Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020

PARTIES - COMMITTEE - LEGAL PERSON - The applicant names the committee as the respondent. The questions are whether a committee is a legal person able to be sued, and therefore whether the committee or instead the body corporate is the proper respondent.

STANDING - JURISDICTION - The applicant applies in its capacity as a committee member. It is also the caretaking service contractor. Some disputes relate to the caretaking service contract. The questions are: whether the applicant is directly concerned with each alleged dispute and therefore has standing to make the application; and whether some disputes are properly characterised as a complex dispute and therefore beyond an adjudicator's jurisdiction.

STAY - NATURAL JUSTICE - The applicant requests an indefinite stay of determination of the application to allow it time to respond to requests for information, on the basis its nominee is unwell. Whether an indefinite stay is required by natural justice and is warranted in the circumstances.

DECLARATORY ORDER - The applicant seeks declaratory orders to provide guidance to the committee about the meaning and effect of certain provisions. The question is whether the order would resolve a dispute and have real consequences or merely be an advisory opinion, and therefore whether a declaration ought to be made.

ADMINISTRATOR - The applicant seeks the appointment of an administrator to conduct various reviews into the committee's conduct. The question is whether an administrator appointment is warranted.

REASONABLENESS - The applicant seeks to have numerous committee resolutions declared void including because the committee did not fully comply with all the requirements for reasonable decision making. The question is whether the decisions are proven to be unreasonable.

Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld): ss 238, 270(1), 270(2), 276(1), 100(5)

• [1] This is the first of the final decisions on a series of 6 applications made in quick succession by applicants who are, or are associated with, the caretaking service contractor, its director and the owner of lot 1 at Somerset Gardens CTS 25221. For two of those applications, interim order applications have been dismissed.[1]
• [2] Pango Holdings Pty Ltd (Pango) is the scheme's caretaking service contractor (a term often shortened to 'caretaker'). By reason of the legislation, Pango is therefore also a member of the body corporate's committee, albeit unelected and non-voting. Pango makes this application in that committee member capacity. Pango's director, Violet Blackstock, is also the owner of lot 1 in the scheme. She nominates her husband, Laszlo Koszo (also known as Les Blackstock), whom I presume also to be an occupier of Lot 1, as her representative in each of the applications.
• [3] The applicant seeks 5 outcomes, the third of which involves many separate outcomes. The requested outcomes are, broadly described and adopting the applicant's numbering:
  1. A declaratory order about the operation of various provisions of the legislation, with a view to providing guidelines for the future conduct of the committee.
  2. An order appointing an administrator to undertake various specified tasks.
  3. An order declaring that resolutions 3, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24 and 25 passed at the Vote Outside of Committee Meeting (VOCM) on 15 July 2024 were void.
  4. An order declaring that the agenda items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 proposed for the EGM of 6 August 2024 were void for irregularity, because motion 25 of the 15 July 2024 VOCM proposing to put up those agenda items is invalid.
  5. An order for the respondent to pay to the applicant the amount paid by the applicant as fees for the adjudication application.
• [4] The grounds for the various orders are that the decisions are at odds with the scope of the caretaking service contractor agreement or that otherwise the committee has, over time and in respect of the particular decisions referred to in the requested outcomes, acted unreasonably or otherwise unlawfully.
• [5] I have dismissed the application in its entirety, variously because:

¾ I do not have jurisdiction for some of the disputes, because they are a 'complex dispute' involving a contractual matter between Pango as the caretaking service contractor and the body corporate, which therefore must be decided by a specialist adjudicator or QCAT

¾ for some of the disputes within my jurisdiction, the applicant as a non-voting committee member is not directly concerned with the dispute and therefore does not have 'standing' to bring the application, and otherwise

• [6] The committee for the body corporate is named as the respondent to this application. Even if I were satisfied it is appropriate to make any of the requested orders, I am not satisfied that I can make an order against the committee, as I cannot see that it is able to be sued.

• [7] Somerset Gardens CTS 25221 consists of 97 lots and common property. The scheme is governed by the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (Act) and, as specified in its community management statement, the Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020 (Accommodation Module).
• [8] An adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances to resolve a dispute relating to the Act, the regulation modules made under the Act, or a scheme's by-laws.[2]
• [9] An adjudicator is not bound by the rules of evidence and procedure that apply to a court.[3] However, an adjudicator must be reasonably satisfied of the relevant matters on the balance of probabilities, base their findings on logically probative evidence,[4] and observe natural justice.[5]

• [10] This application was decided 'on the papers', meaning that the application, submissions and evidence were given in writing only. All submissions have been read and considered, and where relevant to legal questions to be considered and factual matters in dispute, those submissions are referred to in my reasons, below.
• [11] I note that the applicant seeks to make something of the fact that the Commissioner may choose to inform the body corporate that it need not distribute the application to owners and to invite their submissions.[6] Nonetheless, submissions were invited from owners, according to the Commissioner's usual practice.
• [12] The applicant's nominated representative, Lazlo Koszo (then known to this Office as Les Blackstock), advised the Commissioner that he wished to inspect other parties' submissions on the application before deciding whether to pay the fee to receive copies of them. However, that could not be arranged because he was overseas at the time and the inspection of documents can only be done personally, at this Office's Brisbane location. On 19 June 2025, I therefore provided those submissions[7] to the applicant, through Mr Koszo by email, and invited the applicant's response,[8] pursuant to my investigation power.[9] The applicant did not respond to the invitation.
• [13] On 18 July 2025, I also put the applicant on notice of my preliminary views on the issues concerning the proper respondent, jurisdiction for complex disputes, and standing.[10] Again, there was no substantive response to my invitation to address me on those issues, apart from an email of 8 August 2025, discussed below.

• [14] While not substantively responding to my emails of 19 June and 18 July 2025, the applicant, through Mr Koszo, emailed this office on 8 August 2025, informing the Commissioner's delegate that, among other things, he had changed his name to Lazlo Koszo (the application materials until this point had always referred to him as Les Blackstock). It was not explained why this Office was informed of this only now, given the change of name certificate provided as evidence of the change is dated 15 December 2021, now more than 3 years ago, nor why the applicant's director, Mrs Blackstock, repeatedly and solely referred to him as Les Blackstock in nominating him as the applicant's representative.
• [15] The 8 August 2025 email from Mr Koszo also seeks to explain the lack of substantive responses on behalf of the applicant and requests an indefinite stay of all the applications presently undecided until Mr Koszo is well enough to make reply submissions, respond to my preliminary views referred to above, and to deal with other matters. The 8 August email provides:

As you are aware I have not responded to previous emails, from yourself or adjudicators in matters 1027-2024, 1162-2024, 1202-2024, 0034-2025 and 0107-2025.

This action, is not because of a lack of desire, but being unable due to my psychological distress.

That has been caused, in part, by the actions of the committee at Somerset Gardens and the response of staff at the BCCM Commissioner's office. The action of staff that I speak of are:

- forcing me to address "urgency" that was latter not an issue in front of adjudicators,

- be make the adjustments to my applications and been respond in previous applications.

- the way that the staff at the commissioner's office failed to reaonsobale address my handle complaint made to the department of justice,

- and what appears to be a bias against applicants who stand up against bullies misusing their powers on the body corporate Act. To me section 276(1) to allows adjudicators to deal with "anticipated" contraventions of the Act, however the adjudicators

- would not stop stopping [sic] committee members acting to cause nuisance and harm on body corporate land that led to a deterioration in my wife's well being, that I had to deal with and then led to my own deterioration

- would not stop those committee members overspending (that end of year Financial reports are attached, read page 3). How can it be a just and equitable decision to allow administrative budget to be over spend by $150,000 and using the sinking fund to pay for additional expenditure.

I attach a medical certificate (and my change of name certificate) that explains my present situation being unable to respond.

I am working on be being able to recover and have left the county, on my treating doctor's advice with my wife to try to help our recovery.

I ask that all matters be placed "on hold" till my recovery allows me to be able to fairly respond to requests and submissions and make adjustments to the application that the adjudicator suggested.

• [16] The medical certificate referred to is issued by a general practitioner who reports that Mr Koszo has been a patient in his care 'for the last 5 years' and 'is currently suffering from a relapse of his fragile mental conditions' and that 'he has just been assessed by his Psychiatrist.' There is no other information provided about the nature or severity of the condition, nor is a report from the treating psychiatrist provided. The certificate goes on to state that Mr Koszo 'is medically unfit and unable to complete and present a submission to the Commission on the due date on 04/08/2025' but there is no opinion given as to his fitness after that date, nor a general prognosis.
• [17] I take the last paragraph of Mr Koszo's email to be a request for an indefinite stay of this and the other applications still on foot.
• [18] I responded to the applicant on 8 August 2025, requiring it to inform me by 18 August 2025 whether the applicant proposed to nominate another representative in the proceedings, other than Mr Koszo, or otherwise withdraw the applications presently on foot. I also said that I would otherwise proceed, without further notice, in the absence of a suitable response. I did not receive a response by the date of this decision.

Relevant considerations for a stay application

• [19] I now turn to the considerations relevant to granting an indefinite stay of the application.
• [20] An adjournment or stay application must be considered in the relevant statutory, factual and case management context.[11]
• [21] Section 4 of the Act provides that its secondary objects include to 'to provide an efficient and effective dispute resolution process'. I take those words to imply a requirement to decide an application without undue delay. That view is bolstered by section 269 of the Act, which deals with the 'investigation' of an application by an adjudicator.[12] The section requires an adjudicator to 'act as quickly .... as is consistent with a fair and proper consideration of the application'. Even if that were not specifically provided for in the Act, an adjudicator must consider the reasonable needs and expectations of all parties in the interests of fairness and justice, including as to the timeliness of a decision. Brennan J, speaking for the justice system generally, said in the High Court matter Jago v District Court (NSW):[13]

... it is a truism that justice delayed is justice denied. In Lord Bacon's words (quoted by Dr Kenny, op.cit., p 607) "(j)ustice is sweetest when it is freshest." Therefore, within the limits of their resources, the courts so mould their procedures as to avoid unnecessary delays in the disposition of cases both criminal and civil. But the avoidance of delay in administering justice is not the sole concern of the courts. The courts do not have command of all of the resources which are necessary to secure prompt justice and, if they were to assume a responsibility beyond their capacity, they would offer a hope of protection which they are unfitted to fulfil. The furthest which a court can go is to regulate its procedures to avoid unnecessary delay, to do what can be done to achieve fairness in a trial and to prevent the abuse of its process.

• [22] Relevant considerations in deciding whether to grant a party's application for adjournment or stay include:[14]

¾ the extent to which the need for a delay is properly explained and evidenced

¾ the point to which the proceedings have progressed and the extent to which the requesting party has already had an opportunity to put their case

¾ the prospects of success in the application for the requesting party

¾ the concomitant strain and uncertainty imposed on other parties and affected persons by delay, whether they be natural persons or corporations, and

¾ the potential for loss of public confidence in the legal system which arises where a decision-maker is seen to accede to applications made without adequate explanation or justification.

