• Pre-sentence Detention declaration pursuant to s 18(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991:

• Section 6AAA Statement:

• 5 years 6 months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years 6 months

Disqualification from obtaining any licence or permit for a period of 2 years from 25 July 2024.

1. The applicant seeks leave to appeal on the following grounds:

(1) The learned sentencing judge erred in failing to take into account the fifth principle in Verdins.

(2) The learned sentencing judge failed to take into account the applicant's relative youth.

(3) There is fresh evidence that demonstrates the true significance of facts in existence at the time of the sentence being the inherent dangerousness of the intersection.

(4) The individual sentences and total effective sentence are manifestly excessive.

1. The two charges, to which the applicant pleaded guilty, arose from a collision between a vehicle driven by the applicant, and a vehicle in which the two victims were each passengers, on Saturday 11 February 2023 at the intersection of Clegg Road and Wellington Road, Wandin South. The accident occurred at about 3:55 pm. Shortly before the collision, the applicant was driving in his capacity as an Uber driver south on Wellington Road towards the intersection of Clegg Road. There were two passengers in the rear seat of his vehicle. The applicant entered the intersection at a speed of approximately 42 to 44 kms per hour, having failed to stop at a Stop sign applicable to him. His vehicle collided with a motor vehicle driven by Ms Jorja O'Connor, which was then travelling west on Clegg Road at a speed of 52 kph to 57 kph.
2. Ms O'Connor's grandfather, Mr Lewis Carnegie, was seated in the front passenger seat of her vehicle, and her great-uncle, Mr Peter Carnegie, was seated in the rear seat of the vehicle. The collision caused Ms O'Connor's vehicle to rotate and roll onto its roof, and then to hit an embankment. As a consequence, Mr Lewis Carnegie suffered a crush injury to his pelvis and significant soft tissue trauma. He died at the Royal Melbourne Hospital from his injuries approximately two hours after the collision. Mr Peter Carnegie suffered lacerations to his head and neck, together with multiple fractures, which included an undisplaced fracture of the C7 vertebra, fractures of multiple ribs and a fractured clavicle. His neck lacerations required repair by plastic surgery. In addition, he suffered hypovolaemic shock which required intravenous fluid replacement and transfusion of two units of blood.
3. Both Clegg Road and Wellington Road, in the area of the collision, had an applicable speed limit of 60 kph. Both roads were in good condition. The area was surrounded by residential and farming properties. The collision occurred on a clear sunny day. The visibility was good and there were a few vehicles on the road.
4. Clegg Road was a straight section of two-way, two-lane bitumen road running in an east/west alignment. Vehicles travelling on Clegg Road had right of way at the intersection of Wellington Road.
5. Wellington Road was also a two-way, two-lane highway that ran in a north/south direction. On the approach of the applicant's vehicle to the intersection, there were a number of warning signs and road markings to alert a driver travelling in the direction of the applicant's vehicle of the requirement to stop at the approaching intersection. Those signs and markings comprise the following:

(1) At a distance of approximately 160 m before the intersection was a sign with images, warning drivers that people, horses and cyclists may be in the vicinity.

(2) At a distance of 134 m before the intersection, on each side of the road, were yellow diamond-shaped signs bearing the words 'rumble strips' in black lettering.

(3) At a distance of 111 m before the intersection, was the first set of three rumble strips, which consisted of 13 raised white horizontal markings across the whole of the side of the road on which the applicant was driving. The markings were designed to create vibration when traversed by a vehicle.

(4) At a distance of 85 m before the intersection, on either side of the road, were signs warning drivers to be prepared to stop. The signs consisted of a yellow diamond, within which was a red octagonal image (the same shape as a stop sign), and above which was a black arrow pointing ahead. Immediately underneath the diamond sign was a separate red rectangular sign with the words 'prepare to stop' in white lettering.

(5) At a distance of 75 m before the intersection was the second set of rumble strips.

(6) At a distance of 42 m before the intersection was the third set of rumble strips.

(7) At a distance of 6.7 m before the intersection, there was a visible sign, on each side of the road, that consisted of a red octagon on which the word 'STOP' was written in white lettering.

(8) At the commencement of the intersection with Clegg Road was a solid white line indicating that drivers must stop.

