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Category: Principal judgment

Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Grant Colb (Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
A Brown (Plaintiff)
J Wilcox (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2023/0074585

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

1. Grant Colb (the defendant) is currently subject to an extended supervision order (ESO) under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act). By notice of motion filed 28 January 2026, he applies for the following orders:

“1. An order pursuant to 13 (1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 that the extended supervision order made by Weinstein J on 15 August 2023 be revoked.

2. In the alternative to paragraph 1, pursuant to s 13(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006, an order that the extended supervision order made by Weinstein J on 15 August 2023, be varied by deleting the following conditions from the order: 5, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48 and 49.”

Preliminary

2. The defendant was convicted of murder, committed on 12 May 2005. The defendant was sentenced by Latham J for a period of 18 years commencing 20 May 2005, with a non-parole period of 14 years, making his earliest release date 19 May 2019: Regina v Grant John COLB [2006] NSWSC 811.

3. An ESO was imposed by Weinstein J on 15 August 2023 for a period of 3 years (State of New South Wales v Colb (Final) [2023] NSWSC 969 (“Colb (Final)”)). A copy of the conditions of that order is annexed to his Honour’s judgment.

4. The ESO was made after his Honour imposed an interim supervision order (the ISO) on 28 April 2023, for a period of 28 days (State of New South Wales v Colb (Preliminary) [2023] NSWSC 471 (“Colb (Preliminary)”)). The ISO was extended due to two periods of suspension while the defendant was in custody for breaches of the ISO and remained in place until the ESO was imposed on 15 August 2023.

5. The relevant legislative framework is set out in the judgments of Weinstein J: Colb (Preliminary) at [13]-[25]; Colb (Final) at [10]-[22].

6. The background to the matter is set out in Weinstein J’s preliminary judgment in the context of his discussion of the considerations to be taken into account pursuant to s 9(3) of the Act: Colb (Preliminary) at [30]-[53].

Evidence on the Motion

7. In addition to the materials in existence at the time the ESO was ordered I have received, most relevantly on behalf of the defendant, a report of Dr Japname Kang. Dr Kang, in addition to being briefed with material relevant to the application, interviewed the defendant for the purposes of her assessment and provided her expert opinion in relation to questions asked with respect to the application for revocation, and in the alternative, a modification of the conditions. The defendant’s evidence also included an affidavit of Sidnei Pettitt, a social worker employed by Legal Aid NSW, a letter from the defendant’s psychologist, Dr Carollyne Youssef, and a letter from a community support, Mr Peter Southon.

8. Additional evidence of significance on the application tendered by the plaintiff included the Offender Integrated Management System (OIMS) Case Notes, a Supplementary Risk Assessment Report (SRAR) of Mr Samuel Ardasinski, an affidavit of Ms Kelli Grabham, High Risk Offender Applications and Operational Governance Officer within Corrective Services’ ESO team, and the defendant’s updated custodial history.

9. Dr Kang was cross-examined on behalf of the plaintiff. No other oral evidence was called.

Events since the ESO

10. Since the defendant’s release on the ESO on 15 August 2023, he has not attained any degree of stability in the community. He has, as a result of breaches of the ESO, been in custody more often than he has been out. The following table sets out the defendant’s periods in the community and in custody since being released on the ESO:

| Period | Date in | Date out | Days in | Cumulative tally of days in | Reason | Days in Community prior to period of custody | | 1 | 01/09/2023 | 01/11/2023 | 61 | 61 | H 93489620 (drug test) | 17 | | 2 | 08/11/2023 | 07/03/2024 | 120 | 181 | H 79351575 (curfew breach) | 7 | | 3 | 21/03/2024 | 08/05/2024 | 48 | 229 | H 81036979 (drug test) | 14 | | 4 | 24/05/2024 | 23/09/2024 | 122 | 351 | H 96771804 (drug test) | 16 | | 5 | 28/09/2024 | 10/10/2024 | 12 | 363 | H 97549270 (curfew/disobey) | 5 | | 6 | 26/10/2024 | 10/01/2025 | 76 | 439 | H 98593452 (drug test) | 16 | | 7 | 16/01/2025 | 14/04/2025 | 88 | 527 | H 83783079 & 83752341 (other offences, drug possession) | 6 | | 8 | 15/05/2025 | 14/07/2025 | 60 | 587 | H 556197692 (drug test) | 31 | | 9 | 02/08/2025 | 02/11/2025 | 92 | 679 | H 99993220 (drug test) | 19 | | 10 | 05/12/2025 | 23/02/2026 | 80 | 759 | H 102911554 (drug test) | 33 | | 11 | 27/03/2026 | - | 26 [1] | 785 [2] | H104170474 (drug test) | 32 |

11. The effect of the periods in custody during which the order was suspended under the Act was, at the date of hearing, to extend the expiry date of the ESO to 6 October 2028.

12. As can be seen from the table, in addition to the defendant having spent a significant proportion of the time since the imposition of the ESO in custody, his return to custody after release has generally been within a short time. The longest period the defendant has continuously spent in the community is 33 days. This has had an obvious deleterious impact on his ability to maintain any sort of stable accommodation. The defendant had been successful in obtaining permanent accommodation through Department of Communities and Justice housing. Regrettably that accommodation became available on 1 April 2026 at which time the defendant was in custody as a result of his arrest on 27 March and the property was relinquished. In the absence of stable accommodation, the defendant has been reliant on short-term solutions, including, on occasion, hotels paid for by Mr Southon.

13. As the table demonstrates, the majority of the defendant’s breaches of the ESO have related to his use of prohibited drugs. The defendant has made attempts at rehabilitation in relation to his drug use subsequent to being placed on the ESO. On 16 July 2025, the defendant attended Nepean Hospital Inpatient Withdrawal Management Unit and underwent 12 days of detoxification. He then attended Wayback, a well-known residential rehabilitation facility, on 28 July 2025. However, on his attendance at Wayback he was observed to be obviously drug affected, admitting to the use of both heroin and methylamphetamine. He was denied entry into the programme.

14. More recently, on 19 March 2026, the defendant, as a result of his drug affected state (including delusions and paranoia) was directed to St Vincent’s hospital where he was given a bed in Gorman House, a detoxification unit within the hospital. This pre-empted, by some days, a scheduled appointment to attend for detoxification on 25 March 2026. The defendant spent a number of days in Gorman House with the intention he be discharged from there to Rainbow Lodge for residential rehabilitation. On 25 March 2026, Rainbow Lodge staff escorted the defendant to a funeral from which he was to attend Rainbow Lodge. In the course of this the defendant made inappropriate comments to staff of Rainbow Lodge leading to the revocation of his placement. The defendant then spent two nights in a hotel before he was arrested on 27 March 2026 and returned to custody.

15. Despite the regular cycle of imprisonment, the defendant has managed to find some support in the community. Mr Southon began communicating with the defendant while he (the defendant) was in custody during the course of his sentence. He has provided mentorship and practical assistance, including assisting the defendant with short term accommodation. The defendant has also been referred, by Legal Aid, to a psychologist, Dr Youssef, with whom he has established a relationship and is engaged in ongoing sessions. These relationships are independent of the ESO and appear to be both positive and ongoing.

16. Further, while the defendant has, since the imposition of the ESO, regularly breached it, one matter that should be noted is that none of the breaches have involved any violence.

17. The short summary above is sufficient to provide an understanding of the background to this application.

Revocation

18. The defendant contends that the ESO is not having the intended effect. The defendant’s repeated imprisonment for short periods as a result of breaches of the order rather than substantive offending, it is submitted, are adding to his risk rather than reducing it. The defendant drew support for this submission from the report of Dr Kang.