• [23] My first concern with the request is in regard to the need for the stay. It is Mr Koszo's alleged incapacity which is presented as the reason, yet he is no more than the applicant's director's nominee. The applicant's director Mrs Blackstone is allegedly also unwell (there is no evidence of that before me) but alternatively the applicant could engage with the application by nominating a lawyer or another person to act for it.
• [24] As to the evidence for Mr Koszo's alleged incapacity, it is scant and frankly unconvincing - 'fragile mental conditions' is an unhelpfully vague diagnosis_ - _and does not account for Mr Koszo's apparent ability to draft the email set out above, including to make further submissions about alleged financial mismanagement, and to travel to and from overseas.
• [25] I cannot see why the applicant, through Mr Koszo or otherwise, could not at least briefly respond to indicate (for example) disagreement with my preliminary views about parties, jurisdiction and standing. As to the further time required, the applicant gives no indication as to when it might even engage further with the application. I cannot reasonably be expected to wait indefinitely just for a response to that fundamental issue.
• [26] As to the purpose of the delay, the applicant seeks a stay to allow time for it to reply to other parties' submissions and my email about my preliminary views. I am obliged under the Act to provide natural justice to the parties[15] and I would do so even if that were not statutorily mandated, given the nature of the proceedings. However, there is a limit to which a decision-maker is expected to go in accommodating special requests; the obligation extends only to giving the party a reasonable opportunity to put their case, and whether the party has been afforded natural justice in any one instance depends on the particular circumstances.[16]
• [27] In that regard, I note that the applicant had already been invited to receive copies of the submissions for the purpose of a reply, but at that time chose not to receive copies and instead pressed an impracticable request to physically inspect the submissions while its director and nominee were overseas. While it is the case the receiving submissions would have come at a greater cost - the applicant was informed the cost would be $344.40 - rather than inspecting them, that cost is hardly prohibitive for this applicant. Further, my invitation to the applicant to address my concerns about the nomination of parties, jurisdiction and standing was made out of an abundance of caution. A decision-maker is not obliged to reveal to the applicant their thought processes or adverse conclusions on the application, unless those things would not obviously be apparent on the known material.[17] In that regard, the applicant had clearly turned its mind to these issues in its submissions. The onus ultimately rests with the applicant to make its case at the outset. In any event, as will be apparent from my consideration of the issues, below, I cannot see that the applicant could say much about those matters which would likely improve its ultimate prospects of success.
• [28] Finally, an indefinite stay of an application, at an applicant's request, and especially when it seeks to invalidate a number of body corporate decisions which the body corporate is both entitled and required to act upon, would unfairly leave a metaphorical sword hanging above the committee members' and owners' heads. In my view, the respondent and affected owners would be justified in feeling less confident in the capacity of the Commissioner's dispute resolution service to serve its purpose, were an indefinite stay granted at this stage.
• [29] I therefore decline to stay determination of the application any further.

• [30] I will firstly deal with some fundamental aspects of dispute resolution under the Act which are particularly relevant in his case.
• [31] The first of those matters is the nomination of the 'parties' - that is, the 'applicant' and the 'respondent' - to an application.
• [32] The second of those matters is a jurisdiction issue - specifically, that disputes about a caretaking service contract generally are beyond an adjudicator's jurisdiction.
• [33] The third matter concerns whether the applicant has a sufficient connection to each of the various disputes - usually called 'standing' - to entitle them to make an application for dispute resolution.
• [34] I will then go on to address the merits of the grounds for the various requested orders.

• [35] I will firstly address the applicant's choice of respondent for the application.
• [36] The then-current version of the adjudication application form, BCCM Form 15, required an applicant to identify a respondent to the application and separately to indicate the capacity in which the respondent is named, with reference to section 227 of the Act, for example that it is the body corporate. The applicant must also indicate the capacity in which it applies, for example as an owner.
• [37] Section 227 is relevant to an application because section 276(1) of the Act empowers an adjudicator to make an order to resolve a 'dispute', and 'dispute' is defined by section 227(1) with reference to paired categories of disputants.[18] Section 227 therefore plays a key role in defining the boundaries of the Act's dispute resolution jurisdiction.
• [38] Section 227 relevantly provides:

(a) the owner or occupier of a lot included in a community titles scheme and the owner or occupier of another lot included in the scheme; or

(b) the body corporate for a community titles scheme and the owner or occupier of a lot included in the scheme; or

(c) the body corporate for a community titles scheme and a body corporate manager for the scheme; or

(d) the body corporate for a community titles scheme and a caretaking service contractor for the scheme; or

(e) the body corporate for a community titles scheme and a service contractor for the scheme, if the dispute arises out of a review carried out, or required to be carried out, under chapter 3, part 2, division 7; or

(f) the body corporate for a community titles scheme and a letting agent for the scheme; or

(g) the body corporate for a community titles scheme and a member of the committee for the body corporate; or

(h) the committee for the body corporate for a community titles scheme and a member of the committee; or

(i) the body corporate for a community titles scheme and a former body corporate manager for the scheme about the return, by the former body corporate manager to the body corporate, of body corporate property; or

(j) if the dispute is about access by an interested person (layered arrangement) to the records of a body corporate for a community titles scheme in a layered arrangement of community titles schemes - the person and the body corporate; or

(k) if the dispute is about the giving of documents or material required to be given to a body corporate for a community titles scheme by an original owner under this Act - the body corporate and the original owner for the scheme.

(2) An application by a person mentioned in subsection (1)(a) to (h) for a declaratory order about the operation of this Act is also a dispute even if there is no respondent or affected person for the application.

an application by a body corporate for an order declaring the financial year for the body corporate

• [39] On the application form, the applicant has nominated 'The secretary to the Body Corporate of Somerst [sic] Garden CTS 25221)' as the respondent but also checked a box to indicate the respondent's capacity is 'the committee' (there being no checkbox on the form to indicate 'secretary'). In its submissions,[19] the applicant refers to having a dispute with the committee, and also to the committee being the respondent, and so I take the committee to be the applicant's intended respondent.
• [40] One of those categories, in subsection 227(1)(h), provides for a dispute between a committee and a committee member (and vice versa), and I note there is no category for a dispute between two committee members or a committee member and the secretary. Presumably that, and perhaps also the gist of the applicant's complaints being about committee actions, prompted the applicant to name the committee as the respondent. Therefore, it seems both logical and consistent with section 227(1) for the applicant to name the committee as the respondent to the application.
• [41] However, for the reasons following, in my view, whenever a committee is a material participant in a dispute, for example when a committee decision is sought to be enforced or challenged, including for a section 227(1)(h)-type dispute, the body corporate should be named as the applicant or respondent (as the case may be).
  • [42] I will next address various aspects that issue:

¾ firstly, whether the categorises of disputants specified in section 227(1) dictates who must be named as applicant and respondent

¾ secondly, and regardless of section 227(1)(h), whether a committee can be an applicant or respondent in an application for adjudication

¾ thirdly, whether an adjudicator can order that an application be amended to change the nominated parties, despite the applicant's wishes, and

¾ fourthly, despite anything flowing from the above considerations, whether in the circumstances the nomination of parties ultimately matters.

Does s 227(1) dictate the nomination of parties?

• [43] In almost all cases, the combination of disputants as identified in the section 227(1) categories will also be appropriate to be named as the parties in the application - for example, where a lot owner disputes the body corporate's compliance with its maintenance obligations, the application is appropriately made as owner applicant against body corporate respondent. However, in my view, the appropriate parties to the application diverges from the section 227(1) disputant categories when the dispute involves a committee, because I cannot see that a committee may sue or be sued (ie, be an applicant or respondent), for reasons discussed below.
• [44] I have noted above that an applicant might be prompted to name the committee as a party because a committee is contemplated by section 227(1)(h) to be a participant for a relevant dispute. A question therefore arises as to whether section 227(1) dictates who or what must be named as the parties.
• [45] I would firstly observe that the explicit purpose of section 227(1) is to define a 'dispute'. An application involves a dispute but a dispute is not an application, and so the parties to a dispute are not necessarily the parties to an application. Further, I cannot see that the Act explicitly ties the nomination of parties to the subsection 227(1) categories. I note that subsection 227(2) commences 'An application by a person mentioned in subsection (1)(a) to (h)...', which might suggest that all of the parties mentioned therein, including a committee, may be an applicant. However, I do not take that to be a necessary implication, and the use of the word 'person' indicates that the applicant needs to be a legal person, in which case I have doubts that a committee may be an applicant.[20] That contention is addressed further below.
• [46] The answer, in my view, is therefore that while section 227(1) governs the types of disputants who may be the subject of an application for adjudication, it does not necessarily follow that the categories of disputants necessarily indicate who are then the proper parties in the application.

Can a committee be a party to an application?

• [47] Whether someone or something can be a party to an application is another way of asking whether they can sue or be sued. It is uncontroversial to say that natural persons and corporate entities, being recognised legal persons, may sue and be sued civilly, under the general law. For an association of natural persons, corporate character was described by Fullagar J in Williams v Hursey (Williams) as:[21]

... independent existence as a legal person. It is given a personality, which is distinct from that of all or any of its members, and which continues to subsist unchanged notwithstanding the changes which are bound to occur from time to time in its membership