1. On the hearing of the plea, the prosecution tendered dashcam footage from a vehicle that had been travelling west on Clegg Road two vehicles behind Ms O'Connor's vehicle. The footage captured the collision, and depicted the applicant's vehicle entering the intersection without stopping or apparently braking. It also depicted that the weather was fine and visibility was good. In addition, the prosecution tendered dashcam footage of a drive-through taken by police after the collision. Among other matters, the footage demonstrated that the stop sign on the righthand side of Wellington Road was fully visible at a distance of at least 146 m before the intersection.
2. After the collision, the applicant's vehicle came to a stop on the southwest corner of the intersection. There were no tyre marks to suggest that either his vehicle or Ms O'Connor's vehicle had engaged in emergency braking before the collision. The witness who attended the scene heard the applicant saying that he was sorry and asking whether the accident was caused by his fault.
3. The applicant was interviewed by police on 27 February 2023. The applicant told police that he had been driving Uber vehicles for about four years. He said that he was not familiar with the road and that he was using navigation. He said that he stopped his vehicle before the intersection at a Stop sign, looked over to his right and left and again to his right, saw that the roadway was clear, and then started to cross the intersection, when his vehicle was struck by the other vehicle.
4. Following the interview, the applicant was released pending further inquiries. He was subsequently charged on 9 November 2023 and released on bail. An initial committal mention took place on 2 February 2024 which was adjourned. At the adjourned committal mention on 16 February 2024, the applicant pleaded guilty. Subsequently, on 19 February, a notice suspending his licence was served on him. The plea hearing took place on 15 July and 16 July 2024 and the applicant was sentenced on 25 July 2024.

1. The applicant was born in Punjab, India in January 1999, and at the time of sentence was 25 years of age. He has no previous convictions. When he was 14 years of age, his father left India to work in a construction company in Dubai. Unfortunately, his father had a heart attack and died there in February 2015. As a consequence, the applicant and his mother struggled financially, but he was able to complete his secondary education.
2. In November 2018, the applicant came to Melbourne. He commenced studying for an Advanced Diploma of Building Design at Oceania Polytechnic Institute, which was a private institute designed to accommodate overseas students wishing to study in Australia. He completed the three-year course and attained the Advanced Diploma in November 2021. The applicant then completed a two-year Certificate IV in Engineering at Sheila Baxter Training Centre Pty Ltd, which is another private educational institute for overseas students. Having obtained that qualification at the end of 2023, the applicant then enrolled in a Diploma of Mechanical Engineering at Baxter Institute, and he applied for a graduate visa to enable him to continue that study.
3. The applicant's student visa entitled him to work for 20 hours per fortnight while he was undertaking study. In 2018, he commenced employment for Uber Eats and subsequently, in June 2021, he commenced to work as an Uber driver. During that time he upgraded his vehicle from an old Toyota Camry to the Corolla vehicle which he was driving at the time of the collision. In addition, for a period between November 2018 and November 2020, the applicant had been employed by '5AB Tiling'. A reference from that employer was tendered at the plea. It stated that the applicant had been hardworking, well-behaved and disciplined. Subsequently, the applicant had worked for two years as a security guard employed by Force Response Security. A reference from that company stated that the applicant had demonstrated exceptional professionalism, dedication and a strong work ethic.
4. On the plea a number of character references were tendered which were summarised in some detail in the reasons of the sentencing judge.[1]
5. Following the accident, the applicant was referred by his general practitioner to Ms Hyacinth da Gama Monteiro, a psychologist and clinical counsellor, for supportive counselling and psychotherapy. The applicant attended six psychological assessments and counselling sessions between 24 February 2023 and 28 July 2023, and subsequently attended four additional sessions between 14 August 2023 and 27 March 2024.
6. A lengthy report of Ms Monteiro was tendered on the plea. In the report Ms Monteiro stated that the applicant qualified for a diagnosis of nine separate psychological disorders. In the course of the plea, the judge, correctly, identified a number of significant concerns relating to the report. In particular, the report did not give any content of the specific symptoms relating to each of the nine diagnoses, the report appeared to traverse the applicant's plea of guilty, and the tenor of the report appeared to be quite adversarial, and not impartial. In the course of discussion, the applicant's counsel abandoned reliance on the opinions expressed by Ms Monteiro. Counsel did rely on the section of the report relating to the applicant's background, and the fact that he had expressed remorse to Ms Monteiro for his offending, and that he had sought counselling for depression and anxiety following the collision.
7. On the plea, counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant had lower moral culpability for the accident. In particular, it was noted that the applicant was not affected by drugs or alcohol, he had not engaged in erratic driving and was not speeding, and he was not sleep deprived. Counsel noted that the applicant, at the scene, expressed his remorse, and that he cooperated with police. In written submissions in support of the plea, counsel for the applicant relied (inter alia) on the fifth limb of the Verdins[2] principles, on the basis that there was a serious risk that imprisonment would have a significant adverse effect on the applicant's mental health.[3] However, in the course of oral submissions, following discussion with the judge, counsel withdrew that submission and acknowledged that he did not make any arguments in relation to the application of the principles stated by this Court in Verdins.
8. In essence, as mitigating circumstances, counsel for the applicant on the plea relied on the following matters: the applicant's early pleas of guilty; his remorse; his cooperation with police; the circumstance of the applicant will be deported on the completion of his sentence; and the delay between the occurrence of the accident and the hearing of the plea.

