a DSO, where the DSO reasonably believes that the information is relevant to your risk of committing a serious violence offence or breaching the ESO.

Part E: Drugs and alcohol

20. You must not:

a) Possess, purchase or consume alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO;

b) Possess or use prohibited drugs; or

c) Abuse prescription drugs which are not prescribed to you.

Note: If it appears the defendant has failed to comply with this condition, in deciding what recommendation to make about the breach, the DSO should take into account whether the defendant disclosed any drug use to the DSO and/or whether the defendant took any steps in relation to AOD counselling/courses/programs/other medical intervention.

21. You must submit to drug and alcohol testing.

22. Condition not made.

23. You must attend and participate in programs and courses for drug and alcohol rehabilitation as reasonably directed by a DSO and must not discharge yourself from such programs and courses without prior approval of a DSO.

Part F: Non-association

24. You must not associate with any person specified by a DSO.

25. Condition not made.

26. You must agree to a DSO disclosing your criminal history to another person, if a DSO considers the disclosure is reasonably necessary, having regard to community safety. Before any disclosure is made, you will first be given the opportunity to make the disclosure yourself within a timeframe as identified by a DSO.

NOTE: Under this condition, a DSO may confirm with the other person that a proper disclosure has been made.

27. If you commence an intimate or sexual relationship with someone, you must notify a DSO within 24 hours and truthfully answer any questions the DSO asks regarding the relationship or friendship.

Part G: Weapons

28. You must not possess or use any of the following:

a) a firearm, firearm part or ammunition within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996; or

b) a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998.

29. Without limiting or altering condition 28, you must not possess or use any of the following, without a DSO’s prior approval:

a) a knife, machete, sword or any other device that consists of a single-edged or multi-edged blade or spike that is designed or adapted to inflict violence, whether actual or threatened;

b) any other implement made or adapted for use for causing injury to a person; or

c) anything intended, by the person having custody of the thing, to be used to injure or menace a person or damage property.

NOTE: Condition 29 does not apply to knives for ordinary domestic use.

30. Condition not pressed.

31. Condition not made.

Part I: Search and seizure

32. You must submit to a search of your person conducted by a DSO or any other person nominated by a DSO for the purposes of ensuring you are not in possession of a weapon. If during such a search a weapon is located on you, the DSO has the authority to seize that item. Such a search is not to be undertaken in your approved residence.

33. Condition not made.

Part J: Personal details and appearance

34. You must not change your name from “DARRYL LUKE SMITH” or use any other name without notifying a DSO.

35. You must not significantly change your appearance without the approval of a DSO.

36. You must let a DSO photograph you, dressed, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant change to your appearance.

37. If you change the details of any current form of identification or obtain further forms of identification, you must provide a DSO with such details.

Part K: Medical intervention and treatment

38. You must undergo ongoing psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) as directed by a DSO, including any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction.

39. If directed, you must undergo an assessment for the purposes of a Mental Health Care Plan or Community Treatment Order.

40. You must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that you consult.

41. You must take medications that are prescribed to you by your healthcare practitioners and only in the manner prescribed.

42. You must notify a DSO immediately if you cease to take or decline to commence taking any medication as referred to in the above condition.

43. You must agree to your treatment and service providers and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on your progress and attendance, and information you have told them, with each other and with a DSO.

44. You must agree to any information obtained under condition 43 being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in your supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO, NSWPF and CSNSW.

45. You must agree to the disclosure of your criminal history to any healthcare professionals that are treating you if disclosure of that information is considered relevant by a DSO to the management of your risk factors.

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