Solaris v Health Care Complaints Commission

The issue to be determined: whether this appeal has utility

1. When this appeal was heard, on 30 May 2025, the interim prohibition order that had been the subject of consideration by the Tribunal at first instance had lapsed. No application was made to address the further interim prohibition orders that were then in force.
2. In those circumstances, at the hearing of the appeal, we inquired about the utility of the appeal. The HCCC contended that there was no utility at that stage because the interim prohibition orders the subject of the Tribunal's decision had lapsed. However, the HCCC nonetheless addressed the substance of the issues raised by the appeal on the basis that our decision may impact upon the making of further interim prohibition orders against the Appellant. Similarly, the Appellant submitted that, since there remained in place interim prohibition orders in identical terms to those in place at the time of the Tribunal's consideration of the matter, there remained utility in the appeal of the Tribunal's decision at the date the appeal was heard.
3. Despite those submissions, we have concluded that the appeal had no utility at the date it was heard. As we explain below, to the extent that doubt attended that conclusion, such doubt has been eliminated by intervening events.

The HCCC subsequently imposed a permanent prohibition order

1. On a date after the appeal hearing, the HCCC issued a prohibition order to the Appellant under s 41A of the Health Care Complaints Act.
2. We are informed by its recent written submissions that the prohibition order made under s 41A is a permanent prohibition order and that it "is not making interim orders" with respect to the Appellant. The circumstances concerning why submissions have been received recently is explained below.
3. Neither party informed the Appeal Panel of the making of the permanent prohibition order; instead, its existence came to the attention of the appeal panel when the Appellant, as he is entitled to do, commenced further proceedings in the Tribunal seeking a review of that decision. The proceedings concerning the permanent prohibition order are ongoing.
4. Both parties were responsible for bringing to the attention of the Tribunal a material change to the underlying facts of the appeal: People with Disability Australia Incorporated v Minister for Disability Services & Anor [2011] NSWCA 253 (PWD) per Allsop P at [3]. The failure by the parties to alert the Tribunal to such a material change was wasteful of costs and time and is contrary to the guiding principle and the obligations of the parties to assist the Tribunal, as provided under s 36 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act), see further: PWD at [6].
5. We have not been informed of the terms of the permanent prohibition order, although the HCCC, in its recent submissions, offered to provide a copy of it. The Appellant informs us, in his written submissions, that the permanent prohibition order relied on the findings of the interim prohibition order. It would not be appropriate for us to consider the terms of the permanent prohibition order, given that the Appellant is seeking to challenge its imposition in other proceedings in the Tribunal. The fact that a permanent prohibition order has been made is the only relevant detail to our consideration of the matter.
6. As a consequence of our becoming aware that a permanent prohibition order had been made, we sought further submissions from the parties on the question of whether there remained any utility in determining this appeal. Both the Appellant and the HCCC provided written submissions on that question.

1. The parties were also asked to make submissions on whether the question of the utility of the appeal might be determined without a further hearing pursuant to s 50 of the NCAT Act_._ Neither party, in their submissions, sought a further hearing on the question of utility. We are satisfied, having read the submissions of both parties, that we should dispense with a further hearing.
2. By his recent submissions, the Appellant argued that there remained utility in determining the substance of the appeal. The HCCC, however, submitted that there was not. We have concluded, for the reasons that follow, that there is no utility in our determination of the appeal, and it is to be dismissed on that basis.

Should we decide on an appeal that has no utility?

1. Generally, neither the Tribunal at first instance, nor the appeal panel should entertain appeals that have no practical consequences for the parties: FZK v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) [2025] NSWCATAP 197 at [32]; Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice v Feeney [2021] NSWCATAP 139 at [7]- [26]; NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet v Cianfrano [2009] NSWADTAP 15 at [13]- [14]. There are some limited exceptions to that principle, which, for the reasons we discuss below, do not apply here.
2. It is relatively common, in coming before the Tribunal at first instance or on appeal, that the facts or changes to the law intervene to cause an appeal to become arid or lack utility. In Ugur v Bridge Housing Limited [2024] NSWCATAP 203, to which the HCCC refers in its submissions, the appeal panel of the Tribunal found that it should not determine matters where the decision will have no consequence for the parties or could, at most, be considered advisory. That decision arose in the context of an appeal from a decision where the Tribunal's orders at first instance had been carried out or otherwise superseded.
3. In Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force v Parish [2025] NSWCATAP 180, at [49]−[60], the appeal panel provided the following recent summary of the relevant principles concerning the approach to be taken where the utility of an appeal has come into question. We respectfully adopt that summary as follows:

"46 A proceeding, or an aspect of it, will lack utility if its determination serves no practical purpose. One way a proceeding or issue can become moot is if, due to supervening events or circumstances, there is no longer a controversy between the parties: Hunter Development Corporation v Save Our Rail NSW Incorporated (No 2) [2016] NSWCA 375 (Hunter Development) at [40].

