State of New South Wales v BG (final)

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: State of New South Wales (plaintiff)
BG (defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
N Evans (plaintiff)
W Tuckey (defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (plaintiff)
Legal Aid Commission NSW (defendant)

File Number(s): 2025/301498

Publication restriction: No

JUDGMENT

1. The plaintiff seeks an extended supervision order (ESO) in respect of the defendant under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW). The plaintiff’s summons was filed on 7 August 2025 and a preliminary hearing took place before McGuire J on 10 October 2025. On 24 October 2025 his Honour ordered the appointment of experts in psychiatry and/or psychology to assess the defendant and made an interim supervision order (ISO) with effect from 9 November 2025: State of New South Wales v BG (Preliminary) [2025] NSWSC 1412.

2. Reports of Dr Jeremy O’Dea, psychiatrist, and Dr Michael R Davis, forensic clinical psychologist, dated 25 and 26 November 2025 respectively, have been furnished to the Court pursuant to McGuire J’s order. Ports, particularly that of Dr Davis, have change the complexion of the apparent risk of the defendant re-offending, relative to how the case appeared at the stage when a preliminary assessment had to be made by McGuire J.

3. The defendant was born in December 1960. He married in 1980 and he and his wife had a son and two daughters. They were divorced in 1994. After the divorce the defendant had the care of the children. His relevant past offending is summarised in McGuire J’s judgment, to which reference may be had for greater detail than I find necessary to repeat here.

Relevant offending

4. In 1998 and 1999 the defendant committed four sexual assaults upon a girl of 10 to 11 years who was a school friend of his daughter. He was aged 37 to 38 when the offences were committed. The young complainant was entrusted to stay with the defendant from time to time, for sleepovers as a friend of the daughter. McGuire J noted that the particulars of the offending were as follows (at [17]):

[It] involved the defendant climbing into bed with the victim, touching her vagina and breasts, and engaging in digital-vaginal penetration, forced cunnilingus, and penile-vaginal penetration.

5. In 2001 the defendant indecently assaulted his daughter, then aged 15. He arrived home intoxicated, got into bed with a girl and touched her on the upper thigh, stomach and breasts. The conduct stopped when her 21 year old boyfriend entered the room.

6. In February 2004 the defendant befriended the father of a family that lived near his own residence. During the early hours of one morning, after an evening drinking with the father in the home of that family, the defendant entered the bedroom of a nine year old female child and digitally penetrated her vagina.

7. The defendant denied all charges and was convicted on each of them in three separate trials by jury. He still denies his guilt. The offending against the defendant’s daughter in 2001 was the first matter to be reported and prosecuted. For that he was sentenced on 25 September 2002 to 12 months imprisonment, suspended upon his entering into a good behaviour bond.

8. The offending of 2004 was reported soon after it occurred and the defendant was arrested and remanded in custody from 24 June 2004. On 24 November 2005 he was sentenced to 5 years and 4 months imprisonment, commencing from the date of his arrest. A non-parole period of four years was fixed but the defendant was not released until 23 June 2009, by which date he had served five years. He completed the last four months of his sentence in the community on parole, without breach.

9. The young girl who had been serially abused by the defendant in 1998 and 1999 brought her complaint to the attention of police in mid 2013. The defendant was arrested and charged for that conduct on 14 August 2013 and was remanded in custody until his conviction in November of that year. He was sentenced to a series of terms of imprisonment for the four counts, amounting to a total effective sentence of 9 years with a non-parole period of 6 years and 9 months. That sentence dated from his arrest. The defendant was not released to parole and he served out his full term until 12 August 2022.

2022 ESO

10. Prior to the defendant’s release at the conclusion of that sentence the State made its first application for an ESO. An ISO was made in the first instance and extended as necessary until McNaughton J was able to determine the application on a final basis: State of New South Wales v BG [2022] NSWSC 1531. Her Honour ordered that the defendant be subject to an ESO for 3 years, commencing 10 November 2022. Pursuant to s 11 of the Act her Honour imposed 54 conditions of the ESO, including the following:

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

Electronic Monitorinq

4. The defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by a DSO and must not tamper with, or remove, the equipment.

Schedule of Movements

5. If directed, the defendant must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start.

6. If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by a DSO, he must seek approval from a DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless a DSO approves a shorter period.