• [48] However, an unincorporated association of persons cannot sue or be sued unless some instrument, such as a statute, gives it that capacity.[22] That might arise explicitly, by providing that it can sue or be sued, or it might arise implicitly, by providing for example that the group is a registered organisation or has a common seal or that it may own and deal with property.[23]
• [49] Given that a suit against an unincorporated association is by default not contemplated under the law, one would expect to see a clear indication of any exception. So, for example, the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) explicitly provides that an unincorporated association may be sued, through a nominated defendant, in the specific case of an action for alleged child abuse.[24]
• [50] For the purposes of this Act, section 238 provides for who may make an adjudication application, that being a 'person, including the body corporate for a community titles scheme'. A 'person' is not defined in the Act. A meaning of 'person' is found in section 32(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) (AIA): 'In an Act, a reference to a person generally includes a reference to a corporation as well as an individual' and the Schedule defines 'corporation' to include 'a body politic or corporate' but does not mention an unincorporated body. The AIA Schedule accounts for unincorporated bodies, in the definition of 'entity', but section 238 does not allow an application by an 'entity'. In my view, unless there is a contrary indication elsewhere in the Act, that tends to suggest that an unincorporated association cannot make an adjudication application, nor, by implication, that it can be a respondent to one. I will next address whether there are any such contrary indications.
• [51] The relevant instruments in this case are the Act and the regulation modules, and so I have looked for indications in them of whether a committee has corporate character. I consider the following matters to be relevant indicators.
• [52] The fact that a committee can be a disputant for section 227(1)(h) purposes might indicate a capacity to sue or be sued even if, as I have suggested above, that section does not mandate who are the parties. But if in fact it is an indicator, it is not a particularly strong one. A body corporate is also mentioned as a disputant in section 227(1) but that in itself apparently was considered insufficient to complete the picture because the legislation at section 33(2) additionally provides explicitly that a body corporate can sue and be sued. It was arguably unnecessary for that to be provided in the legislation because the fact that a body corporate exists[25] would almost certainly be sufficient to conclude it can sue and be sued. To put it another way, in my view it is significant that the legislation omits to say that a committee also can sue and be sued. Concluding that section 227(1) does not indicate that a committee may be a party does not render section 227(1)(h) useless; it still serves the purpose of marking out the territory for an actionable dispute. I say more about the purpose of section 227(1) in that regard, below.
• [53] A committee has significant decision-making power, which also might indicate corporate character. However, that power is limited. Perhaps most significantly, subsection 100(1) provides that a 'decision of the committee is a decision of the body corporate' - it does not say that a committee decision is 'also' a body corporate decision. In other words, while a decision may have been made in a committee meeting, formally it is a body corporate decision. Further, the range of issues upon which a committee can make a decision is restricted; it cannot make a decision changing the rights, privileges or obligations of the owners, and owners are able to resolve to take much of a committee's legislated functions and powers out of the committee's hands by further restricting the issues it may decide. [26]
• [54] Further to that point above concerning the limited authority of a committee, Ch 3, Part 1, Div 2 of the Act indicates that a committee essentially operates only with delegated authority of the body corporate, to which it is subordinate: the section principally addressing committee powers, section 100, is titled 'Power of the committee to act for the body corporate', indicating it does not act for itself; and a committee has no choice but to implement a lawful body corporate decision.[27] That is underscored by the regulation modules, for example Accommodation Module section 5(1), providing that a reference to the chairperson is a reference to the 'chairperson of the body corporate for the scheme' (and similarly for the secretary and treasurer) ie not as an office-holder of the committee for the body corporate.
• [55] Fullagar J in the _William_s extract above notes that a group or association is indicated to have corporate character if it continues to subsist unchanged notwithstanding changes in its membership. That could be said of a committee, which can continue to exist despite membership changes from time to time. But a committee's very existence is not certain at any one time. That is because owners may fail to elect a committee, or decide to replace a committee with a body corporate manager or seek an order to replace a committee with an administrator.[28] That, in my view, suggests a committee does not have the perpetual existence Fullagar J was describing as an indicator of distinct legal personality. The ephemeral nature of a committee makes it unsuitable to be sued. I note also that while it is possible to have qualified legal capacity, there is no such thing at law as qualified legal personality - legal personality either exists or does not.[29]
• [56] Further, the Act provides for a body corporate to hold proprietary rights and assets,[30] but there are no equivalent provisions for a committee. Not only is that characteristic of the committee's lack of legal personality, its inability to hold assets highlights the limited mechanisms for redress if it is sued, or remedy if it sues.
• [57] It is also not necessary that a committee can sue or be sued, because the body corporate stands available for that purpose. As I have noted, the Act creates a body corporate upon the establishment of the scheme and also explicitly provides that a body corporate may sue and be sued in the body corporate's name.[31] For that purpose, section 315 of the Act provides that a body corporate is required to record an address for service of legal documents with the registrar, and also provides for an owner's address for service, but it makes no similar provision for a committee.
• [58] In my view, these factors tend to militate against an idea that, under this legislation, a committee has distinct legal personality, or otherwise can sue and be sued.
• [59] Accordingly, I do not consider that a committee is a legal person which can sue or be sued, and therefore be nominated as an applicant or respondent for an adjudication application.

Can the nominated parties be amended by order?

• [60] The applicant did not respond to my invitation to consider amending the application, to instead name the body corporate as the respondent. I have therefore considered whether an adjudicator can order that a person or body corporate be substituted or joined as a party to an application, regardless of the applicant's wishes. I note there is seemingly such a power conferred on Queensland's Supreme, District and Magistrates Courts, by r. 62 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, but it has been said that it is not for the court to exercise that power without an application seeking it.[32] In any event, there is no such power vested in adjudicators by the terms of this Act, and I cannot see a basis to conclude that the power arises by necessary implication or inherently.
• [61] I note that an example given for section 240(1) of the Act provides that the Commissioner 'may require the application to be amended to more accurately identify respondents to, or affected persons for, the application', but that is not the same as an adjudicator doing so by order, as the Commissioner and adjudicators have clearly differentiated powers in the dispute resolution process. In any event, the statutory example is odd because the provision it purports to exemplify does not in fact empower the Commissioner to compel an applicant to make an amendment nor to reject an application for wrongly naming a respondent.[33] Rather, it empowers the Commissioner to 'require the applicant to give further information or material about the application to help the commissioner decide the further action to be taken on the application.' While an example may extend the meaning of a provision, the example and the provision are to be read in the context of each other and if the example and the provision are inconsistent, the provision prevails.[34]
• [62] Even if an adjudicator or the Commissioner did have power to unilaterally amend the application parties, in this case it is apparent from its submissions on the issue that the applicant has given careful consideration to the proper formulation of this application and has decided to proceed as a committee member (Pango having legal personality) against the committee as respondent.

Does the choice of committee or body corporate as respondent matter?

• [63] The question arises as to whether it matters if the committee and not the body corporate is named as a party to an application - putting to one side whether it is in fact technically proper - especially when it is a legislated requirement to give notice of the application to the body corporate and it is the Commissioner's usual practice to also require notice to be given to all owners, so that they may be heard.[35]
• [64] My concern is that if an order is made for or against a committee as applicant or respondent, and action to enforce the order is required, the jurisdiction in which enforcement action is taken may decline to make an enforcement order for or against the committee on the basis it is not a legal person and (as a respondent) has no property or assets against which to secure enforcement.[36] I also note that I cannot make an order involving the payment of money for or against a committee, given it cannot hold assets.
• [65] My next concern is that, if I decide that the order can only be made on the non-party body corporate - for example, to appoint an administrator, as sought in this case - the scope for making a non-party order in this jurisdiction and under the general law is, I understand, apparently quite limited. Under this Act, I am limited to making a very restricted costs order in favour of a non-party who suffered a loss arising from an application, for example the cost of getting legal advice[37]. As to the general law, I am less certain, but it appears the occasions are rare: costs orders (and even then, only in limited circumstances); freezing assets the subject of a proceeding; and interlocutory orders advancing the just and efficient conduct of proceedings, such as for discovery of documents. The enforcement jurisdiction might also decline to instead make an order for or against its corresponding body corporate because it was not a named party to the adjudication application.
• [66] A jurisdiction hearing an appeal of an order for or against a committee may have similar concerns in deciding the question of whether to allow the appeal and make orders other than those made at first instance.

• [67] It follows that I do not consider it appropriate to make orders against the committee as respondent.
• [68] However, in case I am wrong on that point, I will go on to consider the application as if the committee is an appropriate respondent.
• [69] I will next address the questions as to what extent I have jurisdiction to resolve some of the disputes and whether the applicant has standing to bring the application in respect the other requested outcomes.

• [70] The applicant submits expressly that it makes this application not in its capacity as the caretaking service contractor in respect of a dispute with the body corporate.[38] That raises an important question about my capacity to decide this application, because disputes in that category would generally fall outside a department adjudicator's jurisdiction, being a 'complex dispute'. Section 229(2) of the Act provides that 'the only remedy for a complex dispute' is a resolution of the dispute by a specialist adjudicator or QCAT. The necessary implication of the phrase 'only remedy' is that only a specialist adjudicator or QCAT has jurisdiction to decide a complex dispute.[39] Schedule 6 of the Act defines 'complex dispute' with reference to disputes mentioned in one of various provisions of the Act, including section 149B. Section 149B provides that it applies to a dispute about a 'claimed or anticipated contractual matter' including about the engagement of a caretaking service contractor, and confirms that a party to such a dispute may apply to a specialist adjudicator or QCAT for an order to resolve the matter. A caretaking service contractor is defined by Schedule 6 of the Act to mean a service contractor for the scheme who is also a letting agent for the scheme. The applicant is, by its own admission, a caretaking service contractor, and that is confirmed by the terms of the 'Caretaking and Letting Agreement' executed by the body corporate and Pango on 26 October 2022 (Agreement). Schedule 6 defines a 'contractual matter' as follows:

contractual matter, about an engagement or authorisation of a body corporate manager, service contractor or letting agent, means - > > (a) a contravention of the terms of the engagement or authorisation; or > > (b) the termination of the engagement or authorisation; or > > (c) the exercise of rights or powers under the terms of the engagement or authorisation; or

(d) the performance of duties under the terms of the engagement or authorisation.

• [71] Accordingly, a dispute between Pango and the body corporate about the Agreement is likely to be beyond my jurisdiction, unless some other aspect of the dispute changes its essential character. As will be discussed below, at my paragraphs [80] and [81], the proper characterisation of a dispute turns on the objective nature of the dispute, regardless of any other characterisation asserted by a party.

• [72] An applicant cannot bring an application simply because the nature of the dispute brings it generally within the Act's jurisdiction. The applicant must have a sufficient connection or concern with the dispute. That requirement is sometimes referred to as the locus standi rule and the connection is usually referred to as having 'standing' in the application.
• [73] Australian courts' general approach to standing is summarised by Lockhart J in Right to Life Assn (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health:[40]

Australian courts, notably the High Court in its judgment in the Australian Conservation Foundation case, have closed the door to the principle of open standing. The effect of the locus standi rule is to exclude some people from obtaining relief from the courts in declaring and enforcing the law in circumstances where others could obtain that relief. Neither Australian nor any other country of which I have knowledge has a completely open system in civil law in the sense that anyone can obtain a ruling from a court on any subject upon which the person desires a ruling; for example, a system where a person can obtain a declaration that another person had committed a crime or where A can seek a declaration as to whether B is indebted to C. The general rule is that a person can obtain relief from a court in civil cases only if the person is interested in the sense which I have mentioned earlier.

• [74] The word standing is not explicitly used in the Act but the requirement to have it in this jurisdiction is clearly indicated by the terms of section 238 of the Act, which governs who may make an application. It provides:

(1) A person, including the body corporate for a community titles scheme, may make an application if the person -

(a) is a party to, and is directly concerned with, a dispute to which this chapter applies; and

(b) other than a body corporate who makes an adjudication application for an alternative insurance order - has made reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute by internal dispute resolution.

(2) This section is subject to sections 183A and 184 to 186.

• [75] The relevant words in that section for standing purposes are 'directly concerned with'. There is no need for the word 'standing' itself to be employed. In Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council, Gageler and Gleeson JJ explained that standing has been variously expressed in other terms too including, for example, 'sufficient interest', 'sufficient material interest', 'special interest' or a 'real interest'.[41] Their Honours went on to say (at [66]):

In Robinson, Mason J observed that "cases are infinitely various" and that "what is a sufficient interest in one case may be less than sufficient in another". In Onus, Brennan J added to that observation that the sufficiency of the interest of a person in a particular case "must be a question of degree, but not a question of discretion" and that in answering that question of degree it is appropriate to consider both whether the interest is "sufficient to assure that 'concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues' falling for determination" and whether the interest is "so distinctive" as to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

• [76] As Brennan J observed in Onus,[42] the connection or interest a person has in a particular case may be a matter of degree, but standing is not a matter over which the adjudicator may exercise discretion - the applicant either has an objectively sufficient degree of interest or connection to establish standing, or they do not. So, the seriousness of an alleged contravention (for example) is not relevant to deciding whether a party has standing for the particular dispute.

