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[2016] NSWSC 1209
plaintiff. Judgment for Socratous and Kadi jointly against Galanopoulos for $691,532.12 plus interest under s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) from 26 July 2016 to 23 August 2016. Further judgment...
The Court ordered Galanopoulos to pay two amounts. Socratous and Kadi were jointly awarded $691,532.12 for claims connected with the bank debts discharged from the sale of their jointly owned home. Socratous alone was awarded $182,913 for payments he said Galanopoulos had agreed to make. The Court granted summary judgment because Galanopoulos had not defended the later pleadings, had provided no responsive evidence, and had raised nothing showing a triable issue. Interest and costs were also ordered.
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2,216 words · generated 28/09/2026
White J dealt with an amended notice of motion seeking summary judgment against Dimitri Galanopoulos. The case arose from loans made by National Australia Bank to two businesses associated with Galanopoulos and Neil Socratous: Baronia Holdings Pty Ltd and D Galanopoulos & Associates Pty Ltd, which traded as DNM Partners. Socratous and his wife, Rita Kadi, had guaranteed debts and given the bank a mortgage over their jointly owned home in Mosman. Galanopoulos was also a guarantor of relevant indebtedness. The Court's account of the original lending and guarantees appears at [2]-[9].
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The pleadings and evidence concerned more than one financial arrangement. The D Galanopoulos & Associates loan initially involved a $545,000 facility. The judgment records that the loan was later divided into a $142,000 loan to Socratous and a $403,000 loan to Galanopoulos. Galanopoulos's earlier defence admitted responsibility for the $403,000 amount, and Socratous's affidavit evidence included correspondence about that division: [7], [9]. The pleadings also concerned Baronia loans of $650,000 and $120,000, and agreements between Socratous and Galanopoulos about sharing repayments or interest: [4]-[5], [9].
The Mosman property was sold shortly before the motion was heard, and the bank was paid from the sale proceeds. The plaintiffs then sought judgment for amounts linked to that payout and for earlier payments Socratous said he had made on Galanopoulos's behalf: [12]-[19]. The total sought was $874,445.12, made up of $182,913 for payments said to have been due from Galanopoulos, $298,300.53 claimed under the guarantee, and $393,231.59 for his agreed proportion of the D Galanopoulos & Associates debt: [13]-[19].
A procedural distinction was important. Galanopoulos had filed an earlier defence, but he did not file a defence to the amended or further amended statements of claim and did not serve evidence in response to the summary judgment motion: [6], [10]. He appeared at the final hearing and made submissions, but White J found that those submissions did not disclose a defence to any part of the claim: [12], [16], [23]. Kadi had not initially been a party. The Court joined her as a co-plaintiff after considering that she and Socratous jointly owned the property from which the bank debts were discharged: [17]-[22].
The final orders divided the judgment according to who was entitled to each claim. Socratous and Kadi jointly received judgment for $691,532.12, comprising $298,300.53 and $393,231.59. Socratous alone received judgment for $182,913. Interest was ordered under s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), from different starting dates for the two judgments. Galanopoulos was ordered to pay Socratous's costs: [24]-[25].
The central procedural reason was the combination of admissions and the lack of any material indicating a triable issue. White J did not treat the mere fact that Galanopoulos appeared at the hearing as sufficient to answer the claims. The reasons identify the particular procedural record: admissions in his earlier defence, no defence to the later pleadings, no responsive evidence, and submissions that did not suggest a defence: [23].
That reasoning is specific to the record described in the judgment. It is not expressed as a general rule that every failure to file a defence necessarily results in summary judgment. The Court considered the pleadings alongside the evidence and what Galanopoulos said at the hearing. In relation to the $182,913 claim, the Court noted evidence supporting each component and the absence of rebuttal evidence: [13]-[16]. It then concluded that Socratous was entitled to that amount: [16].
