Stanford v Stanford [2025] FedCFamC2F 1452 | Case summary

Federal Circuit and Family Court (Div 2)|2025-10-17

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

The wife retain, to the exclusion of the husband, the property situated at B Street, Town C ("the Town C property").
The husband forthwith remove any caveats registered by him over the Town C property at his expense.
Pursuant to s.90XT(1) of the Act, wherever a splitable payment becomes payable in respect of the wife's interest in the Super Fund 1 ("the fund") of which D Pty Ltd is the trustee, the husband be entitled to be paid an amount calculated in accordance with Part 6 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001 using the base amount of $36,250 provided that such base amount does not exceed the value of the interest determined under s.90XT(2) and there be a corresponding reduction in the superannuation interest of the wife to whom the splitable payment would have been made but for this order.
Order 4 take effect from the operative time, being the fourth business day after the date on which a sealed copy of this order is served on the trustee of the fund.
The wife otherwise retain to the exclusion of the husband her superannuation interest in Super Fund 1.

The husband retain to the exclusion of the wife:

(a) his interest in Super Fund 2;

(b) his Motor Vehicle 1;

(c) his music equipment;

(d) his bitcoin;

(e) his bank accounts; and

(f) furniture and chattels in his possession.

The wife retain to the exclusion of the husband:

(a) her 50% interest in the real property at E Street, City F, United Kingdom;

(b) her Motor Vehicle 2;

(c) her bank accounts; and

(d) furniture and chattels in her possession.

The wife pay and indemnify and keep indemnified the husband in respect of any and all liabilities in her name, including but not limited to:

(a) credit cards;

(b) personal loans; and

(c) past, present and future taxation liabilities arising in her sole name.

The husband pay and indemnify and keep indemnified the wife in respect of any and all liabilities in his name, including but not limited to:

(a) credit cards;

(b) personal loans;

(c) mortgages; and

(d) past, present and future taxation liabilities arising in his sole name.

Unless otherwise specified in these orders and except for the purpose of enforcing the payment of any money due under these or any subsequent orders:

(a) the husband and wife each be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all property (including choses-in-action) owned by them or in their possession of that part as at the date of the orders;

(b) the husband and wife each forgo any claim they may have to any superannuation, long service leave or other employment entitlements or benefits belonging to or earned by the other and forgo any claim they may have to inheritances received by the other;

(c) monies standing to the credit of the husband and the wife in any joint bank account be divided equally between them and thereafter the husband and the wife forthwith close the joint account/s at their equal expense (if any) and each of them otherwise retain any bank account in their respective names;

(d) all insurance policies be the sole property of the owner named therein;

(e) the husband and wife each be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders and any other liability in their respective names; and

(f) any joint tenancy of the husband and wife in any real or personal estate be hereby expressly severed.

Pursuant to the Act the parties intend that these orders as far as practicable finally determine the financial relationship between them and avoid further proceedings between them.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

This is an application under s.90SM of the Family Law Act 1975 ("the Act") for a de facto property settlement. The applicant is the husband and the respondent is the wife.

The husband is 49 years old and the wife is 60 years old. They commenced cohabitation in May 2019 and separated finally on 25 November 2023. That is a period of 4.5 years. The parties lived apart from September 2021 until about August 2023 but spent weekends together.
The parties do not have any children together. The wife has two adult children from a previous relationship.
The husband is a tradesperson. The wife is a professional.
In 2012, the husband pleaded guilty to charges of procuring sexual penetration by fraud and one charge of attempting to secure sexual penetration by fraud. The context of the offending was that the husband, while pretending to be a woman by the name of Ms G, contacted women through websites such as ...@... and ...@.... He then, in his fictional persona as Ms G, asked them online if they would like to work for his fictional escort agency. "Ms G" told those women who were interested that they needed to have sex with her scout to see if they were suitable to work for her escort agency. The "scout" was the husband. He had sex with five of the women.
The husband told police that this subterfuge was the only way he was able to have sex with beautiful women. The husband was sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment. He was placed on the sexual offenders register for life.
In 2017, the husband was released on parole. He breached his parole conditions by setting up an online dating profile. He was returned to prison between late 2017 and mid-2019.
The wife and the husband began a relationship in 2017.
Upon the husband's release from prison in mid-2019, the husband commenced cohabitation with the wife. They lived in her rented premises in Suburb H with her son, who was doing year 12 at the time.
In 2020, the wife bought land in Town C that was registered in her sole name. The husband claimed that the two of them bought the land together. The wife denied that. By September or October 2021, a house had been built on the land. The wife moved into the house in Town C in September or October 2021, while the husband stayed in Suburb H with the wife's son.
Previously, in 2002, the wife inherited from her mother, in equal shares with her sister, a property in City F in the United Kingdom. The wife's father had a life interest in the City F property. In 2022, the wife's father died. The wife's father did not leave her an inheritance, but as his life interest in the City F property had expired, the wife's half share in the City F property became available to her. However, the wife's sister continues to live in the City F property, and there is no intention to sell it.
In about April 2022, the wife's son moved out of the Suburb H property.
In about August 2023, the husband moved to Town C and lived with the wife.
While the husband had been living in Suburb H and the wife had been living in Town C, the parties would see each other on weekends at one house or the other. Whichever house they were not staying in would often be rented out on Airbnb.
In November 2023, the parties separated on a final basis. The wife believed the husband was seeing another woman or women.
The wife worked throughout the relationship. The husband worked at times during the relationship.
The main issue in dispute is how much money and effort the husband put into the Town C property.

(a) his amended application filed on 27 March 2025;

(b) his case outline filed on 7 May 2025**;**

(c) the trial affidavit sworn or affirmed by him on 27 March 2025;

(d) the amended financial statement sworn or affirmed by him on 27 March 2025;

(e) the affidavit sworn or affirmed by Mr J on 25 March 2025;

(f) the affidavit sworn or affirmed by Ms K on 27 March 2025;

(g) the affidavit in reply sworn or affirmed by him on 24 April 2025;

(h) exhibit 18, being the husband's bank statement number 38 being pages 4254 to 4268 of the husband's tender bundle regarding the payment for the dog of $1500;

(i) exhibit 20, being pages 21, 26, 27 and 31 of the 82-page bundle from the Department of Corrections file;

(j) exhibit 21, being pages 4, 6 and 7 of the 14-page bundle from the Department of Corrections file;

(k) exhibit 22, being page 9 of the 14-page bundle from the wife's employer's file and being the wife's CV;

(l) exhibit 23, being an email dated 1 June 2020 at 10:16am from the wife to L Bank including a loan application form;

(m) exhibit 24, being an email dated 27 April 2020 at 8:22am from the wife to L Bank;

(n) exhibit 25, being page 11 of the husband's tender bundle two being the wife's emails dated 9 June 2020 regarding acceptance of an offer;

(o) exhibit 26, being an email dated 6 July 2020 from Mr M to the husband and wife regarding custom changes and the deposit;

(p) exhibit 27, being page 16 of the husband's tender bundle two being an email dated 5 July 2020 from the husband to Mr M regarding amendments to the house plans;

(q) exhibit 28, being page 17 of the husband's tender bundle two being an email dated 6 July 2020 from Mr M to both the husband and the wife;

(r) exhibit 29, being page 18 of the husband's tender bundle 2 being an email dated 6 July 2020 from Mr M to the husband about the home loan funds;

(s) exhibit 30, being page 1690 of the husband's tender bundle being a spreadsheet of building expenses;

(t) exhibit 31, being pages 21, 23 and 24 of the husband's tender bundle two being emails regarding conveyancing;

(u) exhibit 32, being page 25 of the husband's tender bundle 2 being an email from Mr M to the husband and wife dated 5 August 2020 regarding house plans;

(v) exhibit 33, being page 26 of the husband's tender bundle 2 being an email from the husband to Mr M dated 4 August 2020 regarding queries about air conditioning and the kitchen bench;

(w) exhibit 34, being pages 59 and 60 of the husband's tender bundle being emails from the husband regarding heating and cooling;

(x) exhibit 36, being page 810 of the husband's tender bundle being a message from the wife to the husband's brother Mr N;

(y) exhibit 37, being bank statements relating to payments by the husband in relation to the house; and

(z) exhibit 39, being a letter from the husband's solicitor to the wife's superannuation fund.

