Stanford v Stanford

(a) The Respondent shall select an agent and conveyancer to act on the sale, and inform the Applicant of those professionals in writing;

(b) The property shall be listed for sale via private treaty or by auction with the listing price or reserve price to be as determined by the Respondent;

(c) The process for marketing the property shall be as determined by the Respondent;

(d) That upon agreement being reached for the sale of the property the Respondent shall execute the contract for sale and any other documents necessary to complete the sale of the property including all transfer documentation forthwith upon its submission to him by the agent or the conveyancer;

(e) That if the property does not sell within the initial marketing period, the Respondent is to continue to list the property for sale as recommended by the agent, and accept any offer to purchase the property within 10% of the initial and subsequent listing prices; and

(f) The proceeds of sale for the sale of the property are to be distributed as follows:

(i) The costs of any mortgages secured against the property;

(ii) The costs of the agent, including sale commission;

(iii) The cost of the conveyancer;

(iv) The usual adjustments and costs of sale;

(v) $136,000 to the Applicant; and

(vi) The balance to the Respondent.

1. With the exception of the above Orders, the parties be declared the sole owner of:

(a) All items of furniture, jewellery, or personal chattels in their possession or control;

(b) All motor vehicles in their possession or control, or registered in their name;

(c) Any interest in a business, trust or resource in their name, or owned jointly with any third party or entity;

(d) All funds held in their sole name or held jointly with any third party or entity (either in cash or with any banking institution);

(e) All life insurance policies and superannuation funds standing in their sole name; and

(f) All other property in the possession or ownership of the parties as at the date of the making of these Orders.

1. In the event of either party failing to comply with any of the provisions of these Orders, such that enforcement action is required to give effect to these Orders, the procedure for such enforcement is as follows:

(a) The party who seeks to enforce the relevant provisions of the Orders shall give the other party fourteen days' notice of their intention to approach the Registry of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia to seek compliance;

(b) In the event there continues to be a failure to comply, the party may approach a Judicial Registrar of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, and they can be hereby appointed pursuant to section 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to execute any necessary documents and carry out any necessary acts to give force and effect to these Orders; and

(c) the defaulting party shall pay the applying parties' costs on an indemnity basis.

1. These are Orders to which section 81 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) applies for the purpose of finally determining all property matters between the parties and to avoid any further proceedings between them.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are the Reasons for Judgment in respect of the competing property adjustment applications as brought by the applicant, Ms Camden, and the respondent, Mr Westing. The parties were in a de facto relationship and the 3-year-old child of the relationship, X ("X"), lives with the applicant along with her 8-year-old half-brother D ("D").

PARTIES' APPLICATION AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT

1. On 7 August 2025, the Court dispensed with the requirement for compliance with r 8.15(3)(e) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) and the annexures to the parties' affidavits form part of the evidence in this case.
2. The applicant relied on the following documents:

(a) Amended Initiating Application filed 28 January 2025;

(b) Affidavit of the applicant filed 7 August 2025;

(c) Affidavit of the applicant filed 24 March 2025;

(d) Affidavit of the applicant filed 10 March 2025;

(e) Affidavit of the applicant filed 26 February 2025;

(f) Affidavit of Ms E filed 24 February 2025;

(g) Affidavit of the applicant filed 26 August 2024;

(h) Affidavit of the applicant filed 26 May 2024;

(i) Affidavit of the applicant for the non-filing of Family Dispute Resolution Certificate filed 26 May 2024;

(j) Financial Statement filed 4 February 2025; and

(k) Balance Sheet filed 28 January 2025.

1. The respondent relied on the following documents:

(a) Case Outline document filed 17 April 2025;

(b) Response to Further Amended Initiating Application filed 4 February 2025;

(c) Financial Statement filed 11 February 2025; and

(d) Affidavit of the respondent filed 11 February 2025.

1. By the conclusion of the hearing the orders as sought by the applicant comprised of, inter alia, the following:

(a) The property pool be divided 50/50 inclusive of the respondent's superannuation;

(b) There be a 20% adjustment in the applicant's favour for spousal maintenance;

(c) There be a 10% adjustment in the applicant's favour because her contributions were made more arduous due to family violence;

(d) The respondent pays the applicant an amount of no less than $50,000 by way of spousal maintenance;

(e) The respondent pays the applicant an amount of no less than $50,000 by way of step-child maintenance;

(f) The respondent pays to the applicant child support as a lump-sum payment; and

(g) The respondent pays for the applicant's legal costs.

