Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

1. Before the Court is an Application for Review of a Registrar's decision filed on 28 July 2025 (Review Application).
2. The application before the Registrar was an Application by the first respondent (Minister), for summary dismissal of the applicant's application for judicial review filed on 15 February 2022 (Substantive Application).
3. On 1 July 2025, the Registrar made orders for the Substantive Application to be summarily dismissed pursuant to r 13.13(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (Rules) and that the applicant pay the Minister's costs fixed in the sum of $4,189.38.
4. Rule 21.04 of the Rules provides that a review of the exercise of power by a Registrar must proceed by way of a hearing de novo. Accordingly, the Minister's Application for summary dismissal (Summary Dismissal Application) is to be considered afresh.

1. The applicant is a citizen of India.
2. On 13 July 2014, the applicant entered Australia on a student visa.
3. On 7 December 2019, the applicant applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 500) visa (Visa). In support of his Visa application, the applicant provided a written submission, a copy of his passport, a number of academic transcripts, certificates and letters of course completion.
4. On 31 January 2020, a delegate of the Minister (Delegate) refused to grant the Visa on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy cl 500.212 of sch 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). Clause 500.212 of sch 2 of the Regulations required the Delegate to be satisfied the applicant was a genuine temporary entrant (GTE).
5. On 20 February 2020, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision. In the application for review, the applicant nominated a migration agent as his authorised recipient and provided the email address (representative's email address) for correspondence.
6. On 30 August 2021, the Tribunal sent a letter to the applicant by way of email to the representative's email address, inviting the applicant to provide information about his proposed course of study and his entry and stay in Australia as a student pursuant to s 359(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) (s 359 Letter). The Tribunal requested that this information be provided by 13 September 2021 and advised the applicant that any request for an extension of time to provide the information must also be received by 13 September 2021. The s 359 Letter also informed the applicant that if the Tribunal did not receive the information within the period allowed or as extended, it may make a decision on the review without taking any further action to obtain the information. Further, the applicant was informed that if the Tribunal did not receive the information, he would lose any entitlement he might otherwise have had under the Act to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments.
7. Neither the applicant nor his representative provided a response to the s 359 Letter.
8. On 7 October 2021, the applicant emailed the Tribunal and attached a 'Change of Contact Details' form, withdrawing the authorisation for his representative to act on his behalf and provided the email address (applicant's email address) for future correspondence.
9. On 30 November 2021, the Tribunal conducted a check of the Provider Registration International Student Management System (PRISMS) database to confirm the applicant's enrolment status. At the time of the check, the applicant was not enrolled in any course of study.
10. On 6 December 2021, the Tribunal sent a letter to the applicant by way of email to the applicant's email address, inviting the applicant to comment on information it considered would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review (s 359A Letter). The particulars of that information were that the Tribunal had conducted a recent check of the PRISMS database which indicated that the applicant was not enrolled in a course of study and accordingly, would not be able to satisfy cl 500.211 of the Regulations. The Tribunal requested that the applicant provide a response by 20 December 2021 and advised that any request for an extension of time to provide a response must also be received by 20 December 2021. The s 359A Letter also informed the applicant that if the Tribunal did not receive the information within the period allowed or as extended, it may make a decision on the review without taking any further action to obtain the information. Further, the applicant was informed that if the Tribunal did not receive the information, he would lose any entitlement he might otherwise have had under the Act to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments.
11. The applicant did not provide a response to the s 359A Letter.
12. On 14 January 2022, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate to refuse to grant the applicant the Visa. On the same day, the Tribunal sent a copy of its decision to the applicant's email address.