• [77] One might wonder why standing matters. After all, if there is a dispute to be resolved, and its subject matter concerns an issue within jurisdiction, one might say that resolving the dispute must be worthwhile. One might go on to say that if a person is motivated to bring the application, pay the application fee and put their time and energy into compiling the necessary information and evidence, then they are for all intents and purposes sufficiently connected to it to have standing.
• [78] However, courts have long recognised that motivation to bring an application, however well-intentioned, does not itself satisfy the requirement for standing. In Kuczborski v Queensland,[43] the High Court considered whether the applicant/appellant had standing to challenge the validity of the Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (Qld), and explained why standing is important and requires strict observance:[44]

[184] The established requirements as to standing ensure that the work of the courts remains focused upon the determination of rights, duties, liabilities and obligations as the most concrete and specific expression of the law in its practical operation, rather than the writing of essays of essentially academic interest. To recognise that a person has a sufficient interest to seek the exercise of judicial power where that exercise is apt to affect 'the legal situation of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the court' serves to maintain the ordinary characteristics of judicial power.

[185] It may be accepted that there is a general public interest that governments act in accordance with the law enforced by the courts; but to conclude that the plaintiff's sense of grievance at the injustice of these laws is not an interest which suffices to give him standing to challenge their validity is not to undermine this aspect of the rule of law. Any person actually in jeopardy of punishment under these laws will have standing to challenge their validity.

[186] In addition, the established requirements as to standing help to ensure that the exercise of judicial power is informed, as fully as possible, by the 'concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues'. It may be acknowledged that the rules as to standing will not always achieve that purpose, as will be seen in the discussion of the wide-ranging arguments agitated in this case in relation to the second category of challenged laws. Nevertheless, adherence to the established requirements as to standing is generally apt to improve the quality of judicial decision-making by ensuring that the focus and strength of the arguments advanced by the parties reflect the importance of the prospective outcome for the parties. (footnotes omitted)

Standing and the s 227(1) categories of disputant

• [79] The applicant proceeds on the basis that it is a committee member and that it is disputing committee decisions, and so has standing because there are disputants which match a requisite category, namely subsection 227(1)(h).
• [80] However, as McGill DCJ observes in Body Corporate for Palm Springs Residences CTS 29467 v J Patterson Holdings Pty Ltd,[45] finding a category in section 227(1) applicable to the nominal status of the parties is not enough to satisfy section 238 as to standing. Further, his Honour seemingly considered the standing requirement, or something essentially similar, arises also under section 227(1). So, for example, someone who is a caretaking service contractor does not have standing simply because section 227(1)(d) nominally provides for them and because they have a dispute with the body corporate; it is also necessary to consider whether the dispute in fact has anything to do with their role or circumstances as a caretaking service contractor and the relationship of that to the body corporate. His Honour said:

[12] Accordingly it seems to me that what matters for the purpose of s 227(1)(d) is whether the dispute is between the body corporate and someone who came to be in dispute with the body corporate because of circumstances associated with that person's status as a caretaking service contractor. That follows because the purpose of the chapter as indicated in s 228(1)(d) includes dealing with disputes about matters arising under the engagement of persons as service contractors. Accordingly what matters for the purpose of s 227 is the basis of the dispute rather than the status of the individuals concerned. What matters is whether the dispute arose with the party other than the body corporate because that other party was a caretaking service contractor. .... Conversely, I do not think that a dispute which arose in circumstances which had nothing to do with a caretaking service contract would come within s 227(1)(d) merely because the party to the dispute other than the body corporate happened, coincidentally, also to be a party to a caretaking service contract of the body corporate.

• [81] Similarly, in Breeze Mr Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Bay Village Community Title Scheme 33127,[46] Daubney J was required to decide which jurisdiction could hear an application, noting that section 229 removes jurisdiction from adjudicators and gives it to QCAT and specialist adjudicators, for a 'complex dispute' involving a contract. His Honour did not accept that the application, made by a party in their capacity as an owner against a body corporate, was relevantly a dispute between such parties for section 270(1)(b) purposes, because the subject matter of the dispute was in fact the termination of an caretaking service contract between the parties; it was therefore 'not a dispute involving the Applicant qua owner of a lot'. [47] Daubney J also observed[48] that this strict approach to characterising a party's capacity as a section 227(1) disputant was consistent with section 226 of the Act, because that section defines an 'owner' or 'occupier' to mean a person in their capacity as an owner or occupier of a lot, and 'not for example in their capacity as a service contractor or letting agent for the scheme'.

• [82] The connection or interest to be demonstrated for standing purposes must be material, not merely intellectual or emotional. In Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth,[49] Gibbs J said:[50]

[A]n interest, for present purposes, does not mean a mere intellectual or emotional concern. A person is not interested within the meaning of the rule, unless he is likely to gain some advantage, other than the satisfaction of righting a wrong, upholding a principle or winning a contest, if his action succeeds or to suffer some disadvantage, other than a sense of grievance or a debt for costs, if his action fails.

• [83] Similarly, in Unions NSW v New South Wales,[51] the High Court considered a challenge to the constitutional validity of a statutory cap on electoral expenditure. Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Gleeson and Jagot JJ observed, on the need to have a personal interest at stake (at [25]):

The plaintiffs cannot and do not assert that any of their rights, duties or legal interests have been infringed by the past application of s 35. ... The plaintiffs assert invalidity solely by reference to the implied freedom of political communication. That implied freedom is not a personal right; it is a freedom from unjustified legislative interference.

• [84] Further, in addition to requiring accurate and objective characterisation of the nature of dispute (as in, for example, Body Corporate for Palm Springs Residences and Breeze Mr Pty Ltd, above) courts will resist efforts to contrive a position of standing, or to 'elevate form above substance'. This was noted by Collier J in Access For All Alliance (Hervey Bay) Inc v Hervey Bay City Council:[52]

... merely incorporating a body and providing it with relevant objects does not provide it with standing it otherwise would not have had. This point was made clear in Right to Life Assn (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health [1995] FCA 1060; (1995) 56 FCR 50, particularly by Lockhart J at 67.

• [85] Lockhart J in Right to Life Assn (NSW) Inc further illustrated the nature of the required connection to the dispute by noting that the sufficiency of an applicant's connection may be put in doubt when there is another party with a closer or stronger connection:[53]

In order that an applicant may show that he is a person "aggrieved", the element of "grievance" must be special to the applicant. He must suffer more greatly or a different way than other members of the community.

• [86] In the community titles context, two decisions take the same approach. QCAT as the appeal tribunal considered the issue of standing in Saviane v Hope Island Resort Principal Body Corporate & Anor[54] and expressed doubt that it should consider a matter involving alleged encroachment into a lot, a dispute characterised as involving essentially 'proprietorial claims'. That was because the applicant was merely the occupier of the encroached-upon lot, and was not joined in the action by the lot's owner, who was the more directly-affected party.
• [87] Again in QCAT, in Davis & Santelli v The Body Corporate Westminster House Clayfield,[55] a lot owner's standing for appeal purposes was said to be severed when they sold the lot to which the dispute attached. The applicants / appellants wished to continue but the Members decided they had no such standing, and regarded it as telling that the new owner of the lot did not consider there was a dispute to be resolved.[56] The Members also referred to various authorities to the effect that an application made without standing was arguably frivolous or vexatious, and concluded it had become vexatious in that instance.[57]
• [88] The concept of direct concern or connection plays another important part in the Act's dispute resolution service, insofar as it concerns an 'affected person' for an application. Such a person has particular status under the Act, because the Commissioner is obliged to give notice of an application and invite a submission from them, and they have a right of appeal.[58] The definition of 'affected person' is:[59]

affected person, for an application, means a person, other than a party to the application, who would be directly and materially affected by the outcome sought by the application.

3 For an application by the owner of a lot in a community titles scheme against the body corporate seeking waiver of a penalty for late payment of a contribution, other lot owners are unlikely to be affected persons.

• [89] The expressions of who may be an applicant and who is an affected person are strikingly similar. They both call for consideration of whether a person has a direct connection to a dispute or its outcome. It surely follows that if a person is not sufficiently connected to a dispute to be regarded as an affected person, then they cannot be sufficiently connected to be an applicant. I make that observation in light of the following. The definition of 'affected person' includes 3 examples, the third of which is extracted above. Even, as in that example, where the dispute is about body corporate finances (in which all owners as members clearly have an interest), the legislature apparently intended that not all owners would necessarily have the requisite standing as an affected person, ie that their interest or connection is possibly only indirect. I regard that example as helpfully indicative as to the degree of connection contemplated by section 238 of the Act.

For which disputes does the applicant have standing?

• [90] It is possible for a person to have standing in more than one capacity, insofar as they 'wear different hats' (although in practice it would likely be rare that they would have standing in 2 or more different capacities for the one dispute). Accordingly, the applicant would have standing in an application to resolve a dispute involving it as a caretaking service contractor and the body corporate, a category of dispute recognised by subsection 227(1)(d). However, as I have noted above, I do not have jurisdiction to decide such an application insofar as it is a 'complex dispute'. As will be seen further below, I consider that some of the disputes the subject of this application are better characterised as such.
• [91] The applicant (acting through a nominated representative) is also a committee member and so potentially has standing in that capacity in this jurisdiction, for a dispute with the committee, ie the subject of section 227(1)(h). As a committee member it may also have standing in a dispute with the body corporate, ie the subject of section 227(1)(g), although in this case the body corporate is not a respondent. I say more about the limits of the applicant's standing as a committee member, below.
• [92] Mrs Blackstock as the owner, and Mr Koszo as the occupier, of Lot 1, potentially have standing in a dispute with the body corporate (subs 227(1)(b)), but they are not applicants in this case.
  • [93] The next question is what type of dispute is and is not relevant to the category of committee member and committee as disputants, for subsection 227(1)(h) and standing purposes. As can be seen from the discussion above, an applicant nominally falling within one of the categories of disputants for section 227(1) purposes does not itself answer the standing question for any given dispute.
• [94] At first glance, it might seem that a committee member would have standing in relation to any dispute about any committee decision, simply by reason of them being a committee member. However, it bears repeating the point, made in various ways in the authorities above,[60] that to have standing a person must have a concrete interest in the outcome of the resolution of the dispute. Noting also the reasoning applied in Body Corporate for Palm Springs Residences, extracted above, I cannot see that a committee member has standing in a dispute about a committee decision unless the dispute directly affects the committee member's interests as a committee member. I do not consider that would be the case merely because the committee member took part in a committee decision. For example, a committee decision to deny a lot occupier's application for approval to keep a pet does not directly affect a committee member's interests, nor would their interests be affected by an adjudicator's decision overturning such a decision. A committee member would have no more interest in an adjudicator overturning a committee decision than for example an adjudicator would have in the appeal Tribunal overturning an adjudication decision.
• [95] Further, while the applicant is formally a committee member, its connection with committee-related issues is in my view different from the connection held by the elected and voting committee members, a difference which may (or may not) be relevant to the standing issue in a given case. Fundamentally, that is because a non-voting member does not have all of the status, rights and obligations of executive and ordinary committee members.[61] Accordingly, while a non-voting committee member and a voting committee member both may have standing in relation to a dispute with the committee (depending on the issue), it would not be standing in relation to wholly the same matters.
• [96] I also note that if, for example, a lot owner wishes to dispute a committee decision, only the section 227(1)(b) category is available to them, specifying the body corporate to be the other disputant.[62]
• [97] In light of that, the construction of section 227(1) suggests to me that disputes in the subsection 227(1)(h) category of committee member and committee are largely limited to matters wholly internal to the committee and directly affecting the committee member or committee (as the case may be) and not directly affecting other parties - ie inward-directed rather than outward- directed decisions.
• [98] It is difficult to be more specific than that, in the absence of concrete examples to consider, but for example, in a case such as this, I consider the applicant's standing as a non-voting committee member would be limited to things such as a dispute as to whether it was wrongly excluded from a committee meeting, pursuant to section 54 of the Accommodation Module.

