Singh v Minster for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 32

1. On 3 April 2024 the Tribunal dismissed the Merits Review Application. The Tribunal found it did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision. The Merits Review Application was made on 10 February 2024 sixteen days after the time proscribed in the Migration Act. (Tribunal's Decision).
2. The Applicant was notified on 4 April 2024 of the Tribunal Decision.
3. The Applicant filed the Application for Judicial Review in this Court on 8 May 2024 (Initiating Application). The Initiating Application was accompanied by an Affidavit of the Applicant that annexed the written reasons for the Tribunal Decision. The Minister filed a Response on 4 July 2024 seeking summary dismissal of the Initiating Application (Summary Dismissal Application).
4. On 8 October 2025 a registrar of this Court summarily dismissed the Initiating Application pursuant to s 143(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFCOA Act) and rule 23.08(1)(a) of the GFL Rules together with costs.

(1) A party to proceedings in which a delegate has exercised any of the powers of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) under section 254 may:

(a) within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court; or

(b) within any further time allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court;

apply to the Court for review of that exercise of power.

1. A review application is not an appeal but rather a hearing de novo. This means that the Applicant does not have to "demonstrate any material error of fact, or principle, in the order under review" and the Court considers the matter afresh: Noble Earth Technologies Pty Ltd v Hampic Pty Ltd trading as Cyndan Chemicals [2012] NSWSC 935 at [39]. The task of the Court when considering a review application was described by Deputy Chief Justice McClelland in Newman & Tate [2020] FamCA 1114 at [12] as "not one of ascertaining whether, in the making of the Order, there was an error on the part of the Registrar". The review of a Registrar's determination is an original hearing in the sense that error does not need to be established: see Feiteiro & Feiteiro [2019] FamCA 647 referring to Henley & Henley [2019] FamCA 101 at [7]. Thus, the review is taken to mean a re-examination of the matter afresh: see Tomko v Palasty (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 369; 71 NSWLR 61 at [43].

1. Rule 3.06 of the GFL Rules provides that an application for review of a Registrar's decision must be made within 21 days of the exercise of a power by a Registrar. An application for review must be listed for hearing as soon as possible, and unless impractical to do so, within 28 days after the date of filing.[2]
2. The Registrar's orders were made on 8 October 2025. The last day of the prescribed time period for the Applicant to file the Application for Review was 29 October 2025. The Application for Review was lodged on 8 November 2025, 12 days outside the prescribed time for filing. Before hearing the Summary Dismissal Application afresh, in these circumstances, I must first determine whether I should exercise my discretion to grant the Applicant an extension of time to file the review application.
3. The Court has a broad discretion under r.1.15 of the GFL Rules to extend time for the filing of an application for review. It is well established that the following factors should be taken into account in determining whether it is in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time:

(a) the length of delay and whether there has been a reasonable and adequate explanation for it, noting that the weight of these factors in any given case can vary considerably: MZZGC v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 842 at [15];

(b) whether there is any prejudice to the Minister; and

(c) whether the applicant's substantive grounds seeking judicial review justify the extension of time, noting that "[w]hether that standard of veracity is described as being 'arguable', 'reasonably arguable', or 'sufficiently arguable' or having 'reasonable prospects of success'", the hurdle is relatively low: DHX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 127 at [76]; see also Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579 at [15] - [19].

1. In the Application for Review the Applicant sought review of all 8 October 2025 Orders. The relief sought by the Applicant was expressed in the following terms:

Details of orders sought to be reviewed

ORDERS 2, 3, 4 and 5

Orders sought

1. THAT EXTENSION OF TIME BE ALLOWED.

2. THAT THE APPEAL BE ALLOWED

3. THAT I NEED A FAIR CHANCE FOR SPEAK ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF MY APPLICATION.

4. THAT MY MEDICAL EXAMINATION REPORT WAS SATISFACTORY.

5. THAT WAVE OUT ALL CONDITIONS.

6. THAT THE RESPONDENT PAY THE COST OF APPEALLANT FOR THIS APPEAL.

As written

1. At the Review Hearing the Applicant appeared as a litigant in person. The Applicant was offered the assistance of a Punjabi interpreter but advised the Court that he did not require an interpreter and that he wished to proceed with the hearing. I explained to the Applicant the nature of the Review Hearing, that is being a hearing de novo, and the manner in which the hearing would be conducted. I established that the Applicant had copies of the Court Book, the Minister's submissions, the Application for Review, the Initiating Application and the filed affidavits.
2. I was satisfied that the Applicant was able to participate meaningfully in the hearing.
3. The Minister pressed the summary dismissal application should I determine that an extension of time be granted.