7. The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency.

Part B: Accommodation

9. The defendant must be at his approved address between 9pm and 6am unless other arrangements are approved by a DSO.

Part D: Employment, finance and education

19. The defendant must take all reasonable steps to participate in interventions as recommended by a DSO, including the development of a case management plan which may include employment, education, training or participation in personal development programs.

20. The defendant must give his DSO at least 4 working days' notice before commencing any paid employment, volunteer work or educational course and must comply with any written direction from his DSO not to engage in particular paid employment, volunteer work or educational courses.

Part E: Drugs and alcohol

24, The defendant must not possess or consume alcohol without the prior approval of a DSO.

25. The defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing.

26. The defendant must not enter any licensed premises including hotels, bars, racecourses and licenced clubs, but excluding cafes and restaurants, without the prior approval of a DSO.

Associations with Others (not children)

29. The defendant must not associate with any person or persons specified by a DSO.

30. If the defendant associates with a person who is the parent or guardian or has care and control of a female child under the age of 18 years, he must notify the DSO of the association as soon as possible. The DSO may want to tell the person about the defendant's criminal history if the DSO has concerns, on reasonable grounds, about the defendant's association and the defendant must permit that disclosure.

31. Without limiting condition 27, the defendant must not: associate with any people who he knows are consuming or under the influence of illegal drugs […].

Part I: Access to the internet and other electronic communications

36. The defendant must obey any reasonable direction by a DSO about communication, internet access and use of electronic devices (including, but not limited to, approval of devices used, method of communication, access to the internet and restrictions on deleting information).

41. The defendant must not use any coded or encrypted messaging application or service.

43. The defendant must not access, join and/or connect to any social networking service or application without the prior approval of a DSO, including, but not limited to, use of internet-based email, instant messaging services, online community services, multi player video games and other telecommunications-based services including text and voice services.

44. The defendant must provide consent for a DSO (or any other person requested by a DSO) to remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including any internet service provider account, email accounts and social media accounts, in monitoring compliance with this Order.

11. Of the 18 years of his life between the ages of 43 and 61, the defendant has spent 14 years in prison and 4 months on parole. Since his release at the age of 61 he has spent the next three years living under the very tight conditions of the 2022 ESO. The conditions have been rigorously enforced with frequent unannounced home visits and no relaxation of the electronic monitoring condition, the scheduling condition or the nighttime curfew. There has been no “step down” or tapering off of those restrictions until some modest changes were made in October of this year.

The issue in these proceedings

12. There is no issue between the parties regarding satisfaction of the procedural requirements in s 5B(a)-(c) and s 5I of the Act and I find that those requirements are met. The issue to be determined arises under s 5B(d), namely, whether:

the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.

13. On the evidence before the Court, the type of serious offence to which the risk of reoffending relates is a serious sex offence, as defined in s 5 of the Act. Specifically, it is the risk of the defendant committing an offence punishable by imprisonment for 7 years or more, against a child, contrary to one of the provisions of Div 10 of Pt 3 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Based on the defendant’s past record and upon risk assessment reports that have been submitted to the Court, the present application for an ESO is concerned with a risk that the defendant might have, or attempt to have, sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years, or a child between 10 and 16 years, or a child between 14 and 16 years (ss 66A, 66B and 66C of the Crimes Act). Other potential offences of which he may be at risk of committing would be against s 66D (assault of a child between 10 and 16 years with intent to have sexual intercourse) or ss 66DA or 66DB (sexual touching of a child under 10 years or between 10 and 16 years).

Opinions of court-appointed experts

No major psychiatric disorder

14. Dr O’Dea’s opinion at [87]-[88] of his report dated 25 November 2025 is that the defendant does not suffer from a major psychiatric illness. However, he has Alcohol Use Disorder that is in remission in a controlled environment. The controlled environment is constituted by the prohibition on consuming alcohol under condition 24 of McNaughton J’s ESO made on 10 November 2022 and a similar condition under McGuire J’s ISO of 24 October 2025. Compliance with alcohol abstention has been verified by breathalyser tests administered by Community Corrections officers at frequent intervals for more than three years.

15. At [89] of Dr O’Dea’s report, as explained in his oral evidence, he concluded that the defendant’s sexual offending during the 6 years from 1998 to 2004, against three different children, one of whom was a prepubescent child previously unknown to him:

raises the potential for [the defendant] to have […] specific and significant, if not predominant, heterosexual paedophilic and heterosexual hebephilic components to his over sexuality as potential drivers of his sex offending behaviours.

