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[2025] QCA 227
respondent. Leave to appeal refused; the applicant must pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The Court of Appeal held that the dispute about the caretaking agreement was a complex dispute and that the BCCM Act specified the exclusive routes for resolving it. The District Court could not decide it, even though the applicant asked only for a declaration. The Court did not decide whether QCAT could grant that declaration, because that question was not necessary to resolve the appeal. Leave to appeal was refused, with costs against the applicant.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
1,826 words · generated 07/10/2026
Sino Amber had acted as caretaker and letting agent for the Riverbend Gardens community titles scheme since 2019 under a caretaking agreement. On 16 May 2025, the body corporate resolved to terminate that agreement. Sino Amber disputed the body corporate’s asserted right to terminate and maintained that the agreement continued in force ([4]–[6]).
Sino Amber filed a claim in the District Court on 18 June 2025. It sought a declaration that the agreement remained in force and was binding on both parties ([1], [7]). The body corporate’s conditional notice of intention to defend raised a jurisdictional objection. It argued that the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (BCCM Act) provided a specialist adjudicator or QCAT as the available original decision-maker for the dispute, leaving the District Court without jurisdiction ([8]).
The primary judge dismissed the claim on 24 June 2025, finding that the proceeding had not been properly started because the District Court lacked jurisdiction ([2], [9]–[13]). Sino Amber then sought leave to appeal. The Court of Appeal, constituted by Boddice and Brown JJA and Wilson J, refused leave and ordered Sino Amber to pay the respondent’s appeal costs ([19]).
The Court of Appeal’s decision concerned the forum and statutory jurisdiction for resolving the dispute. It did not determine whether the body corporate validly terminated the agreement, whether the agreement remained in force, or which party was right about the contractual dispute.
The central provision was s 229 of the BCCM Act. The judgment set out the section in full at [14]. In relevant part, s 229 says that “the only remedy for a complex dispute” is resolution by an order of a specialist adjudicator, an order of QCAT exercising original jurisdiction, or an order of the appeal tribunal on appeal on a question of law. The section also describes the only remedy for disputes that are not complex and contains qualifications and exceptions.
The threshold point was not contested: the dispute between Sino Amber and the body corporate was a complex dispute ([15]). The Court therefore treated s 229 as applicable. Boddice JA described the section’s terms as “clear and unambiguous” and concluded that the only remedy was through a specialist adjudicator or QCAT in its original jurisdiction ([15]).
A key aspect of the reasoning was the distinction between a statutory restriction on the available remedy and a restriction on a court’s jurisdiction. The applicant’s arguments included that QCAT could not grant the specific declaratory relief sought, and that the District Court should therefore be able to hear the claim ([10]). The primary judge rejected that position, including on the basis that the District Court was itself a court of statutory jurisdiction and that the specific BCCM Act provision prevailed over the more general jurisdiction provision in s 68(1) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) ([11]–[13]).
On appeal, Boddice JA relied on the reasoning quoted from Dunlop v Body Corporate for Port Douglas Queenslander CTS 886 (No 2) [2021] QSC 85. That passage explains that although s 149B(2) uses “may” in relation to applying for an order, s 229 states that an order through the statutory process is the only remedy for a complex dispute. The quoted reasoning also refers to earlier authority treating the effect of the equivalent provision as removal of a court’s jurisdiction to resolve the dispute ([16]). Boddice JA adopted the resulting conclusion, describing the legislative intention as “to remove a court’s jurisdiction to resolve” a complex dispute ([17]).
The Court also addressed the fact that Sino Amber sought a declaration rather than another form of relief. It held that the result was not changed by the declaratory form of the claim ([17]). In other words, the Court treated the statutory restriction as applying to resolution of the dispute itself, not merely to a particular remedy that might be requested from a court.
The Court did not, however, decide whether QCAT had power to make the declaration Sino Amber wanted. Brown JA said that the primary judge had set out strong arguments supporting QCAT’s power to make a declaration, but considered it unnecessary to decide that question given Boddice JA’s reasoning on the District Court’s jurisdiction ([20]). This distinction matters: the judgment resolves the District Court jurisdiction question, but leaves the scope of QCAT’s declaratory power undecided.