1. The Applicant did not address the reason for the delay in the Review Application or in the affidavit filed with the Review Application. I asked the Applicant what his reason was for not filing the Review Application within the time prescribed by the GFL Rules. He said to me words to the effect that he did not know that he was required to file the Review Application within 21 days of Registrar making the order and that he thought he had thirty days.
2. The Minister submitted that the delay was relatively short but that the reason given was not a reasonable excuse. I agree the Applicant's ignorance of the time limitation is not a reasonable excuse. Further the fact that the period to bring an application for review is so limited reflects the need for certainty and finality in the review process.
3. Being a litigant in person "brings no special privileges and cannot justify lack of proper attention to the interests of other parties. It provides no reason to permit procedural or other conduct outside the standards reasonably expected when a litigant exercises a right to access the Court and its process whether at first instant or on appeal".[3] The relevant standard applicable in this case is compliance with the procedural rules to file an application for review within the twenty-one days prescribed. That standard was not met by the Applicant.

1. The Minister submitted that no substantial prejudice would be occasioned by the grant of an extension of time however submitted that the mere absence of prejudice does not justify the granting of an extension of time.

1. The grounds of review in the Initiating Application (Grounds of Review) were:
   1. I, Sharanjit Singh, the primary applicant for a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) visa.
   2. On 10 November 2023, I applied for a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) visa. However on 29 January 2024, the delegate refused to grant me the visa on the basis that I did not meet clause 485.216(1)
   3. Then, I applied for a review application of the delegate's decision with the Tribunal
   4. I applied for Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) visa on 10 November 2023 and on 29 November 2023 the Department requested for further infromatio i.e Health Examination in regards to my visa application.
   5. I booked the Health Examination and On 29 December 2023, I attached my health examination booking receipt from BUPA to IMMI account.
   6. But, on 08 January 2024 the Department refused my visa application without waiting for me to go ahead with the health examination. I believe theDepartment's decision made without considering the information provided.
   7. I emailed the Department of Home Affairs regarding the jurisdiction error but I haven't got response back from the Department.
   8. It was a stressful situation for me and due to that I missed my 21 days timeframe to AAT as well. I was under the impression that the Department will accept their mistake and revise their decision. I waited till last for the DoHA response and applied AAT accordingly.
   9. On 27 February 2024 The Tribunal invitted me to comment on the validity of the review. The letter invited me to comment on the validity of the review in writing by 12 March 2024.
   10. On 12 march 2024, I sent an email to the Tribunal with the following:-

"I applied Subclass 485 and the Department requested for further information i.e Health Examination in regards to my

visa application. On 29.12.2023 , I booked the examination and attached a receipt in my immi account. To my surprise, the Department refused my visa application without waiting for me to go ahead with the health examination.

I emailed

the Department of Home affairs regarding jurisdictional error. Till date no response is received.

It was a stressful

situation for me and due to that I missed my 21 days timeframe to AAT as well. I was under the impression that the Department will accept their mistake and revise their decision. I waited till last for the DoHA response and applied AAT accordingly. I will be very thankful if AAT member can accept my request as it was not my mistake and DoHA should be held responsible for their Jurisdictional Error.

1. My Application clearly raises an arguable case, and the decision of the tribunal is short and void and must be overlooked again
2. Substantial justice was not provided and that's the reason I want to apply in Federal Circuit Court of Australia

1. The question before the Court when considering a summary dismissal is whether any of the grounds in the Initiating Application are 'arguable', 'reasonably arguable', 'sufficiently arguable', or have 'reasonable prospects of success'. In undertaking that assessment the Court is to undertake an impressionistic examination of the grounds of review: DHX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 127 at [68], citing MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391. A closer examination of the merits is appropriate in some cases: see Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 96 ALJR 819 at [18].
2. The Court may give summary judgment under rule 23.08 of the GFL Rules or under s 143(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth). For the Court to do so it must conclude that an applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or claim: Spencer v The Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 (Spencer); Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2) [2018] FCA 473 (Przybylowski). The Court is not required to be satisfied that the applicant is bound to fail. The party pressing the application for summary dismissal has the onus of proving that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of success.
3. Given orders are made for summary dismissal at an early stage of the proceedings, the discretionary power to summarily dismiss an application must be exercised with caution. In Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ commented as follows at [57]:

[...] Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.