1. The Tribunal issued its statement of decision and reasons on 14 January 2022 (Tribunal Decision).
2. At paragraphs [1] - [4] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal summarised the procedural background of the matter.
3. At paragraphs [5] - [9] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal stated that it wrote to the applicant on 30 August 2021, pursuant to s 359(2) of the Act, inviting the applicant to provide information in relation to whether he was enrolled in a registered course of study and confirmed that this correspondence was provided to the applicant's nominated address, being the representative's email address. The Tribunal noted that no such information was provided within the prescribed period nor was an extension sought or granted. The Tribunal concluded that s 359C applied and pursuant to s 360(3) the applicant was not entitled to appear before the Tribunal.
4. At paragraph [7], the Tribunal noted that it provided a copy of the PRISMS record to the applicant via the applicant's email address on 6 December 2021 and provided 14 days for the applicant to respond or comment on that information pursuant to s 359A. The Tribunal noted that the applicant did not provide a response within the prescribed period. As a result, the Tribunal decided to proceed to a decision without taking any further steps to obtain the information.
5. At paragraphs [12] - [13] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal set out the relevant law, including the requirement of cl 500.211(a). Clause 500.211(a) of sch 2 of the Regulations required the Tribunal to be satisfied that the applicant was enrolled in a registered course of study at the time of its decision.
6. At paragraphs [14] - [17] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found there was no evidence before it that the applicant was enrolled in a course of study and concluded that cl 500.211 of sch 2 of the Regulations was not met. For those reasons, the Tribunal found the applicant did not meet the criteria for the grant of the Visa and affirmed the decision under review.

1. On 15 February 2022, the applicant filed the Substantive Application. In the Substantive Application, the applicant sought orders quashing the Tribunal Decision.
2. In the Amended Response filed 12 May 2025, the Minister sought orders that the Substantive Application be summarily dismissed pursuant to r 13.13 of the Rules.
3. Rule 13.13(a) provides that:

The Court may order that a proceeding be stayed, or dismissed generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceeding, if the Court is satisfied that:

(a) the party prosecuting the proceeding or claim for relief has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or claim; or

1. In Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28 the majority in the High Court said at [59]:

In many cases where a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting a proceeding, the proceeding could be described (with or without the addition of intensifying epithets like "clearly", "manifestly" or "obviously") as "frivolous", "untenable", "groundless" or "faulty". But none of those expressions (alone or in combination) should be understood as providing a sufficient chart of the metes and bounds of the power...

(Emphasis added.)

1. On 28 May 2025, the applicant filed an Amended Application (Amended Substantive Application).

1. The Summary Dismissal Application was heard by the Registrar on 23 June 2025. The applicant was represented at the hearing by Mr Jeans, solicitor, of Jeans Lawyers. The Minister was represented at the hearing by Mr Lopez, solicitor, of HWL Ebsworth Lawyers. On 1 July 2025, the Registrar delivered ex tempore reasons summarily dismissing the Amended Substantive Application: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1241 (Registrar's Decision).

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF A REGISTRAR'S DECISION

1. Rule 21.02(1) of the Rules provides that an Application for Review of a Registrar's decision must be made within 7 days. Rule 21.02(2) provides that time may be extended in a proceeding by the Court "on any terms that the Court ... thinks fit". Further, an application for review must be listed for hearing as soon as possible, and unless impossible to do so, within 14 days after the date of filing.
2. The Registrar's Decision was made on 1 July 2025. An application for review of that decision in this Court was therefore required to be made no later than 8 July 2025. The Review Application was not lodged until 25 July 2025 and was not accepted for filing until 28 July 2025.
3. Accordingly, the Review Application was lodged 17 days after the expiry of the statutory timeframe and accepted for filing 20 days after the expiry of the statutory timeframe.
4. No formal application for an extension of time is sought by the applicant in the Review Application however an oral application was made at the hearing.
5. The Minister opposed any extension of time.

Should the Court be satisfied to make an order extending time?

1. The discretion of the Court to extend the time for the filing of an application for review is broad but must be exercised in the interests of justice. It will not be in the interests of justice to extend time for the bringing of a review application if the substantive application "does not have sufficient prospect of success to make it just that the prospective appellant be permitted to proceed with it": WAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399, [9].
2. The principles to be applied in considering whether to extend time are well established and were considered in BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49. In that decision, Jagot and Halley JJ found that the Court has an obligation "to evaluate all of the relevant circumstances and to decide if the Court is satisfied that the extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice". Further, they identified that whilst the matters to which regard may be had are not expressly confined by the Act, the following are usually relevant when considering an extension of time - although it is noted that this list is not exhaustive:

(1) the extent of the delay and the explanation for it;

(2) any prejudice to the respondent if an extension were granted; and

(3) the merits of the substantive application.

