Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

1. Before the Court is an Application for Review of a Registrar's decision filed on 2 March 2026 (Review Application).
2. The application before the Registrar was an application by the first respondent (Minister) for summary judgment of the applicant's application for judicial review filed on 15 November 2024 (Substantive Application).
3. On 3 February 2026, the Registrar made orders for there to be judgment for the Minister against the applicant and for the Substantive Application to be dismissed pursuant to s 143(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFCOA Act), and r 23.08(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (2025 GFL Rules). The Registrar further ordered that the applicant pay the Minister's costs fixed in the sum of $4,553.02.
4. Rule 3.08(1) of the 2025 GFL Rules provides that a review of the exercise of power by a Registrar must proceed by way of a hearing de novo. Accordingly, the Minister's application for summary judgment (Summary Judgment Application) is to be considered afresh.

1. The applicant is a citizen of India.
2. On 15 March 2024, the applicant applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa (Visa). In support of his Visa application, the applicant provided a written statement addressing the genuine temporary entrant criteria and various other supporting documents including identity documents, financial documents and academic documents. In the Visa application, the applicant nominated the email address for correspondence (Email Address).
3. On 14 August 2024, a delegate of the Minister (Delegate) refused to grant the Visa on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy cl 500.212 of sch 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). Clause 500.212 of sch 2 of the Regulations required the Delegate to be satisfied the applicant was a genuine temporary entrant. On the same day, the Delegate sent a copy of its decision and refusal notification letter to the applicant's Email Address (Refusal Notification Letter). The Refusal Notification Letter also informed the applicant of the relevant time period for seeking review with the Tribunal, stating that:

Review rights

The Department cannot consider your visa application any further. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a merits review of this decision.

An application for merits review of this decision must be given to the AAT within 21 calendar days after the day on which you are taken to have received this letter.

As this letter was sent by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted.

The abovementioned time in which an application may be made to the AAT for merits review of this decision is prescribed by law and cannot be extended.

You may only seek merits review of this decision with the AAT if you are physically present in Australia at the time the application for merits review is made.

1. On 4 September 2024, the applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, as it then was (Tribunal), for review of the Delegate's decision. In the application for review, the applicant nominated the Email Address for correspondence. In support of the application for review, the applicant also submitted a fee reduction request form and an ANZ bank statement indicating an account balance of $269.44. The applicant did not provide any evidence of payment of, or payment details for, the prescribed fee.
2. On 9 September 2024, the Tribunal emailed the applicant inviting him to comment on the validity of his application for review (Invitation to Comment). The Tribunal noted that the application was not valid as the applicant had not paid the application fee, being half of the application fee of $1,748.00, before the expiry of the time limit for lodging the application. Further, the Tribunal noted that there were no bank account details given by the applicant on the application form which would give the Tribunal authority to withdraw money for the application fee. The applicant was invited to make any comments in writing by 23 September 2024 on whether a valid application had been made.
3. On 17 September 2024, the applicant wrote to the Tribunal and provided a written statement in response to the Invitation to Comment (Response).
4. On 9 October 2024, the Tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction to determine the review application. On 10 October 2024, the Tribunal sent a copy of its decision to the applicant's Email Address.

1. The Tribunal issued its statement of decision and reasons on 9 October 2024 (Tribunal Decision).
2. At paragraph [2] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found that it had no jurisdiction to review the Delegate's decision as the application was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation.
3. At paragraph [3] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal recorded that pursuant to s 347 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), the applicant's application for review had to be lodged with the Tribunal within the prescribed period, and accompanied by the prescribed fee, unless a determination had been made under reg 4.13(4) of the Regulations that the fee should be waived on the basis of financial hardship. Pursuant to reg 4.10 of the Regulations, the Tribunal identified that the prescribed period in this case ended on 4 September 2024. The Tribunal noted that the fee must be paid within the prescribed period (Kirk v MIMA [1998] FCA 1174; (1998) 87 FCR 99), or within a reasonable period after a determination has been made under reg 4.13(4) (Braganza v MIMA [2001] FCA 318; (2001) 109 FCR 364).
4. At paragraph [4] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal identified that, at the time of lodging the application, the applicant had asked the Tribunal to reduce the prescribed application fee, however, had not paid any part of the application fee before the prescribed period finished.
5. At paragraphs [5] - [6] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found that neither the prescribed fee nor the reduced fee had been paid and no reg 4.13(4) determination had been made within the prescribed period. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that the application for review was not a valid application and the Tribunal therefore had no jurisdiction.