• [99] I have already noted that, to the extent the applicant may have standing as the caretaking service contractor, such disputes are beyond my jurisdiction. Otherwise, I decline to make orders for many of the requested outcomes on the basis that the applicant as a committee member does not have standing to bring the application in relation to the dispute at hand. I will make specific determinations on standing when I deal with each requested outcome.
• [100] However, in case I am wrong on the standing issue in those cases, I will also consider the merits of each requested outcome as if the applicant had standing.

1. A declaratory order under section 227(2) of the BCCM Act, to the application of the following section of the Act and Regulations, aiming to provide clear guidelines for the future behaviour of the committee of Somerset Gardens, related to:

a) Section 57 and section 60 of the BCCM (accommodation module) regulations in making decisions on behalf of the body corporate, specifically in dealing with the Body Corporate Manager and the Caretaker under the relevant agreements by way of recorded decision and not emails without notification to lot owners.

b) Section 45, 47, 57 and 60 of the BCCM (accommodation module) regulations to actions of the committee with regard the involvement of the caretaker as a member of the committee.

c) Section 221 of BCCM (accommodation module) regulations with regard access to the body corporate records to all committee members

d) Section 57 and section 60 of the BCCM (accommodation module) regulations to actions of the committee on making decision on

2. approval of authorisation under section 177 of the BCCM (accommodation module) regulations

e) Section 170 of the BCCM (accommodation module) regulations on the actions of the committee on the maintenance of the common property differentiated from improvements under section 176 of the Regulations.

f) Section 95(2) of the BCCM Act on the committee requirements to put into force the resolutions of the body corporate.

g) Section 94(1)(b) of the BCCM Act on the requirements of the committee to enforce the by-laws of the CMS.

• [102] In support of the order, the applicant outlines a detailed history of what it says are various historical and recent breaches of committee obligations as grounds for the order, and by way of summary says:

With this detailed explanation of [the committee's] behaviour the caretaker feels that the body corporate would be best served by a declaratory order that deals with the application of several sections of the Act and Regulations that the committee has failed to act on or act in a way that the caretaker considers is contrary to the Act and Regulations.

Such an order would be a "guideline" and stop the misinterpretation of the Act to justify the behaviour of the Somerset Gardens and other committees.

A declaratory order will give a guide to future behaviour but it will not fix past behaviour.

• [103] In relation to standing, at least for some of those matters there is a direct connection to the applicant's role as a non-voting committee member, for example section 221 Accommodation Module deals with committee members' access to body corporate records. But for others, I cannot see the necessary connection; for example section 170 Accommodation Module concerns maintenance of common property, which is a body corporate obligation owed to owners. Regardless, the application for this order fails for another reason.
• [104] The applicant wishes me to give what are, in substance, advisory opinions about the application of laws to various hypothetical future disputes. However, a declaration must be directed to resolving a factual dispute or a question about how the law applies to a particular circumstance, with concrete consequences. The often-cited statement of general principle governing the exercise of the power to make a declaration is from High Court in Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission:[63]

It is a discretionary power which "[i]t is neither possible nor desirable to fetter ... by laying down rules as to the manner of its exercise." However, it is confined by the considerations which mark out the boundaries of judicial power. Hence, declaratory relief must be directed to the determination of legal controversies and not to answering abstract or hypothetical questions. The person seeking relief must have "a real interest" and relief will not be granted if the question "is purely hypothetical", if relief is "claimed in relation to circumstances that [have] not occurred and might never happen" or if "the Court's declaration will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties".

• [105] The requested order is therefore not suitable to made as a declaration. That applies whether it is an order pursuant to subsection 227(2), as requested, or pursuant to subsection 227(1).
• [106] I therefore decline to make the first requested order.

An order appointing an administrator, and authorising the administrator to perform the obligations of the committee of the body corporate of Somerset Gardens CTS 25221 to do the following: [numerous tasks are listed]

• [108] In summary, the tasks are (adopting the applicant's numbering):

a) put into effect body corporate decisions pursuant to motion 13 of the 2018 AGM, concerning exclusive use areas and fence lines > > b) engage lawyers and owners to conduct a review of all the scheme's by-laws and submit motions for revised by-laws > > c) conduct a review of the register of authorisations affecting common property and to deal with any deficiencies by taking action against any person who failed to comply with their obligations in that regard > > d) conduct a review of the register of authorisations affecting lot owner improvements to common property and to take appropriate action to rectify any deficiencies > > e) conduct a review in relation to the body corporate's common property maintenance > > f) following the review in e) above, propose remedial general meeting motions as appropriate > > g) conduct a review of committee members' compliance with the code of conduct > > h) following the review in g) above, propose motions to enforce the code of conduct and get legal advice about civil proceedings for bad faith or negligent conduct

1. call a general meeting to present motions relevant to all of the above matters

h) call a committee election, at which time the administrator appointment would cease.

• [109] The applicant proposes Mr Koszo (in the name Les Blackstock) for the appointment, for which he requests no remuneration.
• [110] While many of the proposed tasks refer to the committee, I am not satisfied there is a sufficiently-direct connection to the applicant's status as a non-voting committee member for standing purposes, because I cannot see how the outcome would directly affect it. I cannot see anyone other than an owner, and perhaps an incumbent elected committee member, having standing to request an administrator appointment.
• [111] But regardless of standing, I consider that an application for an administrator appointment must be made against the body corporate as the respondent, not the committee, because all decisions made on behalf of a body corporate, including committee decisions, are body corporate decisions.[64] I would therefore decline to make this order also on the basis that the body corporate is not the respondent.
• [112] However, I will go on to consider the merits of the requested order in case I am wrong on those points.
• [113] The Act provides that an administrator's role is to perform some or all of the obligations of the body corporate, the committee, or a member thereof, or to assist in the enforcement of another order made in the application appointing them, depending on the terms of the order making their appointment.[65]
• [114] The Act does not specify any grounds or criteria for the appointment of an administrator by an adjudicator. However, it is not a step to be taken lightly, as an administrator potentially has substantial powers. It is clear from the decision in Surace v Commisso[66] and the many adjudication decisions which have followed it that the appointment of an administrator should be a last resort, to be enacted for the resolution of impasses, problems or disputes which cannot be resolved by other more direct means. For example, any concern about the implementation of motion 13 of the 2018 AGM is more properly resolved either by an application for an order about motion 13 or by proposing an appropriate general meeting motion.
• [115] Further, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for an adjudicator to appoint an administrator to take steps and make decisions which owners are entitled and able to make for themselves, such as considering their existing by-laws and proposing new by-laws, whether with or without engaging a lawyer.
• [116] The requested order implies that conducting investigations or reviews into past alleged misdeeds is a committee or body corporate obligation, but I also cannot see any basis for that, and nor, therefore, a basis for appointing an administrator to undertake such a task. That is not to say that the proposed reviews cannot occur. Any committee member or owner may volunteer to undertake an investigation or review, and presumably the right to access body corporate records is granted for that purpose (among others).[67] If the owner of lot 1 and the caretaking service contractor wish it, Mr Koszo is already free to undertake the proposed reviews as their agent; they do not require an order to appoint him as administrator for the purpose.
• [117] For completeness, I note that the Act separately provides for the appointment of an independent and properly qualified auditor of a body corporate's financial records,[68] but that is not the same as an administrator appointment.
• [118] There are probably circumstances in which, despite my general observations above, I would appoint an administrator because a scheme is has the appearance of functioning but seemingly cannot find a way out of non-compliance, for example because its committee is routinely controlled by incompetent or ill-intentioned or warring members. But if that were truly the case for this scheme, as the applicant would have me believe, at least one other owner of the 97 lots or one other committee member would have supported of the application. In this application, the submissions indicate only opposition to the application. The notion that only the applicant can see the truth of the situation is fanciful.
• [119] I am also not satisfied that Mr Koszo would be a suitable administrator. Firstly, given the obvious acrimony between him and the committee, there is too-great a potential for the administrator tasks to be undertaken with bias. Secondly, that fact that it has apparently only just occurred to Mr Koszo to inform this office that his name is not in fact Les Blackstock suggests to me (at best) a lack of good judgment. Thirdly, if Mr Koszo is not in a fit state to respond to my enquiries, as he asserts, then he is also not in a fit state to be an administrator.
• [120] I therefore decline to make the second requested order, firstly because the applicant lacks standing, secondly because the order could not be made on the committee as respondent, thirdly because an administrator appointment on the requested terms and claimed bases is not warranted, and fourthly because Mr Koszo would not be a suitable administrator.

An order declaring that resolutions, 3, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25 (relating to agenda items 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10) passed at the Vote Outside of Committee Meeting on the 15th July 2024 are at all times void.

• [122] The minute of the VOCM indicates it was issued on 9 July 2024 and the vote 'resolved' on 15 July 2024, and so I take that latter date to be the date of the decisions made by the committee. Accordingly, the application, being received by email at this office in business hours on 15 October 2024, was made just within 3 months of the committee's decision, that being the time limit imposed by section 242(2)(b) of the Act.
• [123] The requested order requires separate consideration of each resolution.
• [124] The applicant commences this part of the application with submissions on VOCM motion 24, which was to approve the committee adopting one of two quotations for a report on the condition of the common property, the explanatory note indicating it may form the basis for issuing a remedial action notice (RAN), presumably to the caretaking service contractor. The alternative quotations for the cost were $2,485 and $2,300.
• [125] I do not accept that the applicant as committee member has standing to apply for this order, and so I would decline to make the order on that basis. Regardless, I will go on to consider the merits of the request.
• [126] In respect of motion 24 and the other motions referred to in this requested order, among other things, the applicant complains that the committee acted unreasonably in passing the resolutions, in contravention of section 100(5) of the Act. On the question of reasonableness, the applicant lists a series of factors which it derives from an appeal of an adjudicator's decision heard in QCAT, Re Body Corporate for Viridian; Kjerulf Ainsworth & Ors v Martin Albrecht & Anor[69] (Ainsworth QCATA) The applicant says the following commonly apply to all of the resolutions referred to in the third requested order (quoting verbatim):

a. There was no evaluation of the known facts, circumstances and considerations which may bear rationally upon the issue in the resolutions made.

b. There was not a consideration of all relevant matters and an assessment of the reasonableness of the claims on which the resolutions were made, having regard to all relevant considerations.

c. All known relevant considerations, that could have a rational bearing upon the claims on which the resolutions were made, were not taken into account, thus it is impossible to form a just and fair judgment on whether objectively there are reasonable grounds for the decisions.

d. That information that was presented on he claims on which the resolutions were made, were only opinion or argument and should not had a rational bearing on the resolutions.

e. The existence of the opinion or argument presented, capable of supporting a claim on which the resolutions were made, did not of itself mean there are reasonable grounds to make the resolutions.

f. There was no logical understandable basis presented sufficient to ensure that a condition or requirement is objectively reasonable, in making the resolution.

g. Not relevant evidence that has been adduced nor any relevant arguments been advanced that would suggest reasonable grounds exist to make the resolutions.

h. The particular assumptions advanced, to suggest a claim on which the resolutions were made logically, overlook or discount relevant factors of the decision depending on the particular circumstances of the decision, and are thus legitimately characterised as not reasonable.

