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[2026] NSWSC 8
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-01-23
McNaughton J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: State of New South Wales v Craig (Preliminary) [2026] NSWSC 8
Hearing dates: 12 December 2025
Date of orders: 23 January 2026
Decision date: 23 January 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: McNaughton J
Decision: (1) An order pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”):
(a) Appointing two qualified psychiatrists or psychologists (or any combination of two such persons) to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and
(b) Directing the defendant to attend those examinations.
(2) An order:
(a) Pursuant to s 10A of the Act, that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order (“the interim supervision order”);
(b) Pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act, that the interim supervision order be for a period of 28 days; and
(c) Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, directing that the defendant, for the period of the interim supervision order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to this judgment.
(3) An order that access to the Supreme Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a Judge of the Court, and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.
Catchwords: HIGH RISK OFFENDER – preliminary hearing –serious violence offender – application for interim supervision order – where making of order and nature of some conditions contested by defendant –whether there is high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order – interim supervision order imposed
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 33, 35, 93C
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) ss 3, 4, 5A, 5B, 5D, 5I, 6, 7, 9, 10A, 10C
Cases Cited: Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57
State of New South Wales v Simcock (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1805
State of New South Wales v Chaplin [2019] NSWSC 471
State of New South Wales v Kamm (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1
State of New South Wales v Devaney (Final) [2022] NSWSC 60
Tannous v State of New South Wales (2020) 103 NSWLR 183; [2020] NSWCA 261
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Drew Gregory Craig (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
P Boyle (Plaintiff)
C Akthar (Defendant)
Solicitors:
NSW Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Karim + Nicol Lawyers (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2025/00435966
By way of summons filed on 11 November 2025, the State of New South Wales (the plaintiff) seeks that Mr Drew Gregory Craig (the defendant) be subject to an extended supervision order, or ESO, for a period of 3 years subject to conditions.
In the interim an application is brought by the plaintiff for the defendant to be subject to an interim supervision order (ISO), pursuant to s 10A of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act), as well as orders for the appointment of two qualified psychiatrists and/or psychologists to conduct separate examinations of the defendant, and to furnish their reports to the Court pursuant to s 7(4) of the Act. The hearing for these interim and interlocutory orders took place on 12 December 2025.
The plaintiff relies on three affidavits of Luke Sampson; one affirmed on 11 November 2025 with an accompanying exhibit LS-1; the second affirmed on 25 November 2025 with an accompanying exhibit LS 2; and the third affirmed on 10 December 2025.
The defendant relies on the affidavit of Nadia Karim affirmed on 8 December 2025.
The defendant contests the imposition of the ISO on the basis that the “unacceptable risk” pre-condition in s 5B(d) of the Act has not been satisfied. The defendant concedes that the other statutory preconditions have been satisfied.
In short, the defendant contends that the Court would not be satisfied to the high standard required that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious violence offence if not kept under supervision. The defendant submits that he has only once wounded a person with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. His criminal history is otherwise devoid of the serious violence with which the Act is concerned. Should this position not be acceded to by the Court, the defendant has indicated which of the conditions proposed by the plaintiff are wholly or partly contested.
The plaintiff was represented at the hearing by Ms Boyle, and the defendant by Ms Akthar. I am grateful for their assistance and that of their instructing solicitors.
The defendant is a 27-year-old man. He had a dysfunctional childhood. Both parents were drug users, and his mother used drugs and alcohol during her pregnancy with the defendant. He reported experiencing traumatic events during his formative years, including finding his stepfather’s body following his death by overdose when he was 11 years old; witnessing domestic and sexual violence against his mother; and being removed from his mother’s care and placed into foster care at a young age.
His education was disrupted by his behavioural challenges. He has a history of substance abuse, including methamphetamine and heroin. Despite claiming he had ceased such use since June 2024, the Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW) Intake Screening Questionnaire dated 1 November 2024 indicates he disclosed that ice use contributed to his arrest at that time. I note, however, that he had several negative drug tests whilst on parole in 2024.