1. On 15 November 2024, the applicant filed the Substantive Application.
2. On 19 December 2025, orders were made for the Minister to file any amended response setting out the basis upon which the Minister applied for summary judgment, with such application to be listed for hearing on 3 February 2026. Procedural orders were also made for the filing of a court book, written submissions and any additional evidence upon which the parties sought to rely.
3. In the Amended Response filed 7 January 2026, the Minister sought that the Court exercise its discretion under r 23.08(1)(a) of the 2025 GFL Rules to enter summary judgment against the applicant in relation to their Substantive Application on the grounds that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.
4. On 8 January 2026, the Minister filed written submissions in support of their Summary Judgment Application.
5. On 3 February 2026, the applicant filed written submissions and an affidavit in opposition to the Summary Judgment Application.

1. The Summary Judgment Application was heard by the Registrar on 3 February 2026. On the same day, the Registrar made orders that there be judgment for the Minister against the applicant for the whole of the applicant's claim pursuant to s 143(2) of the FCFCOA Act, and r 23.08(1)(a) of the 2025 GFL Rules, and that the Substantive Application be dismissed. The Registrar also ordered the applicant to pay the Minister's costs, fixed in the amount of $4,553.02. The Registrar settled their reasons into judgment on the same day: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 122 (Registrar's Decision).
2. Rule 23.08(1)(a) of the 2025 GFL Rules provides that:

(1) The Court may order that judgment be given against a party if the Court is satisfied that:

(a) the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding; or

1. Section 143(2) of the FCFCOA Act provides that:

(2) The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:

(a) the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and

(b) the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.

1. In Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28 the majority in the High Court said at [59]:

In many cases where a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting a proceeding, the proceeding could be described (with or without the addition of intensifying epithets like "clearly", "manifestly" or "obviously") as "frivolous", "untenable", "groundless" or "faulty". But none of those expressions (alone or in combination) should be understood as providing a sufficient chart of the metes and bounds of the power...

(Emphasis added.)

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF A REGISTRAR'S DECISION

1. Rule 3.06(1) of the 2025 GFL Rules provides that an application for review of a Registrar's decision must be made within 21 days. Rule 1.15 of the 2025 GFL Rules provides that time may be extended by the Court.
2. The Registrar's Decision was made on 3 February 2026. An application for review of that decision in this Court was therefore required to be made no later than 24 February 2026. The Review Application was not filed until 2 March 2026.
3. Accordingly, the Review Application was filed six days after the expiry of the statutory timeframe.

Should the Court be satisfied to make an order extending time?

1. The discretion of the Court to extend the time for the filing of an application for review is broad but must be exercised in the interests of justice. It will not be in the interests of justice to extend time for the bringing of a review application "if the substantive application does not have sufficient prospect of success to make it just that the prospective appellant be permitted to proceed with it" e.g., in another context, WAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399, [9].
2. The principles to be applied in considering whether to extend time are well established and were considered in BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49. In that decision, Jagot and Halley JJ found that the Court has an obligation "to evaluate all of the relevant circumstances and to decide if the Court is satisfied that the extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice". Further, they identified that whilst the matters to which regard may be had are not expressly confined by the Act, the following are usually relevant when considering an extension of time - although it is noted that this list is not exhaustive:

(1) the extent of the delay and the explanation for it;

(2) any prejudice to the respondent if an extension were granted; and

(3) the merits of the substantive application.