1. The respondent seeks an order for him to pay the applicant a cash amount equivalent to 15% of the total property pool.

(1) Exhibit 1 being the applicant's residential address marked as confidential.

(2) Exhibit 2 being F Company residential property valuation for B Street, Suburb C, dated 6 February 2025 (66 pages).

(3) Exhibit 3 being Centrelink Statement for Ms Camden dated 7 August 2025 (2 pages).

(4) Exhibit 4 being Statement of Account Complete Freedom from Ms G for the period 26 November 2023 to 25 May 2024 statement Number 12, page 1 of 5, page 2 of 5, and page 3 of 5 (3 pages).

(5) Exhibit 5 being the text messages from the respondent's father to the applicant dated 8 November 2022, 9 November 2022, and 25 November 2022 (2 pages).

(6) Exhibit 6 being details of Objection Decision document from Child Support Agency (4 pages).

(7) Exhibit 7 being a summary created by the applicant of the respondent's bank statement relating to alcohol purchased and payments to TAB (31 pages).

1. The applicant was the only witness in her case.
2. The respondent was the only witness in his case.
3. Due to s 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) applying, the applicant, who was self-represented, did not personally cross-examine the respondent. To assist the process, the Court asked a number of questions of the respondent as provided in a written outline by the applicant.

1. In the preparation of these reasons for judgment, the Court had reviewed and considered the entirety of the applicant's evidence, which was by and large not relevant to the issues the Court had to determine.
2. The Court has considered the respondent's evidence, which was focused on the issues at hand.
3. The Court has also reviewed the transcript of the proceedings.
4. Consideration of evidence does not mean discussion. Only relevant matters have been referred to in these reasons for judgment.

1. The applicant was born in 1999 and is currently 26 years old. The applicant is a full-time parent and lives with her two children D and X in rental accommodation.
2. The respondent was born in 1990 and is currently 35 years old. The respondent is employed as a tradesperson and lives with his parents, working a 36-hour week doing day shifts on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday from 6am to 6pm.
3. The applicant's first child, D was born in 2016.
4. The parties' child, X was born in 2022.
5. The respondent started working full-time as a tradesperson in 2007, when he was 17 years old. During the parties' relationship, the respondent worked night shifts, usually four to six nights in a row of 12 hours each, and then had time off for the remainder of the week. The respondent has remained working for the same company since 2007, with a new employer taking over the business during the course of the respondent's employment.
6. In 2014, the respondent purchased a property at B Street, Suburb C ("B Street") for $210,000 as part of a house and land package with the build costing $273,470. The total cost was $483,470. The respondent paid a deposit of $10,500 and funded the balance through a mortgage with H Bank.
7. In 2018, the respondent together with his parents and brother, purchased the property at J Street, Suburb K ("J Street") for $615,000.
8. The parties commenced a relationship in or around 2019:

(a) The applicant asserts that the parties commenced a relationship in November 2018, and commenced cohabitation in or around December 2018 to January 2019.

(b) The respondent asserts that the parties met in November 2018, started dating in February 2019, broke up in June 2019, reconnected in October 2019, broke up again in February 2020, and were together again in November 2020.