1. At the hearing before me on 13 August 2025 and 21 August 2025, the applicant was represented by Mr Jeans, solicitor, of Jeans Lawyers and the Minister was represented by Ms Sassine, solicitor for HWL Ebsworth Lawyers.

1. The delay is of a moderate length, being a period of approximately 20 days.
2. At the hearing, the solicitor for the applicant submitted that he was unaware of the requirements of r 21.02(1). He was therefore unaware of any delay, the extent of such delay and the explanation for it. Accordingly, he was unable to address the Court in any way as to these matters.
3. The absence of any explanation whatsoever for the delay weighs strongly against the grant of an extension of time.

1. The Minister properly contends that it would not suffer any particular prejudice, other than as to costs, if an extension of time were granted.
2. However, the mere absence of prejudice is not sufficient to justify a finding in favour of an extension of the time for filing: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6].
3. I consider this to be a neutral consideration.

1. In his Amended Substantive Application for judicial review filed on 28 May 2025, the applicant raises the following ground (without amendment):
   1. The Second Respondent's decision, made on 14 January 2022, is affected by jurisdictional error because it failed to comply with procedures that were required by the Act to be observed in connection with the making of the decision, thereby failing to exercise jurisdiction.

Particulars

1. On 7 October 2021, the Applicant notified the Second Respondent of his email address of "navjotsingh1994@rocketmail.com": [CB 62]. On 6 December 2021, the Second Respondent sent the s.359A letter to "navjotsingh1994@rocketmail.com;": [CB 66]. The Court will note the addition of a semi-colon.
2. The Second Respondent was required to send the s.359A letter to the last email address provided to the Tribunal by the recipient for the purposes of receiving documents: s.494B(5)(d) of the Act. The letter was not sent to that address, but another address with an added semi-colon. The Second Respondent proceeded to make a decision based on a fact which did not exist.
3. The Second Respondent's finding in paragraph 16 of the Decision was based on s.359A information which had not been put to the Applicant.
4. The s.359A letter was not sent in "strict accordance" with the law, despite the Second Respondent's claim in paragraph 14 of the Decision. In effect, it was never sent to the Applicant. The Second Respondent committed an error of jurisdiction by making a decision based on information that was required to be put to the Applicant.

1. In oral submissions, solicitor for the applicant sought to press two additional grounds of judicial review.
2. Firstly, the applicant submitted that s 353 of the Act required the Tribunal to act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case and that the Tribunal erred as it failed to do so (Ground 2).
3. Secondly, the applicant submitted that the Tribunal failed to act in a manner that was fair and just. In support of this, the applicant identified that the 359A Letter informed the applicant that if he did not provide the information within the time specified (or as extended), it may make a decision on the review without taking further action to obtain the information, and that he would lose any entitlement he might otherwise have had to appear at a hearing. The applicant contended that this was misleading, and consequently not fair and just, as the applicant had already lost any entitlement to appear as a result of his failure to respond to the s 359 Letter (Ground 3).
4. I address these additional grounds below.

1. By Ground 1 the applicant submits that the Tribunal incorrectly included a semi-colon in the applicant's email address and therefore the s 359A Letter was not sent in accordance with the requirements of the Act.
2. The Minister submits that this ground is misconceived and that the s 359A Letter was sent to the correct email address for the applicant. The Minister submits that the semi-colon that can be seen at the end of the recipient's email address on Tribunal correspondence is merely punctuation and does not comprise part of the email address. As there was no error in the email address used to send the s 359A Letter, the Tribunal did not err in relying on the PRISMS records, proceeding to make a decision without a hearing or by conducting the review without taking further steps to obtain the information from the applicant.
3. I accept the Minister's submissions as to this.
4. The email attaching the s 359A Letter is included at page 66 of the Court Book filed by the Minister in this matter (CB). That email address appears as 'xxxx@rocketmail.com;', with the inclusion of a semi-colon. The unchallenged evidence before the Court of Ms Tegan Weir, solicitor, HWL Ebsworth Lawyers, is that when clicking on the email address included on page 66 of the CB the email address that is generated is 'xxxx@rocketmail.com', absent the semi-colon. Accordingly, I accept the Minister's submission that the inclusion of the semi-colon is punctuation and does not comprise part of the email address. The s 359A Letter was therefore sent to the applicant's last notified email address.
5. As I understand it, at the hearing, the solicitor for the applicant submitted that Ms Weir's evidence does not assist the Court because it simply demonstrates the email address which is generated by Ms Weir's computer system and does not evidence what actually occurred when the Tribunal's email system was used to send the email at issue. I reject that submission. I am satisfied that the email address without the semi-colon is that which was generated at the relevant time and demonstrates that the correct email address was used and is not simply a result of Ms Weir's computer system.
6. The solicitor for the applicant also placed some emphasis on the fact the s 359A Letter was sent from a generic Tribunal email address. I am unable to see the relevance of this or how that may have affected the email address to which the s 359A Letter was sent.
7. Accordingly, Ground 1 has no reasonable prospects of success.