47 As a matter of general principle, courts will ordinarily refuse to determine issues which no longer have utility or have become moot. In Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; [1999] HCA 9 at [47], the High Court explained:

'Because the object of the judicial process is the final determination of the rights of the parties to an action, courts have traditionally refused to provide answers to hypothetical questions or to give advisory opinions.'

49 Courts have the power to dismiss or stay proceedings which involve issues that are not live between the parties, so as to protect the court's processes from being abused. This includes the power to dismiss an appeal which was brought as of right, if later events show that the questions involved in it have become moot between the parties': Jardin v Metcash Ltd [2011] NSWCA 409 (Jardin) at [30]-[31].

50 The Tribunal likewise has the power to summarily dispose of issues which have no utility. Section 36(1) the NCAT Act provides that the guiding principle for proceedings under the Act is to 'facilitate ... the real issues in the proceedings'. This imperative applies to 'the resolution of the issues between the parties': NCAT Act, s 36(4). The Tribunal has procedural powers under ss 36 and 38 to ensure that proceedings meet the guiding principle: Sunaust Properties Pty Ltd t/as Central Sydney Realty v The Owners - Strata Plan No 64807 [2023] NSWCA 188 at [160]- [162].

51 While the general rule is that proceedings which have become moot should not be entertained, there is a line of authority which suggest that courts nevertheless have a discretion to determine matters which have been regularly commenced; notwithstanding that there is no longer a live substantive issue between the parties: People with Disability Australia Incorporated v Minister for Disability Services [2011] NSWCA 253 (PWD); Jardin; Hunter Development; Commissioner of Taxation v Industrial Equity Ltd (2000) 98 FCR 573; [2000] FCA 420 (Industrial Equity)

52 Those cases identify the following factors can be relevant to the exercise of that discretion, on an appeal:

(1) Where there is a live issue of costs between the parties and resolution of the issue depends on determining the appeal on its merits: Hunter Development at [27]-[38], [46], [56]; Jardin at [32].

(2) Where the appeal raises an important question of principle which will have ramifications for other cases: PWD at [13]-[15]; Jardin at [32]; Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales v XY [2014] NSWCA 466 at [118]- [119].

(3) Where appeals have been brought in the public interest and there is 'an issue of construction having significance beyond the immediate rights of the present parties and there are serious arguments capable of being advanced as to the correctness of the judgment': Industrial Equity at [16].

53 In Jardin, Campbell JA noted that the discretion should be exercised sparingly, stating (at [35]):

'It could only be in rare circumstances, if ever, that a court was justified in reaching a decision on [a] legal question that had no practical consequences for either of the parties: Gardner v Dairy Industry Authority of New South Wales [1977] 18 ALR 55 at 60, 69.'

54 The foregoing provides some basis to suggest that the Tribunal, too, has a narrow discretion to determine a matter, which was regularly commenced, but where there is no longer a live substantive issue between the parties. The question of costs might provide such justification, although, it is not always necessary or appropriate to finally determine the merits of a matter in order to determine costs: Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622 at 624 (McHugh J).

55 The discretion of the Appeal Panel to consider a moot appeal was discussed by the Appeal Panel in Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice v Feeney [2021] NSWCATAP 139 at [7]- [25]. It was there noted that the question of costs and whether an error of principle is raised might provide the basis to exercise the discretion. Nevertheless, the Appeal Panel declined to entertain the moot appeal in that case. It dismissed the appeal under s 55(1)(b) of the NCAT Act, as misconceived or lacking in substance.

...

60 We accept, as a general proposition, that where a matter has been regularly commenced, but subsequent events mean that there is no longer a live issue as between the parties, the Tribunal may have authority to determine the matter. The real question is what orders the Tribunal would have power to make; and why."