1. In about November 2020, the parties were renting and living together in a property in Suburb L.
2. In February 2021 the respondent moved back in with his parents, and the applicant remained in the Suburb L property until March 2021 when she moved in with her mother. There was also a short period of time during which the parties lived with the respondent's parents.
3. In May 2021, the parties moved into J Street. At the time, the rent for J Street paid by the parties was $470 a week. The applicant signed a lease for the property, and each party paid half the rent.
4. On 29 May 2022, the parties separated on a final basis and the respondent moved out of J Street.
5. Between 29 May 2022 and mid-August 2022, the respondent spent time with X on some weeknights and alternate weekends. The respondent has not spent time with X since 18 August 2022.
6. In November 2022, the applicant stopped paying rent on J Street. She remained living in the property until November 2023, all the while not paying any rent nor making any financial contributions toward the property.
7. In November 2023, the applicant was evicted from J Street.
8. Since 7 November 2023, the respondent had been paying the applicant child support as assessed in the amount of $1,119.83 per month. Prior to being assessed for child support, the respondent paid half the rent of J Street.
9. In January 2024, J Street was sold for $850,000. At the time of settlement of sale, the mortgage to H Bank was $611,454, and the net proceeds paid to the four legal owners was $218,412. The respondent received $48,101.
10. The applicant commenced these proceedings on 26 May 2024.
11. Between November 2023 and December 2024, the applicant did not have stable accommodation. At the time of the hearing, the applicant was living in rented accommodation.
12. In December 2024, the respondent was re-assessed for child support. The assessment from 1 February 2025 to 30 April 2025, is for the respondent to pay $1,577 per month.
13. On 28 April 2025, at the commencement of the hearing, orders were made for the respondent to pay $6,535 to Suburb C Lockup Storage by way of a partial property distribution. The hearing was adjourned part-heard to 7 August 2025, and it concluded on 8 August 2025 when judgment was reserved.

1. The applicant was not in paid employment for the duration of the parties' relationship but was in receipt of Centrelink benefits.
2. During the parties' relationship and for some months after it concluded, the parties had in place an automatic transfer arrangement from the applicant's account into the respondent's account, which resulted in a periodic transfer of majority of the applicant's Centrelink payments into the respondent's account. The applicant did not have access to the respondent's account into which her funds were transferred. When the applicant asked the respondent for money, he then gave her some money. However, it was the respondent, who by and large, controlled the finances. The funds in this account were utilised for rent, food, and utilities.
3. The respondent conceded in his oral evidence that after he left J Street, there remained in place an automatic transfer arrangement from the applicant's bank account into the respondent's bank account for a period of 15 weeks. These funds, the respondent asserts, were utilised for the applicant's half share of the rent. The applicant was receiving $1,300 in Centrelink payments per fortnight, from which about $800 per fortnight was being transferred into the respondent's account. The applicant's half share of the rent was $235 per week during this period.
4. During the relationship, the respondent was the primary income earner.
5. During the relationship, the applicant was the primary carer for the children and performed all household duties.
6. The applicant frankly conceded that the respondent quickly came to fulfil the role of a father figure for D. When he came home from night shifts, the respondent would sleep briefly before getting up to take D to school before returning to bed.
7. The respondent cooked and did some housework, maintained the garden, and did the grocery shopping. The respondent drove the applicant to appointments and took D to football on weekends.
8. The respondent's parents purchased driving lessons for the applicant. The applicant relied on the respondent and his parents to drive her and D as needed.

1. On 3 December 2022, the applicant was hand-delivered an eviction letter by the respondent's father, which stated she was in breach of her rental agreement and requesting she vacate J Street by midDecember 2022.
2. Following an application brought by the respondent, his parents and his brother at NCAT, orders were made in August 2023, terminating the residential tenancy agreement between the applicant and the owners of J Street, that the applicant pay the landlord the sum of $4,700 being rental arrears to August 2023, and a daily occupation fee of $33.57 until vacant possession is given to the landlord. The order for possession was suspended until October 2023.
3. After the applicant did not comply with the NCAT order being the payment of an occupation fee and the payment of $4,700, the respondent agreed to repay his parents and brother these amounts.
4. In November 2023, NCAT made orders by consent for the appeal against the August orders to be dismissed, and for the orders made in August 2023 to be varied such that possession was extended to 5pm in November 2023 and the requirement for the tenant to pay $4,700 was set aside.
5. The applicant was evicted from J Street in November 2023.

1. As noted earlier, when J Street was sold, the net amount of proceeds of sale was $218,412.32. The respondent received $48,101, which at the time of final hearing was held in trust by his legal representatives.
2. The respondent explains that from his share of the proceeds of sale (of which $48,101 remains), he paid the applicant's unpaid rent, the costs of NCAT, and repairs and cost of remedial work to J Street (the respondent asserts was caused by the applicant's occupation and lack of maintenance) including skip hire, carpet cleaning, gardening, locksmiths, and air conditioner remotes.