(a) her response filed 9 August 2024;

(b) her undertaking as to disclosure filed on 10 April 2025;

(c) her trial affidavit sworn or affirmed on 10 April 2025;

(d) her financial statement affirmed on 10 April 2025;

(e) her case outline filed on 1 May 2025;

(f) exhibit 1, being pages 2, 3, 10 and 13 of the wife's tender bundle regarding loans from the wife to the husband;

(g) exhibit 2, being page 20 of the wife's tender bundle regarding a mobile phone;

(h) exhibit 3, being page 21 of the wife's tender bundle regarding the amplifier;

(i) exhibit 4, being 31 of the wife's tender bundle regarding the TV;

(j) exhibit 5, being page 47 of the wife's tender bundle regarding payments to the husband;

(k) exhibit 6, being page 50 of the wife's tender bundle regarding the payment of $300 by the wife to the husband;

(l) exhibit 7, being page 51 of the wife's tender bundle regarding the payment of $900 by the wife to the husband;

(m) exhibit 8, being the wife's O Bank statement dated 24 October 2022;

(n) exhibit 9, being page 4536 of the husband's tender bundle being his ANZ bank statement regarding the $1000 home deposit;

(o) exhibit 10, being pages 42 and 43 of the wife's tender bundle being bank statements;

(p) exhibit 11, being pages 3928, 3929 and 3996 of the husband's tender bundle;

(q) exhibit 12, being the husband's statement number 25 being pages 4048 to 4059 of the husband's tender bundle;

(r) exhibit 13, being the husband's statement number 27 being pages 4074 to 4087of the husband's tender bundle;

(s) exhibit 14, being the husband's statement number 37 being pages 4238 to 4253 of the husband's tender bundle;

(t) exhibit 15, being the husband's statement number 39 being pages 4268 to 4277 of the husband's tender bundle;

(u) exhibit 16, being the husband's statement number 43 being pages 5562 to 5590 of the husband's tender bundle; and

(v) exhibit 17, being a statement from the P Authority about the Self-Employment Allowance scheme.

The husband and the wife were both cross-examined. Ms K and Mr J were not cross-examined. Their evidence goes largely to whether the parties were in a de facto relationship, which the wife eventually conceded. Ms K also gave evidence about the husband's contributions to the Town C property, which was vague and hearsay. It does not significantly add to the husband's own evidence on this issue.

On the third day of the hearing, 23 May 2025, the parties emailed to chambers a minute of proposed orders setting out the proposed orders that were agreed and not agreed (exhibit 19). In that minute and at the hearing, the husband and wife consented to the following:
1. Pursuant to s. 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 ("the Act") a de facto relationship existed between the husband and the wife, and that the de facto relationship commenced in or around May 2019 and ended on 25 November 2023.

...

The husband retain to the exclusion of the wife his interest in [Super Fund 2].

8. The husband otherwise retain to the exclusion of the wife:

a. his [Motor Vehicle 1];

b. his music equipment;

c. his bitcoin;

d. his bank accounts; and

e. furniture and chattels in his possession.

The wife otherwise retain to the exclusion of the husband:

her 50% interest in the real property at [E Street], [City F], United Kingdom;

b. her [Motor Vehicle 2];

c. her bank accounts; and

d. furniture and chattels in in her possession.

The wife pay and indemnify and keep indemnified the husband in respect of any and all liabilities in her name including but not limited to credit cards, personal loans, and past, present and future taxation liabilities arising in her sole name.

The husband pay and indemnify and keep indemnified the wife in respect of any and all liabilities in his name including but not limited to credit cards, personal loans, mortgages and past, present and future taxation liabilities arising in his sole name.

That unless otherwise specified in these orders and except for the purpose of enforcing the payment of any money due under these or any subsequent orders:

each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all property (including choses-in-action) owned by or in the possession of such party as at the date of the orders;

each party hereby forgoes any claim they may have to any superannuation, long service leave or other employment entitlements or benefits belonging to or earned by the other and forgoes any claim they may have to inheritances received by the other;

monies standing to the credit of parties in any joint bank account are to be divided equally between the parties and thereafter the parties forthwith close the joint account/s at their equal expense (if any). Each party otherwise retain any bank account in their respective names;

all insurance policies to become the sole property of the owner named therein;

each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these Orders and any other liability in their respective names; and

any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is hereby expressly severed.

Pursuant to the Family Law Act 1975 the parties intend that these Orders shall as far as practicable finally determine the financial relationship between them and avoid further proceedings between them.

The husband proposed the following further orders:
1. Within 60 days of the date of these orders, [the] wife pay to the husband the sum of $274,704.30 ("the payment").
2. Pursuant to s.90XT(1) of the Family Law Act 1975, wherever a splitable payment becomes payable in respect of the Respondent's interest in the [Super Fund 1] ("the Fund") of which [D] Pty Ltd is the Trustee, the Applicant shall be entitled to be paid an amount calculated in accordance with Part 6 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001 using the base amount of $44,702.00 provided that such base amount shall not exceed the value of the interest determined under s.90XT(2) and there be a corresponding reduction in the superannuation interest of the Respondent to whom the splitable payment would have been made but for this order. This order shall take effect from the operative time being the fourth business day after the date on which a sealed copy of this order is served on the Trustee of the Fund.

...

The wife pay an amount toward the husband's legal costs on a full indemnity basis.

The wife proposed the following further orders:
1. The wife retain, to the exclusion of the husband, the property situate at [B Street], [Town C] ("the [Town C] property").
2. The husband forthwith remove any caveats registered over the [Town C] property as (sic) his expense.

...

The wife retain to the exclusion of the husband her superannuation interest in [Super Fund 1].

The husband indicated that he would agree to the wife's proposed further orders 2 and 3 if his proposed orders 4 and 5 were made.

Basically, the husband wanted the wife to pay him $274,704.30 cash plus he wanted a super split from the wife of $44,702.00. The husband calculated the $274,704.30 as 65% of the wife's assets which were, in round figures:

(a) $230,000, being the wife's share of the property in the UK;

(b) $140,000, being the equity in the Town C property; and

(c) $49,000, being an add-back for money the wife had at separation but which had been dissipated.

Those figures total $419,000, of which 65% is $272,350.
Basically, the wife wanted the parties to each keep their own possessions and there to be no additional payment to the husband of cash or superannuation. In closing submissions, the wife conceded that the husband might be entitled to up to 10%. It was not clear whether the wife meant 10% of the pool or 10% of the equity in the Town C property.

The husband presented in the witness box as a person who thought his charm would lead other people to believe his self-centred conception of the truth.
The wife presented in the witness box as a person who was aiming to be clever rather than candid. She rarely conceded anything until she was presented with documentary evidence.
The husband's credibility is substantially affected by his very serious criminality in procuring sexual penetration by fraud on five occasions and attempting to do so on a further occasion. These are obviously crimes of dishonesty. The facts of the case show that the husband's offending was not a spur of the moment transgression, but a carefully planned and executed scheme. He did not offend only once, but offended repeatedly. Even after spending five years in jail, he did not learn from his imprisonment, but almost immediately breached his parole conditions and was returned to jail for a further period.
These circumstances suggest that the husband has a limited conception of right and wrong, and a poor comprehension of the impact of his nefarious deeds on other people. These circumstances tend to suggest that the husband would not be an honest and reliable witness.
The wife accused the husband of financial dishonesty, in receiving money from the New Enterprise Incentive Scheme ("NEIS") to which he was not entitled. The NEIS was a scheme by which the government financially assisted people who started their own businesses. The wife did not provide appropriate evidence to prove that very serious allegation against the husband, or even the terms of the scheme. The husband denied he was dishonest in relation to the NEIS. He also claimed that the wife oversaw his applications for money from the NEIS, and claimed that, therefore, any dishonesty was shared. The husband did not provide appropriate evidence to prove that very serious allegation against the wife. In the absence of proper evidence on this issue, I am unable to conclude that either party was financially dishonest in relation to the NEIS.
In her trial affidavit, the wife affirmed that final separation occurred in September 2021. She claimed that, based on that date of separation, the husband was out of time to bring this proceeding and could only do so with an extension of time. However, she formally conceded at the trial that separation occurred in August 2023. That is a very consequential difference. It reflects poorly on the wife's credibility that she originally affirmed in her trial affidavit that separation occurred in September 2021.
The wife also affirmed in her trial affidavit that the husband had lent her $23,500 to assist with the deposit for the purchase of her property in Town C. She affirmed that, upon separation, the husband had forgiven that loan, with the result that the husband had gifted her $23,500. However, at trial, the wife conceded that the husband had not forgiven the loan of $23,500, and said that she still owed him that money. At trial, the wife said that she was willing to repay that sum to the husband, even though the minute of proposed orders that she submitted during the trial (exhibit 19) made no allowance for such a repayment. The wife's false claim that the husband forgave the loan reflects poorly on her credibility. Indeed, as discussed below, the wife's claim that the husband lent her money was also false. In fact, as found below, the husband contributed to the Town C property on the basis that it was shared property. This false claim of a loan also reflects very poorly on the wife's credibility.
The wife also said in her trial affidavit that the relationship began in 2018 when the husband "was still incarcerated". In cross-examination, she conceded that was a "mistake", and said it began in 2017. That was a consequential error, because it concerned whether the relationship began when the husband was on parole or in prison. The "mistake" reflects poorly on the wife's reliability as a witness.
The wife also said in her trial affidavit that:

In [mid]-2019, when [Mr Griggs] was released from prison, he did not have a place to live. He was about to be homeless so I offered him to come and rent a room from me.

This was in the context of the wife trying to downplay the relationship to the court, and claiming that it was not a de facto relationship at all after September 2021. However, in a letter dated August 2018 to the parole board, the wife said that:

(a) she was the husband's partner;

(b) they had been in a relationship for thirteen months;

(c) she visited him fortnightly;

(d) they often talked about their future together; and

(e) she had offered the husband a home with her.