1. At the relevant time, s 353 of the Act was included in Division 4 - Part 5, headed "reviewable decisions: Tribunal powers" and provided as follows:

Tribunal's way of operating

The Tribunal, in reviewing a Part 5-reviewable decision:

(a) is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence; and

(b) shall act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case

1. Solicitor for the applicant submitted that following the applicant's failure to respond to the Tribunal, there were a number of steps that the Tribunal could have taken in order for the requirements of s 353(b) to have been met. Firstly, the applicant submitted that s 353 of the Act required the Tribunal to advise the applicant that he had lost his right to a hearing when he did not respond to the s 359 Letter in September 2021. Secondly, the applicant submitted that s 353 of the Act required the Tribunal to have telephoned the applicant when the applicant failed to provide a response to the s 359A Letter in December 2021. Thirdly, the applicant submitted that s 353 required the Tribunal to consider whether it ought conduct an interview, whilst conceding that in circumstances where the applicant had failed to respond to the s 359 Letter and/or the s 359A Letter, pursuant to s 360(2)(c) and (3) of the Act, he had lost his right to appear before the Tribunal and there were no provisions of the Act that provided for the Tribunal to conduct an interview in the relevant circumstances.
2. The solicitor for the applicant was unable to direct the Court to any case law in support of these submissions, nor any provisions of the Act which would enable the Tribunal to conduct an interview in circumstances where the applicant had lost the right to appear before the Tribunal. The applicant's solicitor submitted that the "novelty" of the submission provided a basis as to why the matter ought not be summarily dismissed.

1. The Minister submitted that s 353 does not mandate specific procedures to be observed by the Tribunal or the method by which to reach a conclusion. The Minister further submitted that a decision is not reviewable on the basis that the Tribunal failed to observe procedures required under s 353. The Minister referred to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 (Eshetu) but otherwise was also unable to assist the Court as to this ground.

1. At issue in Eshetu was s 420 of the Act (as in force at that time). Section 420 was headed "Refugee Review Tribunal's way of operating" and provided as follows:

(1) The Tribunal, in carrying out its functions under this Act, is to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick.

(a) is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence; and

(b) must act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case.

1. Section 420(2) was therefore in the same terms as s 353.
2. In Eshetu at [49] Gleeson CJ and McHugh J said:

The history of legislative provisions similar to s 420 was examined in Qantas Airways Ltd v Gubbins. They are intended to be facultative, not restrictive. Their purpose is to free tribunals, at least to some degree, from constraints otherwise applicable to courts of law, and regarded as inappropriate to tribunals.

(Footnotes omitted).

1. At [75] of that decision, Gaudron and Kirby JJ said:

It is important to note that s 420(2) of the Act is in two parts. Paragraph (a) provides that in reviewing a decision, the Tribunal "is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence". Paragraph (b), which provides that it "must act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case", is its counterpart. Together, those paragraphs describe the general nature of review proceedings and require the Tribunal to operate as an administrative body with flexible procedures and not as a body with technical rules of the kind that have sometimes been adopted by quasi-judicial tribunals.

1. At [178] Callinan J, quoted with approval Lindgren J in Sun Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1997] FCA 1488; (1997) 151 ALR 505 where he said:

I agree with Foster J in Yao-Jing Li that para 420(2)(b) requires that the RRT must come to grips with the substance and merits of an application before it. His Honour said:

'... the term "substantial justice" is concerned with the decision of the issues raised in the case rather than the process of deciding them.'