19. Dr Kang, in her report, said that she agreed with the majority of the previous psychiatric and psychological diagnoses. She reported that the defendant meets DSM-5 criteria for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, cluster B personality disorder with prominent antisocial and borderline traits, and polysubstance use disorder.

20. In response to a question which asked, “Noting that one of the purposes of [the Act] is to encourage the rehabilitation of the offender, having regard to the amount of time [the defendant] has spent in custody due to breaches of the ESO, is the order promoting his rehabilitation or is it having an adverse effect”, Dr Kang said at [61]-[64] of her report:

“61. The purpose of [the Act] includes facilitating rehabilitation while ensuring community protection. In [the defendant’s] case, the current ESO, has not demonstrably promoted rehabilitation. Instead, it may be contributing to a cycle of destabilisation and repeated incarceration. Since the ESO commenced, [the defendant] has been returned to custody on multiple occasions, often within days of release, for non-violent breaches such as drug use, failing to reside at the approved address, or breaching curfew or reporting conditions. He has spent the majority of the ESO period in custody rather than in the community.

62. [The defendant] has described the ESO as restrictive, distressing, and counterproductive. He reported that the constant surveillance, GPS monitoring, and rigid scheduling requirements have left him feeling entrapped and demoralised. These subjective experiences align with his complex trauma history and personality vulnerabilities and may be exacerbating rather than ameliorating risk. From a clinical perspective, the current model of enforcement appears to reinforce institutional dependency and undermine autonomy which are factors critical to successful community reintegration.

63. Research consistently indicates that repeated short-term imprisonment, especially for technical or non-violent breaches, does not reduce recidivism and may increase the likelihood of future offending. Frequent returns to custody disrupt continuity of care, impede engagement with therapeutic and support services, and reinforce criminogenic patterns of instability and marginalisation. For example, Wan et al. (2014) found that individuals subjected to short-term incarceration for parole or supervision breaches had higher reoffending rates than those offered structured community-based interventions.

64. Given [the defendant’s] entrenched institutionalisation, polysubstance dependence, cognitive vulnerabilities, and limited prosocial supports, the current enforcement approach is unlikely to support long-term behavioural change. While the ESO may serve a community protection function in a narrow sense, it is not fulfilling its rehabilitative purpose in its current form.” (footnote omitted)

21. The defendant submits that Dr Kang’s observations have an additional salience in a context in which the defendant has not committed a violent offence since he was 28 years old, noting that he is now 49 years old. As observed above, breaches of the ESO have been for non-compliance with the orders, not for offences of violence.

22. Dr Kang, however, also reported that there had been no substantive change to the defendant’s risk profile since the ESO was imposed. The question is therefore a practical one as to whether that risk is best managed under an ESO, or whether revocation of the ESO will be a more effective alternative. That question is best understood in the light of medical opinion that the defendant’s drug use is inextricably linked with his risk of violence, a relationship confirmed by Dr Kang and the court appointed experts called before Weinstein J, Drs McSwiggan and Dayalan. It follows that, for the ESO to be effective, it must manage the defendant’s substance abuse.

23. Section 9(2) of the Act provides that in deciding whether to make an ESO the safety of the community is the paramount consideration. The ESO having been made on this basis, the same consideration must apply in deciding whether to revoke an ESO.

24. In considering the defendant’s risk the first thing that might be observed is that while the ESO has not been effective in promoting the defendant’s rehabilitation, it cannot be assumed it has not been effective in its primary purpose of protecting the community. In this regard, while repeated incarceration has been a negative for the defendant, at least some of those periods of incarceration are capable of being viewed as interventions at a time when the defendant’s behaviour was, through his drug use, becoming increasingly erratic. Given the connection between the defendant’s drug use and his risk, it may be that incarceration was effective in preventing escalation of the defendant’s behaviour leading to violence. This is essentially the point made by Mr Ardasinski in his SRAR.