That letter gives a very different impression of the relationship, and the reasons for and the nature of the cohabitation, from the impression the wife tried to convey to the court. Rather than the cohabitation commencing because the wife took pity on the husband, as the wife tried to convey to the court, the letter to the parole board shows that the cohabitation commenced because the parties were in a relationship and the wife wanted the husband to live with her. Also, in cross-examination, the wife conceded that the husband was not about to become homeless, because people are not given parole if they have nowhere to live. These discrepancies reflect poorly on the wife's credibility.
The wife said in her trial affidavit that the husband took over the lease of the Suburb H property. However, in cross-examination, she conceded that the lease remained in her name, although she was living in Town C. This might seem like a minor discrepancy, but it reinforces the view that the wife is not careful with the truth.
For these reasons, I do not consider the wife to be a credible and reliable witness. She distorts the facts to suit her case.
While judgment in this matter was reserved, the husband filed an application in a proceeding. He wanted to substitute a list of payments he claimed to have made in respect of the Town C property for the list that his counsel had provided to the court, and he wanted a bundle of bank statements to be substituted for the bundle of bank statements his counsel had tendered as exhibit 37.
The husband said in support of his application in a proceeding that:

During Ms Teicher's cross examination of the Respondent, Her Honour asked Ms Teicher [the husband's counsel] whether there was much more to be asked of the Respondent.

(a) Her Honour had expressed concern that time was running short, and Her Honour had indicated that she did not want these matters to proceed into a fourth hearing date.

In response to Her Honour's question, Ms Teicher confirmed that there was still a considerable number of transactions that remained to be put to the Respondent. Ms Teicher confirmed that she would focus her remaining cross examination of the Respondent upon the transactions of larger value. 2. After a while longer, between approximately 3pm and 3.30pm, Her Honour again asked Ms Teicher whether there were many more transactions to be put to the Respondent, and Ms Teicher again indicated that there was still a considerable number of transactions that remained. 3. Her Honour then asked, for the sake of saving time, to be provided a list of my direct financial contributions to the [Town C] property at the end of the day ("the Requested List").
That is a significant distortion of what occurred.
The matter was listed at a compliance and readiness hearing for a final hearing for two days, presumably because the parties said that was how long it would take. On the first day of the hearing, 8 May 2025, the matter was stood down for about one and a half hours for settlement discussions, which were unsuccessful. Additionally, I was only able to sit for one hour after lunch, due to medical appointments, which caused us to lose one hour of hearing time. On the second day of the hearing, 9 May 2025, I had to adjourn for the lunch break 15 minutes early, for another medical appointment. That caused us to lose another 15 minutes of hearing time.
Also on the second day of the hearing, 9 May 2025, at about 11.40am, during her re-examination of the husband, Ms Teicher asked for the matter to be stood down for twenty minutes for her to organise her voluminous documents to be able to tender them in an appropriate manner. The matter was stood down at 11.42am and resumed 41 minutes later at 12.23pm.
When the court resumed at about 12.23pm on the second day of the hearing, Ms Buchanan, for the wife, told the court that her client was very distressed, and she was visibly tearful, because, in Ms Buchanan's words, "quite obviously we're not going to finish today." Ms Teicher seemed to agree with that assessment. (The wife's distress seemed to be based on the fact that she was funding her legal proceedings from her own money, and an extra day of hearing would therefore cost her a lot. The husband's legal proceedings, on the other hand, were funded by the Commonwealth under the Commonwealth Family Violence Scheme, so an extra day of hearing would cost him nothing).
Then, notwithstanding that Ms Teicher had asked for the matter to be stood down to organise her documents, Ms Teicher, without asking any further questions of her client in re-examination or tendering any further documents, told the court that her case was closed and she had no further evidence to call.
At about 4pm on the second day of the hearing, Ms Teicher asked the court to adjourn early, because there was a home loan document that she wanted to get under subpoena before asking any further questions in cross-examination. The court adjourned at 4.02pm.
On the third day of the hearing, on 23 May 2025, at the beginning of the day, Ms Teicher asked for the court to be stood down so that she could look at the subpoenaed home loan documents. The matter was stood down for about one hour.
All in all, due to the matter being stood down and adjourned early (mostly for Ms Teicher's convenience) we lost about 3.5 hours. Due to my need to attend medical appointments, we lost about another 1.25 hours. That totals about four hours and 45 minutes of hearing time. That is almost a full day of hearing time.
Ms Teicher cross-examined the wife for the whole of the afternoon of the second day of the hearing and until 3.48pm on the third day of the hearing. The cross-examination was not particularly focussed and efficient. The husband's tender bundle was more than 10,000 pages long. Ms Teicher spent a lot of time asking the wife about entries in the husband's voluminous bank statements, which were part of his over 10,000 page tender bundle.
Rather than each page being exhibited as she went, Ms Teicher indicated that she would tender all of the relevant pages of the husband's bank statement as one exhibit. Ms Teicher said, at page 220 of the transcript:

... I will seek to tender these various pages, perhaps as one document, your Honour, if that's suitable to the court.

When the time came, exhibit 37 was to be the pages of the husband's bank statement that contained entries he said reflected payments he made towards the property in Town C and that had been put to the wife in cross-examination. I said, at page 227 of the transcript:

We're going to have to get all these page numbers identified ... for the exhibit.

So can we just say, exhibit 37, the payments by the husband in relation to the house, and you will need to give a list of all the page numbers to Ms Buchanan and my associate.

Ms Teicher said that she would do that. It was understood that, to save hearing time, after the hearing, Ms Teicher would give to my associate and Ms Buchanan a list of the pages from the husband's bank statements that she had asked about in cross-examination. It was understood that all of those pages, and no others, would be included in exhibit 37.
Following the hearing, Ms Teicher provided to my associate by email a document that was supposed to be a list of the page numbers from the husband's tender bundle that were supposed to be exhibit 37. In my associate's view, Ms Teicher's email referred to some incorrect page numbers and contained some other errors. My associate queried those errors with Ms Teicher by email. Ms Teicher responded by providing a list of payments the husband had allegedly made for the Town C property, many of which had not been put to the wife in cross-examination.
My associate responded, saying that, if the husband wished to adduce further evidence, he would have to file the appropriate application. The husband did file such an application on

4 August 2025. I dismissed that application for reasons given orally at the time. The primary reasons were that the evidence that the husband then wished to adduce had been known to him before the hearing began, and adducing the evidence after the conclusion of the hearing would require at least the wife, and possibly the husband as well, to be recalled for cross-examination so that the new evidence could be appropriately put. That would obviously add to the costs of the proceeding. 4. The husband said in his affidavit in support of his application to re-open:

Her Honour then asked, for the sake of saving time, to be provided a list of my direct financial contributions to the [Town C] property at the end of the day ("the Requested List").

In this statement, the husband implied that I had asked for a list of his financial contributions that included items that had not been put to the wife in cross-examination. That is what the husband provided to the court following the hearing, and which he sought in his application to adduce further evidence to provide to the court. I most definitely did not ask Ms Teicher to provide a list of alleged payments made by the husband that Ms Teicher had not cross-examined the wife about. That would have been a gross denial of procedural fairness, which I would never have entertained.
What I did ask, to save time, was for Ms Teicher, after the hearing concluded, to provide a list to my associate and Ms Buchanan of the page numbers of the husband's over 10,000 page tender bundle that Ms Teicher had taken the wife to in cross-examination about the husband's bank statements, which he said contained entries relating to payments that he had made towards the Town C property. That is very different. The husband completely misrepresented what I had asked for. The only reason that the pages of the husband's bank statement were not tendered immediately after each page was referred to in cross-examination was that Ms Teicher said that she would tender them all in one go at the end of the cross-examination on the husband's bank statements.
I have now used the transcript to identify all the page numbers containing entries that the wife was cross-examined about. That has become exhibit 37.
In relation to the timing issues raised by the husband, at the commencement of the third day of the hearing, Ms Teicher said that she wished to have the matter stood down so she could look at a subpoenaed document. I indicated that I would stand the matter down, and then said, at page 155 of the transcript:

And time-wise, are you expecting to finish today?

Ms Teicher said that she would do her best, but she was not sure. I said:

It's just not acceptable to say a case is going to take two days and then it takes four.

Later in the morning, Ms Teicher asked the wife about an alias the husband used in his role as a musician. I queried the point of the question, and Ms Teicher conceded it was irrelevant. I said at page 165 of the transcript:

... we do want to finish the case today.

Just focus on what's going to make a difference.

At page 173 of the transcript, when Ms Teicher was taking a long time to get her question out, and it appeared that the question might have been objectionable, the following exchange occurred:

HER HONOUR: Well, just ask the question, and then we can work out what to do.

MS TEICHER: Now - so some of this overlaps with what I've asked the witness ---

HER HONOUR: Well, just ask the question, please.

MS TEICHER: Yes, your Honour.

HER HONOUR: Please, Ms Teicher.

MS TEICHER: Thank you, your Honour. I will do that.

HER HONOUR: We don't want to sort of not finish today.

MS TEICHER: No. I know.