• [127] While that Ainsworth QCATA appeal decision is not irrelevant to the issue of reasonableness, the ultimate decision in that line of appeals was in the High Court, namely Ainsworth v Albrecht[70] (Ainsworth High Court). I note that the dispute in that case involved consideration of whether the opposition of an individual voter to a motion requiring a resolution without dissent was unreasonable. However, it was followed in a QCAT appeal decision of Carmody J on the issue of reasonable committee decision-making, in Body Corporate For Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall, [71] and in the QCAT appeal decision of Senior Member Stilgoe OAM and Member Collins, on the reasonableness of a general meeting ordinary resolution, in Body Corporate for the Reserve CTS 31561 v Trojan Resorts Pty Ltd.[72] Accordingly, Ainsworth High Court is the leading authority on reasonableness for all purposes.
• [128] In any event, the applicant lists those Ainsworth QCATA factors apparently in the belief they constitute a checklist of things which must be proven to have been complied with, for each body corporate or committee decision. That is not the gist of Ainsworth High Court; it requires only that the impugned action be considered objectively and in light of the ordinary meaning of the word 'reasonable', which mainly requires that (in the case of a decision) it be rational and based only on relevant factors, given the circumstances.[73] Some of those specific factors identified by the applicant may be relevant in any given instance, but rarely would all of them. The Ainsworth High Court decision also makes it clear that there is no onus on a body corporate to prove that it or its committee acted reasonably.[74] Rather, the adjudicator must be satisfied that the impugned action was unreasonable, and the persuasive onus in that regard rests with the applicant.
• [129] It is difficult to follow the logic in the applicant's arguments against the validity of passing motion 24. It says there was no evidence presented to the committee to justify seeking a condition report. It acknowledges that a condition report is an appropriate step towards issuing a RAN, but also seems to say that a condition report is unjustified because there is no evidence that a RAN was required in the circumstances - if I have understood that argument correctly, I suggest that it fails for being circular.
• [130] The applicant also notes that motion 25 proposed issuing a RAN without a condition report, suggesting that expenditure on a condition report is unnecessary for the purposes of motion 24. The applicant also says the caretaking service contractor's reputation is harmed by the implication it is not performing the Agreement.
• [131] A body corporate is obliged to maintain the common property,[75] and most if not all such work is routinely outsourced to third party services providers. Such work is apparently, to some extent, within the terms of the Agreement. The body corporate is also obliged to monitor the state of the common property, as part of its maintenance obligation. It is also obliged to monitor performance of the Agreement, so that it can reasonably resolve to make or withhold any payment claimed under it. It is therefore likely to be reasonable for a body corporate to gather independent reliable evidence about the condition of the common property, regardless of whether it is for the purpose of assessing the performance of the caretaking service contractor. The fact that a condition report was not considered to be required for the purposes of motion 25 does not make it unreasonable to get one for the purposes of motion 24.
• [132] It is also an uncomplicated issue, and so I cannot see that the decision reasonably required anything more to be provided to the committee for it to make a reasonably-informed decision, whether by way of evidence or information.
• [133] As to the cost to the body corporate, there may come a point where the expenditure required for a condition report is so large as to be unreasonable in the circumstances, but in this case the proposed expenditure was modest.
• [134] I am not swayed by the damage-to-reputation argument. Even if that harm were caused, I do not see that as being a concern which should stop the body corporate taking the step. If a body corporate or its committee were to be retrained from passing motions which implied wrongdoing by the subject of the motion, it would be stymied in doing much of its work; for example, it would be extremely difficult to enforce a by-law against an occupier said to be in breach.
• [135] I am not satisfied the decision was unreasonable.
• [136] I therefore decline to make the requested order in regard to VOCM motion 24, firstly because the applicant lacks standing, and secondly because I am not satisfied the decision to pass it was unreasonable.
• [137] I am also not convinced that this is not, at its root, a complex dispute about a contractual matter, given that the applicant's main concern seems to be that the resolution's appropriateness ultimately turns on whether the applicant has performed its caretaking duties. Regardless, I would dismiss this part of the application for the other reasons addressed above.
• [138] VOCM motion 3 was:

THAT in accordance with the By-Laws and in keeping with the general improvement conditions, the Body Corporate Committee grant approval to the Owner of Lot 28 to install an awning within their backyard on the condition that all future maintenance be the responsibility of the Owner of Lot 28.

• [139] The applicant's submission about the motion is:

None of the requirements identified in paragraph 84 of QCAT Re: Body Corporate for Viridian; Kjerulf Ainsworth & Ors v Martin Albrecht & Anor [2014] QCATA 294 (17 October 2014) have been presented to the members of the committee, as there were no attached documents to allow the making of a decision on the VOCM in relation to this motion that would allow a reasonable decision to be made.

• [140] I cannot see what direct connection the applicant has with the alleged dispute as a committee member. It is not affected by the outcome of the resolution nor the outcome of this application to invalidate it. Accordingly, I decline to make this order for lack of standing.
• [141] Even if it had standing, the applicant does not explain what documents were necessary for the committee to make a reasonably-informed decision on what seems like a fairly straightforward and uncontroversial issue. I also repeat my observations at paragraphs [127] and [128] above, concerning the test for reasonableness.
• [142] I therefore decline to make the requested order in regard to VOCM motion 3, firstly because the applicant lacks standing and secondly because I am not satisfied the decision to pass it was unreasonable.
• [143] VOCM motion 5 was:

THAT the Committee instruct the Caretaker to obtain a quotation for the removal of two (2) large trees, stumps and poison area on top of rear rock wall at Lot 83, for Committee consideration.

FURTHER THAT the Committee instruct the Caretaker to obtain a quotation to rectify the drainage concerns at the rear of Lot 83, for Committee consideration.

• [144] The applicant's submission about the motion is:

None of the requirements identified in paragraph 84 of QCAT Re: Body Corporate for Viridian; Kjerulf Ainsworth & Ors v Martin Albrecht & Anor [2014] QCATA 294 (17 October 2014) have been presented to the members of the committee, as there were no attached documents to allow the making of a decision on the VOCM in relation to this motion that would allow a reasonable decision to be made.

Equally it is not a requirement of the caretaker's agreement to make "quotations" available to the committee when they are under the spending limit of the caretaker and no approval is required to take remedial action for any repairs.

• [145] The task referred to in the motion and the applicant's submission about it call for determination of a question about what constitutes performance of duties under the terms of the Agreement. It is therefore a dispute about a contractual matter, a dispute which would need to be heard as a 'complex dispute' in QCAT or by a specialist adjudicator. Therefore, I do not have jurisdiction. In any event, the applicant does not have standing as a committee member.
• [146] Regardless, the applicant does not explain what documents were necessary for the committee to make a reasonably-informed decision on what seems like a fairly straightforward and uncontroversial issue. It is quite possible the committee members were confident they knew all they reasonably needed to know. I also repeat my observations at paragraphs [127] and [128] above, concerning the test for reasonableness.
• [147] I therefore decline to make the requested order in regard to VOCM motion 5, firstly because it involves a complex dispute for which I lack jurisdiction, secondly because the applicant as committee member lacks standing, and thirdly because I am not satisfied that the decision to pass it was unreasonable.
• [148] VOCM motion 6 was:

THAT the Committee approve the quotation from Category 5 Plumbing & Gas to add a new 250mm pit to collect water at the rear of Lot 42 and add a new line connecting to the storm water line for the expenditure amount of $1,687.00 incl. GST, to be funded from the accumulated Skin fund.

None of the requirements identified in paragraph 84 of QCAT Re: Body Corporate for

Viridian; Kjerulf Ainsworth & Ors v Martin Albrecht & Anor [2014] QCATA 294 (17

October 2014) have been presented to the members of the committee, as there were no

attached documents to allow the making of a decision on the VOCM in relation to this

motion that would allow a reasonable decision to be made.

However the quote shows that the drains were clear (not maintenance required) and

• [150] I do not accept that the applicant as committee member has standing to apply for this order. It is not affected by the outcome of the resolution nor the outcome of this application to invalidate it. Accordingly, I decline to make this order for lack of standing.
• [151] The applicant says the quotation from the plumber cannot be provided in evidence because it is 'commercial in confidence'. That seems unlikely, given it became a public document when it was provided to the body corporate, and regardless it is for the plumber to claim that privilege. In any event, the applicant does not say the quotation document does not exist, or that it does not express what is suggested by the motion's words, or that the works were not a body corporate obligation. I do not see the relevance of the works being requested by an owner; body corporate maintenance is often conducted pursuant to such a request. It is a matter for the committee as to whether the contractor was in fact entitled to payment, and the fact that maintenance ultimately was not required does not necessarily mean the contractor was not entitled to be paid. The amount itself is relatively small. I also repeat my observations at paragraphs [127] and [128] above, concerning the test for reasonableness.
• [152] I therefore decline to make the requested order in regard to VOCM motion 6, firstly because the applicant lacks standing, and secondly because I am not satisfied the decision to pass it was unreasonable.
• [153] VOCM motion 9 was:

THAT in accordance with the By-Laws and in keeping with the general improvement conditions, the Body Corporate Committee grant retrospective approval to the Owner of Lot 50 for the skip bin previously placed on the common property on the condition that the owner of the Lot shall indemnify the Body Corporate, and or the occupant or invitee of another lot within the complex against any damage, loss, or expense, legal or otherwise, incurred or suffered as a result of the skip bin.

FURTHER THAT in accordance with the By-Laws and in keeping with the general improvement conditions, the Body Corporate Committee grant approval to the Owner of Lot 50 to have a new skip bin placed on the common property on the condition that the owner of the Lot shall indemnify the Body Corporate, and or the occupant or invitee of another lot within the complex against any damage, loss, or expense, legal or otherwise, incurred or suffered as a result of the skip bin.

None of the requirements identified in paragraph 84 of QCAT Re: Body Corporate for Viridian; Kjerulf Ainsworth & Ors v Martin Albrecht & Anor [2014] QCATA 294 (17 October 2014) have been presented to the members of the committee, as there were no attached documents to allow the making of a decision on the VOCM in relation to this motion.

However, section 182 and 183 of the Act and the CMS do not allow "retrospective" approval and action under section 94(1)(b) of the act should have been to issue a contravention notice.