1. At the hearing before me on 11 March 2026, the applicant appeared on his own behalf. The Minister was represented by Mr Slankard, solicitor, of Sparke Helmore.
2. The applicant also relied on his affidavit filed 2 March 2026 in support of the Review Application (March Affidavit).

1. The delay is not lengthy, being a period of approximately six days.
2. In the March Affidavit, the applicant provides the following explanation for the delay of filing (without amendment):
   1. On 23 February 2026, I contacted Luke from the Federal Court regarding my case. I was informed by him that I was eligible to lodge a federal court application within 28 days of the relevant decision.
   2. Based on this advice, I began preparing the documents and information required for filing in the federal court, including evidence supporting my grounds for review.
   3. On 26 February 2026, I was advised by the Migration Team that I am not eligible to apply int he federal court. This created an unavoidable delay in lodging my Application for Review with the Federal Circuit and Family Court.
   4. I am seeking an Extension of Time to lodge my Application for Review because of these circumstances, including my reliance on prior advice and the time-sensitive nature of this matter.
   5. I have prepared a statement detailing the delay, the advice I received, and the urgency of filing this review. This statement is attached to this affidavit as Annexure AN1 - Original Extension of Time Statement (Statement).
3. In the Statement annexed to the March Affidavit, the applicant repeats the above and says that the delay was not due to neglect or lack of diligence but rather due to a genuine misunderstanding of the process. The applicant also says that he attempted to lodge the application via the Court's e-lodgement system, but it was not working and accordingly he forwarded it by email to the Registry.
4. Ignorance of the law, processes or timeframes does not provide an adequate explanation for delay in lodging: SZNYE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500 at [8] - [9]; SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319 at [38]. It is the applicant's responsibility to ascertain his review rights. Further, the applicant has provided no probative objective evidence of his asserted communications with the Federal Court or asserted failed attempts to lodge the application via the Court's e-lodgement system.
5. Accordingly, I do not consider that the applicant has provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay.
6. This weighs against the grant of an extension of time.
7. Notwithstanding the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay, given the modest period of the delay, had I been persuaded that the grounds of review had a reasonable prospect of success I would have been inclined to grant an extension of time. However, for the reasons set out below, I do not consider the grounds of review to have any reasonable prospect of success.

1. The Minister properly contends that it would not suffer any particular prejudice, other than as to costs, if an extension of time were granted.
2. However, the mere absence of prejudice is not sufficient to justify a finding in favour of an extension of the time for filing: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6].
3. I consider this to be a neutral consideration.

1. The Substantive Application for judicial review filed on 15 November 2024, raises three grounds of review. Those grounds are as follows (without amendment):
   1. Procedural Fairness: The AAT denied me a fair opportunity to present my case and respond to concerns.
   2. Financial and Personal stress: I did not hold a job for long time, dad passed away and marriage is breaking.
   3. Payment Processing Error. The AAT dismissed my case due to minor payment error. I showed them I manage funds but accidentally omitted payment details.

Did the Tribunal have jurisdiction to conduct the review?

1. The issue of whether the Tribunal's jurisdiction was enlivened is a jurisdictional fact, the existence of which the Court must determine: Xie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172 at [19]. Accordingly, it is necessary that I consider whether the Tribunal correctly found that it did not have jurisdiction to conduct the review.
2. Pursuant to the provisions of s 347(1) of the Act and reg 4.10(1)(a) of the Regulations, a valid application for review to the Tribunal must be made within the prescribed period of 21 days, and be accompanied by payment of the prescribed fee.
3. Section 348(1) of the Act provides that if an application is properly made under s 347 of the Act for review of a Part 5-reviewable decision, the Tribunal must review the decision.
4. I am satisfied that Delegate's Refusal Notification Letter complied with s 66(2) of the Act with the relevant legislative requirements because:

(a) it was sent to the applicant by email to the nominated address: s 66(1) and s 494B(5);

(b) it specified the criterion the applicant did not satisfy: s 66(2)(a);

(c) the decision record specified the clause of the Regulations that formed the basis of the visa refusal decision: s 66(2)(b);

(d) it gave written reasons for its decision that the criterion was not satisfied: s 66(2)(c); and

(e) it stated that the decision could be reviewed and notified the applicant of the time in which the application for review could be made, who could apply for the review, and where the application for review could be made: s 66(2)(d).