The judgment presents s 229 as the governing statutory provision and applies it to a dispute accepted to be complex. It does not provide a broad account of the law before s 229, nor does it undertake a detailed legislative history. The relevant comparison in the judgment is the earlier equivalent provision discussed in the passage from Dunlop: s 184(2) of the BCCM Act’s predecessor or earlier version was described there as equivalent to the current s 229(2) ([16]).
The Court’s contribution in this case is its application of the existing statutory wording to a claim framed as a request for declaratory relief. It confirms that, where the dispute is a complex dispute, the restriction in s 229 is not avoided merely because the claimant asks a court to declare the parties’ contractual position. The Court concluded that the District Court lacked jurisdiction and that the primary judge had made no error ([17]–[18]).
The decision does not establish that QCAT necessarily has power to grant every form of relief that might be sought in a complex dispute. That issue was expressly left undecided ([20]). Nor does the judgment determine how s 229 applies to a dispute that is not complex, to a dispute falling within a statutory exception, or to circumstances in which the statutory process has been affected by an event identified in s 229. The section’s text and qualifications are reproduced at [14], but this appeal concerned a complex dispute and did not require the Court to decide those other situations.
Accordingly, the narrow effect is important: the case applies s 229 to the District Court claim before it, rather than resolving every question about the jurisdiction of QCAT, the operation of other parts of the BCCM Act, or the merits of a caretaking agreement dispute.
At [15], Boddice JA said: “The only remedy, in such a dispute, was by a specialist adjudicator or QCAT, as its original jurisdiction.” In plain English, once the parties accepted that the dispute was complex, the Court treated the BCCM Act’s designated dispute-resolution routes as exclusive.
At [17], Boddice JA said that the conclusion was not affected by the fact “that only declaratory relief was sought by the applicant.” This means the claim’s form did not restore the District Court’s authority. A claim asking the court to declare the agreement’s status was still an attempt to resolve the complex dispute.
At [18], Boddice JA concluded: “There was no error in the primary judge’s conclusion that the District Court did not have jurisdiction.” This is the operative appellate conclusion. The Court did not decide the contractual question; it decided that the District Court was not the forum with jurisdiction to decide it.
Finally, Brown JA’s statement at [20] marks a limit on what the decision decides. Although the primary judge had given strong reasons for concluding that QCAT could make a declaration, Brown JA said that question was unnecessary to decide. In plain English, the Court of Appeal did not endorse a final ruling on QCAT’s declaratory powers.
The judgment is most directly relevant to a fact pattern with three features. First, the dispute is a complex dispute for the purposes of the BCCM Act. Second, the subject matter is a dispute between parties connected with a community titles scheme, here a body corporate and a caretaker and letting agent. Third, a party attempts to have a court resolve the dispute, including by seeking declaratory relief.
The particular dispute concerned whether a caretaking agreement remained in force after the body corporate resolved to terminate it ([5]–[7]). The Court did not decide the meaning or enforceability of that agreement. The jurisdictional reasoning turns on the accepted classification of the dispute as complex and the operation of s 229, not on the Court resolving the underlying contract issue.
The decision should not be read as deciding every body corporate dispute or every claim for a declaration. The judgment expressly proceeds on the basis that the dispute was complex and that s 229 applied ([15]). It reproduces statutory qualifications and exceptions at [14], but does not analyse their application to the facts. The fact pattern addressed is therefore narrower than “any dispute involving a body corporate”.
The judgment was delivered on 14 November 2025 and the supplied text contains no account of subsequent decisions applying or considering it. It is therefore not possible, from this judgment alone, to describe how later courts have treated the decision.
The authorities discussed in the judgment are earlier ones. Boddice JA cited Dunlop at [16], quoting Henry J’s discussion of s 229 and the effect of the phrase “the only remedy”. At [17], Boddice JA also cited Henderson v The Body Corporate for Merrimac Heights (No 2) [2011] QSC 336 for the proposition that the legislative intention was to remove a court’s jurisdiction to resolve a complex dispute. The judgment does not state that either authority was overruled or displaced. Rather, it uses them to support its construction of s 229.
The clearest expressly unresolved question is whether QCAT can make a declaration in a case of this kind. Brown JA said it was unnecessary to decide the point, notwithstanding the primary judge’s reasons in favour of QCAT having that power ([20]). The Court of Appeal’s decision should not be treated as a definitive ruling on that issue.
Other matters were outside the question the Court had to decide. The judgment does not determine whether the body corporate’s termination resolution was valid, whether the contract remained in force, or what substantive rights the parties had under the agreement. Nor does it determine how s 229 would apply if the dispute were not complex, or if one of the statutory qualifications or exceptions reproduced at [14] were engaged.