The defendant has a lengthy criminal history, commencing at the age of 12. He has incurred a number of institutional misconduct charges whilst in custody. Between March 2017 and September 2025, the defendant has been involved in 67 incidents resulting in institutional misconduct charges including six for intimidation; six for fight or other physical combat; three for assault; two for participate/incite riot; four for refuse drug sample; one for misbehave attending service program and three for possess drug.
The defendant is currently serving the balance of parole for a sentence which expires on 10 February 2026 and is also bail refused on unresolved charges.
The offence which enlivens the court’s jurisdiction is wound with intent to cause grievous bodily harm contrary to s 33(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (the index offence). This index offence constitutes a “serious offence” being a “serious violence offence” according to ss 4 and 5A(1)(a) of the Act. He was convicted of this offence following a finding of guilt at trial and was sentenced by Judge O’Brien in the District Court at Nowra on 14 February 2020 to 5 years and 6 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years and 3 months. He was eligible for parole on 10 February 2023, and this sentence expired on 10 May 2025.
In brief, the facts of this offence are that the 25 year old male victim was known to the defendant and in December 2018 had lived with him for a short time. Whilst they lived together the victim took a mobile phone from the defendant. In the early hours of 30 December 2018, the victim was walking along a road when a car pulled up behind him. The defendant got out of the car, holding a lawnmower blade approximately 50cm long. The defendant said words to the effect of “give me all your stuff” and struck the victim several times with the blade. The defendant returned to the car and said to the driver “[f]ucking chopped him brother”. The pair drove off, leaving the injured victim behind. A few hours later, the defendant messaged the victim, “that’s for taking my phone from my room and sealing [sic] it to heind [sic]”. The victim required surgery, having sustained three wounds each 3–4cm deep. The defendant was arrested on 3 January 2019 when he reported on bail for an unrelated matter at Nowra Police Station.
On 17 August 2020, the defendant was convicted and sentenced for one offence of robbery in company contrary to s 97(1) of the Crimes Act (the robbery offence) to 4 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years by Acting Judge O’Connor in the District Court at Nowra. That sentence expires on 10 February 2026. That sentence was partly concurrent and partly consecutive with the sentence for the index offence. The defendant is thus a “supervised offender” within the meaning of s 5I(2)(a)(v) of the Act up to 10 February 2026.
The robbery offence took place on 25 July 2019 and involved a 14 year old victim not known to the defendant. The victim was walking home from work at approximately 7.46pm when a car pulled up behind him and the defendant and a co-offender got out of the car with their faces covered. One of the offenders demanded the victim’s mobile phone which the victim handed over. When the victim failed to reply to a request for his PIN, he was asked again by one of the offenders who was holding a “bladed object”. The victim then supplied his PIN. The offender holding the bladed object then grabbed the victim by the shoulders, struck him and took his backpack, and the two offenders left in the car. The victim’s mobile phone, backpack and wallet were all taken. The defendant was arrested later that evening. Acting Judge O’Connor was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender had possessed the bladed object, nor that he was the aggressor.
The defendant is subject to a Firearms Prohibition Order and a Weapons Prohibition Order. The defendant was charged on 10 September 2024 and 29 October 2024 with two sets of offences yet to be resolved but some of which are now certified by the NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. These include an ammunition acquisition charge and a “related” offence of making a false representation resulting in a police investigation (first set of offences); and a fire firearm at dwelling house, acquire firearm whilst subject to a prohibition order; destroy property in company, be carried in conveyance without owner’s consent; and acquire pistol when subject to prohibition order (second set of offences).
The first set of offences involves the defendant, on 9 September 2024, whilst on parole, having presented himself to Shellharbour Hospital with a wound to his foot which staff believed was a gunshot wound. He told police the wound resulted from lighting fireworks, but police found .22 calibre rounds of ammunition in a bag in his possession. He absconded while hospital staff were arranging him to be transported to Wollongong Hospital for surgery. He was arrested the next day when reporting for bail. The following day he sent a text to a woman asking her to say she put “them in there” and to say the bag was hers.