16. Dr O’Dea explained that a criterion of diagnosis of paedophilia is predominant sexual interest in prepubescent children. The doctor’s clear opinion is that that has not to date been demonstrated in relation to the defendant and is regarded by the fact that he has “predominantly had adult heterosexual activity, as far as we know, and […] only intermittent brief paedophilic activity”. Dr O’Dea gave evidence that hebephilia, constituted by a strong, specific and sometimes predominant sexual interest in post-pubescent children, is not a psychiatric illness but is recognised as a clinical condition. He is of the view that the defendant may have a specific and significant hebephilic “component to his over sexuality”, but not a predominant interest.

17. Similarly, Dr Davis does not consider that the diagnostic criteria for either paedophilia or hebephilia are fully satisfied. He said this at [127] of his report of 26 November 2025:

Without in any way of minimising [his] offences, the circumscribed nature of the offending is not indicative of the sexual preference for pre-pubescent or pubescent children over adults that is necessary to make either diagnosis. […] It is my opinion that while [the defendant] has clearly seen available children as a viable sexual substitute in the past, and has even befriended a family with at least some possible motive to offend against their daughter, [he] does not have a preferential sexual interest in pre-pubescent or pubescent children.

18. Dr Davis referred to paedophilia and hebephilia, where those psychiatric disorders are able to be diagnosed, by the collective term “sexual deviance”. In a footnote to [127], he said this:

[From] a risk perspective, presence of diagnosable sexual deviance is an important consideration. Indeed, the scholarly literature indicates that the two most potent categories of risk factors are sexual deviance and antisocial orientation/behaviour. In [the defendant’s] case he does not appear to have overt evidence of either.

19. Dr O’Dea listed a wider group of the most significant predictors at [99], as follows:

[It] is generally agreed that the best predictors of future sexual offending are past sex offending and the presence of significant sexual deviance (such as a psychiatric diagnosis of a Paraphilic Disorder [paedophilia or hebephilia]), substance abuse and Personality Disorder.

Personality and mood disorders

20. Dr O’Dea has assessed the defendant as having a personality disorder, rather than a major psychiatric disorder. His report contains the following opinions:

[91] [In] the context of his history of repeated offending, problems with anger, his apparent lack of remorse, and his problems in interpersonal relations, would point to [BG] meeting the criteria for a Personality Disorder with antisocial and potentially paranoid traits.

[92] Personality Disorders, and in particular Antisocial Personality Disorder, like personality in general are usually considered enduring conditions characterised by patterns of inner experience and behaviour that deviate markedly from the expectations of an individual’s culture, and are manifested in a variety of domains, including cognition, affect, interpersonal functioning, and impulse control, with antisocial personality disorder characterised by repeated antisocial behaviours, impulsivity, repeated failure to conform to lawful behaviours, irritability and aggressiveness, disregard for the safety of others, and problems with remorse.

[93] Furthermore, Personality Disorders in general, and Antisocial Personality Disorder in particular, are generally considered to have a limited amenability to treatment and fundamental change but are often considered manageable, and therefore modifiable, particularly with external supportive controls being successfully put in place in the long term.

21. Dr Davis, also, has diagnosed the defendant with a personality disorder, although he formulates it slightly differently, in the following terms:

[122] […] [It] is my opinion that the most appropriate diagnosis is Adjustment Disorder (with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct). […]

[124] […] [It] remains my opinion that he has prominent paranoid (suspects others are harming him, reads hidden messages into benign remarks, perceives attacks on his reputation, somewhat reluctant to confide in others due to fears) and narcissistic (sense of entitlement, interpersonally exploitative, reduced empathy, somewhat grandiose) personality features that do not quite meet formal criteria for either paranoid or narcissistic personality disorder. Nonetheless, the combination of these difficulties meets criteria for a diagnosis of Mixed Personality Disorder (with narcissistic and paranoid features).

22. Dr Davis assessed the defendant’s paranoid recollections and interpretations of events as not delusional but constituting an over valuing of “some actual difficulties that he has experienced within the prison and wider correctional environment”. Dr Davis has been able to assess the defendant over time because he prepared one of the two court-ordered reports upon which McNaughton J relied in November 2022. As at November 2025 he made the following findings:

[122] It is my opinion that [BG's] mental state has deteriorated somewhat during the time since our initial assessment interview in September 2022. Indeed he is notably more paranoid and there is a degree of depressed mood and traumatic preoccupation that was not present during our previous assessment. Given that [BG's] mood does reportedly rise in response to positive events, it is my opinion that his depressive symptoms are reactive in nature and reflect his dissatisfaction whilst subject to an Extended Supervision Order.