The contribution claims arose from the payout of the bank debts. The bank received $894,901.60 on completion of the property sale. The judgment identifies the relevant payout figures and states that the amounts fell within the limits of the guarantees: [18]. White J said the co-guarantors were entitled to contribution and found no defence to the claim for contribution. The judge then distinguished the identity of the proper claimants: because the money used to discharge the debts came from property owned by Socratous and Kadi, both were entitled to the relevant contribution relief: [18]-[19].
The $393,231.59 claim related to Galanopoulos's proportion of the D Galanopoulos & Associates debt, calculated by reference to his agreed responsibility for 403/545 of the loan. The Court said the debt had been discharged from the Mosman sale proceeds and again considered that both Socratous and Kadi were entitled to contribution because the sale proceeds came from their jointly owned property: [19]. The reasoning linked the source of the funds used for repayment to the identity of the plaintiffs entitled to seek that relief.
That issue led the Court to UCPR r 6.20. White J quoted the rule as requiring persons jointly entitled to the same relief to be joined unless the Court otherwise orders: [20]. Kadi indicated consent to joinder, and the judge ordered that she be joined as a co-plaintiff: [21]. The Court consequently entered joint judgment for the contribution claims, while preserving Socratous's separate claim for the earlier payments: [22], [25].
The judgment does not describe a change in the law, resolve conflicting authorities, or set out a broad test for summary judgment. It applies the principles and procedural provisions identified in its reasons to the record before it. The clearest statement of its summary judgment reasoning is at [23], which explains that the decision rested on the combined effect of the admissions, the absence of defences to the later pleadings, the absence of evidence suggesting a triable issue, and the hearing submissions.
The decision's treatment of contribution is also confined to the circumstances before White J. The judgment records that Galanopoulos had guaranteed relevant indebtedness, that the plaintiffs' property sale proceeds discharged the debts, and that the amounts claimed fell within the guarantee limits. On those facts, the Court said the plaintiffs were entitled to contribution: [18]-[19]. It does not set out a comprehensive account of contribution law or analyse authorities on the subject.
The procedural point about joinder is stated through UCPR r 6.20. White J quoted the rule and applied it to the circumstance that Socratous and Kadi were jointly entitled to part of the relief: [20]-[22]. The judgment does not consider competing interpretations of the rule. Nor does it state that the same joinder outcome would follow in circumstances where ownership of the asset, the source of payment, or the claimed relief differed.
For practitioners and compliance professionals, the decision's value in this respect lies in its illustration of how a court may connect the pleaded claim, evidence of payment, prior admissions, and the identity of persons entitled to relief. It should not be read as establishing a novel general doctrine on any of those topics. The text supplies no authorities on which to base a wider account of the law.
At [16], White J states that there was evidence supporting each part of the $182,913 claim and that Galanopoulos had served no rebuttal evidence, filed no defence to the later pleadings, and said nothing in submissions that suggested a defence. The judge concluded that Socratous was entitled to judgment for that amount. In plain English, the court accepted the evidence supporting this component because no material before it identified a live factual or legal dispute about it.
At [18], the judge says that the plaintiffs were entitled to contribution from Galanopoulos as a co-guarantor. The paragraph also records the bank payout figures and says the amounts fell within the guarantee limits. In plain English, the court treated the payment of the guaranteed debts as supporting a claim against another person who had guaranteed them, on the facts and pleadings before it.
At [19], White J addresses the $393,231.59 attributed to Galanopoulos's proportion of the D Galanopoulos & Associates loan. The judge says the whole loan was discharged from the Mosman property sale proceeds and concludes that both Socratous and Kadi appeared entitled to contribution. The practical point is that the court looked not only at the defendant's agreed share of the debt, but also at the fact that the funds used for repayment came from property belonging jointly to the two plaintiffs.
At [20]-[21], the judge identifies the joinder question and quotes UCPR r 6.20. The Court then records Kadi's consent and orders her joinder. In plain English, where the relief belongs jointly to two people, the rule described in this judgment generally requires both to be parties unless the Court orders otherwise. Here, the Court joined Kadi rather than making an order that she need not be joined.