1. The judge commenced her reasons by considering, in some detail, the circumstances of the accident. Her Honour noted that although the applicant claimed that he had observed the Stop sign and had stopped at the intersection, there was no doubt, on the evidence, that he did not stop at the Stop sign.[4] The judge was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant simply did not look or pay attention as he entered the intersection. Her Honour rejected the submission that the collision occurred because of 'momentary inattention' by the applicant. Her Honour concluded that there was no explanation for the collision, other than that the applicant had not been paying attention to the signs and road markings leading to the intersection, and he had failed to concentrate and keep a proper lookout as he approached and entered the intersection.[5] The judge considered that, in the circumstances, the applicant's offending was a relatively serious example of dangerous driving and that the applicant's moral culpability was high.[6]
2. The judge also considered in some detail the applicant's personal circumstances, and referred to and summarised the 15 character references that were tendered on the applicant's behalf. The judge accepted that since the applicant had arrived in Australia at the age of 19 years, he had been a 'law-abiding, hardworking and decent person who has led a blameless life here'.[7] The judge accepted that the applicant was remorseful, as indicated by his early pleas of guilty, which had spared the victims further grief. Her Honour accepted that the applicant's pleas of guilty had utilitarian value in facilitating the course of justice and saving the inconvenience of witnesses being required to give evidence. The judge also accepted that the applicant had been very stressed and anxious since the accident, and that the delay, which had been caused through no fault of the applicant, had weighed heavily on him.[8]
3. The judge noted that it was to the applicant's credit that he had tried to continue to work and study as best he could in the 18 months which had passed since the collision. Her Honour accepted that the sentence, which she would impose, would have a consequence that the applicant's visa to remain in Australia would be cancelled, which itself would cause the applicant to suffer some anxiety while he was serving his sentence.[9]
4. The judge then returned to a consideration of the applicant's offending. Her Honour noted that dangerous driving involves a serious breach in the proper management or control of the applicant's vehicle, which posed a real danger to other members of the public in the vicinity, and which created risks that significantly exceeded the risks ordinarily associated with driving.[10] The judge noted that although counsel had originally submitted that the exceptions, prescribed by s 5(2H)(e) of the Sentencing Act, applied, counsel resiled from that submission.[11]
5. In considering the applicant's sentence, the judge noted that general deterrence in cases such as this must be given considerable weight, in order to send a message to others in the community who do not pay heed to road signs and road markings.[12] The judge considered that there was nothing which mitigated the applicant's serious lack of attention to driving which had caused the collision.[13]
6. Finally, having summarised the victim impact statements, the judge noted that she took into account the applicant's early and remorseful pleas of guilty, and the anxiety, stress and guilt which the applicant had suffered. Her Honour also took into account that, as a result of being deported, the applicant would no longer be able to study in Australia, and that he would find being imprisoned very difficult.[14]