At page 204 of the transcript, when Ms Teicher was asking some detailed questions about the heating and cooling system at the Town C property, I asked:

I think the point is probably made, your Honour. ... So I will stop.

At page 206 of the transcript, at about 2.40pm, Ms Buchanan said she had some emails about carpets that Ms Teicher needed to look at. Ms Teicher said:

I don't want to stand it down. ...

I don't want to delay it. ...

We need to finish.

Ms Buchanan and her client also were very keen for the matter to finish on the third day of the hearing.
I said:

... we're at almost quarter to three.

If we get to quarter past three with cross-examination, that would allow each of you half an hour for submissions. ...

So you've basically got 35 minutes. ...

Or we're not going to finish today. ...

I'm assuming - would you both want half an hour for submissions or ---

Ms Teicher began the questioning about the entries in the bank statements that became exhibit 37 at page 214 of the transcript. At page 220 of the transcript, Ms Teicher said that she would tender all the pages as one exhibit. At page 221 of the transcript, Ms Teicher said that, "I'm doing the bigger items". I then said:

Well, it's now 10 past 3. I don't know if Ms Buchanan has much in the way of re-examination.

At page 227 of the transcript, I also asked Ms Teicher if she was serious when she asked the wife about a payment of $36.99. At page 228 of the transcript, in relation to the payments that the husband claimed to have made for the Town C property, Ms Teicher did concede that there was some double counting (which my associate picked up).
At page 230 of the transcript, Ms Teicher concluded the questions in relation to exhibit 37, saying:

...Those are the bulk of the expenditures that were made by [Mr Griggs] ... in relation to the property, correct? --- Yes.

I will seek to tender all of those, and I will provide the list to the associates and to my learned friend, your Honour.

Ms Teicher then went on to ask a number of other questions about other topics. She did not say at any stage that she had not been able to ask all the questions she wished in relation to exhibit 37.
Contrary to the husband's affidavit in support of his application to re-open, it is not true that:

Ms Teicher again indicated that there was still a considerable number of transactions that remained.

Ms Teicher did indicate that what she had covered in cross-examination was "the bulk" of the husband's expenditures in relation to the Town C property. That implied that there were other expenditures that she had not asked about, but that they were of minor significance.
It is certainly not the case, as the husband claimed, that because Ms Teicher had a "considerable number" of other transactions that she wished to put before the court, that I invited her to provide details of those additional transactions after the hearing. It is preposterous that I would have done so.
I accept that everyone felt pressured to finish the hearing, largely because the wife had been so upset and tearful on the second day of the hearing when it appeared that the matter would not finish that day. However, there had been a lot of time wastage with the matter being stood down at Ms Teicher's request for no useful purpose, and Ms Teicher asking pointless questions.
Importantly, for present purposes, the husband in his affidavit in support of his application to re-open significantly distorted what I said during the hearing and why. This distortion of the facts also leads me to conclude that the husband is not a credible and reliable witness.
In summary, neither the husband nor the wife was a credible and reliable witness.
Following the conclusion of the hearing, I marked as exhibit 38 the document that the husband provided following the hearing containing his claimed expenditures that were not put to the wife in cross-examination. However, because the husband was not given leave to re-open, I have not taken into account the additional expenditures in exhibit 38 that were not put to the wife in cross-examination.

Section 90RD of the Act permits the court to make a declaration that a de facto relationship existed between two persons. Under s.90RG of the Act, the court is only permitted to make such a declaration if it is satisfied that one or both of the persons were ordinarily resident in a participating jurisdiction when the primary proceedings commenced. There was no dispute about this issue. On the material before the court, I am satisfied that the husband and the wife were both ordinarily resident in a participating jurisdiction when the primary proceedings commenced.
Under s.90SB of the Act, the court may only make an order under s.90SM if the court is satisfied:

(a) that the period or the total periods of the de facto relationship were at least 2 years; or

(b) that there is a child of the de facto relationship; or

(c) that:

(i) the party to the de facto relationship who applies for the order or declaration the applicant made substantial contributions of the kind mentioned in s.90SM(4)(a), (b) or (c); and

(ii) a failure to make an order under s.90SM would result in serious injustice to the applicant; or

(d) that the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory.

Section 90SM of the Act, subject to s.90SM(6) of the Act, gives the court power to alter the interests of the parties to a de facto relationship in the property of those parties following the breakdown of their relationship. Sub-section 90SM(2) of the Act provides that:

The court must not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order.

Subsection 90SM(3) of the Act sets out the matters the court must take into account when considering what orders, if any, should be made for the alteration of the interests of the parties in property. Those matters are:

In considering what order (if any) should be made under this section in property settlement proceedings, the court:

(a) is to identify:

(i) the existing legal and equitable rights and interests in any property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; and

(ii) the existing liabilities of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; and

(b) is to take into account (except for the purpose of making an order with respect to the ownership of property that is a companion animal):

(i) the considerations set out in subsection (4) (considerations relating to contributions); and

(ii) the considerations set out in subsection (5) (considerations relating to current and future circumstances).

Subsection 90SM(4) of the Act sets out the following considerations regarding contributions that the court is to take into account so far as they are relevant:

(a) the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the de facto relationship, or a child of the de facto relationship: > > > (i) to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; or

(ii) otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property;

whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them;

(b) the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the de facto relationship, or a child of the de facto relationship:

(i) to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; or

(ii) otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property;

whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them;

(c) the contribution made by a party to the de facto relationship to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the de facto relationship and any children of the de facto relationship, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent;

(ca) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the de facto relationship has subjected or exposed the other party, on the ability of a party to the de facto relationship to make the kind of contributions referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c);

(d) the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the de facto relationship;

(f) any other order made under this Act affecting a party to the de facto relationship or a child of the de facto relationship;

(g) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the de facto relationship has provided for a child of the de facto relationship.

Contributions regarding current and future circumstances

Subsection 90SM(5) of the Act sets out the following considerations regarding current and future circumstances that the court is to take into account so far as they are relevant:

(a) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the de facto relationship (the subject de facto relationship) has subjected or exposed the other party, on the current and future circumstances of the other party, including on any of the matters mentioned elsewhere in this subsection; > > (b) the age and state of health of each of the parties to the subject de facto relationship; > > (c) the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties to the subject de facto relationship and the physical and mental capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment; > > (d) the effect of any material wastage, caused intentionally or recklessly by a party to the subject de facto relationship, of property or financial resources of either of the parties to the subject de facto relationship or both of them; > > (e) any liabilities incurred by either of the parties to the subject de facto relationship or both of them, including the nature of the liabilities and the circumstances relating to them; > > (f) the extent to which either party to the subject de facto relationship has the care of a child of the de facto relationship who has not attained the age of 18 years, including the need of either party to provide appropriate housing for such a child; > > (g) commitments of each of the parties to the subject de facto relationship that are necessary to enable the party to support themselves and any child or other person that the party has a duty to maintain; > > (h) the responsibilities of either party to the subject de facto relationship to support any other person; > > (i) the eligibility of either party to the subject de facto relationship for a pension, allowance or benefit under: > > > (i) any law of the Commonwealth, of a State or Territory or of another country; or > > > > (ii) any superannuation fund or scheme, whether the fund or scheme was established, or operates, within or outside Australia;

(j) if either party to the subject de facto relationship is eligible for a pension, allowance or benefit as mentioned in paragraph (i) - the rate at which it is being paid to the party;

(k) a standard of living that in all the circumstances is reasonable;

(l) the extent to which an alteration of the interests of the parties to the subject de facto relationship in any property would enable a party to undertake education or establish a business or otherwise obtain an adequate income;

(m) the effect of any proposed order on the ability of a creditor of a party to the subject de facto relationship to recover the creditor's debt, so far as that effect is relevant;

(n) the extent to which each party to the subject de facto relationship has contributed to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other party;

(o) the duration of the subject de facto relationship and the extent to which it has affected the earning capacity of each party to the subject de facto relationship;

(p) the need to protect a party to the de facto relationship who wishes to continue that party's role as a parent;

(q) if either party to the subject de facto relationship is cohabiting with another person - the financial circumstances relating to the cohabitation;

(r) the terms of any order or declaration made, or proposed to be made, under this Part in relation to:

(i) a party to the subject de facto relationship (in relation to another de facto relationship); or

(ii) a person who is a party to another de facto relationship with a party to the subject de facto relationship; or

(iii) the property of a person covered by subparagraph (i) and of a person covered by subparagraph (ii), or of either of them; or

(iv) vested bankruptcy property in relation to a person covered by subparagraph (i) or (ii);

(s) the terms of any order or declaration made, or proposed to be made, under Part VIII in relation to:

(i) a party to the subject de facto relationship; or

(ii) a person who is party to a marriage with a party to the subject de facto relationship; or

(iii) the property of a person covered by subparagraph (i) and of a person covered by subparagraph (ii), or of either of them; or

(iv) vested bankruptcy property in relation to a person covered by subparagraph (i) or (ii);

(t) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the subject de facto relationship is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for a child of the subject de facto relationship;

(u) the terms of any Part VIIIAB financial agreement that is binding on either or both of the parties to the subject de facto relationship;

(v) the terms of any financial agreement that is binding on a party to the subject de facto relationship;

(w) any other fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account.