The second set of offences involves an allegation that during a fight between the defendant’s family and another local family in October 2024 the defendant’s mother was assaulted. The following day, police allege that the defendant and a co-accused droved from Sydney to the Nowra region, swapped vehicles to a stolen BMW, and drove the BMW to the home of his mother’s alleged attacker. The defendant allegedly approached the front bedroom window of the premises and discharged one round from a sawn-off shotgun. None of the occupants were injured. The defendant allegedly continued to drive the stolen BMW and threatened another road user with a sawn off shot gun after driving erratically. He allegedly burnt the stolen car the following day. At the time of the alleged offending, the defendant was disqualified from driving. When arrested a few days later, he had $1975 in cash in his possession and resealable bags containing methylamphetamine.
Both sets of matters were adjourned to 19 December 2025 for mention.
Whilst I note these are only allegations, given my task at this stage is to take the information before the Court at its highest, it is clear that it is appropriate to have regard to this material in relation to the assessment of the likelihood that the defendant will commit a further serious offence (s9(3)(i) of the Act): State of New South Wales v DK (Preliminary) [2018] NSWSC 1947 at [39] and the cases referred to therein.
The Supreme Court may make an order for the interim supervision of an offender if, in proceedings for an extended supervision order, it appears to the Court –
(a) that the offender’s current custody or supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined, and
(b), that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order.
(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and
(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and
(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I [what is now agreed to be s 6], and
(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.
A supervised offender is defined in s 5I, subss (2)-(3) to include someone who was in custody or on parole while serving a sentence for a serious offence.
A serious offence is defined in s 4 and includes a serious sex offence and a serious violence offence.
A serious violence offence is defined in s 5A and includes a serious indictable offence (relevantly, within the meaning of the Crimes Act) that is constituted by a person:
(a) engaging in conduct that causes the death of another person, or grievous bodily harm to another person, with the intention of causing, or while being reckless as to causing, the death of another person or grievous or actual bodily harm to another person, or
(b) attempting to commit or conspiring with or inciting another person to commit an offence of a kind referred to in paragraph (a).
An application for an ESO is to be supported by the documentation specified in s 6(3). This includes a risk assessment report from a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner and documentation addressing each of the matters referred to in s 9(3) of the Act.
Section 7(4) of the Act provides that if, following the preliminary hearing, I am satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO, I must make orders appointing two qualified psychiatrists and/or registered psychologists or any combination of two such persons to examine the defendant and to furnish reports to the Court.
Section 5D of the Act provides that the Court is “not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine that there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.”
The meaning of unacceptable risk is not defined in the Act. Its meaning was considered by Beazley P in Lynn v State of New South Wales (2016) 91 NSWLR 636; [2016] NSWCA 57 at [50]-[51] (Lynn):
“As the respondent pointed out in its submissions, by reference to dictionary definitions, the word ‘unacceptable’ requires context in which, or parameters against which, the ‘unacceptable’ risk can be measured. Thus, according to the Macquarie Dictionary, that which is unacceptable is ‘so far from a required standard, norm expectation, etc as not to be allowed’. The Oxford Dictionary defines the word by reference to its antonym ‘acceptable’. Something is ‘acceptable’ if it is ‘tolerable or allowable, not a cause for concern; within prescribed parameters’.
What the court, therefore, must find to be unacceptable is the ‘risk’ that the offender poses ‘of committing a serious violence offence if … not kept under supervision’. The respondent accepted that the precise parameters or standard or norm against which that determination is to be made are not immediately evident from the text of the provision. That must be so. A determination as to whether something is unacceptable is an evaluative task, and evaluative determinations require a context in which to be made.”
“The nature of the risk he posed had to be assessed by reference to past conduct, the seriousness of the possible future conduct and the period over which the risk may come to fruition. The assessment must be based on an absence of protective measures. The criterion of unacceptability will no doubt depend upon these matters, together with a comparison, to the extent that the evidence permits, of what may be described as the background level of risk to the community […]”
The unacceptable risk inquiry is not discretionary, but it does involve an evaluative balancing exercise to be undertaken in the overall context of the primary object of the Act, that being to ensure the safety and protection of the community: s 3(1) of the Act. Unacceptability of risk involves consideration of both the likelihood of the risk eventuating and the gravity of the risk that may eventuate: State of New South Wales v Simcock (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1805 at [71] (Wilson J); and State of New South Wales v Chaplin [2019] NSWSC 471 at [15] (Rothman J).
