[2009] VCAT 1977
General information, not legal advice.
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2009-09-24
Original judgment source is linked above.
General List - Freedom of Information Act 1987 sections 39, 41, 46, 49, 50(2)(e), request to amend record, whether record contained information relating to the personal affairs of a person
Smeaton v Victorian Workcover Authority (General) [2009] VCAT 1977
The bundle of documents (Exhibit A in this proceeding) are to be:
2 Otherwise the application of the applicants is dismissed.
Re Mann and Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (1997) 12 VAR 142
Re Buhagiar and Victorian Police (1989) 2 VAR 530
G v Health Commission of Victoria (Unreported, County Court, 13 September 1984)
Stephens v Victoria Police 1998 2 VAR 236
Re Griffiths v Victoria Police 2 VAR 595
9 Workcover sought that I affirm its decision because:
10 However, Workcover did not otherwise oppose the making of the orders set out in paragraph 8(a) and 8(b)(ii) above. Toward the end of the hearing counsel stated that Workcover would have consented to those orders set out in paragraph 8(a) and 8(b)(ii) being made by consent of the parties. The Smeatons did not consent to this.
Where a document containing information relating to the personal affairs of a person (including a deceased person) is released to the person who is the subject of that information (or in the case of a deceased person, that person's next-of-kin) that person shall be entitled to request the correction or amendment of any part of that information where it is inaccurate, incomplete, out of date, or where it would give a misleading impression.
Where an agency to which or Minister to whom a request is made under section 39 decides to amend the record of information to which the request relates, the agency or Minister may, in its or his discretion, make the amendment either by altering the record or by adding an appropriate notation to the record.
Where a request for correction or amendment under section 39 has been acceded to by an agency, the correction or amendment may take the form of a notation of the original document but no correction or amendment shall be made which has the effect of deleting or expunging the information which has been corrected or amended or of destroying the document except with the concurrence of the Keeper of Public Records.
The amendment of personal records is dealt with in Pt V of the Act. The rationale for these provisions is well caught by the following comments of Gesell J about the amendment provisions of the US Privacy Act: RR v Department of the Army 482 F Supp 770 (1980) at 773:
'Accuracy of government recorded personnel information is particularly important in our complex and bureaucratically interrelated society, where an individual's rights and benefits may well be influenced or determined by what some government agency has to say about him. The prejudice resulting from inaccuracy may affect determinations reached by third parties, public or private, as well as those made by the record-keeping agency. Of course no individual is entitled to shape or color such information according to his own whims or preferences. On occasion accuracy is achieved only be allowing a disputed question of fact or judgment previously recorded to remain in the record, qualified by subsequent data. On the other hand, it may be necessary to eliminate clear mistakes of fact or irresponsible judgment from an individual's file so as not to prejudice prospects for a fair determination of his rights or benefits.'
The purpose of s 39 is summed up by the following comments of Judge Rendit in G v Health Commission of Victoria (County Court, 13 September 1984), p 10:
'What s 39 is about is ensuring that personal information concerning an applicant and read by third persons, does not unfairly harm the applicant or misrepresent personal facts about the applicant. It is concerned that the third persons reading the personal information do not get the wrong impression. It is to safeguard against this occurring, that rights are given to an applicant under s 39, to correct his personal record.'
With respect, I also concur with the following comments of Judge Rendit in G's case about the operation of s 39:
'A misleading statement or impression is one which is untrue or is likely to lead to an erroneous conclusion...whether there would be misleading impressions...is objective. What, on the reading of the material, is fairly and reasonably open as an interpretation, not what would some person failing to apply reason or who was biased or who failed to act fairly and reasonably in interpreting the material get, as an impression (at 10-11).
There is a difference between a misleading impression and an inaccuracy, although each will overlap the other to a large extent. One can readily envisage circumstances where the recorded facts are inaccurate, and also give a misleading impression. Equally, recorded facts which are accurate may yet give a misleading impression, either because of incompleteness or because the language used in recording the facts, whilst accurate, yet would convey a misleading impression (at 9).'
Section 41 of the Act provides that where an agency decides to amend the recorded information to which a request relates it may in its discretion make the amendment either by altering the record or by adding an appropriate notation to the record. Section 42 sets out what is to be included in a notation to the record. Section 49 of the Act states that no correction or amendment shall be made which has the effect of deleting or expunging the information which has been corrected or amended or of destroying the document except with the concurrence of the Keeper of Public Records.
Mr Howie in [Stephens v Victoria Police 1998 2 VAR 236] at 239 identified four useful categories to consider in deciding whether there should be amendment of information in the nature of opinion[2]. With respect, I agree with his categories. They are:
'1. The facts underlying such opinion have been thoroughly discredited or have been demonstrated to be totally inadequate;
2. The person forming such opinion was tainted by bias or ill will, incompetence or lack of balance, or necessary experience;
3. The factual substratum underlying the opinion is so trivial as to render the opinion formed dangerous to rely upon and likely to result in error;
4. The facts upon which the opinion was based were misapprehended.'
The term "information relating to the personal affairs of a person" in section 39 should be read as narrowing the class of documents about which an applicant may request amendment. The definition of the same term in section 33 of the Act (which is broad, such as including "information that identifies any person" - see 33(9)) should not be used. Section 33 is protective in that it prevents the disclosure to others of information about a person.
Counsel opposed the order sought that I order Workcover replace all copies of the Review Letter on decision file number 09 92 50790 with a copy of the letter annotated by the Smeatons to correct what they say are inaccuracies in the letter (the Smeatons' preference).
On the 22nd of October 2003 Dr Strauss provided Allianz Australia with a verbal report confirming that although you require the assistance of night carer [sic] in his opinion it is not sound to give carer status to Mr Smeaton.
I think the legislature contemplated that s 39 would be used generally to correct erroneous information concerning an individual retained by an agency for its purposes.
[2] Mr Howie was quoting Gessell J in PR v Department of Army 482 F Supp 770 (1980).
[3] While I have no view on the following matter, Workcover may decide to add a copy of this decision to the file, to further explain the situation.
Smeaton
Victorian Workcover Authority