Under s.4AB of the Act, family violence is defined as:

(1) For the purposes of this Act, family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful.

(2) Examples of behaviour that may constitute family violence include (but are not limited to):

(a) an assault; or

(b) a sexual assault or other sexually abusive behaviour; or

(c) stalking; or

(d) repeated derogatory taunts; or

(e) intentionally damaging or destroying property; or

(f) intentionally causing death or injury to an animal; or

(g) economic or financial abuse; or

(i) preventing the family member from making or keeping connections with his or her family, friends or culture; or

(j) unlawfully depriving the family member, or any member of the family member's family, of his or her liberty.

(2A) For the purposes of paragraph (2)(g), examples of behaviour that might constitute economic or financial abuse of a family member include (but are not limited to) the following:

(a) unreasonably denying the family member the financial autonomy that the family member would otherwise have had, such as by:

(i) forcibly controlling the family member's money or assets, including superannuation; or

(ii) sabotaging the family member's employment or income or potential employment or income; or

(iii) forcing the family member to take on a financial or legal liability, or status; or

(iv) forcibly or without the family member's knowledge, accumulating debt in the family member's name;

(b) unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet the reasonable living expenses of the family member, or the family member's child (including at a time when the family member is entirely or predominantly dependent on the person for financial support);

(c) coercing a family member (including by use of threats, physical abuse or emotional or psychological abuse):

(i) to give or seek money, assets or other items as dowry; or

(ii) to do or agree to things in connection with a practice of dowry;

(d) hiding or falsely denying things done or agreed to by the family member, including hiding or falsely denying the receipt of money, assets or other items, in connection with a practice of dowry.

(3) For the purposes of this Act, a child is exposed to family violence if the child sees or hears family violence or otherwise experiences the effects of family violence.

(4) Examples of situations that may constitute a child being exposed to family violence include (but are not limited to) the child:

(a) overhearing threats of death or personal injury by a member of the child's family towards another member of the child's family; or

(b) seeing or hearing an assault of a member of the child's family by another member of the child's family; or

(c) comforting or providing assistance to a member of the child's family who has been assaulted by another member of the child's family; or

(d) cleaning up a site after a member of the child's family has intentionally damaged property of another member of the child's family; or

(e) being present when police or ambulance officers attend an incident involving the assault of a member of the child's family by another member of the child's family.

In Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108; (2012) 293 ALR 70; (2012) 87 ALJR 74; (2012) 47 Fam LR 481; (2012) FLC 93-518; [2012] HCA 52, the High Court explained the proper approach to an application under s.79 of the Act. Section 90SM mirrors s.79, except that it applies to de facto relationships. Accordingly, Stanford is applicable to the present proceedings. In Stanford, the High Court said the following:
1. First, it is necessary to begin consideration of whether it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order by identifying, according to ordinary common law and equitable principles, the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in the property. ... The question posed by s 79(2) is thus whether, having regard to those existing interests, the court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order.
2. Second, although s 79 confers a broad power on a court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to make a property settlement order, it is not a power that is to be exercised according to an unguided judicial discretion. In Wirth v Wirth, Dixon CJ observed that a power to make such order with respect to property and costs "as [the judge] thinks fit", in any question between husband and wife as to the title to or possession of property, is a power which "rests upon the law and not upon judicial discretion"...(footnotes omitted)
3. Because the power to make a property settlement order is not to be exercised in an unprincipled fashion, whether it is "just and equitable" to make the order is not to be answered by assuming that the parties' rights to or interests in marital property are or should be different from those that then exist. All the more is that so when it is recognised that s 79 of the Act must be applied keeping in mind that "[c]ommunity of ownership arising from marriage has no place in the common law". Questions between husband and wife about the ownership of property that may be then, or may have been in the past, enjoyed in common are to be "decided according to the same scheme of legal titles and equitable principles as govern the rights of any two persons who are not spouses". The question presented by s 79 is whether those rights and interests should be altered. (footnotes omitted)
4. Thirdly, whether making a property settlement order is "just and equitable" is not to be answered by beginning from the assumption that one or other party has the right to have the property of the parties divided between them or has the right to an interest in marital property which is fixed by reference to the various matters (including financial and other contributions) set out in s 79(4). The power to make a property settlement order must be exercised "in accordance with legal principles, including the principles which the Act itself lays down". To conclude that making an order is "just and equitable" only because of and by reference to various matters in s 79(4), without a separate consideration of s 79(2), would be to conflate the statutory requirements and ignore the principles laid down by the Act. (footnote omitted)

...

In many cases where an application is made for a property settlement order, the just and equitable requirement is readily satisfied by observing that, as the result of a choice made by one or both of the parties, the husband and wife are no longer living in a marital relationship. It will be just and equitable to make a property settlement order in such a case because there is not and will not thereafter be the common use of property by the husband and wife. No less importantly, the express and implicit assumptions that underpinned the existing property arrangements have been brought to an end by the voluntary severance of the mutuality of the marital relationship. That is, any express or implicit assumption that the parties may have made to the effect that existing arrangements of marital property interests were sufficient or appropriate during the continuance of their marital relationship is brought to an end with the ending of the marital relationship. And the assumption that any adjustment to those interests could be effected consensually as needed or desired is also brought to an end. Hence it will be just and equitable that the court make a property settlement order. What order, if any, should then be made is determined by applying s 79(4).

Stanford requires the following matters to be determined in applications brought under s.79 of the Act, and, by parity of reasoning, s.90SM of the Act:

(a) whether the parties have separated;

(b) the assets and liabilities of each party;

(c) the contributions of each party;

(d) the future needs of each party;

(e) bearing in mind all of the foregoing matters, whether it is just and equitable to make any orders altering the interests of the parties in their property; and

(f) what orders, if any, are just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.

In In the Marriage of Hickey (2003) 30 Fam LR 355; (2003) FLC 93-143; [2003] FamCA 395 at paragraph 39, the Full Court of the Family Court described the preferred four step approach in property matters as follows:

The case law reveals that there is a preferred approach to the determination of an application brought pursuant to the provisions of s.79. That approach involves four inter-related steps. Firstly, the court should make findings as to the identity and value of the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties at the date of the hearing. Secondly, the court should identify and assess the contributions of the parties within the meaning of s 79(4)(a), (b) and (c) and determine the contribution based entitlements of the parties expressed as a percentage of the net value of the property of the parties. Third, the court should identify and assess the relevant matters referred to in s 79(4)(d), (e), (f) and (g), (the other factors) including, because of s 79(4)(e), the matters referred to in s 75(2) so far as they are relevant and determine the adjustment (if any) that should be made to the contribution based entitlements of the parties established at step two. Fourth, the court should consider the effect of those findings and determination and resolve what order is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case...

In the light of the High Court's decision in Stanford, it seems that the basic steps stated in Hickey remain correct. That is, the court is required to:

(a) identify the assets owned by the parties, jointly or separately, and the liabilities to which the parties are subject, jointly or separately;

(b) take into account the contributions made by each party;

(c) take into account the so called "future factors"; and then

(d) determine what order, if any is just and equitable.

The husband and wife agreed that they had no joint assets or liabilities at the time of trial.
The parties agreed that the husband's individual assets at the time of trial were as follows:

The parties agreed that the husband's individual liabilities at the time of trial were as follows:

The parties agreed that the husband's superannuation at the time of trial was worth $71,419.
That means that the husband's total assets less liabilities plus superannuation less liabilities are worth $79,827.
The parties agreed that the wife's individual assets at the time of trial were as follows:

The parties agreed that the wife's individual liabilities at the time of trial were as follows:

The parties agreed that the wife's superannuation at the time of trial was worth $160,823.
That means that the wife's total assets less liabilities plus superannuation are worth $534,189.
The combined total of the husband and the wife's assets less liabilities plus superannuation is therefore $614,016. Consequently, the wife presently holds about 87% of the parties' combined assets and the husband presently holds about 13% of the parties' combined assets.
In relation to the husband's claim that there should be an addback of $49,000, being money held by the wife at separation but now dissipated, I will consider that issue in the context of post-relationship contributions.

The parties agreed that the husband's initial contributions at the commencement of the relationship in May 2019 consisted only of his superannuation which was worth $68,169 at the time.
The parties agreed that the wife's initial contributions included:

(1) her superannuation worth $69,169;

(2) her half share in the City F property (the value of which at the time is unknown but which is now worth $237,659); and

(3) savings of "a few thousand dollars".

The wife also claimed that she had a car and furniture of unknown value. That claim was not disputed, but, without a valuation or agreement, I cannot attribute any value to them.