The test to be applied at this stage is not a stringent one: Lynn v State of New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 1147 at [18]. The court is proceeding on the assumption that the asserted facts are proved and then considers whether, based on that assumption, it is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses a risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under an ESO: State of NSW v McGee (Preliminary) [2019] NSWSC 53.
An offender may pose an unacceptable risk even where the likelihood of committing another serious offence is low if the likely consequences of such an offence are very grave: State of New South Wales v Kamm (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1 at [41] and [43] (Harrison J); and State of New South Wales v Devaney (Final) [2022] NSWSC 60 at [73] (Dhanji J).
As noted above, the defendant concedes that the statutory pre-conditions for the making of the interim orders sought by the plaintiff are made out, other than the “unacceptable risk” pre-condition in s 5B(d) of the Act.
Having considered the material, leaving aside the issue of unacceptable risk for the moment, I am otherwise satisfied that the statutory preconditions are made out as follows:
The defendant is an “offender” (as defined in s 4A) who has served a sentence of imprisonment for a “serious offence” in custody: s 5B(a). Specifically:
(a) He is over 18 years of age (being 27 years old): s 4A(a); (b) He has been sentenced to imprisonment to be served by way of full-time detention following his conviction for a serious offence, namely the index offence: s 4A(b). This is a serious violence offence in accordance with ss 4 and 5A(1)(a).
He is a “supervised offender” within the meaning of s 5I(2)(v). Specifically, he is an offender who, when the application for the order was made, was serving a sentence of imprisonment that is part of a cumulative sentence in relation to which at least one of the sentences is a sentence for a serious violence offence. That sentence expires on 10 February 2026.
The application for the order was made in accordance with s 5I (which is to be read as s 6) – that is, the application has been brought within the requisite time period, namely on 11 November 2025, that date being within the last 9 months of the defendant’s current custody, and is supported by documentation required by s 6(3) subss (a) and (b).
Further, pursuant to s 10A(a), I am satisfied that the defendant's current custody or supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined, namely on 10 February 2026.
I now turn to the issue of unacceptable risk. That is, the only remaining question in order to determine whether the ISO and the orders for examination by experts should be made under ss 7 and 10A of the Act is whether the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, satisfy the Court to a high degree of probability that that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision: s 5B(d) of the Act. As noted above, the test is not a stringent one at the preliminary hearing stage.
I have considered the factors set out in ss 9(2) and (3) of the Act in light of the material set out above. Importantly, s 9(2) of the Act provides that the safety of the community is the paramount consideration.
As to the factors in s 9(3), in particular I note the following.
The defendant has a history of committing violent offences which began when he was a juvenile and continued, ultimately culminating in the index offence.
The defendant has also exhibited violence in custody whilst incarcerated, and during his limited time in the community, has breached the conditions of his parole on numerous occasions. The defendant also has had entrenched substance abuse issues both in the community and in custody, exhibiting a heightened risk of violence when intoxicated and/or seeking drugs. Whilst most recently he has shown promising signs of improvement, returning negative drug tests, and is receiving Buvidal, he requires considerable ongoing support and supervision with respect to his drug dependency. Further, given the defendant has been in custody for most of his adult life, his reintegration into the community as a law-abiding person will be challenging. His behaviour to date indicates that he has struggled to manage himself in the community for any length of time without succumbing to substance misuse and involvement in criminal conduct.
The defendant has also been diagnosed with mental health issues, including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and post-traumatic stress disorder, requiring monitoring. Any deterioration in his mental state may impact upon his ability to engage in treatment and case management.
I note that in sentencing the defendant for the index offence, Judge O’Brien made a finding of “special circumstances” on the basis that the defendant required an extended period of supervision in the community to allow him to readjust to community life and address his drug use. Judge O’Brien found that the defendant’s prospects of rehabilitation were guarded.