1. The appeal panel in Song v Dickenson No 2 [2025] NSWCATAP 208, after considering the general principles concerning the phrase "substantial miscarriage of justice" when considering whether to grant leave to appeal, further considered the question of utility at [41]:

... If an appeal raises a question of law, the appeal should, if upheld, be capable of affecting the orders at first instance in a meaningful way: Narraport Woollahra Holdings Pty Ltd v Ice Box Liquor Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCATAP 240 at [34(8)]. However, an appeal will lack utility if its determination serves no practical purpose: The Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force v Parish [2025] NSWCATAP 180 (Parish) at [47]; Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice v Feeney [ 2021] NSWCATAP 139 at [26]. Similarly, if leave to appeal is required, there must be utility in granting leave: Imbree v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2024] NSWCATAP 158 at [86].

1. Here, if the orders of the appeal panel were to be upheld, they would not be capable of affecting the orders at first instance in any way because the order the subject of the appeal had expired and no further orders of the same kind can be made. Accordingly, the appeal serves no practical purpose.
2. Further, taking into account the criteria summarised in Parish at [52], we consider that:

(1) There is no live issue of costs between the parties, and the resolution of the issue does not depend on determining the appeal on its merits. The Appellant, by his notice of appeal, does not seek costs. While we note that in his original written submissions on appeal, the Appellant submitted 'I reserve the right to claim costs after receipt of the full HCCC reply', that submission does not give rise to a live issue of costs between the parties in circumstances where the Tribunal's discretion to award costs would need to be predicated by, in the first instance, the Appellant being successful at any stage of the proceedings (which he is not) and, in the second instance, by there being special circumstances arising from the conduct of the parties to justify an award of costs: s 60 NCAT Act.

(2) This appeal does not raise an important question of principle or have ramifications for other matters in the way in which, for example, the Court of Appeal considered the matters raised in PWD. In PWD at [14]-[15], Beazley JA, as Her Excellency then was, concluded that the appeal was not lacking utility because it involved the proper consideration of a statutory provision where at least one other proceeding was on foot, where the answer to that question would be "pivotal" to the determination of the other proceedings. By contrast, the subject matter of this appeal primarily concerns whether the Appellant was afforded procedural fairness in the initial proceedings, whether the Tribunal exhibited bias in its reasoning, and whether its decision was based on erroneous factual findings. The matters to be determined are, therefore, confined to the particular facts and conduct of the proceedings. We cannot see that these proceedings will have any bearing on the proceedings subsequently pursued by the Appellant against the imposition of a permanent prohibition order. Much of the Appellant's submissions on utility were directed to the imposition of having to re-litigate in the new proceedings issues he has already argued regarding the interim prohibition order. We reject that submission given that a permanent prohibition order is made under different provisions and only after an investigation has been concluded - it is an entirely different order from the orders which have been the subject of these proceedings.

(3) Nor do we consider that the issues between the parties in these proceedings have 'significance beyond the immediate rights of the present parties' in the sense discussed in Commissioner of Taxation v Industrial Equity Ltd (2000) 98 FCR 573; [2000] FCA 420 (Industrial Equity) at [16]. In Industrial Equity, there was both a live issue of costs of the first instance proceedings and a question of interpretation concerning the nature and extent of the Commissioner of Taxation's powers to issue notices to taxpayers to attend compulsory examinations. The issues in this appeal do not have application beyond the rights of the present parties and therefore, we cannot conclude that the appeal has been brought in the public interest in the relevant sense.

1. Further, we do not consider that there is an error of principle that requires resolution of the kind contemplated by the appeal panel in Feeney.
2. The role of the Tribunal is not to give advisory opinions or make declarations: Australian Press Council Inc v Southey [2022] NSWCATAP 127 at [47]-[48], Song v Dickenson No 2 at [83].
3. Where the appeal is moot, the Tribunal has power to dismiss it under s 55(1)(b) of the NCAT Act: Feeney at [8].

The nature of the order the subject of the Tribunal's decision at first instance, and on the appeal

1. The appeal concerned the Tribunal's decision to affirm an interim prohibition order made by the HCCC on 3 December 2024. The terms of the interim prohibition order were the same as those of the original interim prohibition order set out in paragraph one above.
2. On 18 December 2024, the matter was heard and determined by the Tribunal, affirming the HCCC's decision to impose the interim prohibition order. The reasons for that decision are set out in Solaris v Health Care Complaints Commission [2024] NSWCATOD 204 (Reasons). Before us, the Appellant challenged the orders made on that date.
3. As we have noted above, the interim prohibition order made on 3 December 2024 was in fact one of several consecutive interim prohibition orders made by the HCCC against the Appellant under s 41AA of the Health Care Complaints Act.
4. A summary of the interim prohibition order regime imposed on the Appellant by the HCCC was set out in Solaris v Health Care Complaints Commission [2024] NSWCATOD 97 at [8]- [10], where the Tribunal constituted by PM Ransome considered an application for a stay of an interim prohibition order. In that regard, the Tribunal observed:

'An issue arises in the proceedings in that the interim prohibition order the subject of the application by Mr Solaris has in fact expired.