1. In support of ground 1, counsel acknowledged that in the course of the plea, counsel for the applicant disavowed reliance on the fifth limb of the principles stated in Verdins. Nevertheless, counsel noted that despite the judge's reservations concerning the report of Ms Monteiro, her Honour did accept that the applicant was suffering from depression and anxiety. However, the judge found that there were no mitigatory factors available to the applicant pursuant to the principles stated in Verdins.
2. Counsel submitted that once the judge had accepted that the applicant suffered from depression and anxiety, there was no reason for her to reject the opinion of the psychologist that the applicant would be highly vulnerable to additional stress in custody. It was submitted that the judge's acceptance, that the applicant's mental health would cause him to suffer in custody, was evident from the endorsement by the judge on the Court orders that the applicant suffered from anxiety and depression and that all possible psychological support should be provided to him. It was submitted that in the circumstances, and notwithstanding the position taken by counsel on the plea, the failure of the judge to mitigate the applicant's sentence, on the basis of the fifth limb of the Verdins principles, constituted a miscarriage of justice.
3. In response, counsel for the respondent submitted that on the hearing of the plea, counsel for the applicant had specifically abandoned reliance on the fifth limb of the principles in Verdins, which was a consequence of significant deficiencies in the report of the applicant's treating psychologist, Ms Monteiro. Counsel noted that the deficiencies in Ms Monteiro's report included the following: there was no acknowledgment that the author had read the County Court Practice Note; Ms Monteiro had included comment in the report on matters outside her expertise; Ms Monteiro had provided diagnoses for nine psychological conditions based on the applicant's self‑report, but she did not give any content to the symptoms that supported those diagnoses; Ms Monteiro ultimately arrived at a conclusion that appeared to traverse the applicant's pleas of guilty; and Ms Monteiro is the sister of the applicant's solicitor, in circumstances in which the tenor of the report appeared adversarial rather than impartial.[15]
4. Counsel further submitted that the fact that the judge found that the applicant had suffered guilt, stress, depression and anxiety was, in any event, insufficient to enliven the application of the fifth limb of Verdins.

1. As we have noted, in the course of the plea, counsel for the applicant expressly disavowed reliance on the report of Ms Monteiro as a basis for relying on any of the propositions, concerning the effect of impaired mental functioning on sentencing, outlined by this Court in Verdins.
2. On the first day of the plea, after counsel had tendered Ms Monteiro's report, the judge identified a number of concerns relating to the manner in which the report was expressed, and concerning the failure of Ms Monteiro to provide any proper basis of the nine psychological disorders which she identified the applicant as suffering. On the second day of the plea, counsel, having given the matter consideration, advised the judge that he was unable to 'cure the deficiencies' in the report, and stated that, apart from three exceptions, he did not propose to rely on it. Specifically, counsel withdrew the submission, contained in his written outline, concerning the application of the Verdins principles. Counsel, in effect, relied on the report for three purposes. First, the report set out the applicant's history and background. Secondly, the report noted that the applicant had attended a number of treatment sessions with Ms Monteiro. Thirdly, the report noted that the applicant had stated that he was very remorseful in respect of the collision, in particular because, as a result of it, Mr Carnegie had died.
3. We should observe that counsel, on the plea, was correct to disclaim reliance on the opinions expressed by Ms Monteiro in her report. As noted by the primary judge, the report failed to set out any appropriate basis upon which Ms Monteiro purported to diagnose the applicant to suffer some nine separate psychological disorders. A number of the views expressed by Ms Monteiro traversed the applicant's guilty plea. The report was expressed in quite adversarial, and subjective, terms. Apart from the three matters relied on by counsel on the plea, the report was patently inadmissible.
4. On the present application, counsel submitted that, notwithstanding the concession made by counsel on the plea, nevertheless, the judge did accept that the applicant suffered depression and anxiety for which he had sought counselling from Ms Monteiro. In particular, in considering the effect of delay, the judge accepted that the applicant had had the matter hanging over his head, causing him to suffer '... guilt, stress, depression and anxiety' for which he had sought counselling from Ms Monteiro.[16] Later in the reasons, in summarising the mitigating factors, the judge accepted that a term of imprisonment would weigh more heavily on the applicant, together with the 'shame and distress' he felt as a consequence of the collision.[17]
5. It was appropriate that the judge both acknowledge, and accept as mitigating circumstances, the fact that the applicant had suffered some depression and anxiety as a consequence of the accident, and as a consequence of the delay in the disposition of the case. However, it is quite evident that the findings by the judge, to that effect, did not amount to an acceptance that the applicant thereby suffered impaired mental functioning of the kind, and degree, which would form the proper basis for the application of the principles summarised in Verdins.
6. The courts have emphasised that a degree of intellectual rigour must be exercised in considering that issue, and, in particular, there must be an appropriate evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that the principles apply in the case that is under consideration. As this Court stated in Director of Public Prosecutions v O'Neill:[18]

Fourth, the fifth and sixth limbs of Verdins may operate where the existing impairment will make prison more onerous, or where prison may exacerbate the mental condition, if the expert evidence establishes the significance of the impairment to the imposition of a prison sentence.