25. Taking a longer term view, I accept, as Dr Kang opined, that the defendant’s repeated incarceration is interfering with his rehabilitation and the lack of rehabilitation contributes to his risk. Viewed in this way, the order might be seen to be having a deleterious effect not only with respect to the defendant’s rehabilitation, but with respect to the primary purpose of the Act, being community safety. The difficulty, however, is that whilst the defendant’s incarceration has stymied attempts at residential rehabilitation, it cannot be assumed that rehabilitation would have continued unimpeded in the absence of an order. In this regard, the evidence suggests it is only through steps taken by the defendant’s Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO), including lobbying on his behalf, that he has been able to obtain placements in detoxification units and rehabilitation facilities. Whilst the defendant has some supports outside of those in place through the ESO, and without intending any disrespect to those persons, those supports are limited. On the evidence it cannot be assumed that the defendant would, in the absence of an ESO, be able to arrange for his detoxification and rehabilitation. Put another way, while the ESO has interfered with the defendant’s rehabilitation it does not follow that in the absence of an ESO greater progress towards rehabilitation would have been made, or would have been more likely to have been made. Further, the fact that rehabilitative efforts have been stymied to date does not mean further efforts will not be more successful under an ESO in future. Whilst it is difficult to have any confidence, what can be said is that an ESO, with the defendant’s supervisors working with him on the common goal of rehabilitation, provides the best hope.

26. Ultimately, the most recent assessments of the defendant’s risk, while not determinative, must also be given weight. Dr Kang said in her report at [68]-[69]:

“68. In my opinion, there has been no substantive change in [the defendant’s] risk profile since his assessments by Dr Sally McSwiggan and Dr Sathish Dayalan in July 2023. At that time, both clinicians identified [the defendant] as presenting with a high risk of recidivism, informed by his entrenched antisocial behaviours, trauma history, substance dependence, and limited insight. Those risk factors remain unchanged.

69. Since the 2023 assessments, [the defendant] has not demonstrated any sustained period of stability in the community. He has not engaged in long-term rehabilitation or therapeutic interventions, and his mental state, insight, and overall functioning appear consistent with prior assessments. There has been no evidence of meaningful behavioural change, improvement in coping strategies, or enhanced engagement with support services.”

27. Mr Ardasinski said in the SRAR at [9]:

“In summary, little has changed in [the defendant’s] risk profile since he was made subject to an ESO in 2023. There has been limited opportunity for risk factors to coalesce, given how often, and how rapidly, he has returned to custody for breaches of his ESO (mostly for substance use)…

Given the primacy with which substance use, especially the use of methamphetamines, is causally linked to [the defendant’s] risk of repeat serious violence, there have been real challenges in managing his risk when he has tested positive for these drugs whilst under supervision.”

28. To date the order has not operated in the manner in which it was no doubt hoped it would. It has not been successful in promoting the defendant’s rehabilitation. It has resulted in hardship to the defendant in the form of his repeated short-term imprisonment, a matter in and of itself likely, according to Dr Kang, to act against his rehabilitation. In the absence, however, of a basis to conclude that the defendant has the necessary resources to promote his own rehabilitation in the absence of an ESO, he remains an unacceptable risk. I am not satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances since the order was made that would justify me revoking the order. The defendant’s primary relief must be refused.

The alternative relief sought – modification of conditions

29. The defendant, as an alternative to the primary relief, sought the revocation of a limited number of conditions. As noted above, the current conditions are set out in the annexure to the judgment of Weinstein J: Colb (Final).

30. Some of the reports tendered on the motion provided opinions in relation to conditions which the defendant did not challenge. It is not necessary to address those unchallenged conditions. The conditions subject to challenge are dealt with below.

Electronic monitoring

31. The defendant sought the removal, or in the alternative, modification of, this condition. I am not of the view that the condition should be removed altogether. In the context of the defendant’s unstructured, and somewhat chaotic, lifestyle when in the community, effective supervision of the defendant would be greatly undermined in the absence of such monitoring.