1. Further, there is now no dispute that the application for review by the Tribunal of the Delegate's decision was made within the prescribed period, albeit on the last day of that period.
2. However, s 347(1)(c) provides that the applicant's application for review by the Tribunal was required "to be accompanied by the prescribed fee".
3. Regulation 4.13 of the Regulations relevantly provided as follows:

(1) Subject to this regulation, the fee for an application for review of a decision by the Tribunal is $3,000.

Note: The fee in subregulation (1) is subject to increase under regulation 4.13A.

(2) No fee is payable on the following:

(a) an application for review by the Tribunal of a primary decision of a kind referred to in subsection 338(4) of the Act;

(b) an application, made by a non‑citizen who is in immigration detention, for review by the Tribunal of a decision to which paragraph 4.02(4)(f) applies.

(3) If a person combines 2 or more applications for review by the Tribunal in accordance with regulation 4.12, an application fee is payable in respect of only 1 of those applications.

(4) If the Registrar of the Tribunal is satisfied that the payment of the fee mentioned in subregulation (1) has caused, or is likely to cause, severe financial hardship to the review applicant, the Registrar may determine that the fee payable is 50% of the amount mentioned in subregulation (1).

1. Accordingly, subject to the issue of fee reduction pursuant to reg 4.13(4), the Act required both the application and the payment of the prescribed fee to occur within the prescribed period: Benissa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 76 at [19] - [24] per Edelman J; Dahi v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 784 at [23] per Davies J; BXS20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 20 at [54] per Thawley and Kennett JJ, with whom Stewart J agreed at [58]; Boyjonauth v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 130 (Boyjonauth) at [67] - [68] per Thawley, Rofe and Kennett JJ.
2. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant sought a fee reduction when lodging his application for review by the Tribunal. However, for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction by reason of the reduced filing fee request, the applicant needed to have paid the reduced fee (being 50% of the total fee) within the prescribed period: Boyjonauth at [74] - [76] per Thawley, Rofe and Kennett JJ. If the Tribunal received the application and a means to facilitate the payment of the reduced filing fee on or before the prescribed period, the Tribunal's jurisdiction would have been validly invoked: Dinayadura v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1409 at [39] per Judge Gostencnik citing Vumentala v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCA 744 at [16] per Branson J.
3. The materials lodged by the applicant at the time he sought review by the Tribunal are before the Court. These were provided by email to the Tribunal at 5.58pm and 6.20pm on 4 September 2024 (Emails). Attached to the Emails were a number of documents including the application form, an ANZ bank statement showing a balance of $269.44 as at 21 June 2024, a request for a fee reduction and a copy of the Delegate's decision and the Refusal Notification Letter.
4. The payment section of the application form (Part I) is entirely blank, does not specify by what method payment is proposed to be made, does not include any credit card details, the signature of the applicant, any BSB or account number or provide any authority for the Tribunal to deduct the filing fee (whether reduced or not). The only account details were those evidenced on the ANZ bank statement, which was as at 21 June 2024, which did not demonstrate sufficient funds to pay the filing fee, nor provide any authority to the Tribunal to deduct any sums from this account. There was nothing before the Tribunal on 4 September 2024, being the last day of the prescribed period, which would have enabled the Tribunal to facilitate payment of the filing fee.
5. Accordingly, neither the filing fee nor the reduced filing fee was paid by the end of 4 September 2024 and no determination had been made under reg 4.13(4). The requirements of s 347(1)(c) of the Act were therefore not met and the Tribunal correctly concluded that in those circumstances it did not have jurisdiction to conduct the review.
6. Two other matters arise from the materials and were relied upon by the applicant at hearing. At the hearing the applicant submitted that the Tribunal ought have considered these matters in determining whether it had jurisdiction to undertake the review.
7. I address these matters below.
8. Firstly, as set out above, the applicant provided a Response to the Invitation to Comment. In the Response the applicant submitted that he had been incorrectly informed over the telephone that the Tribunal offices were open until 5.30pm. He submitted that he attended the offices at 5.05pm on 4 September 2024 to submit the application and pay the filing fee but was unable to do so as the offices were closed. This is also asserted in the Emails. Further, he submitted that this issue arose due to the Tribunal's online system not allowing part payment of the filing fee. For the reasons set out in paragraph [59] below, it is not necessary that I determine whether the applicant was, in fact, given incorrect information as to the Tribunal's opening hours. However, I note that:

(a) in the Emails he says he called the Tribunal "yesterday", being 3 September 2024, whilst he informed the Court that he spoke to someone at the Tribunal on the day he attended;

(b) the applicant's evidence about this matter is unsupported by any probative objective evidence; and

(c) it is the applicant's responsibility to ascertain his review rights.

1. Secondly, attached to the Response is a Commonwealth Bank statement for an account held in the name of the applicant. That statement demonstrates that on 4 September 2024, $2,000 was transferred into that account. At the hearing the applicant contended that this demonstrated that he had the funds available to pay the filing fee and an intention to do so.
2. I reject the submission that these were matters the Tribunal ought have considered in determining whether it had jurisdiction to conduct the review. The requirement that the application for review be accompanied by the prescribed fee within the 21-day period is jurisdictional and the Tribunal has no power to confer jurisdiction on itself: Dorji v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC2G at [39]. Accordingly, irrespective of what efforts or attempts the applicant says he made and even if he was incorrectly told that the Tribunal offices were open until 5.30pm, the fact remains that neither the filing fee nor a reduced fee was paid within the prescribed time and in those circumstances the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to conduct the review sought.

1. By Ground 1 the applicant submits that the Tribunal denied him a fair opportunity to present his case and respond to concern.
2. As submitted by the Minister, to the extent that the Tribunal owed the applicant any duty of procedural fairness, that duty was discharged by the sending of the Invitation to Comment.
3. Further, as stated above, the applicant was correctly notified of the Delegate's decision and the Tribunal correctly found that it did not have jurisdiction to conduct the review. Further, for the reasons set out above, the Tribunal had no discretion to waive the requirement that an application for review must be filed within time, and with the prescribed fee, to be a valid application.
4. Ground 1 therefore has no reasonable prospect of success.

1. By Ground 2 the applicant merely states that he had financial and personal stress and that he did not have a job for a long time, his father passed away and his marriage was breaking down. Ground 2 does not assert any jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.
2. Ground 2 has no reasonable prospect of success.

1. By Ground 3 the applicant asserts that the Tribunal dismissed his case due to a minor payment processing error and that the applicant accidently omitted the payment details from the form.
2. I have addressed these matters already. For the reasons set out earlier, the Tribunal correctly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to conduct the review. Further, as already set out, the Tribunal had no discretion to waive the requirement that an application for review must be filed within time, and with the prescribed fee, to be a valid application.
3. Ground 3 has no reasonable prospect of success.

1. For the reasons set out above, the Minister has established that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting his claim for relief. The Summary Judgment Application must therefore succeed. As the Substantive Application has no reasonable prospect of success, it is not in the interests of justice to extend the time for bringing the Review Application.
2. The Registrar's orders made on 3 February 2026 dismissing the Substantive Application remain in full force and effect.

1. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time to review the decision made by a Registrar on 3 February 2026 is refused and the Review Application is otherwise dismissed.
2. The Minister seeks an order that the applicant pay its costs in the fixed amount of $1,000. I note that this is below the scale provided in sch 2 of the 2025 GFL Rules for a proceeding concluded at or before an interlocutory hearing. I shall order accordingly.

I certify that the preceding seventy-three (73) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge J Young.