23. A decline in the defendant’s mental well-being over the three years of the 2022 ESO is entirely understandable. Review of the contemporaneous notes made by Community Corrections officers of the ESO team show that he has been carefully compliant with restrictive aspects of the order, frequently expressing anxiety at the prospect that he might be found in breach, prosecuted and returned to prison. That is a rational approach on his part. It must be well known amongst released inmates, as it is amongst anyone who has anything to do with the High Risk Offenders legislation, that frequent sentences of imprisonment for breach of conditions, for terms of several months at a time, are common place. As I have observed in a number of decisions under this legislation, prosecutions for breach of condition are often brought for very minor contraventions and the suspension of the order during terms of imprisonment for breach often results in significant extensions of the overall duration of the order.

24. Further, the unwillingness of those administering the defendant’s 2022 ESO to relax the monitoring, scheduling and curfew conditions, combined with his resentful attitude and belligerent interactions with his DSOs, are factors that have subjected him to very severe social isolation for the past three years. From my reading of the Offender Integrated Management System (OIMS) notes, he has made nil progress towards constructive reintegration into the community while the ESO has been in force. The operation of the order has been a substantial impediment. The OIMS notes clearly show that the dominant feature of the defendant’s life since his release from prison in August 2022 has been endless conflict with his DSOs. In my view the conflicts have often arisen from directions and decisions by the DSO’s that would not have contributed to reducing his risk of reoffending but have caused friction and a perception on the defendant’s part of persecution.

25. In at least one significant respect, I am satisfied that the defendant’s mental state has been worsened by three years under the ESO regime. I accept the following evidence from Dr Davis:

[163] I note that [BG’s] depressed mood, which currently meets criteria for Adjustment Disorder (with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct*)*, is a reactive condition that has occurred in response to the vicissitudes of life whilst subject to an Extended Supervision Order. It was not present at the time of our previous assessment in 2022 and is likely to ameliorate at some stage in the future.

Treatment

26. At [95] of his report, Dr O’Dea suggested a form of treatment by “judicious use of testosterone lowering (or anti-libidinal) medication”, which he considers would be appropriate “if specific and significant heterosexual paedophilic or heterosexual hebephilic orientation were to be identified”. However, such orientation has not been identified. In those circumstances, on the facts and diagnoses of which the experts are presently confident, the doctor’s only suggestion for treatment is the following:

[97] [BG’s] evident problems with anger could also be further assessed by the above psychiatrist and/or psychologist, with appropriate anger management programs implemented and consideration of mood stabilising medication (such as Sodium Vaiproate, Epilim®) dependent [on] the outcome of these assessments and his progress.

[98] Whilst his problems with anger and paranoia, and his evident oppositional personality may continue to make his engagement in therapy problematic, successful treatment of his overall mood may enhance his engagement in such therapy.

27. On the basis that the defendant’s primary diagnosis is a personality disorder, as has quoted above from [92]-[93] of Dr O’Dea’s report, the defendant’s personality disorder has “limited amenability to treatment and fundamental change”.

28. In Dr Davis’ report of 26 November 2025, he identifies what I regard as negligible prospect of useful treatment for the defendant’s personality disorder has diagnosed by Dr Davis. The relevant paragraphs are as follows:

[162] [BG’s] personality disorder is, by definition, chronic and pervasive. Given his age, it is unlikely that there will be any particular personality maturation, although the behavioural manifestations of his personality disorder may conceivably improve to some degree over time. However, this has not occurred in recent years and his characterological paranoia has increased whilst subject to an Extended Supervision Order. […] [BG] is currently not consuming alcohol, and has not done so for more than a decade, so it is unclear if Mr Goodwin will return to problematic alcohol use in the future.