Similarly, in sentencing the defendant for the robbery offence, Acting Judge O’Connor stated:
“I am unable to find that the offender is unlikely to reoffend or has good prospects of rehabilitation […]. In that finding, I have had regard to his extensive criminal record, his failure to take advantage of supervision which has been ordered in the past and that he has continued to offend while subject to conditional liberty. His custodial record reveals multiple institutional breaches including disobeying directions, participating in and inciting a riot, possessing prohibited drugs, assaults, refusing drug sample, damage property and failing a drug sample.
[…] At best his prospects are guarded and are dependent upon following psychiatric and or advice from a psychologist while in custody and upon his release. In that regard, Mr Paro recommended psychological intervention to address his mental health issues, drug rehabilitation and acquiring vocational skills.”
I further note that the defendant has successfully completed four courses as part of the High Intensity Program Unit, operated by the Corrective Services NSW. The Risk Assessment Report (RAR) dated 9 July 2025 notes that apart from those programs, the defendant has had limited opportunities to participate in programs in custody. While he has been assessed as suitable for the Intensive Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program, and he has expressed a willingness to participate in that program, as yet he has not been able to do so due to his security classification.
The author of the RAR assessed the defendant’s risk of future offending using the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide – Revised (VRAG-R) which has moderate predictive accuracy. Although not assessing the risk of “serious violent” offending, but rather simply “violent” offending, the defendant’s score classifies him as high risk, and places him in the highest risk category compared to other violent offenders. Further, the author also assessed the defendant using the Violent Risk Scale – second edition (VRS-2). This assessment classified the defendant as being well above average risk for violent offending.
The author of the RAR identified certain dynamic risk factors as relevant or potentially relevant when considering the defendant’s risk of violent offending including: violent lifestyle and violence cycle; weapon use; emotional control, interpersonal aggression and violence during institutionalisation; and substance-related problems and impulsivity. The most likely risk scenario for further serious violent offending was assessed by the author to involve:
“[R]eactive violence in circumstances where he perceives harm, threat or wrongdoing by an individual towards a family member or someone close to him; he would likely ruminate over his grievance and experience feelings of anger, and this could lead to him expressing his anger through violence perpetrated against that individual. A violent reoffence would most likely occur in the context of methamphetamine use, and the severity of harm would increase with [the defendant’s] access to a weapon. A return to substance use, medication non-compliance, increased anger or hostility and expressed concern about harm to his family or statements indicative of revenge seeking should signify more imminent risk of reoffence.”
I have also considered the Risk Management Report (RMR) dated 6 August 2025. The author of the report observed that in relation to the defendant’s most recent period in the community, the defendant was approved to reside in the Matraville area, but his attendance at the approved address was intermittent, and he repeatedly disregarded exclusion zone directions and continued to enter the Shoalhaven area without approval. The author further noted that the defendant’s mother remained supportive and would be willing to provide post-release accommodation. His mother opined that the Shoalhaven LGA exclusion zone was “setting him up to fail” by denying him family support. The defendant himself maintained, during the interview process, that family support was imperative to his successful reintegration, and he failed to acknowledge any risk associated with the area. The author set out a supervision plan.
I have considered carefully the submissions made skilfully on the defendant’s behalf, some of which are also reflected in the above discussion. In particular, whilst I acknowledge the defendant’s central argument that the defendant only has one offence of serious violence on his record, the defendant’s barrister has candidly accepted that it is appropriate, especially at this preliminary stage, for the court to take into account the recent offending which has yet to be formally proved in relation to the issue of unacceptable risk.
I have reached the requisite satisfaction pursuant to s 5B(d) and s 10A of the Act. In doing so I have taken into account the defendant’s past offending, as well as the most recent allegations against him, together with the risk assessment outcomes. Even leaving aside the formal risk assessments, the past conduct (and alleged conduct) of the defendant indicates that he has been involved in a number of unplanned offences characterised by a significant degree of violence and the use of weapons. Given the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration and noting the defendant’s past impulsivity and substance abuse problems, together with his escalating offending, I am satisfied on the material before me to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.
It is appropriate therefore to make orders 1 and 2 as sought by the plaintiff in the summons, together with the ancillary relief sought in order 5. As order 2 makes clear, the ISO is subject to conditions and the plaintiff has proposed a number of conditions. The defendant accepts some of those conditions but opposes some in part or in whole. I have had the benefit of detailed submissions in relation to those contested conditions and I have also been provided with a document which helpfully explains the differences between the two parties. I will now deal with the contested conditions.