Fifth, cogent evidence, normally in the form of an expert opinion, is necessary to establish the existence of the mental impairment, either at the time of the offence, or at sentence, or both, and the nature, extent and effect of the mental impairment experienced by the offender at the relevant time.

Sixth, the assessment by the sentencing judge must be undertaken with rigour, as was made clear in Verdins itself and has since been repeatedly emphasised by this Court on appeal.[19]

1. In the present case, the limited evidence available to the judge was sufficient to enable her Honour to take into account that, as a result of the collision, the delay in conclusion of the case, and the likelihood of deportation, the applicant was suffering guilt, distress, depression and anxiety, as mitigating factors in considering the effect of a term of imprisonment on the applicant. However, the evidence on the plea was entirely insufficient to form a basis for a conclusion that the applicant suffered from some psychological disorder which would deteriorate during a term of imprisonment, or which would render his term of imprisonment more burdensome.
2. For those reasons, ground 1 does not succeed.

1. In support of ground 2, counsel submitted that although the applicant fell within the upper end of youthfulness at the age of 25 years, nevertheless, he was still a relatively young offender without previous convictions. It was submitted that the judge failed to consider that the applicant's relative youth was a mitigating circumstance, and, instead, her Honour emphasised general deterrence.
2. In response, counsel for the respondent noted that the judge did have regard to the fact that the applicant was 25 years old at the time of sentence and was relatively youthful.[20] Counsel further noted that on the plea the applicant's counsel did not submit that the judge was required to regard the applicant's rehabilitation as the primary purpose for imposing sentence because of his relative youth. Further, it was submitted that, as the applicant was 25 years of age at the time of sentence, his youth was of lesser weight. In addition, it was submitted that in cases such as the present, the youth of the offender is required to give way to other important sentencing considerations, including general deterrence.

1. For the reasons contended by counsel for the respondent, ground 2 may not succeed.
2. It is quite clear that the judge did have regard to the circumstance that the applicant was then 25 years of age. After the judge had discussed the circumstances of the collision, and expressed conclusions as to the applicant's moral culpability, her Honour commenced consideration of the applicant's personal circumstances by referring specifically to his age. Subsequently, at a later point, in summarising the mitigating circumstances which were to be taken into account, the judge specifically stated:

It is tragic that a young man, like you, who came to Australia before the age of 20 years in order to better himself and who has worked diligently to do so has brought those good achievements to a sad end by this offending.[21]

1. It is thus quite clear that the judge did have in mind the relatively young age of the applicant. However, and contrary to the submissions made on behalf of the applicant, that consideration did not constitute a mitigating circumstance of particular moment. Although, in most cases, the youth of an offender is relevant as a mitigating circumstance, there are a number of categories of cases, in which that consideration is accorded lesser weight than other sentencing considerations, and in particular, general deterrence and denunciation.[22] It is well-established that that proposition applies to offences of the kind for which the applicant was to be sentenced.
2. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Neethling,[23] this Court was concerned with an appeal by the Director in respect of a sentence imposed on the respondent who was an inexperienced 18‑year‑old driver who pleaded guilty to one charge of dangerous driving causing death and three charges of dangerous driving causing serious injury. In considering the relevance of the respondent's youth, the Court stated as follows:

It has long been accepted that, as a general rule, rehabilitation should be a primary - if not the principal - concern in sentencing a young offender. It is equally well-established, however, that this principle has sometimes to give way to other sentencing considerations. It was submitted for the Director that the present was such a case. We respectfully agree.

It was contended for the Director that, in cases such as this, general deterrence was of primary importance:

• [T]here is widespread community alarm at very serious motor vehicle accidents involving young drivers. It is appropriate that deterrence be used to encourage young drivers not to drive dangerously.

We accept this submission, which accords with the authorities referred to earlier. As Spigelman CJ said in Whyte, the 'frequently recurring case' of dangerous driving causing death is one involving a young offender, of good character and with no or limited prior convictions, and showing genuine remorse. That description fits Mr Neethling perfectly.