• [155] I do not accept that the applicant as committee member has standing to apply for this order. It is not affected by the outcome of the resolution nor the outcome of this application to invalidate it. Accordingly, I decline to make this order for lack of standing.
• [156] It is not apparent to me, and the applicant does not explain, what documents the committee would need to see in order to make a reasonable decision on this issue. The terms of the motion appear to be very simple and straightforward. I also repeat my observations at paragraphs [127] and [128] above, concerning the test for reasonableness.
• [157] Sections 182 and 183 of the Act deal with the body corporate issuing by-law contravention notices. While it is correct that those provisions do not deal with retrospective approval for a by-law breach, neither do they preclude it. Adjudicators have regularly allowed that a body corporate can give retrospective approval for acts which (without approval) constitute by-law non-compliance, where to give approval is within its power.[76] Even if retrospective approval were beyond power, a body corporate is not obliged to take by-law enforcement action for non-compliance if it is unreasonable to do so, and it would likely be unreasonable to take that action if, at the same time, the body corporate were also content to give approval from the present time onwards. That is because by-law enforcement action is designed to be corrective, not punitive. The applicant does not allege that it was not possible for the committee to give such approval, and by-law 3 appears to permit it.
• [158] I therefore decline to make the requested order in regard to VOCM motion 9, firstly because the applicant as committee member lacks standing, and secondly because I am not satisfied that the decision to pass it was unreasonable.
• [159] VOCM motion 13 was:

THAT the Caretaker, with assistance from the Community Manager, is authorised to organise the acquisition of 5 (five) additional green bins for placement around the complex.

FURTHER THAT the Caretaker is to ensure that all 15 green bins (which includes the newly acquired ones) are all accounted for around the complex.

AND FURTHER THAT the Caretaker is to evenly distribute the green bins throughout the complex, ensuring none are hidden or accessible only to the Caretaker.

None of the requirements identified in paragraph 84 of QCAT Re: Body Corporate for Viridian; Kjerulf Ainsworth & Ors v Martin Albrecht & Anor [2014] QCATA 294 (17 October 2014) have been presented to the members of the committee, as there were no attached documents to allow the making of a decision on the VOCM in relation to this motion that would allow a reasonable decision to be made that the additional green bins were needed. This is relevant to the documentation of the caretaker that they were not and would be used by individual lot owners as private property.

However, the actions for the caretaker to take the actions to ensure all green bins are accounted for" and "evenly distribute the green bins" are not functions of the caretaker's agreement.

• [161] Again, the task referred to in the motion and the applicant's submission about it call for determination of a question about what constitutes performance of duties under the terms of the Agreement. It is therefore a complex dispute about a contractual matter, for which I do not have jurisdiction.
• [162] I do not accept that the applicant as committee member has standing to apply for this order. It is not affected by the outcome of the resolution nor the outcome of this application to invalidate it. Accordingly, I decline to make this order for lack of standing.
• [163] It is not apparent to me, and the applicant does not explain, what documents the committee would need to see in order to make a reasonable decision on this issue. The terms of the motion appear to be very simple and straightforward. I also repeat my observations at paragraphs [127] and [128] above, concerning the test for reasonableness.
• [164] I therefore decline to make the requested order in regard to VOCM motion 13, firstly because it is a complex dispute beyond my jurisdiction, secondly because the applicant as committee member lacks standing, and thirdly because I am not satisfied that the decision to pass it was unreasonable.
• [165] VOCM motion 14 was:

THAT the Caretaker provide the Committee with an updated list of nominees within twenty-four (24) hours of the minutes of this VOC being distributed.

None of the requirements identified in paragraph 84 of QCAT Re: Body Corporate for Viridian; Kjerulf Ainsworth & Ors v Martin Albrecht & Anor [2014] QCATA 294 (17 October 2014) have been presented to the members of the committee, as there were no attached documents to allow the making of a decision on the VOCM in relation to this motion.

The actions for the caretaker to provide an updated list of nominees is not a requirement of the caretaker's agreement.

• [167] This is a complex dispute involving the applicant's performance of obligations as caretaking service contractor or the terms of the Agreement, and accordingly I do not have jurisdiction.
• [168] I do not accept that the applicant as committee member has standing to apply for this order. It is not affected by the outcome of the resolution nor the outcome of this application to invalidate it. Accordingly, I decline to make this order for lack of standing.
• [169] It is not apparent to me, and the applicant does not explain, what documents the committee would need to see in order to make a reasonable decision on this issue. The terms of the motion appear to be very simple and straightforward. I also repeat my observations at paragraphs [127] and [128] above, concerning the test for reasonableness.
• [170] I therefore decline to make the requested order in regard to VOCM motion 14, firstly because it is a complex dispute beyond my jurisdiction, secondly because the applicant as committee member lacks standing, and thirdly because I am not satisfied that the decision to pass it was unreasonable.
• [171] VOCM motion 15 was:

THAT the Caretaker provide the Community Manager with all historic termite inspection reports for Lot 45 within twenty-four (24) hours of the minutes of this VOC being distributed.

None of the requirements identified in paragraph 84 of QCAT Re: Body Corporate for Viridian; Kjerulf Ainsworth & Ors v Martin Albrecht & Anor [2014] QCATA 294 (17 October 2014) have been presented to the members of the committee, as there were no attached documents to allow the making of a decision on the VOCM in relation to this motion.

The actions for the caretaker to maintain historic termite inspection is not a requirement of the caretaker's agreement.

• [173] Again, the task referred to in the motion and the applicant's submission about it call for determination of a question about what constitutes performance of duties under the terms of the Agreement. It is therefore a complex dispute beyond my jurisdiction.
• [174] I do not accept that the applicant as committee member has standing to apply for this order. It is not affected by the outcome of the resolution nor the outcome of this application to invalidate it. Accordingly, I decline to make this order for lack of standing.
• [175] Regardless, it is not apparent to me, and the applicant does not explain, what documents the committee would need to see in order to make a reasonable decision on this issue. The terms of the motion appear to be very simple and straightforward. I also repeat my observations at paragraphs [127] and [128] above, concerning the test for reasonableness.
• [176] I therefore decline to make the requested order in regard to VOCM motion 15, firstly because it is a complex dispute beyond my jurisdiction, secondly because the applicant as committee member lacks standing, and thirdly because I am not satisfied that the decision to pass it was unreasonable.
• [177] VOCM motion 17 was:

THAT the Caretaker provide the Committee with quote/s for the 'Winter Trim' for the Committee to review at the Budget Committee Meeting.

None of the requirements identified in paragraph 84 of QCAT Re: Body Corporate for Viridian; Kjerulf Ainsworth & Ors v Martin Albrecht & Anor [2014] QCATA 294 (17 October 2014) have been presented to the members of the committee, as there were no attached documents to allow the making of a decision on the VOCM in relation to this motion.

There is no identification as to what a "Winter Trim" is in the motion and as such the caretaker cannot comply. The document managing the vegetation and trees in the complex is the Vegetation Management Report adopted by the committee in 2019.

• [179] Again, the task referred to in the motion and the applicant's submission about it call for determination of a question about what constitutes performance of duties under the terms of the Agreement. It is therefore a complex dispute beyond my jurisdiction.
• [180] I do not accept that the applicant as committee member has standing to apply for this order. It is not affected by the outcome of the resolution nor the outcome of this application to invalidate it. Accordingly, I decline to make this order for lack of standing.
• [181] Regardless, it is not apparent to me, and the applicant does not explain, what documents the committee would need to see in order to make a reasonable decision on this issue. The terms of the motion appear to be very simple and straightforward. In circumstances where the applicant could easily seek clarification of what is meant by 'winter trim', I am not satisfied that the lack of clarity is a ground to invalidate the resolution. I also repeat my observations at paragraphs [127] and [128] above, concerning the test for reasonableness.
• [182] I therefore decline to make the requested order in regard to VOCM motion 17, firstly because it is a complex dispute beyond my jurisdiction, secondly because the applicant as committee member lacks standing, and thirdly because I am not satisfied that the decision to pass it was unreasonable.
• [183] VOCM motion 18 was:

THAT the Caretaker amend Invoice# INV-0161 as follows:

2. Remove the charge for Bunnings sprayer garden 1L trigger

None of the requirements identified in paragraph 84 of QCAT Re: Body Corporate for Viridian; Kjerulf Ainsworth & Ors v Martin Albrecht & Anor [2014] QCATA 294 (17 October 2014) have been presented to the members of the committee, as there were no attached documents to allow the making of a decision on the VOCM in relation to this motion.

The caretaker had raised the fact that the committee was failing to pay trades people on time and making irrational demands about work and withholding payment to have those demands met. Then the same individuals that had been attacking the caretaker, refused to pay for items and then agreed to all but a small plastic bottle that was purchased as a consumable, to save the body corporate money that resulted in another dispute.

The same members of the committee that have taken this action have in the past delayed the caretaker payments under the contract and that led to a letter of demand before payment was made in 2023.

The caretaker agreement has no allowance for the committee to demand the caretaker alter the invoice for reimbursement and the $2.67 ($2.98 with discount applied).

This is a petty and vindictive action, for the work that the caretaker does as reported in the latest caretakers report.

• [185] The task referred to in the motion and the applicant's submission about it call for determination of a question about what constitutes rights and obligations under the terms of the Agreement. It is therefore a complex dispute beyond my jurisdiction.
• [186] I do not accept that the applicant as committee member has standing to apply for this order. It is not affected by the outcome of the resolution nor the outcome of this application to invalidate it. Accordingly, I decline to make this order for lack of standing.
• [187] Regardless, it is not apparent to me, and the applicant does not explain, what documents the committee would need to see in order to make a reasonable decision on this issue. The terms of the motion appear to be very simple and straightforward. I also repeat my observations at paragraphs [127] and [128] above, concerning the test for reasonableness.
• [188] I therefore decline to make the requested order in regard to VOCM motion 18, firstly because it is a complex dispute beyond my jurisdiction, secondly because the applicant as committee member lacks standing, and thirdly because I am not satisfied that the decision to pass it was unreasonable.
• [189] VOCM motions 19, 20 and 21 resulted in resolutions to take action for alleged by-law breaches against the owners or occupiers of three different lots. Motion 19 relates to the owner of lot 1, which co-incidentally is owned by the director of the caretaking service contractor company. Motion 20 relates to lot 20 and motion 21 relates to lot 39.
• [190] The applicant as committee member has no direct connection to the dispute insofar as it involves any of motions 19, 20 and 21, and therefore lacks standing. Mrs Blackstock as owner of lot 1 would have standing in relation to motion 19 but she is not the applicant. Those other directly-affected lot owners can make their own applications, or can defend any action brought against them, if they are in fact aggrieved by the process.
• [191] The applicant repeats its submission made earlier in regard to motion 24. I also repeat my observations at paragraphs [127] and [128] above, concerning the test for reasonableness. The proposed action starts with issuing a breach letter and also authorises further enforcement action, if necessary. It is difficult to see how such a resolution in itself could be unreasonable, given a body corporate is obliged to enforce its by-laws. If in fact there is clearly no breach, it is unlikely the action would progress further.
• [192] The applicant complains that the resolutions improperly delegate body corporate power to the body corporate manager,[77] by authorising them to prepare, sign and issue a dispute resolution application with this office if the contraventions continue. That aspect of the motions might raise such implications, depending on whether preparing (etc) the application is merely an administrative task or involves the body corporate manager substantially deciding whether an application is warranted. If it is the latter, then that decision cannot be delegated by the committee. But until such time as there is an alleged by-law contravention warranting enforcement action and the body corporate manager does, or firmly proposes to, improperly exercise that authority, I do not think it rises to the level of even an anticipated breach of the Act. I will however caution the body corporate that the committee must turn its mind to specifically authorising any application made with this office, as and when the occasion arises.
• [193] I am not swayed by the applicant's argument that in each instance it is unreasonable to pass such motions because it harms the alleged contravener's reputation to initiate such action, nor that the cost of doing so is an unreasonable expenditure. Such consequences are almost inevitable by-products of the body corporate fulfilling its obligation to enforce the by-laws. If in fact the alleged contravener is wrongly accused, they can raise that in their defence of any application ultimately lodged by the body corporate. If the adjudicator finds in their favour, the decision will be published to the world at large. I also repeat my observations at paragraphs [127] and [128] above, concerning the test for reasonableness.
• [194] I therefore decline to make the requested order in regard to VOCM motions 19, 20 and 21, for the reasons above.
• [195] VOCM motion 25 was:

THAT the Body Corporate calls an Extraordinary General Meeting to be held on 6 August 2024 at 3:00pm at the office of Challenge Strata Management, with the following motions to be included within the agenda: [various matters are listed thereafter]

• [196] I do not accept that the applicant as non-voting committee member has standing to apply for this order. It is not affected by the outcome of the resolution nor the outcome of this application to invalidate it. Accordingly, I decline to make this order for lack of standing.
• [197] The applicant raises a number of issues with the proposed EGM motions referred to in VOCM motion 25, which it says thereby renders the resolution pursuant to VOCM motion 25 void. Motion 25 does nothing more that propose agenda items for the 6 August 2024 EGM, which is a decision squarely within a committee's authority. It may be that the motions proposed on the agenda for the 6 August 2024 EGM are themselves flawed in some way, but the proper approach is to consider and, if appropriate, invalidate those particular motions on their merits as and when they are in fact added to the EGM agenda and passed. If in fact those motions are not passed, then any dispute about their validity is pointless.
• [198] I therefore decline to make the requested order in regard to VOCM motion 25, firstly because the applicant lacks standing, and secondly because I am not satisfied that the decision to pass it was unreasonable or otherwise unlawful.

An order declaring that, the agenda items 2,3,4,5,6,7,8, in the EGM of 6th August 2024, are void for irregularity, due to motion 25 (relating to the agenda items of the EGM on the 6th August 2024), being void in the Vote Outside of Committee Meeting on the 15th July 2024.

• [200] As to standing, I cannot see what direct connection the applicant as a non-voting committee member has with the alleged dispute.
• [201] The order is sought on the basis that the listed EGM motions are invalid due to motion 25 of the VOCM, by which the committee resolved to include them on this agenda, being invalid (or void). However, I have already decided that motion 25 was not invalid or void.
• [202] Accordingly, I decline to make the fourth requested order.

• [203] The applicant seeks an order under section 280(2) Act for the respondent to pay to the applicant the amount paid by it as fees for the adjudication application. Such an order cannot be made on this application, as section 280(2) does not apply, there being no proceeding conciliation application. Even if there had been, it would rarely be appropriate to award those costs to an unsuccessful adjudication applicant.

• [204] For the reasons above, I will dismiss the application in its entirety.
• [205] The applicant makes this application in its capacity as a member of the committee, but in reality, as a non-voting member, it is little more than an observer in those functions unless called upon by the committee to contribute in its capacity as the caretaking service contractor. It is quite obvious from the applicant's own submissions that in fact the bulk of the dispute is motivated by its disputes with the committee in its capacity as caretaking service contractor, [78] for which I do not have jurisdiction. Even if I accept that Violet Blackstock has interests in the body corporate's operations variously as a lot owner, as director of the caretaking service contractor, and as an associate of a non-voting committee member, and Mr Koszo as an occupier, it is difficult to see what real interest the applicant has in challenging most of the resolutions, especially those solely affecting other lot owners. I have dismissed much of the application for lack of standing, accordingly.
• [206] The issue of standing is not merely philosophical, or aimed merely at maintaining the status of (quasi)judicial institutions. The resources of this office are finite and publicly funded, and so should be reserved for dealing with disputes which have material consequences for the parties involved. Applications also strain the resources of respondents and affected persons who respond to the application, in their time but also financially, if they feel the need to get legal advice about their interests in the matter. An adjudicator's capacity to order them to be reimbursed for such costs is limited to $2,000 per application in total, possibly to be shared between multiple parties.[79] In itself, that may not be enough to cover the cost of a lawyer's advice on even a simple matter, for just one party.
• [207] Notably, the other lot owners had no interest in supporting this application. In parts, the applicant claims the outcomes are sought for the benefit or protection of all owners - for example, it seeks to make much of the claim that there is a 'disparity of the exclusive use area and fence lines' benefiting some owners at the expense of others - yet none of those owners are sufficiently concerned with the issues to even write a short submission in support of this application. Ironically, the applicant also urged the Commissioner not to give notice of the application to owners, which would have denied them a chance to make a submission.[80] The submissions from other owners are strongly disparaging of the caretaking service contractor's performance and of the various disputes and disruptions in the body corporate apparently attributable to the caretaker and its representatives.
• [208] The application is without merit, variously misconceived and without substance. I also consider the application was at least in part vexatious, or otherwise frivolous, designed to do little more than battle the committee, with whom the caretaking service contractor obviously has a fraught relationship, over disputes involving its performance as the caretaking service contractor. I note also that it may be considered vexatious to bring an application when one has no standing.
• [209] In these circumstances, I may make a costs order against the applicant, pursuant to section 270(3) of the Act. In ordering costs, I also may have regard to previous applications made by the applicant, and with that in mind my usual practice is to first put an applicant on notice of that risk, with a view to considering whether any future unsuccessful application warrants a costs order.
• [210] As I have noted, this applicant and its associates presently have 6 applications with this office, 2 of them also involving applications for interim orders. The requested outcomes total nearly 300 (many of the requested outcomes having multiple parts), and the total number of pages in the materials is well over 5,500. If all of those applications were necessary to resolve real disputes with which the applicant is directly connected, then so be it. But, so far, this application for final orders and the 2 applications for interim orders have been dismissed, entirely. The management and determination of the applications has already been, and will continue to be, a large draw on the resources of this office, the respondent and the other owners.
• [211] I therefore urge the applicant to reconsider whether all of it is required and has reasonable prospects of success, in light of my comments and findings in this application.

In the course of reviewing my statement of reasons issued 29 August 2025, I noted a typographical error. Prior references to 'paragraphs [128] and [128]' are now corrected herein to read 'paragraphs [127] and [128]'. The orders and substantive reasons remain unchanged.

[1] Applications 0107-2025 and 0562-2025, see Somerset Gardens [2025] QBCCMCmr 57 and Somerset Gardens [2025] QBCCMCmr 238

[2] Section 276 and Schedule 5 of the Act

[4] R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 at 488 per Lord Diplock, for example discussed in Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1214 at [104]- [109]

[7] Including a submission received after the nominated deadline.

[11] Zubair v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2905 at [11]

[12] I take the 'investigation' period to be the period between the application being referred to adjudication by the Commissioner and a final decision being made.

[13] [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 45

[14] Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v The Australian National University [2009] HCA 27 (2009) 239 CLR 175; at [30] per French CJ, and [97]-[103] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Zubair v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2905 at [22]

[16] Sullivan v Department Of Transport [1978] FCA 48; (1978) 20 ALR 323 at 343 per Deane J; Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1963] HCA 41; (1963) 113 CLR 475 at 503-504 per Kitto J

[17] Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 1074; (1994) 49 FCR 576 at

[18] In limited circumstances, an adjudicator may make an order on an application by only one of the types of parties mentioned in subsection 227(1), for example to change a body corporate's financial year date: Act, s 227(2)

[20] The same may be said of Act ss 242(f)(i) and 270(e)(i)

[21] [1959] HCA 51, (1959) 103 CLR 30 at 52

[22] Williams v Hursey [1959] HCA 51, (1959) 103 CLR 30 at 52-55 per Fullagar J, see also Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis [2007] NSWCA 117 at [46]- [51].

[23] Williams v Hursey [1959] HCA 51; (1959) 103 CLR 30 at 52 per Fullagar J

[25] It is created when a community titles scheme is established: Act, s 30

[26] Act, s 100(2); Accommodation Module, s 44(b)

[28] Accommodation Module ss 44, 64; Act, s 278

[29] Williams v Hursey [1959] HCA 51; (1959) 103 CLR 30 at 52 per Fullagar J

[30] See for eg Act, ss 11, 45, 154, 157

[31] Act, Part 2, and sections 30 and 36

[32] Tingalpa Tyre & Mechanical Pty Ltd v Onza Industries Pty Ltd [2021] QCA 252 at [40]

[33] Section 241 Act explicitly provides for the Commissioner rejecting an application, and it makes no mention of the specification of parties.

[34] Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14D

[36] Williams v Hursey [1959] HCA 51; (1959) 103 CLR 30 at 53 per Fullagar J

[37] Act s 270(3), see also for eg Grocon Constructors (Qld) Pty Ltd v Juniper Developer No. 2 Pty Ltd & Anor [2015] QSC 333 at [21] and authorities discussed therein.

[39] James & Anor v The Body Corporate Aarons Community Title Scheme 11476 [2003] QCA 329 at [12] per Davies JA

[40] [1995] FCA 1060; (1995) 128 ALR 238 at 252

[41] [2022] HCA 5 at [65]

[42] Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd [1981] HCA 50 at [28]

[43] [2014] HCA 46

[44] Per Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ

[45] [2008] QDC 300

[46] [2021] QSC 263

[47] Breeze Mr Pty Ltd at [25], [27]

[49] [1980] HCA 53

[50] Australian Conservation Foundation Inc at [20]

[51] [2023] HCA 4

[52] [2007] FCA 615; (2007) 162 FCR 313 at [48]

[53] Right to Life Assn (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health [1995] FCA 1060; (1995) 128 ALR 238 at 253

[54] [2014] QCATA 355

[55] [2016] QCATA 132

[58] Act, section 243(1); see also sections 239, 239B, 240 (the examples given therein), 246, 251, 270(3)(a)(iii), 289(1)(d))11)(E)

[60] For example the above extracts from Kuczborski v Queensland; Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth; Unions NSW v New South Wales.

[61] In relation to voting, see Accommodation Module, ss 13, 52, 54. In relation to the composition of committees, see Accommodation Module, ss 10, 11. In relation to codes of conduct, see Accommodation Module, ss s 101B Sched 1A, Sched 2

[62] That accords with section 100(1) declaring a committee decision to be a body corporate decision.

[63] [1992] HCA 10 at [38] per Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ; see also Daish v Body Corporate for Birchgrove CTS 100 [2013] QCATA 13 at [13]- [14]

[65] Act, section 276(4)(b); 278; 301; Sched 5, item 23

[66] [2009] CCT KA002-09, also reported as Surace v Commiso [sic] [2009] QCCTBCCM 42. See also Duncan and The Owners Of 16 Melville Parade, South Perth Strata Plan 18919 [2025] WASAT 45

[67] Act, s 205; Accommodation Module, s 221

[68] Act, s 150(2)(j); Sched 5, item 12; Accommodation Module, Part 8

[69] [2014] QCATA 294

[70] [2016] HCA 40

[71] [2016] QCATA 177

[72] [2017] QCATA 53

[76] See for eg Surfers Waters [2025] QBCCMCmr 245; Loganholme Industrial Centre [2025] QBCCMCmr 173

[78] Applicants submissions, see for example pp. 24-26.