32. Whilst the motion sought that this condition be deleted in its entirety, the defendant’s submissions focused on the undesirability of maintaining electronic monitoring in circumstances where it prevented the defendant’s entry into particular rehabilitation facilities. Consequently, and on the hearing of the motion, the real issue joined was whether the condition should be varied to exclude the electronic monitoring requirement in the event that doing so would allow entry to residential rehabilitation.

33. The removal of monitoring for the purposes of entering residential rehabilitation raises markedly different considerations to those which led to my conclusion that electronic monitoring should not be removed altogether. The nature of residential rehabilitation is a structured and supervised environment. In making this observation I am cognizant of the evidence of Ms Grabham that rehabilitation facilities are likely to be limited in their resources, and such staff as are available are not trained to provide the level of monitoring required by the defendant. Nonetheless, it seems to me the defendant would be, while in a supervised residential rehabilitation facility, subject to constant and proximate supervision. I am, consequently, not persuaded that there would be an unwarranted increase in risk were the defendant to be housed in residential rehabilitation without electronic monitoring. To the extent that there is any increase in risk, the desirability of the defendant being able to access such a facility, in my view, would justify that increased risk. That is particularly so where, as a result of the defendant’s particular history and presentation, the number of rehabilitation facilities willing to take him is even more limited than is ordinarily the case.

34. Some positive steps are desperately needed to advance the defendant’s rehabilitation, both for his own sake and for the good of the community. I am of the view a targeted relaxing of the electronic monitoring condition may facilitate such a step. Condition 5 should be amended to add the following:

“… This condition is suspended for the duration of any period in which the defendant is a participant in a residential rehabilitation program to which he would otherwise be refused entry as a result of being subject to electronic monitoring.”

Part I: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

35. The defendant seeks the deletion of this part, comprising conditions 35 to 45, in its entirety. The plaintiff does not oppose the deletion of conditions 36 to 45, but submits that condition 35 should be maintained.

36. Consistent with the joint position of the parties, conditions 36 to 45 do not bear any meaningful relationship with the management of the defendant’s risk. In these circumstances those conditions add complexity without a corresponding benefit. They should be deleted.

37. Condition 35 currently provides:

“The defendant must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about communication, internet access and use of electronic devices (including, but not limited to, approval of devices used, method of communication, access to the internet and restrictions on deleting information).”

38. With respect to condition 35, the defendant submits that this is a power which essentially replicates in general terms the specific powers articulated in conditions 36 to 45. As such, it was submitted that condition 35 should be deleted together with the specific powers. To the extent that there may be a need to examine his phone, the defendant pointed to the existence of the search power in condition 46(c)(v). The difficulty, however, is that, absent condition 35, there is no condition providing a power to require the defendant to possess and maintain a telephone. Such a condition is necessary in order to ensure the defendant is contactable in order to manage his risk. While a condition could be framed in specific terms to meet this requirement, some flexibility in the condition is desirable to allow for the myriad ways in which online activity may be used by, or may impact a person such as, the defendant.

39. Conditions 36 to 45 will be deleted. Condition 35 will remain.

Part K: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material

40. The defendant seeks the deletion of conditions 48 and 49 which relate to access to pornography, violent and classified material. Condition 48 requires the defendant to notify his DSO if he has viewed or accessed in any way, such material. Condition 49 requires him to comply with reasonable directions regarding access to such material. The plaintiff, accepting there is nothing in the defendant’s risk profile related to accessing pornography or violent material, does not oppose the deletion of condition 48. The plaintiff, however, submits that condition 49 should be maintained. The plaintiff submits, in effect, that as the condition does not materially add to the burden of the ESO it should remain in place against the contingency that it may, at some point, be required. That is not, in my view, a sufficient basis to maintain a condition. Conditions 48 and 49 will be deleted.

Conclusion

41. The extent of the variations sought are as set out above. The order will be modified in accordance with these reasons.