Citations omitted.

1. The Court must undertake "a critical examination of the available material to determine whether there is a real question of law or fact which should be decided at trial": Spencer; Przybylowski; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis [2013] FCA 641 at [46].
2. The principles articulated in extension of time matters and those determining a summary dismissal application as the standard of assessment of merits are for all intents and purposes the same: AVC19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1752, [3] - [5].

1. The Minister submitted that Grounds one to ten of the Initiating Application "do not assert any identifiable jurisdictional error and should be dismissed on that basis". I asked the Applicant to address me on the Ministers position on grounds one to ten of his Initiating Application. He did not do so. I agree with the submission made on behalf of the Minister ground one to ten do not identify any discernible ground of review. As such the Applicant is unable to show that he has reasonable prospect of success establishing a jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal on these grounds.

1. With respect to Ground 11 the Applicant asserted that he had engaged an agent and that the agent did not tell him that his 21 days were up. He asserted that his primary email address is a Gmail address, not an Outlook address as identified in his visa application. The Applicant submitted that the Outlook address was one created by his agent for the purposes of the visa application.
2. The Minster submitted that there was no error in the Tribunal's application of the law because the prescribed time upon which a Merits Review Application is to be made is 21 days; an email notifying the Applicant of the Delegate's Decision (Notifying Email) was sent to the email address provided by the Applicant; the Applicant had not authorised another person to receive correspondence on his behalf; the Notifying Email identified that the Applicant was entitled to apply for a merits review, and that he had 21 days to make the Merits Review Application commencing the day that he was taken to receive the letter being 8 January 2025.
3. I accept the submission of the Minister that the Tribunal complied with s 66 of the Migration Act. The Tribunal correctly found that it had no jurisdiction because the Applicant had not made the Merits Review Application in the prescribed period and the Tribunal had no discretion to extend the prescribed period to apply. The Delegate gave the Applicant notification of both its decision and the time frame in which an application for merits review must be made. This notification was sent to the email address provided to the Department. There was no indication on the visa application that an agent had been engaged by the Applicant. If the Applicant's contact details had changed it was incumbent upon him to advise the Department.
4. The Applicant has no reasonable prospect of success in establishing a jurisdictional error with respect to Ground 11.

1. The Applicant, despite being asked, made no submission on this ground.
2. The Minister identified this ground as a procedural fairness argument on the part of the Applicant. The procedural fairness requirements in Division 5 Part 5 of the Migration Act did not apply where the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the application made to it. It was submitted that common law procedural fairness was accorded to the Applicant by sending on the 27 February 2024 the Invitation to Comment and giving him an opportunity to respond.
3. The Applicant responded to the invitation, which the Applicant reproduced at paragraph 7 of the Initiating Application. Notably the Applicant did not inform the Tribunal that he had engaged an agent for the purpose of preparing the Visa Application, that the agent had not told him his 21 days to make the Merits Review Application "were up" nor was any documentary evidence regarding the engagement of an agent or communications with the agent provided in the response.
4. The Applicant has no reasonable prospect of success of showing a jurisdiction error with respect to ground 12.

1. I have determined that the Initiating Application has no reasonable prospects of success. Although the extension of time sought is short the absence of any reasonable prospects of success of establishing a jurisdictional error far outweighs the short extension of time sought. Further, even if I had granted an extension of time, based on my findings on the prospect of success of the Initiating Application I would have summarily dismissed it. I otherwise dismiss the Application for Review and affirm the Registrar's decision.
2. The Minister sought costs of $1,000.00 which is less than fixed in the scale amount, as prescribed in Item 2, Division 1, Part 3 of Schedule 2 of the GFL Rules. Accordingly, the Applicant is to pay the Minister's costs in the sum of $1,000.00 with respect to the Application for Review. For the avoidance of doubt, the Applicant is also to pay the cost of the summary dismissal proceedings before the Registrar in the amount of $4,189.38.
3. Orders will be made accordingly.

I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Bingham.

[2] Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) r 3.06.

[3] Bahanko v Sterjov and Others [2008] FCAFC 30; (2008) 166 FCR 415, [6].