For practitioners assessing the reach of the decision, the judgment’s express factual premise is significant: the complex-dispute classification was not in issue ([15]). The supplied reasons do not discuss how a contested classification would be resolved. The judgment also does not analyse the detailed boundary between the statutory dispute-resolution process and every possible court proceeding connected with a community titles scheme. Its holding is that this complex dispute could not be resolved in the District Court, even through the declaratory claim brought here.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Sino Amber Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Riverbend Gardens Community Titles Scheme [2025] QCA 227
PARTIES: SINO AMBER PTY LTD ACN 633 817 731 as trustee for SINO AMBER UNIT TRUST / (applicant) / v / BODY CORPORATE FOR RIVERBEND GARDENS COMMUNITY TITLES SCHEME 26822 / (respondent)
FILE NO/S: Appeal No 2973 of 2025 / DC No 1687 of 2025
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Miscellaneous Application – Civil
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Brisbane – [2025] QDC 90 (Porter KC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON: 14 November 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 14 October 2025
JUDGES: Boddice and Brown JJA and Wilson J
ORDERS: Leave to appeal refused. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
CATCHWORDS: STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – STATUTORY POWERS AND DUTIES – CONSTRUCTION – OTHER MATTERS – where the applicant filed a claim and statement of claim in the District Court of Queensland, seeking declaratory relief in relation to a caretaking agreement for the respondent’s premises and activities – where the primary judge ordered that the claim be dismissed, declaring that the proceeding had not been properly started, for want of jurisdiction – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the District Court of Queensland did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim / Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld), s 6, s 15, s 16, s 149B, s 229 / District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 68(1) / Dunlop v Body Corporate for Port Douglas Queenslander CTS 886 (No 2) [2021] QSC 85, cited / Henderson v The Body Corporate for Merrimac Heights (No 2) [2011] QSC 336, cited
COUNSEL: Z Jiang appeared as director for the applicant / B P Strangman for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Z Jiang appeared as director the applicant / Stratify Legal for the respondent
BODDICE JA: On 18 June 2025, the applicant filed a claim and statement of claim, in the District Court of Queensland, seeking declaratory relief in relation to a caretaking agreement for the respondent’s premises and activities.
On 24 June 2025, the primary judge ordered that the claim be dismissed, declaring that the proceeding had not been properly started, for want of jurisdiction.
The applicant seeks leave to appeal the dismissal. At issue, is whether the primary judge erred in finding that the District Court of Queensland did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim.
Facts
The applicant, since 2019, had undertaken the role of caretaker and letting agent, pursuant to the terms of the caretaking agreement.
On 16 May 2025, the respondent resolved to terminate that caretaking agreement.
The applicant did not accept that the respondent had a right to terminate, contending that as a consequence, the caretaking agreement remained in force.
Claim
The applicant filed a claim, seeking a declaration that the caretaking agreement remained in force and was binding on the parties.
The respondent filed a conditional notice of intention to defend. That notice asserted that the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (BCCM Act) provided for a specialist adjudicator or a Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) determination, in its original jurisdiction, as the only remedy for the dispute about the caretaking agreement, and that accordingly the District Court had no jurisdiction to determine the proceeding.
Primary decision
The primary judge recorded that s 229 of the BCCM Act provided the only remedy for a complex dispute was resolution by a specialist adjudicator or an order of QCAT; that a complex dispute was defined, relevantly, to mean a dispute mentioned in s 149B of the BCCM Act; that s 149B applied to a dispute about the engagement of a person as a caretaking service contractor for a community title scheme; that a caretaking service contractor was defined by s 6 of the BCCM Act to mean a service contractor for the scheme who was also a letting agent for the scheme; and that by reason of ss 15 and 16 of the BCCM Act, the applicant was both a service contractor and a letting agent such that resolution of the dispute was only available by a specialist adjudicator or QCAT.
The primary judge recorded that the applicant contended that QCAT had no jurisdiction, as QCAT did not have power to grant the declaratory relief sought by the applicant and that accordingly, there was jurisdiction to hearing the proceeding in the District Court.
In rejecting the applicant’s contentions, the primary judge found that as QCAT was given original jurisdiction to determine complex disputes, that jurisdiction included all powers necessary to give effect to the substantive jurisdiction. Further, as QCAT had power to determine contractual disputes about letting and caretaking agreements, the power included a power to make a declaration in such a case.