[166] As I noted in my previous report (dated September 2022), I am not convinced that any treatment is going to have an appreciable effect on [BG’s] underlying risk factors as I do not believe he will engage in any offence-specific treatment that is offered. If he was motivated to participate in treatment, l would again recommend that sessions proceed on an individual basis. He is too suspicious, and cantankerous, to meaningfully participate in a group program. Moreover, should offence-specific treatment be considered again, it should follow the tenets of the denier's program that [BG] was offered in the prison setting, with no attempt made to address his denial of offending. In addition, those providing the treatment should be cognisant of his prominent narcissistic and paranoid personality features and tailor treatment sessions accordingly. The paranoid aspects to his presentation are quite evident at present and will constitute a powerful responsivity factor that will resist many treatment approaches.

[167] I am of the view that [BG] would benefit from long-term treatment individualised treatment that aims to address his underlying maladaptive personality features. This will necessarily need to be a lengthy involvement with Clinical Psychologist with particular expertise in the treatment of personality disorders. This is perhaps unlikely to have any appreciable effect on [BG’s] risk, but it will assist him to have a more meaningful existence for the remaining years of his life.

29. Thus, the two experts describe the nature of the defendant’s personality disorder as embedded in his make-up rather than constituting an illness that could be directly treated by medication. For practical purposes there appears to me to be no form of treatment that he could be required to undertake that would have significant prospects of materially modifying his problematic personality traits so as to reduce the likelihood of him committing a further serious sexual offence. Dr O’Dea’s proposed medication of the mood component in the defendant’s presentation would only be directed to making him more amenable to behavioural treatment of his personality disorder. However, such behavioural treatment appears to hold little promise, according to the combined views of both experts.

Degree of risk

30. Dr O’Dea’s assessment of the degree of risk of the defendant committing another serious sex offence is summed up in the following passages of his report:

[105] [From] a full clinical psychiatric risk management perspective, and as judged by various actuarial and more so-called dynamic risk assessment instruments, [BG’s] risk of engaging in further sex offending behaviours in the community in the long term would be considered significant and appropriate for specific psychiatric treatment as detailed above.

[106] More specifically, it would seem reasonable to consider that there would be a significantly high degree of probability that [BG] would be likely to commit a further serious sex offence (as defined in Section 5(1) of the New South Wales Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006) in the community in the long term, if a structured, supervised and assertive community treatment program were not successfully implemented.

[Emphasis added].

31. The difficulty I have in accepting and acting upon that opinion is that the “specific psychiatric treatment as detailed above” and the “structured, supervised and assertive community treatment program” are references to Dr O’Dea’s proposal that the defendant might appropriately receive anti-libidinal medication if an affirmative diagnosis of a paraphilic disorder could be made. Thus, I understand Dr O’Dea’s risk assessment as expressed in the above paragraphs, like the treatment he proposes, as contingent upon the possibility of such an affirmative diagnosis.

32. Dating from the first prosecution of the defendant in 2002, countless psychiatric and psychological examinations and assessments of him have been made. At the present date, after 23 years, the two principal experts in the present case do not consider that there is established one of the essential criteria of a paraphilic disorder. I am able to place only limited reliance on Dr O’Dea’s evaluation of the level of risk of re-offending, in circumstances where his conclusion appears to rest upon such a diagnosis and its associated amenability to treatment by medication.

33. Dr Davis’ assessment of current risk is as follows, from his report of 26 November 2025:

[178] [It] is my opinion that [BG] currently poses a low-to-moderate risk for sexual recidivism (ie somewhat lower than that of the average sexual offender). […] I am of the view that [BG’s] risk could likely be managed in the community without a further Order being imposed. […]

34. That assessment has been made taking into account results from Dr Davis’ application of a number of standardised rating scales and risk classification instruments. One of them, the Risk Matrix 2000/S, is based on static risk factors that have been found to be related to recidivism. On that instrument, the defendant’s factors would place him in the “average” risk category, except for the fact that an age of over 60 years is regarded as a protective factor that should reduce the subject’s category by one level. As the defendant is now 65, his final risk level under this classification system is “below average”, which is the lowest recognised by the instrument. In that category, the observed recidivism rate over five years is 6.5%. Dr Davis refers to opinions to the effect that for this category the five year rate may more accurately be 4.4%.