The wife claimed that the husband subjected her to financial and emotional abuse and intimidation and stalking. By way of examples, in 2022, when the wife bought herself a puppy, the husband became angry and abusive and said that she should not have spent that kind of money without asking for his permission. In August 2023, the husband falsely told one of the wife's former colleagues and a friend that the wife had a drinking problem. On 25 November 2023 at about 12.30am, just before separation, the husband appeared angry and started chopping wood with an axe. On 21 January 2024, the husband followed the wife while she was shopping.
The husband denied the wife's allegations of family violence. The wife did not press them as a significant factor impeding the contributions she made.
The parties kept their finances largely separate. They did not operate a joint bank account.
When the parties commenced cohabitation in May 2019, the husband moved into the wife's rented premises in Suburb H. The wife paid the rent. At that time, the husband was on a community corrections order. The husband was on unemployment benefits from mid-2019 until late 2019. He conceded at trial that he did not contribute to the rent at this time.
The wife worked throughout the relationship. At the commencement of cohabitation, she earned about $70,000 per year. She currently earns about $106,000 per year.
Early in the relationship, the wife was working part-time and also doing cleaning work for holiday rentals. When the husband moved in with her, the husband contributed to that work, but all of the payments continued to be made to the wife. The husband conceded at trial that the wife transferred to him the payments for the work he did.
The husband obtained work in the construction industry, where he worked from about late 2019 until mid-2023, when he lost his job.
In the meantime, in about September or October 2021, the wife moved to Town C, and the husband remained in Suburb H. The wife's son continued to live in Suburb H with the husband until April 2022. The husband and the wife's son shared the rent for Suburb H.
Between October 2021, when the wife moved to Town C, and August 2023, when the husband moved to Town C, the husband and wife spent many weekends together. When possible, the wife rented out the Suburb H property when the husband was not staying there on Airbnb. The husband claimed that the proceeds of the Airbnb rentals were $22,000, over two years. However, his own material shows that the proceeds were $8,856.65 in 2022 and $5,843.68 in 2023. That totals $14,700.33. That is about $7,000 or one third less than the husband said. Again, this is a distortion on the husband's part.
In any event, the husband claimed that he understood that the Airbnb receipts from the Suburb H property were intended to be used to reduce the mortgage on the Town C property, so they should be treated as a contribution on his part. However, the wife's son also contributed to the rent on the Suburb H property, although it was not clear precisely what proportion of the rent the wife's son paid. I would estimate the husband's contribution to the mortgage via the Airbnb payments to be about $10,000.
The parties agreed that the wife made the mortgage repayments on the property. According to her financial statement filed on 8 August 2024, the mortgage repayments were $520 per week. However, according to the wife's bank statement at exhibit 8, as at 26 September 2022, the loan repayments were $1,778 per month, or about $450 per week. The court was not taken to the wife's mortgage statement or any other evidence about the amount of the mortgage. In the circumstances, I consider that it is appropriate to treat the $450 per week as stated in exhibit 8 as reflective of the amount of the mortgage repayments during the relationship, and the $520 per week as stated in the financial statement as reflective of the amount of the mortgage repayments following the relationship. From when the Town C property was bought in December 2020, until separation on 25 November 2023, there were about 155 weeks. At $450 per week, the wife would have spent $69,750 on mortgage repayments during the relationship, less the approximately $10,000 that the husband contributed via Airbnb. The remaining $59,750 is a contribution on the wife's part to the Town C property.
After the husband lost his job in mid-2023, he remained in Suburb H until August or September 2023, when he moved to Town C. He remained unemployed. The husband lived in the Town C property until late 2023, when the wife obtained an intervention order against him.
When the wife moved to the Town C property in about September 2021, the husband and the wife's son took over the rental payments on the Suburb H property.
The husband claimed that, during the early part of the relationship, he cooked and cleaned and ran the house, and took the wife's son to and from school.
The wife said that the husband took her son to school once, when he missed the bus. She said the husband vacuumed "on occasion", washed only his own clothes and, if he cooked, he cleaned up only after himself.
I find the wife much more plausible than the husband on these issues. The wife's son was in year 12. It seems very likely that he would have got himself to and from school. As to the household chores, I prefer the wife's evidence. That is, I consider that the wife did the bulk of the household chores during the early period of their cohabitation.
Of course, the parties only lived in the same house from May 2019 until about October 2021 (about 2.5 years) and from about August 2023 until about November 2023 (about four months). In the meantime, they had separate households for almost two years. During their period of living separately, it seems obvious that the parties would have done their own household chores.
The husband said in his trial affidavit that the parties' intention was to buy a property together but put it in the wife's name alone, so that she could get the first home owner's grant, and then buy another property in the husband's name alone, so that he could get the first home owner's grant. If true, this scheme would have been fraudulent conspiracy. As the de facto partner of a person who had received the first home owner's grant, the husband would not have been eligible to get a first home owner's grant himself. To get the grant, he would have had to have lied about his relationship with the wife.
The wife denied that the parties intended to acquire a property portfolio together. However, she did not squarely deny that the parties intended to buy the Town C property together.
The wife conceded that the husband did "most of the leg work" in relation to liaising with real estate agents and negotiating prices. The wife also conceded that the husband did a lot of the managing of the construction of the house on the Town C property. Also, the wife conceded that the husband provided $23,500 towards the purchase of the property. The husband said he contributed more money than that, which is discussed below. The wife also conceded that the husband worked on the landscaping of the Town C property.
Following separation, the wife sent an email to the husband's brother, saying that the brother had said to the husband that "he should never have bought a house with me". When this was put to the wife in cross-examination, she said that she had just noted that the brother had said "we should never have bought a house together" not that "we did" purchase a house together. That is specious. The message was clearly premised on the fact that the parties had bought a house together.
All in all, I prefer the husband's evidence on this point. That is, I accept that the parties intended that the Town C property would be their joint property, but that it would be bought in the wife's sole name to maximise their access to the first homeowner's grant.
In any event, the wife bought the Town C property in her sole name. She did so partly with a substantial mortgage, partly with a first homeowner's grant and partly with at least $23,500 provided by the husband. The husband drew down some of the funds he provided for the Town C property from his superannuation, presumably on hardship grounds.
The parties also agreed that the wife repaid $8,000 to the husband.
When the parties were living apart, the husband paid part of the rent on the Suburb H property. Those payments did not add to the asset pool in any way.
The husband conceded at trial that he and the wife made numerous payments to and from each other, some of which were repaid. He conceded that the wife lent him $1,750 which he did not repay.
The husband also conceded that the wife paid $495 for a phone for him (exhibit 2). He did not claim to have repaid this amount. I find that he did not.
The husband, after some prevarication, conceded that the wife paid $569 for an amplifier for him (exhibit 3). He did not claim to have repaid that sum and I find that he did not.
The husband also conceded that the wife bought a fridge and possibly a microwave for the Town C property for $1,500. (The husband took the fridge upon separation). This was a contribution by the wife to the Town C property.
The husband also conceded that the wife paid $1,341 for a television for the Suburb H property (exhibit 4). This was a contribution by the wife to the parties' lifestyle.
The wife claimed that she lent the husband $2,277. The husband conceded that the wife paid $2,277 as the deposit for sofas for the Town C property, which the wife also appeared to accept. The husband said, without challenge, that he paid the balance of $2,000. He agreed that, at separation, he took the sofas. However, that does not mean that the wife gave or lent the husband $2,277. It just means that they both contributed about the same amount to furniture for the Town C property. The fact that the husband took the sofas at separation is just part of the normal division of chattels at separation. It does not mean the husband owes the wife $2,277.
The husband also conceded that the wife made payments to U Company of $5,000, $2,207, $5,000 and $1,933 totalling $14,140 (exhibit 1) (Tr.61.21). Those payments were contributions to the Town C property. The husband initially disputed that these payments should be counted as the wife's contributions because they were made by the wife from a redraw on the mortgage. However, the mortgage continues to be the wife's liability, so the payments should be credited to her.
The husband also conceded that the parties went to Bunnings on many occasions and both bought things. The wife's contribution in this regard was not quantified. However, the husband did concede that the wife repaid him the amounts of $199.46, $263.40 and $821.75 which he had previously spent for the Town C property (exhibit 1). Those amounts total $1,284.61, and are a contribution on the wife's part to the Town C property.
The husband also conceded that the wife paid him $210 on 29 August 2023 (exhibit 1). He said that he had just moved to Town C and did not have employment, so he probably just asked her to help him out. This should be regarded as a loan to the husband.
The husband conceded that the wife paid him $300 on 14 September 2023 (exhibit 6). The husband said this was repayment of a payment he had made for an excavator. This is therefore a contribution by the wife to the Town C property.
The husband also conceded that the wife transferred $900 to him so he could pay the concreter. That was a contribution on the wife's part to the Town C property (exhibit 1).
The husband was shown one of the wife's bank statements that indicated that the wife had paid the husband $1,000 for plasterwork on 24 October 2022 (exhibit 8). The husband said that he did not receive those funds. He said that the wife transferred the $1,000 to a particular account so that she could withdraw it as cash to give to the husband's brother, who was the builder.
However, when the husband was shown his own bank account that contained the $1,000 deposit from the wife, he conceded that he had received $1,000 from the wife on 24 October 2022 but denied it was for plasterwork (exhibit 9). In all the circumstances, particularly the husband's dishonesty relating to this payment, and his lack of credibility generally, I accept the wife's claim that this payment was for plasterwork. Accordingly, it was the wife's contribution to the Town C property.