The primary judge also found that even if QCAT could not provide the remedy sought, it did not follow that the District Court had jurisdiction. The District Court was itself a court of statutory jurisdiction and not a court of general jurisdiction. As the BCCM Act specified, the only remedy for a complex dispute was a specialist adjudicator or QCAT, the subject matter of the proceeding in the District Court was excluded from the jurisdiction of the District Court.
Finally, the primary judge found even if that not be so, the more specific provision in the BCCM Act would be given effect by the District Court over the general provisions in s 68(1) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld).
Consideration
“Exclusivity of dispute resolution provisions
Subsections (2) and (3) apply to a dispute if it may be resolved under this chapter by a dispute resolution process.
Notes—
1 For a dispute about a body corporate decision under section 47A, see section 47AA.
2 For disputes about a decision of a body corporate committee under section 410, or a body corporate decision under section 411, see section 412(5).
The only remedy for a complex dispute is—
the resolution of the dispute by—
an order of a specialist adjudicator under chapter 6; or
an order of QCAT exercising the tribunal’s original jurisdiction under the QCAT Act; or
an order of the appeal tribunal on appeal from a specialist adjudicator or QCAT on a question of law.
Subject to section 229A, the only remedy for a dispute that is not a complex dispute is—
the resolution of the dispute by a dispute resolution process; or
an order of the appeal tribunal on appeal from an adjudicator on a question of law.
However, subsections (2) and (3) do not apply to a dispute if—
an application is made to the commissioner; and
the commissioner dismisses the application under part 5.
Also, subsections (2) and (3) do not limit—
the powers of QCAT under the QCAT Act to—
refer a question of law to the Court of Appeal; or
transfer a proceeding, or a part of a proceeding, to the Court of Appeal; or
the right of a party to make an appeal from QCAT to the Court of Appeal under the QCAT Act.”
It was not in issue that the dispute between the applicant and the respondent was a complex dispute. Accordingly, s 229 was applicable. Its terms are clear and unambiguous. The only remedy, in such a dispute, was by a specialist adjudicator or QCAT, as its original jurisdiction.
As Henry J observed, in Dunlop v Body Corporate for Port Douglas Queenslander CTS 886 (No 2):1
“[62] While s 149B(2) provides that a party to a dispute ‘may’ apply for an order of a specialist adjudicator or of QCAT, s 229 mandates the only remedy for a complex dispute is such an order.
[63] The respondents do not argue against the obvious conclusion that Mr Dunlop’s claim in contract against the body corporate is a complex dispute. However, they emphasise s 229(2) does not go to jurisdiction. They submit, drawing on reasoning in MHA v DMA 18, that s 229(2) ‘potentially bars the remedy, not the right’, so that the objection to jurisdiction is misplaced and that if the applicants wish to maintain their reliance upon the statutory bar to the remedy sought, they should do so in their pleading.
[64] However, the authorities relevant to s 229(2) indicate it is more than a statutory bar to the remedy sought in the dispute and that its effect is to remove the court’s jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. As much was concluded by Holmes J, as her Honour then was, in James v Body Corporate Aarons Community Title Scheme 11476. Her Honour observed of s 184(2) of BCCMA, the equivalent provision to what is now s 229(2) of that Act:
The wording of the section itself is unusual: rather than providing for exclusive jurisdiction in so many words, s 184(2) speaks in terms of “the only remedy” being the order of an adjudicator or that of a District Court on appeal on a question of law. But those words ‘the only remedy’ are not ambiguous; it is difficult to see what meaning they can have other than that in the circumstances to which s 184(2) applies, the only manner in which the dispute itself can be resolved is by the means prescribed: the adjudicator’s order or that of the District Court on appeal.”
Conclusion
Orders
Leave to appeal refused.
The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
BROWN JA: I agree that leave to appeal should be refused for the reasons given by Justice Boddice. Although the District Court judge set out strong arguments in favour of QCAT having power to make a declaration in a case such as the present, it is unnecessary to presently decide that question given the reasons outlined by Justice Boddice.
WILSON J: I agree with Boddice JA.
Sino Amber Pty Ltd
Body Corporate for Riverbend Gardens Community Titles Scheme [2025] QCA 227
Leave to appeal refused; the applicant must pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.