35. Dr Davis also applied the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol-Version 2, which considers both static and dynamic risk factors across five domains. He reported the outcome for the defendant as follows:

[147] In addition to the thorough consideration of static and dynamic risk factors in the RSVP-V2, there are two additional important considerations when determining [BG’s] current risk for sexual recidivism. The first is the fact that he is currently 65 years-old and has not committed a sexual offence for more than 21 years. Rates of sexual recidivism reduce considerably with advanced age especially as offenders reach the age of 60 years. However, whilst undoubtedly still present, this protective effect is not quite as strong with extra-familial child sexual victimisation offenders. In addition, [BG] had four years in the community offence-free prior to being remanded for historical sexual offences in 2012 and has recently had three years in the community offence-free, albeit under the quite restrictive conditions of an Extended Supervision Order. This can be a powerful protective factor as rates of sexual recidivism reduce by 12% for every year sexual offence free in the community. Indeed, I formed the opinion in my previous report (dated 23 September 2022) that "the only things that will appreciably reduce [BG’s] risk any further will be the passage of time offence-free in the community and his concomitant advancing age" (p. 58, para. 196). Accordingly, it is my opinion that [BG] currently poses a low-moderate risk for sexual recidivism. I note that one could argue that the risk is low at the age of 65 years, but the fact that there have been extra-familial (although not stranger) pre-pubescent victims in the past, albeit more than two decades ago, indicates that a cautious estimate of low-to-moderate risk is appropriate.

36. I find Dr Davis’ articulation of how he has arrived at a specific level of risk compelling. Notably, it concerns risk of sexual recidivism generally. Risk of commission of a serious sexual offence, being a subset of potential crimes, must be statistically somewhat lower

Use of alcohol

37. Dr O’Dea states, as is well understood, that Alcohol Use Disorder is often a chronic and relapsing condition even after significant periods of abstinence. In his opinion, which I readily accept, long-term and assertive commitment on the part of the individual is required in order to abstain from alcohol use and to avoid ultimate relapse. According to the oral evidence of both Court appointed experts, the risk of relapse is highest early in the attempt to achieve abstinence, which is a stage that the defendant has successfully passed. There are differing views about whether, in the long-term, controlled moderate return to the use of alcohol is more sustainable and achievable than complete abstinence. The defendant did not consume alcohol for nine years during his last term of imprisonment and he has maintained abstinence since. If not under an ESO, the evidence strongly suggests that he would be likely to resume social use of alcohol. Whether he could manage control and moderation is unknown.

38. The significance of this is that both experts regard resumed use of alcohol, at least if it reaches the level of significantly intoxicating consumption, as a risk factor for the commission of further serious sexual offending. That is an important consideration with respect to what conditions might be attached to an ESO if one should be made. At the point of applying the test in s 5B(d) of the Act, I do not consider that the possibility of relapse is a likelihood of such an order that it increases the risk of reoffending to an unacceptable level, where all other factors combined are insufficient to show that the risk is unacceptable.

Postulated risk scenarios

39. In a risk assessment report dated 28 April 2025, Ms H Cieplucha, a senior psychologist in the High Risk Offender Team of Corrective Services, adopted as still “plausible” the following “most likely risk scenario” that was originally provided by her colleague in 2021 for the purposes of the 2022 ESO application:

[BG's] most likely risk scenario for further sexual offending would involve him exploiting either a well-established relationship, or he will create opportunity for access. [BG] does not appear to have any familial supports remaining in his life so currently this appears a less likely scenario. Nevertheless [BG] demonstrated his capacity to gain access to potential victims through establishing a long term friendship with someone who has children or quickly befriended vulnerable parents. [BG] does not require [protracted] periods of time to ingratiate himself with an adult care giver/s and his is capable of offending relatively soon after gaining access. Nevertheless he may take longer to ingratiate himself with a social milieu that will in time allow him proximity to the vulnerable care giver/s and victim. [BG] is not opportunistic per se as he appears to seek out or create the opportunities to develop relevant connections and then to be alone with the victim. He may not know the potential victim well, but there will most likely be a degree of familiarity. Given his history [BG] appears least likely to offend against a stranger. Excessive alcohol consumption is not necessarily a pre requisite or primary contributing factor to his sexual offending however it is likely to have a disinhibiting effect thus could increase his risk particularly if it is accompanied by access to a potential victim. [BG] would most likely target females whose developmental stage falls anywhere between pre-pubescent to older teenager.

40. That projection of a risk situation is based upon the defendant’s conduct more than 20 years ago, when he was aged between 37 years and 43 years (1998 to February 2004). At the time of his most serious offending, in 1998-1999, he had a young daughter in his care, through whose friendship with a girlfriend of similar age he came in contact with the victim. The daughter herself was a victim in 2001. The sole instance of the defendant having sexual contact with a victim through socialising with an adult who was a relative stranger was in February 2004.