Orders

1. The application to revoke the extended supervision order imposed by Weinstein J (the ESO) on 15 August 2023 is refused.
2. The ESO is varied as follows:

(a) Condition 5 is to read: The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with, or remove, the equipment. This condition is suspended for the duration of any period in which the defendant is a participant in a residential rehabilitation program to which he would otherwise be refused entry as a result of being subject to electronic monitoring. (b) Conditions 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48 and 49 are deleted.

3. The defendant is to comply with the conditions of the ESO as varied, as set out in schedule A to this judgment.

**********

Schedule A – Amended Conditions of Supervision

Conditions of the ESO Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

Monitoring and Reporting

1. The defendant must submit to the supervision and guidance of a DSO and obey all reasonable directions of a DSO.

2. Where a direction may conveniently be given in writing (or is required to be given in writing) it may be given electronically including by SMS or other messaging service.

3. The defendant must truthfully answer questions from a DSO, or any other person supervising him, about where he is, where he is going, who he is with, what he is doing and the nature of his associations.

4. Deleted.

Electronic Monitoring

5. The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with, or remove, the equipment. This condition is suspended for the duration of any period in which the defendant is a participant in a residential rehabilitation program to which he would otherwise be refused entry as a result of being subject to electronic monitoring.

Schedule of Movements

6. If directed by his DSO, the defendant is to provide a plan of his anticipated daily movements for approval, limited to places he intends to travel to, the purposes and means of his travel to those places, and the dates of travel.

Note – the DSO is to assist the defendant to the extent possible in condition 6.

7. Approval of the plan in condition 6 must not be withheld unless:

a) a DSO considers his attendance at a location, or the engagement in the activity, will give rise to a risk of committing a serious offence or a risk of breach of another condition of this order; or

b) a DSO considers that there is insufficient time to conduct a risk assessment of the proposed location or activity.

8. The defendant must not deviate from his approved plan except in an emergency or unless he has approval to deviate from the plan.

9. Deleted.

Part B: Accommodation

10. The defendant must live at an address approved by a DSO and notify a DSO of any intention to change the defendant’s address or living arrangements.

11. The defendant must be at his approved address between 9PM and 6AM unless other arrangements are approved by a DSO.

12. Deleted.

13. The defendant must allow a DSO to visit him at his approved address at any time and to enter the premises at that address.

14. The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address or any alternative approved addresses (if relevant) without the approval of a DSO.

15. The defendant must promptly notify a DSO of any visitor entering and remaining at his approved address and must not permit any person to stay overnight, at his approved address (other than persons who ordinarily reside at his approved address), without the prior approval of a DSO.

*In the context of shared accommodation, ‘approved address’ is the defendant’s personal room in the supported accommodation.

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

16. The defendant must surrender any passports held by him to the Commissioner, must not be in possession of any passports, and must not attempt to apply for any passports.

17. The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner of CSNSW.

18. The defendant must not frequent or visit any place or district specified by a DSO.

Part D: Employment, finance and education

19. The defendant must take all reasonable steps to participate in interventions as recommended by a DSO, including the development of a case management plan which may include employment, education, training or participation in personal development programs.

20. The defendant must not start on his own initiative any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of a DSO.

21. The defendant must notify a DSO of any intention to change his employment if practicable

before the change occurs or otherwise at his next interview with a DSO.

22. The defendant must provide any information relating to his financial affairs, including income and expenditure, if directed by a DSO.

Part E: Drugs and alcohol

23. The defendant must not use or possess prohibited drugs, or abuse drugs unlawfully obtained.

24. The defendant must not possess or consume alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO.

25. The defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing.

26. The defendant must not enter any licensed premises including hotels, bars, racecourses and licenced clubs, but excluding cafes and restaurants, without the prior approval of a DSO.

27. The defendant must attend and participate in programmes and courses for drug and alcohol rehabilitation as reasonably directed by a DSO, and must not discharge himself from such programs and courses without prior approval of a DSO.

