SMADU -v- STONE [2016] WASC 80 (14 March 2016)

3 The appellant appeals against his conviction and sentence. The appeal was commenced out of time and hence the appellant requires an extension of time. The appeal notice was only one day out of time. However, for the reasons I will state the grounds of appeal have no merit and no injustice will result from a strict application of the time limits.

4 The appellant requires leave to appeal for each ground of appeal. The court must not give leave to appeal on each ground of appeal unless it is satisfied that the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding.

5 The appeal is grounded primarily on the notion that the appellant has separate legal personalities. It appears the appellant asserts that one such personality owned the motor vehicle and another held the appellant's driver's licence and drove the vehicle. The appellant says that the wrong legal person was charged and raises various arguments which appear to be based on the separate legal personality fiction. This is all nonsense. It would be a waste of judicial resources and an affront to the dignity of this court to answer the pseudolegal arguments raised by the appeal in anything but a summary way.

7 Ground 1 is that the charge was brought against the wrong legal person/capacity. This ground is based upon the fiction that the appellant has more than one legal personality; that one legal personality owned the motor vehicle and a separate legal personality drove it. This is nonsense.

8 Ground 2 is that the 'main basis for the argument [the prosecutor] tries to make is incoherent in the transcript due to "indistinct" insertions and it is thus hard to understand that the charge could be proven so quickly'. Despite the notation 'indistinct' which appears on the transcript, it is clear that the prosecutor was referring to the date on which the appellant was served with the prosecution notice and the court hearing notice, that is 12 May 2015. The court proceeded by taking as proven the allegations in the prosecution notice containing the charge that was served on the appellant. It was entitled do so: Criminal Procedure Act, s 55(4)(b). The allegations in the prosecution notice are sufficient to establish each element of the charge. The appellant was properly convicted. Ground 2 has no reasonable prospect of succeeding.

9 Ground 3 asserts that there was no evidence that the appellant was driving in his capacity under his driver's licence. This appears to be based on the assertion that the appellant has more than one legal personality or capacity. That is nonsense. The ground further asserts in effect that the appellant was not driving the vehicle or it has not been proved that he was. It was alleged in the prosecution notice that the appellant was driving the vehicle and the court took that as proved pursuant to Criminal Procedure Act, s 55(4)(b). It was entitled to do so. Ground 3 has no reasonable prospect of succeeding.

10 Ground 4 asserts that at the time of the alleged offence the appellant was deriving no benefit or valuable consideration from operating under his capacity under his driver's licence. This is more pseudolegal gibberish.

11 Ground 5 is that the address of the vehicle registration does not match the address of the court hearing notice and therefore the appellant can only believe that the police department is attempting to create a joinder between the two distinct and separate legal entities. This is a variation on the theme of separate legal identities and appears to be based on some notion that the prosecutor has to establish joinder to link the separate legal identities. This is more pseudolegal gibberish.

12 Ground 6 is that the infringement notice was sent to a postal address of the owner of the vehicle but the charge was made against the agent holding the driver's licence. This is more nonsense based upon the fiction of separate legal identities.

13 Ground 7 is that as an agent under his driver's licence the appellant owns no property as he has never received any value or consideration in that capacity. This is more pseudolegal gibberish based upon the fiction of separate legal identities.

14 Ground 8 refers to notices sent by the appellant 'trying to ask for greater clarity and to correct the record'. The evidence of these letters was not before the Magistrates Court and is not properly before this court. In any event the ground has no reasonable prospect of succeeding. In his letter of 12 July 2015 the appellant makes statements about the charges against him and that he intended to plead not guilty to the alleged offence. The appellant did not appear in court to answer the charges. The matters alleged in ground 8 give rise to no ground of appeal with any reasonable prospect of succeeding.

15 Ground 9 is that an affidavit was sent on 12 June 2015 to the police department affirming that the vehicle was not being used by an agent under the appellant's driver's licence. This is another ground which appears to be based on the fiction of separate legal personalities.

16 Ground 10 alleges that the prosecution notice and the hearing notice may be incomplete or defective in a number of respects, including references to WAPS ID and brief number. The prescribed forms for a prosecution notice and the court hearing notice do not include the WAPS ID nor the brief number. The information that is absent does not invalidate the documents. In any event, if there was any procedural defect giving rise to a ground of appeal no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred. This ground of appeal has no reasonable prospect of success.

17 Ground 11 is that in light of ground 2 the appellant could not reasonably be certain of the validity or authenticity of the documents. This ground of appeal has no reasonable prospect of success for the same reasons as ground 2.

18 Ground 12 asserts that the appellant's belief is that the incorrect legal identity was charged potentially in the incorrect jurisdiction. This is more pseudolegal gibberish based upon the fiction of separate legal identities.

19 None of the grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. If any of them otherwise had any merit, no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred.

20 The appeal was lodged out of time. The appellant's application for an extension of time is refused. No ground of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Leave to appeal is refused in respect of each ground of appeal. There is no substantial miscarriage of justice. The appellant had notice of the trial. He failed to appear. Each element of the offence was made out by the allegations in the prosecution notice which the Magistrates Court took as proven, as it was entitled to do. The appellant does not allege that the prosecution failed to prove any element of the offence except for the assertion that the charge was brought against the wrong legal person or against the appellant in the wrong capacity. As I have said, that is nonsense.