1. The respondent remains the sole owner of B Street, which is tenanted. The respondent receives $750 per week in rental income for the property. The property remains encumbered by a mortgage, and the respondent meets the loan repayments and all costs associated with the property.

1. While the applicant makes many allegations of family violence, she did not ask the Court to make any specific factual findings.
2. The respondent denies the applicant's allegations of family violence, neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, and financial abuse in their entirety.
3. The applicant did however seek a Kennon & Kennon[1] type adjustment, in effect submitting that her contributions were made more arduous due to family violence. The applicant's allegations of family violence have therefore been considered in a Kennon-based framework.
4. On balance, the Court does not find the allegations made by the applicant proven, such that a Kennon type adjustment be made.

1. The hearing in this matter began prior to the commencement of the changes to the property adjustment provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which started on 10 June 2025.
2. The overall approach to the determination of an application for property adjustment orders was set out by the High Court in Stanford v Stanford.[2]
3. The High Court recorded three fundamental propositions. The first was the need to identify existing legal and equitable interests; the second was that those interests can only be altered by a principled application of judicial discretion; and the third was that, the requirement that the Court must not make any order, unless it is satisfied that in all of the circumstances it is just and equitable to make the order, requires separate consideration and should not be conflated with the statutory considerations required to be taken into consideration as to what order, if any, should be made.[3]
4. Such approach was subsequently considered by the Full Court in Bevan & Bevan,[4] Chapman & Chapman,[5] and Costello & Langdon_[6]_ and consistently applied, including to proceedings pursuant to the de facto relationship provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("Act"), namely Part VIIIAB.[7]
5. As noted earlier, the considerations in ss 90SM(3) and (4) of the Act should not be conflated.
6. As such, once the issue of whether it is just and equitable to make any order is resolved, the Court is to then consider the contributions made by the parties as defined in s 90SM(4)(a) to (c), the matters set out in s 90SM(4)(d) to (g) and, in particular, the subjective considerations as to the parties by having regard to the provisions of s 90SF(3) in so far as they are relevant.
7. The Court is then to consider the justice and equity of the actual orders to be made, in the context of the Court's obligations to make appropriate orders as provided for in s 90SM(1) of the Act.[8]
8. The just and equitable requirement is 'one permeating the entire process'.[9]

1. At final hearing the parties had the following property:

Proceeds from sale of the J Street property in solicitor trust account

1. The respondent sought to include in the balance sheet a purported loan to his parents in the amount of $29,346. Such a loan has not been established on the evidence.
2. On 28 April 2025 the Court ordered that the respondent pay the applicant, at the applicant's direction, the sum of $6,535 to Suburb C Lockup Storage, by way of partial property distribution.

Is it just and equitable to adjust the parties' property interests?

1. It is not assumed that the parties' rights or interests should be different to that which already exists.[10] The Court can take into account considerations under s 90SM(4) when determining whether or not it is just and equitable to divide the parties' property.[11]
2. Noting the parties' relationship, and the different contributions made over that period, notwithstanding the short duration of the relationship, the Court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to embark on a division of the parties' property by way of alteration of their respective interests.

1. The parties lived as a family. The respondent was the primary income earner, while the applicant was the primary home maker and parent. The respondent made contributions of a Robb & Robb[12] kind in respect of D.
2. At most, the parties' relationship lasted 2 years and 7 months, but with breaks.
3. The respondent brought into the relationship two real-estate properties, which were purchased prior to the commencement of the parties' relationship.
4. The respondent remains the owner of B Street, and he continues to make all financial contributions towards that property, as he did prior to the parties' relationship and post the parties' relationship. On a stretch, the applicant made indirect financial contributions to this property during the duration of the parties' relationship.
5. In respect of J Street, at all material times, the respondent owned 33% of the interest in that property, which was subject to a mortgage. The respondent was responsible for paying 1/3 of the mortgage payments.
6. The parties lived in J Street, and paid rent (in part to the respondent) in respect of their occupation of it.
7. Following the end of the parties' relationship, the applicant, together with D and X, remained living in J Street for a period of 12 months. She did not pay any rent during that period. She did not make any contributions towards the mortgage during that period. The NCAT order for the applicant to pay $4,700 in rental arrears was set aside by consent.
8. The contributions based entitlement are overwhelmingly in the respondent's favour.
9. The contribution-based entitlements are assessed as 5/95 in the applicant's favour.