Unsurprisingly, experience in Victoria mirrors that in New South Wales. It is precisely because of the tendency of young drivers to drive dangerously that general deterrence must be regarded as of great importance, and youth must be given relatively less weight. In the present case, the victims were themselves young people. The importance of general deterrence is to try and prevent the very kind of damage which occurred here.[24]

1. The principles thus stated by the Court in Neethling were applicable to the sentence imposed on the applicant in this case. As we have noted, the judge did, appropriately, note that the applicant was 25 years of age at the time of sentencing, and to that extent he could be regarded as young. However, in a case such as this, the applicant's age was of limited weight in the exercise of the sentencing discretion. It is not apparent from the sentences imposed on the applicant, or from the reasons provided by the judge, that her Honour failed to take that consideration into account. It follows that ground 2 of the application for leave to appeal must fail.

1. In the applicant's written case in support of ground 3, counsel noted that the judge found that there was nothing which mitigated the applicant's serious lack of attention to his driving so that his moral culpability was high. In that respect, counsel in the written case sought to rely on an expert report by a forensic engineer, Dr Shane Richardson, dated 13 November 2024 (that is, after the date of the sentence), in which Dr Richardson expressed the opinion that if the design of the intersection was different, the collision most likely would not have occurred.
2. In oral submissions, counsel for the applicant accepted that there was no proper basis upon which this Court could receive and rely on the report of Dr Richardson. Counsel also accepted that in those circumstances, ground 3 could not succeed, and accordingly, she did not press further submissions in relation to it.
3. Counsel was correct in taking that position. As the reasons of the judge made clear, the collision was caused by the significant failure of the applicant to pay attention and to keep a proper lookout while approaching the intersection. The applicant paid no heed to the various warning signs, to which we have adverted, and did not measurably reduce the speed of his vehicle as he approached the intersection. Quite clearly, the collision was not caused by the design of the intersection. Rather, the collision was a result of the dangerous driving of the applicant, to which he pleaded guilty.
4. For those reasons, counsel for the applicant was correct not to further press reliance on ground 3.

1. In support of ground 4, it was submitted that the sentences imposed on each of the two charges, and the total effective sentence, were manifestly excessive. In particular, it was submitted the judge failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors relating to the offending and the applicant's personal circumstances.
2. In that respect, counsel for the applicant submitted that there were a number of relevant mitigating circumstances which were required to be taken into account. They included: the applicant's pleas of guilty, which were made at an early stage; the applicant's remorse; his lack of previous convictions and good character; the nine-month delay in charging the applicant and the delay of two years and five months between the accident and sentencing; the applicant had not been in custody previously; the applicant's relative youth; his good prospects of rehabilitation; the applicant's depression and anxiety which make his time in custody burdensome; the circumstance that the burden of imprisonment would also be greater due to the applicant's potential deportation; the applicant's depression and anxiety; the lack of aggravating circumstances; and the fact that, due to the applicant's personal circumstances, specific deterrence and protection of the community play no part in the sentencing synthesis.
3. It was further submitted that the judge mischaracterised the applicant's offending as a 'relatively serious example of dangerous driving' and in assessing the applicant's moral culpability as high.
4. In response, counsel for the respondent noted that the judge acknowledged that the applicant's offending did not involve aggravating features such as excessive speed, being affected by drugs or alcohol, driving in an erratic manner, or being sleep deprived. However, it was submitted, the judge correctly observed that the absence of those factors did not necessarily mean that the applicant's moral culpability was low. In particular, it was submitted, the judge was correct in sentencing the applicant on the basis that his inattention was such that he had ignored repeated warning signs that he must stop at the intersection, and in addition, the applicant did not look to see what traffic might be crossing his path. Rather, he entered the intersection against the Stop sign without even braking.
5. Counsel further noted that while the applicant did have a number of significant matters in mitigation of sentence, they were largely unremarkable in the context of offences of the kind involved in this case. Further, it was submitted that those mitigating factors do not diminish the importance of other sentencing purposes, including in particular general deterrence. It was submitted that the judge was required to give adequate weight to the objective seriousness of the offences committed by the applicant.
6. Further, it was submitted that the sentences in this case were in conformity with current sentencing practices.