Proposed Condition 4 is: “You must not engage in any threatening, intimidating or abusive behaviour towards CSNSW or electronic monitoring staff involved in your supervision that would cause the staff member to fear for their safety and/or interfere with or impede supervision.”
The defendant contends that this does not have sufficient connection to risk and is also unnecessary as this conduct already constitutes an offence. Further, the defendant’s limited literacy skills means that fewer conditions are better for him.
I am of the view that the condition is appropriate. Whilst the behaviour may already constitute an offence it is beneficial for this to be a condition as it helps to bring clarity as to what behaviour is expected of him and will facilitate how other directions and/or conditions may be enforced under the ISO.
Proposed Condition 8 reads: “If you want to change anything in your schedule of movements once it is approved by a DSO, you must seek approval from a DSO about the change 24 hours in advance unless a DSO approves a shorter period.” I note that it is proposed that this travel together with Proposed Condition 7 which is not opposed and which reads “If directed, you must provide a schedule of movements.”
The defendant submits that this condition is not necessary or proportionate to the defendant’s risk. The plaintiff contends that this facilitates enforcement of scheduling and seeks to ensure the defendant cannot impulsively change his plans and engage in activities likely to increase his risk.
I am of the view that the condition is appropriate**.** In my view it balances appropriate structure with sufficient discretion for the DSO to work effectively with the defendant, noting that Condition 7 only applies “if directed”.
Proposed Condition 14 reads “You must promptly notify a DSO of any visitor entering and remaining at your approved address.”
The defendant opposes this condition as “and remaining at” is inherently unclear and proposes an amendment (opposed by the plaintiff) of adding “You do no need to notify your DSO about delivery or tradespeople carrying out work at your approved address. Where you are residing in the home of another person, you do not need to notify your DSO about the entry of persons visiting the other residents.”
I have considered the defendant’s suggestion that deleting the words “and remaining at” may assist clarity. I am concerned that suggestion may be too restrictive, and I am of the view that the original proposed condition is appropriate with the additional words “unless otherwise directed by a DSO”.
Proposed Condition 15 reads “You must not permit any person to stay overnight at your approved address (other than persons who ordinarily reside there) without the prior approval of a DSO.”
The defendant suggests that additional words should be added: “Where you are residing as a guest in the home of another you need not notify a DSO of persons who stay overnight at your approved address as a guest of the principal resident unless the invitation to the guest has been extended at your request.”
The plaintiff opposes these additional words, submitting that it is appropriate for a DSO to have oversight of associations, and the proposed amendment could create a loophole. I agree with the plaintiff, and am of the view that the original proposed condition is appropriate.
These proposed conditions relate to the provision of information, broadly speaking, about and between healthcare practitioners, service providers and, in certain circumstances, the DSO, the police and Corrective Services. One of these proposed conditions also requires the defendant to notify a DSO immediately if he ceases or declines to take medications.
The defendant opposes these proposed conditions on the basis that they are not necessary or proportionate to the defendant’s risk.
Given that the material before me shows that the defendant is on Buvidal, has benefited from ADHD medication, and that non-compliance with medication is a risk factor, I am of the view that it is appropriate that these conditions are imposed as they allow his medications and conditions to be supported and managed across the whole system.
Otherwise, I impose the conditions as sought and not opposed by the defendant, and I will set them out in the written copy of the judgment when it is published.
Accordingly, I make the following orders:
An order pursuant to s 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act):
(a) Appointing two qualified psychiatrist or psychologists (or any combination of two such persons) to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court; and (b) Directing the defendant to attend those examinations.
(a) Pursuant to s 10A of the Act, that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order (the interim supervision order); (b) Pursuant to s 10C(1) of the Act, that the interim supervision order be for a period of 28 days; and (c) Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, directing that the defendant, for the period of the interim supervision order, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to this judgment.
Annexure - Schedule of Conditions of Supervision (Preliminary)
**********
State of New South Wales
Craig
(2016) 91 NSWLR 636
(2020) 103 NSWLR 183