Interim prohibition orders have been issued by the respondent to the applicant under s 41AA of the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (the Act). The first such order was issued on 4 August 2023. By virtue of s 41AA(4) of the Act an interim prohibition order remains in force for a maximum of 8 weeks. The respondent has made further interim prohibition orders since the expiry of the first order which, in effect, causes the order to continue. The most recent order was made on 2 May 2024. Each order that has been made is in the same terms.

Mr Solaris asks that his proceedings in the Tribunal be taken to be an application in relation to the most recent interim prohibition order in force at the relevant time. The HCCC has no objection to this approach and has evinced an intention to continue to make such orders for the foreseeable future. In the interests of justice I made an order on 7 May 2024 pursuant to s 53 of the NCAT Act that the application made by the applicant on 19 December 2023 which seeks review of the interim prohibition order made on 21 November 2023 is amended to seek review of the interim prohibition order in force at the time of the Tribunal's decision (presently the order made on 2 May 2024).'

1. In the Reasons, the Tribunal also noted that the intention of the parties was to allow the Appellant to seek review of the interim prohibition order in force at the time when the decision was made, the specific order the subject of the decision at first instance was identified as the order made on 3 December 2024: Reasons at [27]-[29].
2. The HCCC may make an interim prohibition order under s 41AA of the Health Care Complaints Act during any investigation of a complaint against a non-registered health practitioner. There is an obvious tension between the statutory requirement that an interim prohibition order remain in force for a period of no more than eight weeks and the need for the HCCC to initiate, conduct, and finalise investigations that can extend beyond such a time period due to their complexity. We are not aware of the reasons behind the statutory time limit set by s 41AA, but it is, in our view, significant that Parliament set such a time limit for the purposes of s 41AA. In particular, each time an interim prohibition order is made, the HCCC is required to have the requisite belief and form the requisite opinions under s 41AA(2).
3. The HCCC summarised its approach to the making of consecutive interim prohibition orders in its statement of decision dated 14 October 2024, in the following terms:

An interim prohibition order remains in force for a period of eight weeks, or for a shorter period as specified in that order. After the order lapses, the Commission considers whether there is a basis to make a new interim prohibition order. There is no limitation on the number of interim prohibition orders that can be made against a provider.

1. In that regard, the Appellant tendered several of the notification and statement of decision documents relating to the various interim protection orders made against him since August 2023. Upon reviewing that material, it is clear that each time an interim prohibition order was made, the HCCC's delegate considered the current state of the investigation being carried out before addressing the matters required under s 41AA(2).
2. Once an investigation is completed in accordance with Div 6 of Part 2 of the Health Care Complaints Act, and the HCCC has made relevant findings and has formed the relevant opinion, it has the power to make a prohibition order for a specified period or permanently: ss 41A(1), 41A(2) of the Health Care Complaints Act. The effect of the requirements in ss 41AA and 41A means that interim prohibition orders may be imposed during an investigation, whereas permanent prohibition orders are made after an investigation has been completed. As a consequence, it appears that once an investigation is concluded, the HCCC has no power to make an interim prohibition order that covers the same subject matter as a permanent prohibition order.
3. The relevance to the current proceedings is that we are satisfied that now that a permanent prohibition order has been made, there will be no further interim prohibition orders made against the Appellant of the kind that is the subject of these proceedings.

1. The HCCC has submitted that, in light of the making of a permanent prohibition order, the appeal has no utility. It submits that the matters sought to be ventilated by the Appellant concern whether the primary decision was affected by appealable errors, including procedural unfairness, bias, misconduct and the Commission's reliance on "malicious and negligent" actions of NSW police detectives. In that regard, the HCCC submits, even if he were to succeed in establishing the alleged errors in the primary decision in relation to the interim prohibition order, that would have no bearing on the proceedings in which the Appellant seeks a review of the HCCC's decision to make a permanent prohibition order. For the reasons that follow, we agree with that submission.