The husband claimed that he paid some of the bills for the Town C property. When asked which bills, he only claimed that he made a payment towards council rates, which is discussed below. I therefore accept that the wife paid all of the utilities at the Town C property. Utilities are essentially lifestyle expenses, rather than direct financial contributions to property. However, the husband benefited from the wife's payment of the utilities when he was living at the Town C property.
Exhibit 37 was a major part of the husband's case. It was derived from his bank statements. I deal with each item in the order they were cross-examined upon. The page references are to the pages of the husband's large tender bundle (as opposed to his small tender bundle), which was 10,771 pages long.
Page 5680 shows a payment of $10,000 on 20 May 2020 from the husband to the wife. The wife agreed in cross-examination that she received that money from the husband but said that it was "part of the loan". She maintained, untruthfully, that she and the husband had discussed him lending the money to her, but she conceded that the supposed agreement was not put in writing. I accept that the husband contributed that $10,000 to the Town C property.
The wife conceded in cross-examination that the husband paid a further $10,000 to her, but Ms Teicher was unable to identify the relevant page of a bank statement or date. My associate and I have also looked for that additional $10,000 but cannot find it. I cannot add that additional $10,000 to the husband's contributions, because the husband did not provide evidence of them, and the wife's concession could have applied to other payments, discussed below, which the husband did provide evidence of.
Page 3981 shows a payment of $2,000 on 6 July 2020 to V Company. Ms Teicher said the date was 2022 but that was a mistake. The wife conceded that the husband made this payment as a deposit on the Town C property. I accept that the husband contributed that $2,000 to the Town C property.
Page 6191 shows a payment of $999.99 from the husband to the wife on 1 September 2020. Ms Teicher said this was a payment of $10,000, which it was not. (Transcript page 217.) Page 6191 also shows a payment from the husband to the wife on 1 September 2020 of $0.01, which the wife said was a test. Added to the other payment, that makes a payment on 1 September 2020 of $1,000. Page 6191 also shows payments from the husband to the wife of $4,000 on 1 September 2020, $3,000 on 2 September 2020 and $1,000 on 23 September 2020. That makes a total of $9,000 paid by the husband to the wife in September 2020.
Page 6194 shows that the husband bought something at the hardware shop for $882.90. He said it was a chainsaw to clear the trees on the Town C property. The wife conceded that the husband cleared the trees but said he kept the chainsaw. Consequently, I accept that the husband made a contribution by clearing trees, but cannot accept that he contributed the $882.90 to the property.
Page 6194 shows that the husband paid $1,104 to Mr W on 17 November 2020 (page 6104 is a duplicate of page 6194). The wife conceded that payment was for an excavator that the husband hired and paid for. I accept that was a contribution the husband made to the Town C property.
Page 6195 shows that the husband paid $360.30 for something at X Store. Ms Teicher put it to the wife that it was a light for the kitchen island. The wife did not concede that. However, in all the circumstances, I accept that it was. That is, I accept that the husband contributed that $360.30 to the Town C property.
The wife conceded that the husband paid her about $9,000 for the driveway. That is substantiated by page 5787, which shows the husband paid the wife three lots of $1,000 on 30 November 2020, page 5788, which shows the husband paid the wife $1,000 on 6 December 2020, page 5789, which shows the husband paid the wife $1,000 on each of 6, 7 and 8 December 2020 and page 5790, which shows that the husband paid the wife $1,000 on each of 9 and 10 December 2020. That adds up to $9,000. I accept that the husband made that contribution to the Town C property.
Page 6218 shows that the husband paid $3,332 to U Company on 28 November 2021. The wife conceded that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 6219 shows that the husband paid Y Store $2,000 on 4 January 2022. The wife conceded that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 6219 also shows that the husband paid $1,378.30 to U Company on 16 February 2022. The wife conceded that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 4097 shows that the husband paid $700 to Z Company on 8 December 2021. (Ms Teicher incorrectly stated this was at page 4789.) The husband said it was for topsoil. The wife did not dispute that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 5814 shows that the husband paid a further $220 to Z Company on 21 March 2022. The wife conceded that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 6221 shows that the husband paid $121 to AA Company on 20 April 2022. The husband said that was to replace the glass in a door that got broken. The wife said he smashed it with a hammer. That is classic wastage. I cannot treat it as a contribution to the Town C property.
Page 5888 shows that the husband paid a further $200 to Z Company on 27 January 2023. The wife did not dispute that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 5889 shows that the husband paid $390 to BB Company on 30 January 2023. The husband said it was for soil. The wife did not dispute that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 5889 also shows that the husband paid Bunnings $1,430.96 on 30 January 2023. The husband said it was for sleepers. The wife accepted that he did buy sleepers, but she did not know how much they cost. She also said he bought a lot of tools for himself. In the absence of evidence showing how much of this expenditure was for sleepers and how much was for tools that the husband retained for his own benefit, I am unable to treat this sum as a contribution by the husband to the Town C property. In any event, that sum would be included in the $3,000 the husband spent at Bunnings discussed below.
Page 5889 also shows that the husband paid CC Store $104.94 on 31 January 2023. The husband said that was for a tree. The wife accepted that it could have been. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 5890 shows that the husband paid $101.40 to BB Company on 1 February 2023. The husband said it was for a fruit tree. The wife did not dispute that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 5890 also shows that the husband paid $272.25 to DD Company on 1 February 2023. The husband said that was for the rental of a bobcat. The wife did not dispute that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 5890 also shows a payment by the husband to the wife of $500 on 2 February 2023. The wife did not dispute that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 5904 shows that the husband paid the wife $900 on 20 March 2023. The wife did not dispute that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 6233 shows that the husband paid $183 to EE Company on 24 April 2023. The husband said that was for the hire of a pressure washer and grass aerator. The wife did not dispute that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 6234 shows that husband paid a further $175 to Z Company on 26 April 2023. The wife did not dispute that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 5912 shows that the husband paid $145.87 to Bunnings on 26 April 2023. The husband said it was for building items. The wife accepted that. However, that sum would be included in the $3,000 the husband spent at Bunnings discussed below.
Page 6235 shows that the husband paid $250 to FF Company on 27 May 2023. The wife accepted that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 5928 shows that the husband paid $1,275.52 to Town C City Council on 3 July 2023. The husband said that was six months of the council rates. The wife said that she did not know why he would have paid the rates, because she paid them herself the week before. She queried whether he might have paid that sum for parking fines, or gym membership.
However, when this issue was discussed during the husband's cross-examination, the wife claimed that she had repaid the husband half of the amount he had paid, being $635. By repaying only half of the rates, the wife basically acknowledged that the husband was a half owner of the Town C property. In any event, the husband claimed, without providing documentary evidence, that he had repaid the wife the $635.
All in all, I consider that the payment of $1,275 by the husband was the payment of six months of the council rates on the Town C property. I accept that the wife repaid the husband half of that, because he admitted that she did. I do not accept that he paid that half back to the wife, because he provided no bank records to that effect. Consequently, I accept that the husband paid $635 for council rates on 3 July 2023.
Because the husband did not claim to have paid any other rates, I conclude that the wife paid the council rates on the Town C property from the time of its purchase in December 2020 until separation on 25 November 2023, except for the $635. That is about three years of rates. The husband said that $1,275 was six months of rates. So the annual amount of rates would be $2,550. For three years, that would be about $7,650, of which the husband has paid about $635. The wife paid the other $7,000. That is a contribution on her part to the Town C property.
The husband claimed that between April 2021 and 15 November 2023, he spent $4,976 at Bunnings for the Town C property. The wife thought a lot of that sum would have been for tools that the husband has kept. However, the wife did concede that the husband would have spent about $3,000 at Bunnings for the Town C property during that period, and the rest on tools that he has retained. I find that plausible. I accept the wife's evidence on this point. That is, I consider that $3,000 that the husband spent at Bunnings was for the Town C property.
Page 6196 shows that the husband paid $1,320 to GG Pty Ltd on 22 December 2021. The wife accepted that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 6197 shows that the husband paid $36.99 to HH Company on 24 December 2021. The wife did not dispute that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 4443 shows that the husband paid $250 to JJ Company on 16 December 2021. The wife accepted that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 5785 shows that the husband paid $339 to KK Company on 22 November 2021. He said that was for the wife to move to Town C. The wife did not dispute that. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
Page 5786 shows that the husband paid $203 to KK Company on 25 November 2023. The wife conceded that was for the transportation of her furniture. I accept that the husband contributed that sum to the Town C property.
In any event, the amounts that I have accepted that the husband contributed to the Town C property total $47,955.18, as evidenced by exhibit 37. That includes the $23,500, which the wife acknowledged she received from the husband.
The husband also contributed labour to the Town C property in the form of helping with negotiating for the purchase of the land, helping with managing the building works and helping with landscaping the property. The husband claimed that work was worth $50,000. However, he provided no expert evidence to that effect. I am unable to accept the husband's unqualified assertions in this regard. However, I do accept that it would have cost the wife a significant amount if she had paid someone to do the landscaping and so on.
Of course, the wife also contributed non-financially to the Town C property, through negotiating and managing the building works. She also established the house as a home, while the husband was living in Suburb H.
In summary, I accept that the husband contributed to the Town C property during the relationship:

(a) the items mentioned in connection with exhibit 37, being $47,955.18, less $8,000 that the wife repaid, leaving $39,955.18;

(b) $10,000 of Airbnb payments that went towards the mortgage; and

(c) negotiating, managing the building works and landscaping.

The husband's direct financial contributions to the Town C property during the relationship amounted to $49,955.18.
The husband contributed nothing to the wife's property in City F, which she owned before she met the husband, or to the wife's other assets.
The wife contributed to the Town C property during the relationship:

(a) $59,750 in mortgage repayments;

(b) about $7,000 in council rates payments;

(c) $8,000 that she repaid the husband;

(d) the first home owner's grant, which I understand was $10,000;

(e) $14,140 to U Company;

(f) $1,284 in repayments to the husband;

(g) $300 for the excavator;

(h) $900 for the concreter;

(i) $1,000 for plasterwork; and

(j) negotiating and managing the building works; and

(k) homemaker activities.

That amounts to $102,374 that the wife contributed to the Town C property during the relationship. In addition, she lent the husband or gave him handouts of about $3,024. Also, the wife paid for various things for the house, such as the fridge and microwave for $1,500.
The wife has always earned more than the husband, and, at times, supported him financially. Neither party contributed to the other's superannuation.
During the relationship, the husband's direct financial contributions to the Town C property were about $50,000 whereas the wife's were about $100,000. That means that the husband's direct financial contributions to the Town C property were about 33% and the wife's were about 67%.
I accept that the husband did a lot of the organising and landscaping at the Town C property. On the other hand, the wife did a lot of organising and homemaker activities at the Town C property. I consider that the non-financial contributions to the Town C property favoured the husband by about 7%.
Nevertheless, at times, the wife substantially supported the husband financially, paying rent and utilities, buying him a phone and an amplifier and lending him money that he did not repay. I consider that these indirect financial contributions amount to 5% in the wife's favour.
Overall, the contributions during the relationship amount to about 35:65 in relation to the Town C property in the wife's favour. I am excluding the City F property, the superannuation and the minor possessions in this percentage calculation.

The husband made no contributions to the Town C property or the relationship generally following separation.
Following separation, the wife continued to make the mortgage repayments. From separation on 25 November 2023 until the last day of the trial on 23 May 2025 would be about 77 weeks. At $520 per week, that would be $40,040 that the wife paid in post-separation mortgage repayments. That is a contribution on the wife's part to the Town C property.
Following separation, the wife also continued to pay the council rates on the Town C property. Eighteen months of council rates, at $2,550 per year, would be $3,825. That was a contribution on the wife's part to the Town C property.
The mortgage repayments and the rates following separation amount to about $44,000.
No doubt, the wife also paid money to maintain the home. However, that was not quantified, so I am not able to take it into account.
The husband claimed that the wife had $49,000 at separation in a bank account and dissipated it post-separation. This issue did not figure prominently in the hearing. In any event, it was common ground that the parties had separate finances. If anything, the wife during the relationship gave more financial support to the husband than he gave to her. That is, the husband did not contribute to the wife's $49,000 accrued at separation. Therefore, if the wife used up all of the $49,000 post-separation, it does not warrant any adjustment.
After separation, the wife continued to earn about $106,000 per year.
Also following separation, the husband obtained a job where he claims to earn about $83,000 per year. The wife claimed that he earned about $140,000 per year (including his music gigs). However, she did not substantiate that claim and I do not accept it.
I consider that the wife's post-separation mortgage and rates payments warrant an adjustment in the wife's favour of 5% in relation to the Town C property.

I consider that the wife's property in City F should be put to one side and retained by her. She owned it before she met the husband and he has made no contribution to it.
Neither party contributed to the other's superannuation and that should also be put to one side.
The husband did not contribute to the wife's minor possessions. The wife paid for some of the husband's minor possessions, such as his phone and amplifier. Otherwise, the parties largely kept their finances separate. As such, their minor possessions should also be put to one side.
In terms of working out the adjustment, I consider that the percentages should be in relation to the equity in the Town C property, rather than the pool overall.
The parties' initial contributions, leaving aside the City F property, were equal.
As discussed above, the parties' contributions during the relationship in relation to the Town C property were 35:65 in the wife's favour.
Following separation, the wife continued to pay the mortgage and rates on the Town C property, leading to a 5% adjustment in relation to the Town C property in the wife's favour.
In total, I would assess the parties' contributions are 30:70 in relation to the Town C property in the wife's favour.

The wife could be expected to earn more than the husband, while she continues to work. However, she is 10 years older than the husband, and, at 60 years old, is approaching retirement age. She probably only has seven years of working life ahead of her, while the husband has

18 years of working life ahead of him. That is a significant difference. 2. The husband said that his earning capacity was restricted by his prior offending. That is entirely his own fault. However, more to the point, he is presently employed, earning at least $83,000 per year. That is a reasonable wage. There is no reason to suppose that the husband will not continue in that employment for the foreseeable future. 3. There are no other relevant "future" factors. 4. In my view, the "future" factors require a further 5% adjustment in relation to the Town C property in the wife's favour leading to a final split of the equity in the Town C property of 25:75 in the wife's favour.

WHETHER IT IS JUST AND EQUITABLE TO ALTER THE PARTIES' PROPERTY INTERESTS

The wife initially submitted that it would not be just and equitable to alter the parties' property interests. However, at the end of the trial, the wife conceded that perhaps the husband was entitled to 10%. As I have said, it was not clear whether that was meant to be 10% of the overall asset pool or 10% of the equity in the Town C property. Either way, I consider that there needs to be some adjustment to reflect the husband's substantial contributions to the Town C property.

The parties jointly proposed that they each keep their assets, other than a share of the Town C property and a share of the wife's superannuation. I consider that it would be just an equitable for each party to keep the assets in their names or possession and, in addition, the husband to receive an amount equivalent to 25% of the equity in the Town C property. That equity is worth about $145,000. Twenty-five percent of that is $36,250. Although that figure is less than the dollar figure that the husband contributed, he was also financially supported by the wife at times. I am satisfied that the percentage figures discussed above result in a just and equitable outcome.
The wife is in no position to pay the husband $36,250 in cash. However, she does have $160,823 in superannuation. The husband proposed that he receive a superannuation split of $44,702. Following the hearing, Ms Teicher emailed to chambers a letter dated 27 March 2025 to the trustee of the wife's superannuation fund enclosing the husband's further amended application which included proposed superannuation orders. That letter is marked as exhibit 39. There is no evidence of a response, but all that procedural fairness requires is that the superannuation fund be put on notice of the proposed orders. I am satisfied that has occurred in the present case.
I note that the husband claimed that a large part of his contribution to the Town C property was money drawn down from his superannuation. In effect, an order that the husband's share of the Town C property be paid in the form of a superannuation split would enable the husband to substantially replenish his superannuation.
There will be orders accordingly.

The husband proposed that the wife pay his costs on a full indemnity basis. Subsections 114UB(1), (2) and (3) of the Act provide that:

(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, subsection 102QAB(6) and sections 114UD and 114UE, each party to proceedings under this Act is to bear the party's own costs.

(2) If, in proceedings under this Act, the court is of the opinion that there are circumstances that justify it in doing so, the court may, subject to subsection (3) of this section, sections 114UC and 114UD and the applicable Rules of Court, make any order for costs and security for costs that the court considers just, whether by way of interlocutory order or otherwise.

(3) In considering what costs order (if any) should be made, the court must have regard to the following:

(a) the financial circumstances of each party to the proceedings;

(b) whether any party to the proceedings is receiving assistance by way of legal aid in respect of the proceedings and, if so, the terms of the grant of the assistance to that party;

(c) the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings including, without limiting paragraphs (a) and (b), the conduct of the parties in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions of facts, production of documents and similar matters, and in relation to their duty of disclosure under subsection 71B(1), 90RI(1) or 90YJA(1);

(d) whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders of the court;

(e) whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings;

(f) whether a party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer;

(g) such other matters as the court considers relevant.

The parties' financial circumstances are as set out above. In summary, neither party is very well off, but the wife is better off than the husband.
The husband was initially privately funded but later, and for the trial, received funding under the Commonwealth Family Violence Scheme. The wife was privately funded.
Both parties conducted the hearing in a disorganised manner, which added to the hearing time. In addition, as discussed above, the husband attempted to mislead the court following the hearing in relation to exhibit 37. The wife substantially shifted her position during the course of the proceedings.
The proceedings were not necessitated by the failure of a party to comply with an order of the court.
Both parties were somewhat unsuccessful in the proceedings.
No offers have been made known to the court.
In all the circumstances, I do not consider that it would be just to order the wife to pay the husband's costs on an indemnity basis or otherwise. That is particularly because the husband was not very successful in the proceedings, and neither party has very much money. The husband's costs application will be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and thirty-one (231) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Riley.

Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001

Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021

Support (Assessment) Act 1989

(2003) 30 Fam LR 355

(2012) 47 Fam LR 481

Stanford v Stanford

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