1. I accept the applicant's submission that Eshetu considered s 420 of the Act and its interaction with s 476 of the Act, as those provisions were in force at that time, and this does not reflect the currently applicable statutory provisions. Nonetheless, I consider Eshetu to reflect the construction to be given to s 353.
2. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Li [2013] HCA 18 (Li) the High Court considered, amongst other things, the construction and operation of s 353 of the Act, as it then was. Section 353 was contained in Div 4 of Pt 5 of the Act and was entitled "Exercise of Tribunal's powers." It was in the same terms as s 420. In Li at [12] Chief Justice French said:

Section 420 of the Act gives the same legislative directions to the RRT as s 353 gives to the MRT...There was a focus in that case on the interaction between s 420 and the limited grounds for judicial review of Migration Act decisions in the Federal Court which were enumerated in s 476 as it then stood. Nevertheless, it was the broad facultative language of s 420 that supported the conclusion that it did not give rise to grounds for judicial review based on a failure to comply with its exhortations. Gleeson CJ and McHugh J described its function as "intended to be facultative, not restrictive" and "to free tribunals, at least to some degree, from constraints otherwise applicable to courts of law, and regarded as inappropriate to tribunals." Gaudron and Kirby JJ described s 420 as determining the general nature of review proceedings and held that there was no basis for concluding that it operated to mandate specific procedures to be observed by the RRT or the method by which it was to reach its decision. Gummow J agreed with what Lindgren J had said, particularly about s 420(1), in Sun Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. Lindgren J pointed to the difficulty of invoking a failure to comply with s 420(1) as a ground of non-performance of a requisite procedure for the purposes of s 476 of the Act. Although his analysis was based upon the interaction with s 476, it threw up the general difficulty of invoking s 420(1) and similarly s 353(1) as giving rise to grounds for judicial review. A complaint about alleged non-compliance with s 420(1) might require consideration of the RRT's staff and financial resources and its internal organisations and practices. His Honour said:

"A mere conclusion that a mechanism of review in its operation in a particular case did not satisfy one or more of the epithets in s 420(1), would not necessarily establish that the [Tribunal] had not been pursuing the specified objective."

Section 353(2) does not import substantive common law requirements of procedural fairness. Nothing said in SZGUR supports such a conclusion. To the extent that the Full Court of the Federal Court treated the direction in s 353 as giving rise to grounds for judicial review, it was in error.

1. Accordingly, I reject the submission that following the applicant's failure to respond to the Tribunal, the Tribunal was required to take any of the steps contended for by the applicant in order to meet the "requirements" of s 353(b) and that the asserted failure to do so gives rise to a ground for judicial review.

Consideration - procedural fairness - s 357A

1. In addition, s 357A of the Act (as at the relevant time) was headed "Exhaustive statement of natural justice hearing rule" and provided, relevantly, as follows:

(1) This Division is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with.

...

(3) In applying this Division, the Tribunal must act in a way that is fair and just.

1. Accordingly, pursuant to s 357A(1) of the Act, Division 5 -Part 5 of the Act (Division 5) is "an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with". As such, notions of common law procedural fairness do not apply in relation to the matters Division 5 deals with, although there can be no doubt that the Tribunal is required to apply the provisions of Division 5 in a fair and just way.
2. I consider that the matters Division 5 deals with plainly include:

(a) information the Tribunal may seek (s 359);

(b) requirements for written invitations (s 359B);

(c) failure to give information, comments or response in response to written invitation (s 359C);

(d) when an applicant must be invited to appear before the Tribunal and when an applicant is entitled to appear before the Tribunal (s 360); and

(e) the Tribunal's power to permit a person to do something he or she is not entitled to do (s 363A).