41. To the extent that the defendant’s past offences exhibit common elements, the ageing of the defendant, the change in his generational stage of life and the cessation of all family contacts are circumstances that in my view make it unlikely that any of those elements would occur in a way that might lead to realisation of the perceived risk of reoffending. The defendant no longer has a young daughter, nor is he living with or in contact with any member of his family or with any young children to whom he has, or might be expected to forge, any connection. Having aged from 43 to now 65, and having moved into vastly different social circumstances, it seems very unlikely that the defendant would have unrestricted access to a young girl in a scenario that would present opportunities for sexual offending, such as the opportunities that were taken more than two decades ago.

42. Dr Davis’ report of 26 November 2025 contains the following observations about the possible risk scenario, which he, likewise, regards as improbable:

[148] The most likely scenario for future sexual offending, in the perhaps unlikely event that it should occur, has to be a repeat scenario in which [BG] sexually touches, and perhaps digitally penetrates, a pre-pubescent, pubescent, or adolescent female to whom he has been granted unrestricted access. I note that his earliest offending also included one offence involving penile-vaginal penetration, but this would appear less likely as this was not a feature of subsequent offences. There is nothing to suggest that [BG] has ever trolled for child victims, but his 2004 offences involved befriending the parents of his child victim, so this may conceivably be a feature of a future offending scenario. Indeed, it would appear unlikely that he will have under-age family members or their friends ever reside with him again (as was the case with two of his three previous victims). Given that [BG] was reportedly intoxicated with alcohol during his offending against two of his three victims, any future offending may, but not necessarily, also involve alcohol misuse.

43. On my assessment of the defendant’s current appearance, age, social awkwardness and lack of social or family connections, I consider it highly unlikely that he would ever be in a position of “unrestricted access” to a pre-pubescent, pubescent, or adolescent female. I regard the risk of this occurring as very low.

Counter-productive effects of the 2022 ESO

44. The defendant volunteered to Dr O’Dea his own assessment that the 2022 ESO has been detrimental to his rehabilitation, as follows:

" …they want to extend my ESO … even though I [have had no further charges since my release from Custody in 2022] … my Solicitor suggested that I should raise the point that you should take in consideration that there has been no breaches of the ESO in the last year … more from my point of view … these are the issues … what it has turned out to be [that the ESO] is a total isolation … restriction … destruction order … [there has been] no encouragement getting me out to do things … just what they want to do … [there are] more than 40 DSO … directives that I must follow … most of them have been contradictory … the backbone of it is I am s’posed to follow what reasonable directions [from the DSO's] ... but [they have] not told me what's reasonable … so far they have been far from reasonable ... I would re-iterate .... what are they trying to achieve with 2 more years of punishment..."

45. Having reviewed the OIMS notes extensively, I do not regard the defendant’s view of the effect that the 2022 ESO has had upon him as unreasonable. The administration and enforcement of the order has not only degraded the defendant’s mental state: see [22] and [25] above. It has impeded his rehabilitation and integration into the community and has thereby exacerbated his risk of reoffending. Dr Davis gave this opinion in his report of 26 November 2025:

[166] While beyond the boundaries of "treatment," [BG’s] social isolation remains a potentially concerning risk factor and he would benefit enormously from any management strategies that aim to increase his social circle and provide more meaningful leisure activities. Some form of employment may also be advantageous in this regard. Indeed, he is currently unfulfilled by life.

46. I have referred above to directions and decisions of the DSOs under the defendant’s 2022 ESO that have caused irritation without contribution to risk reduction. One example is that the defendant has been directed not to ride his motorcycle through the Blacktown Local Government Area and, if he takes public transport through that area, not to alight. That direction has been given on the basis that the victim of his 1998-1999 offences resides there. It is understandable that that victim would be distressed by any encounter with the defendant. However, it is not a legitimate purpose of directions given by Community Corrections officers under an ESO to forbid movements for the purpose of protecting victims of past offending.