1. In order to sustain the proposed ground of appeal, that the total effective sentences and the non-parole period, are manifestly excessive, the applicant must demonstrate that those sentences were wholly outside the range of sentencing options available to the judge. By its nature, such a test is, necessarily, a stringent requirement. It is not sufficient for the applicant to demonstrate that the sentences, either individually or the total sentence, were longer than this Court might have imposed in the circumstances of the case. Rather, the applicant must establish that the sentences were so excessive as to bespeak error by the judge in the exercise of her sentencing discretion.[25]
2. By its nature, the offence of dangerous driving causing death, which constituted charge 1 in this case, is a serious offence. By pleading guilty to that charge, the applicant accepted that he had driven his vehicle in a manner that involved a serious breach of the proper management or control of his vehicle, which breach was so serious as to be, in reality, and not just speculatively, potentially dangerous to others who might be on or in the vicinity of the roadway at the time, and which created a considerable risk of serious injury or death to members of the public.[26]
3. In the present case, as we have discussed, the applicant failed to have regard to a number of matters which warned him of the intersection which he was approaching, and of the requirement that he stop at that intersection. He did not reduce his speed on entering the intersection, and, it is quite evident, he failed to observe the vehicle driven by Ms O'Connor at all before the collision. For the reasons which the judge set out in some detail, her Honour concluded that the applicant's driving constituted a 'relatively serious example of dangerous driving' and that his moral culpability was 'high'.[27]
4. The applicant did have available, and relied on, a number of relevant mitigating circumstances which were recognised and accepted by the judge. They included that the applicant had been a law-abiding, hardworking and decent person. He felt genuine remorse, and his early pleas of guilty spared the victims of an additional layer to their grief. The applicant's pleas of guilty had significant utilitarian value. It was to the applicant's credit that he had continued to attempt to study and work during the period which lapsed since the collision. Further, it was likely that the applicant would be deported at the conclusion of his sentence, which of itself would occasion anxiety to him.[28]
5. Notwithstanding those mitigating circumstances, it is recognised, in cases such as this, that the moral culpability of the offender is a key consideration in the determination of the appropriate sentence.[29] Further, in sentencing an offender for dangerous driving causing death or serious injury, the sentencing purposes of general deterrence and denunciation must be given substantial, if not considerable, weight.[30] In that respect, as the judge in this case stated, those sentencing purposes are given prominence in order to attempt to reduce further incidents of dangerous driving on our roads, and to reduce the terrible amount of deaths and injuries which occur on the roads.[31]
6. Taking those matters into account, and notwithstanding the cogent mitigating circumstances properly relied on by the applicant, it could not be concluded that the sentences imposed on the applicant in this case were manifestly excessive.
7. It follows that ground 4 of the application must fail.

1. For the foregoing reasons, each of the proposed grounds of appeal, relied on by the applicant, do not succeed. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal must be refused.

[1] DPP v Singh [2024] VCC 1106, [30]-[35] ('Reasons').

[2] R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; [2007] VSCA 102 ('Verdins').

[3] Ibid 276 [32] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA).

[18] (2015) 47 VR 395; [2015] VSCA 325 ('O'Neill').

[19] Ibid 415 [76]-[78] (Warren CJ, Redlich and Kaye JJA). See also Brown v The Queen [2020] VSCA 212; (2020) 62 VR 491, 507-8 [60]-[62] (Maxwell P, Niall, T Forrest, Emerton and Osborn JJA); [2020] VSCA 212.

[22] Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372; (2011) 35 VR 43, 55-7 [38]-[42] (Redlich JA); [2011] VSCA 372.

[23] (2009) 22 VR 466; [2009] VSCA 116 ('Neethling').

[24] Ibid 477 [53]-[55] (Maxwell P, Vincent JA and Hargrave AJA) (citations omitted).

[25] Clarkson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 157; (2011) 32 VR 361, 384 [89] (Maxwell ACJ, Nettle, Neave, Redlich and Harper JJA); [2011] VSCA 157; Leimonitis v The Queen [2018] VSCA 198, [32] (Priest JA).

[26] King v The Queen [2012] HCA 24; (2012) 245 CLR 588, 602-3 [32], 608 [44] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ); [2012] HCA 24; R v De Montero [2009] VSCA 255; (2009) 25 VR 694, 716 [80] (Ashley, Redlich and Weinberg JJA); [2009] VSCA 255; Guthridge v The Queen (2010) 27 VR 452, 456-9 [12]-[19] (Neave, Redlich JJA and Coghlan AJA); [2010] VSCA 132.

[29] Neethling [2009] VSCA 116; (2009) 22 VR 466, 474 [38]-[39] (Maxwell P, Vincent JA and Hargrave AJA); [2009] VSCA 116; Lee v The Queen [2021] VSCA 156, [18] (Maxwell P and McLeish JA).

[30] DPP v Oates [2007] VSCA 59, [22] (Neave JA); Woldesilassie v The Queen [2018] VSCA 285, [24] (Maxwell P and Kaye JA).