1. Both parties are still young. The applicant is 9 years younger than the respondent.
2. Following the break-down of the parties' relationship, the respondent was diagnosed with depression and social anxiety. He was prescribed medication for a period of between 12-18 months post separation. He was unfit for work during periods of time in 2022. From mid-2022, the respondent was certified fit for work for day shifts only. He continues to work day shift only. He sees a psychologist once every 3 months.
3. The applicant suffers from long-standing mental health issues as a result of trauma.
4. Neither party has any medical condition which prevents them from gainful employment.
5. The parties' child X will shortly turn 4 years old. She lives with the applicant and is not currently spending any time with the respondent. It is conceded by the respondent that the applicant will continue to have care of the parties' child.
6. The respondent has a significantly larger earning capacity than the applicant, not only because of his history of employment but also because of the applicant's continued care of the parties' child.
7. The respondent has been assessed for and continues to pay child support for X.
8. The applicant has in the past had significant difficulties in securing accommodation for herself and her two children, and she has had periods of homelessness. She does not appear to have any meaningful support network. Her need for stable accommodation into the future will remain.
9. There will be a 10% adjustment in the applicant's favour for future needs.

1. The parties' assets are valued at $924,171.
2. A 15% adjustment in the applicant's favour, sees her retaining $138,626, of which she holds $501. She has also received a partial property distribution of $6,535 which needs to be taken into consideration. An application of basic arithmetic would have the applicant receive $132,090 from the respondent. However, in the circumstances such amount will be rounded up to $136,000 noting the justice and equity requirement.
3. That is, an order for the respondent to pay the applicant the sum of $136,000 will be made by way of property adjustment orders. Such payment is to be made within 60 days. This will see the applicant receive a significant cash lump sum, while the respondent will retain all of his superannuation, B Street and the mortgage attached to it.
4. It is to the applicant's benefit that the adjustment in her favour be simply by way of cash, rather than inclusive of a superannuation split, as the latter would not be available to her for a number of decades.
5. In all of the circumstances, the adjustments the Court makes to the parties' property interests are just and equitable.

1. The application for disclosure at the conclusion of final hearing is non-sensical. The Court is in any event, not satisfied that the respondent has failed to comply with his obligations in this regard.
2. By way of her orders sought, the applicant also made, in effect, a child support departure application to the Court wherein she sought a lump-sum child support payment. In circumstances where the respondent has been assessed and is already paying child support for X, the Court is not satisfied that leave is to be exercised to make a departure order, or inclined to make any child-maintenance orders.
3. The applicant has not established on the evidence that the Court's discretion is to be exercised by the making of an order for maintenance. The Court notes that she is to receive a 10% adjustment of property interests by way of these orders in respect of future needs.
4. The applicant's claims are in reality a claim for compensation from the respondent for hurt feelings, distress and some kind of perceived moral obligation of the respondent towards the applicant.
5. The Court was not taken to any authorities which might have supported the claims brought by the applicant, nor did the applicant address the relevant evidence said to be in support of the various claims she makes.
6. The applicant has not established to the requisite standard that the orders she seeks by way of lump sum de facto spousal maintenance, child maintenance and step-child maintenance ought to be made.
7. The Court so orders.

I certify that the preceding ninety-eight (98) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Obradovic.

[1] [1997] FamCA 27 ("Kennon").

[2] [2012] HCA 52, see in particular [37] to [42].

[3] Oamra & Williams [2021] FamCAFC 117 at [35].

[4] [2013] FamCAFC 116 ("Bevan").

[5] [2014] FamCAFC 91 ("Chapman").

[6] [2024] FedCFamC1A 168 ("Costello & Langdon").

[7] See for example Peters & Walker [2015] FamCA 732.

[8] See generally Russell & Russell [1999] FamCA 1875; (1999) FLC 92-877; Teal & Teal [2010] FamCAFC 120, but in the context of s 79.

[11] Costello & Langdon (n 10) at [28].

[12] [1994] FamCA 136.