Part F: Non-association

Associations with Others (not children)

28. The defendant must not associate with any person or persons specified by a DSO.

29. Without limiting condition 28, the defendant must not:

a. associate with any people who he knows are consuming or under the influence of alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO.

b. associate with any people who he knows are consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs.

c. associate with any person held in custody without prior approval of a DSO.

30. The defendant must not engage the services of sex workers, without the prior approval of a DSO.

31. The defendant must agree to a DSO disclosing his criminal history to another person if the disclosure is reasonably necessary to address the safety of the community. The defendant should first be provided with an opportunity to make the disclosure himself.

32. The defendant must obtain written permission from a DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation

Part H: Weapons

33. The defendant must not possess or use any of the following:

a. a firearm, firearm part or ammunition within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996,

b. a prohibited weapon within the meaning of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998,

34. Without limiting or altering condition 33, the defendant must not possess or use any of the following, without a DSO’s prior approval:

a. a knife, machete, sword or any other device that consists of a single-edged or multi-edged blade or spike that is designed or adapted to inflict violence, whether actual or threatened, other than kitchen knives for use at the defendant’s residence;

b. any other implement made or adapted for use for causing injury to a person; or

c. anything intended, by the person having custody of the thing, to be used to injure or menace a person or damage property.

Part I: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

35. The defendant must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about communication, internet access and use of electronic devices (including, but not limited to, approval of devices used, method of communication, access to the internet and restrictions on deleting information).

36. [DELETED]

37. [DELETED]

38. [DELETED]

39. [DELETED]

40. [DELETED]

41. [DELETED]

42. [DELETED]

43. [DELETED]

44. [DELETED]

45. [DELETED]

Part J: Search and seizure

46. If the DSO reasonably believes that a search is necessary:

a. for the safety and welfare of residents or staff or persons present at the defendant’s approved address; or

b. to monitor the defendant’s compliance with this order; or

c. because the DSO reasonably suspects the defendant of behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence;

then the DSO may direct, and the defendant must submit to:

i) a search and inspection of any part of, or anything in the defendant’s approved address;

ii) a search and inspection of any part of, or anything in, any vehicle owned, hired by, or under the control of the defendant or in which the defendant is travelling;

iii) a search and inspection of any part of, or anything in, any storage facility, including a garage, locker or commercial facility owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant;

iv) a search and examination of his person, and/or

v) a search of any computer, electronic and communication device under his control or in his possession.

47. The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure carried out pursuant to this Order.

Part K: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material

48. [DELETED]

49. [DELETED]

Part L: Personal details and appearance

50. The defendant must not change his name from Grant Colb or use any other name without notifying a DSO.

51. The defendant must not significantly change his appearance without the approval of a DSO.

52. The defendant must let a DSO photograph him, dressed, within one week of the commencement of these conditions and following any significant change to his appearance.

53. If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide a DSO with such details.

Part M: Medical intervention and treatment

54. The defendant must undergo ongoing psychological or psychiatric assessment or counselling (or any combination of these) as directed by a DSO, including any therapy sessions, support and treatment programs the subject of the direction.

55. The defendant must notify a DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that he consults.

56. The defendant must take medications that are prescribed to him by his healthcare practitioners only in the manner prescribed.

57. The defendant must notify a DSO immediately if he ceases to take or declines to commence taking any medication as referred to in the above condition.

58. The defendant must agree to his treatment and service providers and healthcare practitioners sharing information, including reports on his progress and attendance, and information he has told them:

a. with each other; and

b. with a DSO, where that information (in the opinion of the defendant’s treatment, service and healthcare providers) is relevant to the management of the defendant’s risk factors.

59. The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those persons and agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, a DSO and CSNSW.

60. The defendant must agree to the disclosure of his criminal history to any healthcare professionals that are treating him where that information is relevant to the management of the defendant’s risk factors.

*********

Endnotes

As at the date of hearing.

As above.