At [23], White J gives the clearest summary of the basis for the result: admissions, no defence to the later pleadings, no evidence indicating a triable issue, and no helpful point in the defendant's submissions. This is the key passage for understanding why the motion succeeded. It is a fact-specific explanation, not a statement that any one of those circumstances alone will always be decisive.
At [24]-[25], the Court specifies interest and costs. Interest on $691,532.12 ran from 26 July 2016, the date connected with the property sale and bank payment. Interest on the separate $182,913 judgment ran from 28 July 2015, the date proceedings commenced. The first defendant was ordered to pay the first plaintiff's costs.
The decision is most directly relevant to a fact pattern involving a summary judgment application where the defendant has made admissions in earlier pleadings, has not defended later pleadings, has put forward no responsive evidence, and does not identify a triable issue in submissions. The judgment's reasoning depends on that combination: [6], [10], [16], [23]. It does not establish that a defendant's silence will always justify judgment, since the Court's reasons also refer to the evidence and submissions before it.
It may also be relevant where a person who is a co-guarantor is pursued for contribution after another guarantor's property or funds have been used to discharge the guaranteed debt. The judgment records both the guarantee and the payout, and concludes that contribution was available on those facts: [18]-[19]. The plaintiffs' jointly owned property was material to the conclusion that both of them should be claimants for the relevant relief: [19]-[22].
The case also illustrates a joinder question arising where relief is jointly held. The Court considered UCPR r 6.20 and joined Kadi as a co-plaintiff after she consented: [20]-[21]. A separate claim for payments allegedly owed under an agreement was treated as belonging to Socratous alone: [13]-[16], [22]. The distinction between the joint contribution claim and the separate payment claim is central to the form of the orders.
The judgment is less informative for disputes involving contested evidence, a properly pleaded defence, a defendant who identifies a triable issue, or uncertainty about whether the claimant actually paid or discharged a debt. Those circumstances were not present in the account of the motion decided by White J.
The judgment text supplied here contains no references to later cases and provides no information about subsequent treatment of this decision. Its cited sources are the statutory interest provision in s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and UCPR r 6.20. It does not cite earlier judgments as authorities, and it cannot establish whether later courts have followed, distinguished, or otherwise treated it.
Accordingly, no claim about later judicial treatment can be drawn from this judgment alone. Any research on its subsequent history would require sources beyond the text provided here. The reasoning that can be attributed to White J is the reasoning in the paragraphs identified above, particularly [18]-[23].
Several matters are not resolved in the judgment. It does not provide a general analysis of the legal elements of contribution between co-guarantors, or discuss authorities defining the scope of that doctrine. It records the Court's conclusion on the particular guarantees, debts, payments and pleadings before it: [18]-[19].
The judgment also does not examine the merits of a defence that Galanopoulos did not plead or support with evidence. It records that his earlier defence contained admissions and that he had not defended the later pleadings, but does not describe a developed alternative case requiring determination: [6], [10], [23]. The decision therefore does not explain how the same claims would have been assessed if material evidence had raised a genuine dispute.
The reasons do not analyse whether any different result would follow if the property used to discharge the loans were not jointly owned, if one plaintiff alone had supplied the repayment funds, or if the guarantees contained different terms. The Court's conclusion about joint entitlement is tied to the fact that the bank debts were paid from the sale proceeds of property owned by Socratous and Kadi: [17]-[22].
Finally, the judgment does not discuss the calculation methodology behind every component beyond the descriptions recorded at [13]-[19], nor does it set out a separate analysis of costs beyond making the order. These limits mean the decision is best understood through its stated findings and orders, rather than as a comprehensive treatment of loan guarantees, contribution, or summary judgment procedure.
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Solicitors: Sullivan Fernan Lawyers (1st Plaintiff) File Number(s): 2015/220347
Judgment
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Socratous
Galanopoulos
Judgment for Socratous and Kadi jointly against Galanopoulos for $691,532.12 plus interest under s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) from 26 July 2016 to 23 August 2016. Further judgment for Socratous alone for $182,913 plus interest under s 100 from 28 July 2015 to 23 August 2016. Galanopoulos was ordered to pay the first plaintiff's costs: [25].