47. The direction referred to is legally and practically unjustifiable constraint on the defendant’s liberty of movement. Even if it fell within the lawful discretion of a DSO, that direction could have no practical purpose. The chances of the defendant and the victim encountering and recognising one another seem remote. Blacktown LGA is a large area with a large population. If there is any justification for a restraint upon the defendant approaching the victim, the proper legal process would be an application for an Apprehended Violence Order, for which there would presently appear to be no ground. The Local Court would be highly unlikely to make such an order excluding the defendant from an entire municipal area, as opposed to prohibiting him from knowingly approaching within some given radius of the home or some other location of the Person In Need Of Protection. This DSO direction is an example of significant overreach by Community Corrections, symptomatic of a loss of focus on realistic restraints to avert reoffending by this defendant. The required focus has given way to absorption of the responsible officers in reactive conflict with him.

48. Undoubtedly to a significant extent the defendant’s isolation and lack of meaningful activity has been caused by his own cussedness and unwillingness to follow any positive suggestion from his DSO. However, the ESO has created obstacles, as rationally perceived. The defendant’s residence for some time has been a ground floor unit in a two level building with 11 other units. There is a substantial curtilage in front of the building that is accessible and usable as common property. Unannounced visits by the DSOs at intervals of less than a week inevitably have brought upon him the attention and suspicion of near neighbours. The consequent inhibition upon socialising with those near neighbours would inevitably be significant.

49. The 9:00 pm curfew and the prohibition upon attending licensed premises without permission would likewise curtail normal adult social interaction. In the past year the defendant has sought to avoid shopping centres from a perceived fear that interaction with any young person in a public place, however fleeting or unavoidable, may lead to an allegation of breach of his conditions and prosecution.

50. The defendant has expressly stated that his reason for not seeking work is “fear of the Police telling his employers [of his criminal record] and the danger this might put him in”. The defendant does not have high-level skills for employment but he could no doubt find work, solely with other adults. It is credible and rational that he should fear hostility and possible violence if police or the DSO should inform the employer of his convictions for child sex offending, leading to fellow workers becoming aware of that record. No doubt his experiences in prison would cause him to fear violent hostility. The prospect of unannounced DSO visits to his workplace would be quite sufficient to deter the defendant, reasonably, from seeking employment.

51. One of the main supposedly constructive activities repeatedly pressed upon the defendant by the DSOs is attendance at psychological counselling sessions. It is very understandable that the defendant has been highly resistant to this. For decades he has been endlessly interviewed and probed from a psychological and psychiatric point of view. He evidently does not consider that psychological counselling is beneficial. In this he appears to be supported by the opinions of the Court-appointed experts, to the effect that psychological counselling is unlikely to have any significant impact on the long-standing, resistant personality traits that are part of his essentially untreatable personality disorder. Opinions given by experts in this case, and received by the Court on many other occasions, have endorsed that personality disorders are intractable to behavioural treatment.

The risk of reoffending in the absence of an ESO is not unacceptable

52. Noting that Dr Davis now assesses the defendant’s risk of sexual recidivism as low-to-moderate (with respect to any form of sexual offending), I attach importance to his observation, as follows, concerning the possible exacerbation of risk if an ESO be made with strict conditions:

[178] […] The scholarly literature clearly indicates that providing lower risk offenders with high levels of supervision, resources and intervention leads to increases in recidivism.

53. At the low-moderate risk level that I accept on the basis of Dr Davis’ evidence, and taking into account Dr Davis’ view that that risk “could likely be managed in the community without a further Order being imposed”, I am far from being “satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order”. The relatively low level of risk currently identified, in a man who is not known or even alleged to have committed any type of sexual offence in over 21 years, must properly be regarded as acceptable. Further, I am encouraged to the view that the risk is at an acceptable level having regard to the circumstance that there remains the possibility of further mitigation of risk through socialisation and reintegration of the defendant into the community. That is a possibility that simply has not been tried and has not been given any chance of taking effect under the tight administration of the 2022 ESO.

54. The paramount consideration to which the Court must give effect under the Act is the safety of the community. A secondary consideration, prescribed in s 3, is rehabilitation of the defendant. The two objectives are not in tension with respect to this defendant. His risk is at an acceptable low-to-moderate level and, in the absence of any viable treatment or other useful intervention, the best prospect for safety of the community is to enhance his rehabilitation.

Orders

55. The following orders will be entered:

1 The summons is dismissed.

2 The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings.

3 Order 2 made by McGuire J on 24 October 2025 that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision from 10 November 2025 and that he comply with the conditions set out to the Schedule to that order, as renewed and extended on 2 December 2025, is discharged forthwith.

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