1. An appeal is from the orders of the Tribunal. Therefore, the utility of an appeal may be gauged from whether the appeal panel can make orders that will have any material effect on the original orders made: see the authorities cited at paragraph 17 above.
2. The orders the subject of the appeal are the first three orders made by the Tribunal at first instance, these are as follows:

(1) The Respondent's decision of 3 December 2024 is affirmed under s 63(3)(a) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997.

(2) The Application is dismissed.

(3) Subject to order (6), below, pursuant to s 64(1)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) 2013, until further order of the Tribunal, the publication of, or publication of or matters contained in:

(a) the Confidential and Privileged Documents filed on 4 September 2024 and Amended Confidential and Privileged Documents filed on 9 December 2024, and

(b) Tab 41 of the Section 58 Bundle filed on 4 September 2024

(the Confidential Documents)

is prohibited.

1. The section of the notice of appeal where the orders sought on appeal are required to be set out; the Appellant wrote the following:

Proper examination of all the concealed documents, are they really privileged?

Allow fair conduct - miscarriage of justice.

Dismiss HCCC orders! Due to procedural unfairness, lack of transparency, biased and incorrect claims, breaches of legislation, reliance on biased evidence, unreasonable length of time.

1. Consistent with his completed notice of appeal, the Appellant submitted in the covering remarks to his written submissions on the appeal that:

This application seeks to set aside the decision, order a re-hearing, and dismiss the IPSs due to procedural unfairness, bias, factual errors, and significant misconduct by the HCCC and NSW Police ..."

1. The Appellant also submitted, throughout his written submissions, that the interim prohibition order should be set aside; however, he did not make any submissions of relevance concerning the non-publication orders of the Tribunal at first instance. We do not consider that the Appellant prosecuted his appeal in relation to the non-publication order. In any event, we note the Tribunal at first instance made the non-publication order in aid of earlier non-publication and non-disclosure orders of the Tribunal made on 11 July 2024 by PM Ransome that are not the subject of this appeal. In that regard, the Tribunal at Reasons [57] - [61] observed:

'In these Reasons I have referred to the Tribunal having made non-publication and non-disclosure orders on 11 July 2024. These were:

(2) Pursuant to s 64(1)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, until further order of the Tribunal, the publication of the Confidential Material or matters contained in the Confidential Material is prohibited.

(3) Pursuant to s 64(1)(d) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, until further order of the Tribunal, the disclosure of the Confidential Material or matters contained in the Confidential Material is restricted to the respondent, the respondent's legal representatives and the Tribunal.

Since those Orders were made, further documents have been filed by the Commission. I was informed that the only difference between the confidential documents filed before and after 11 July 2024 was the removal of the claim of privilege over the report of Dr Cala. I accepted that it would be necessary to make additional orders to extend the 11 July 2024 confidentiality Orders to the documents filed after 11 July 2024. I have made those Orders below.

Other matters

Mr Solaris did make a number of other submissions which I do not accept for the reasons set out below.

Failure to provide documents

Mr Solaris strongly believes that the Commission, amongst other entities, is deliberately keeping documents from him.

Orders were made by the Tribunal member on 11 July 2024 prohibiting the disclosure of certain documents to anyone other than the Commission. Those orders were made after legal submissions from the Commission as to the non-disclosure regimes in legislation such as the Coroner's Act 2009 (NSW).'

1. Accordingly, the primary relief sought by the Appellant was to have the interim prohibition order set aside. In that regard, there are two difficulties:

(1) First, as was apparent at the commencement of the appeal, the interim prohibition order, the subject of the Tribunal's decision at first instance, had lapsed.

(2) Second, since the HCCC has imposed a permanent prohibition order, it can no longer make interim prohibition orders in the way it had done between about August 2023 and May 2025.

1. We discuss those issues below in the following consideration.

1. The lack of utility of the appeal was raised by the HCCC in its filed reply to the notice of appeal. The HCCC's submissions on the lack of utility of the appeal were, however, only lightly pressed. At the hearing of the appeal, the HCCC confirmed that it had made consecutive interim prohibition orders against the Appellant while continuing its investigations, and that an interim prohibition order was in place at the date of the appeal hearing, albeit not the same order that was in place before the Tribunal at first instance. Accordingly, at the hearing of the appeal, the Appellant remained subject to an interim prohibition order, and further interim prohibition orders were likely to be imposed.
2. In addressing the question of the utility of the appeal where the interim prohibition order had lapsed, the Appellant, in his written submissions, stated that:

The HCCC claims no practical utility exists due to the IPO's expiry on 28 January 2025 (Reply, Para 8; s 41AA(4), HCC Act). This overlooks ongoing harm: (1) reputational damage from upheld false findings (Paras 52, 64) persists, fuelled by police defamation (False Claims, emails, Affidavits to be filed, TABs 10, 35 - source of false IPO claims); (2) my 31-year profession remains halted, costing $100,000+ (Local Court Claim); and (3) successive IPOs (e.g., post-3 December 2024) perpetuate the injustice (Submissions, Factual Background 1). Review retains utility to correct errors, restore procedural fairness, expose misconduct, award costs, and prevent future orders (Choudhury v Health Care Complaints Commission [2021] NSWCATOD 27), rendering the HCCC's mootness argument untenable.

1. The matters raised by the Appellant in that submission assume that the appeal panel has powers that extend beyond the scope of what is permissible on an appeal where, in substance, the only relief sought is to set aside the HCCC's interim prohibition order. Accordingly, that submission cannot be accepted.
2. The HCCC had initially submitted that it was conceivable there may have been some limited utility in considering the substance of the appeal where the HCCC's investigation into the Appellant's conduct was ongoing and it was likely further interim prohibition orders would be made. However, having regard to the manner in which each interim prohibition order was required to be made (as we set out above), we do not agree that any findings by the appeal panel could have affected the HCCC's statutory obligations under the Health Care Complaints Act in making interim prohibition orders against the Appellant, on, for example, a different basis. The nature of the Tribunal's role in administrative review at first instance was not to detect errors of decision-making by the HCCC, such as a failure to afford procedural fairness, but to make the correct and preferable decision on the evidence then before it: s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW).
3. As it is the case that each interim prohibition order requires the HCCC to form the requisite beliefs and opinions set out in s 41AA of the Health Complaints Act, then any application of the Tribunal's views to an order would be limited because an ongoing investigation might change the underlying facts and opinions on which an interim prohibition order was made. That the underlying facts did change is evident from the statements of reasons for the previous interim prohibition orders, which the Appellant tendered on appeal.
4. We do not accept that the appeal had utility at the date of the hearing because there were no orders that we could have made that would have affected the rights and interests of the parties.

The effect of the HCCC making a permanent prohibition order

1. On our reading of the relevant provisions of the Health Care Complaints Act (set out above), when the HCCC makes a permanent prohibition order against an unregistered health practitioner, it can no longer make interim prohibition orders. Therefore, it is no longer the case that any future interim prohibition orders could be made and thus affected by any decision in this appeal.
2. The conclusion of the investigation process, which must have occurred since the HCCC subsequently issued a permanent prohibition order under s 41A of the Health Care Complaints Act, meant that the HCCC had no power to make any further interim prohibition orders against the Appellant. Therefore, to the extent that there was any utility in determining the appeal while the investigation process was on foot, that utility was obliterated on the conclusion of the investigation process. Had we concluded that there was some utility to the appeal while the regime of interim prohibition orders was in place, then the conclusion of the investigation would have led to an inevitable conclusion that the appeal had no utility.

1. We consider that the utility of this appeal was in doubt from the outset because the interim order dated 3 December 2024, the subject of the Tribunal's decision, had expired. Any order made, therefore, could not have been capable of affecting the orders at first instance in a meaningful way. The consequence of the interim prohibition order expiring by the time of the appeal was that there would have been no interim prohibition order to set aside had we decided to uphold the appeal.
2. The conclusion of the investigation, evidenced by the making of a permanent prohibition order, has the consequence that no further interim prohibition orders could have been made against the Appellant. The Appellant has pursued his rights of review in respect of the permanent prohibition order and those proceedings are now before the Tribunal at first instance. If there were any doubt as to the lack of utility of the appeal before the conclusion of the investigation, such doubt is no longer present.
3. Accordingly, we make the following orders:

(1) Pursuant to s 50 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), a further hearing of the appeal to consider the effect of the subsequent making of a permanent prohibition order on the utility of this appeal is dispensed with.

(2) The appeal is dismissed pursuant to s 55(1)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW).

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

08 December 2025 - Formatting on coversheet corrected