1. The full text of these provisions is set out in Annexure A to this judgment.
2. Accordingly, notions of procedural fairness do not apply in relation to these matters and the submissions of the applicant as to the steps he contended ought have been taken by the Tribunal must be rejected.
3. Further, the Tribunal complied with its obligation to apply the provisions of under Division 5 in a fair and just way because, as submitted by the Minister:

(a) the Tribunal invited the applicant to provide information by sending the s 359 Letter and the s 359A Letter to the last email address in connection with the review (s 379A(5)(b), (d); s 359 of the Act);

(b) in the s 359A Letter, the Tribunal put the applicant on notice that it required the information as it was a requirement for the grant of the Visa that the applicant be enrolled in a course of study at the time of decision, and provided a time period and specific way in which the information was to be provided, being in writing by 20 December 2021: ss 359A(1), 359B of the Act;

(c) in the s 359A Letter, the Tribunal put the applicant squarely on notice that if he did not provide the information within the time specified (or extended), it may make a decision on the review without taking further action to obtain the information, and that he would (in bolded text) lose any entitlement he might otherwise have had to appear at a hearing: s 359C(2) of the Act;

(d) as the applicant neither responded to the s 359A Letter by 20 December 2021 nor requested an extension of time, the Tribunal was entitled to make a decision on the review without taking any future action to obtain the information pursuant to s 359C(2);

(e) as s 359C(2) applied to the applicant, the applicant was not entitled to appear before the Tribunal: s 360(3) of the Act; and

(f) as the applicant was not entitled to appear before the Tribunal, the Tribunal did not have the power to permit the applicant to appear before it: s 363A; Hasran v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 40 at [29] per Jacobson, Gilmour and Foster JJ.

1. Ground 2 has no reasonable prospects of success.

1. As to Ground 3, as set out above, s 357A requires the Tribunal to apply the provisions of Division 5 in a fair and just way. I consider the applicant's submissions as to this ground to be misconceived. I accept that by failing to respond to the s 359 Letter the applicant lost any entitlement he otherwise had to appear before the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal did not, as it could have, make a decision on the review at that time without taking any future action to obtain the information pursuant to s 359C(1). Rather, the Tribunal sought different information pursuant to s 359A in the s 359A Letter and, as it ought, put the applicant on notice that if he did not provide that information within the time specified (or extended), it may make a decision on the review without taking further action to obtain the information, and that he would lose any entitlement he might otherwise have had to appear at a hearing. That was correct, in accordance with the provisions of ss 359A, 359B, 359C, 360 and 363A and in no way misleading. In my view, contrary to the applicant's submissions, the s 359A Letter applies the provisions of Division 5 in a fair and just way.
2. However, even if I be wrong, and as contended by the applicant the Tribunal erred by including this statement, I accept the Minister's submission that any such error was immaterial. There is no realistic possibility that absent the inclusion of the statement there would have been a different outcome: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; 418 ALR 152 at [7] and [14].
3. Ground 3 has no reasonable prospects of success.

1. For the reasons set out above, the Minister has established that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting his claim for relief. The Summary Dismissal Application must therefore succeed. As the Amended Substantive Application has no reasonable prospects of success, it is not in the interests of justice to extend the time for bringing the Review Application.
2. The Registrar's orders made on 1 July 2025 dismissing the Amended Substantive Application remain in full force and effect.

1. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time to review the decision made by a Registrar on 1 July 2025 is refused and the Review Application is otherwise dismissed.
2. The Minister seeks that the applicant pay its costs in the amount of $1,805.92. I shall order accordingly.

I certify that the preceding eighty-one (81) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge J Young.

ANNEXURE A

359 Tribunal may seek information

(1) In conducting the review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. However, if the Tribunal gets such information, the Tribunal must have regard to that information in making the decision on the review.

(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the Tribunal may invite, either orally (including by telephone) or in writing, a person to give information.

(3) If a written invitation under subsection (2) is given to a person other than the Secretary, the invitation must be given:

(a) except where paragraph (b) applies - by one of the methods specified in section 379A; or

(b) if the invitation is given to a person in immigration detention - by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.

(4) If an invitation is given to the Secretary, the invitation must be given by one of the methods specified in section 379B.

359A Information and invitation given in writing by the Tribunal

(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Tribunal must:

(a) give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and

(b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review; and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and

(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.

(2) The information and invitation must be given to the applicant:

(a) except where paragraph (b) applies - by one of the methods specified in section 379A; or

(b) if the applicant is in immigration detention - by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.

(3) The Tribunal is not obliged under this section to give particulars of information to an applicant, nor invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information to the applicant, and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 359AA.

(4) This section does not apply to information:

(a) that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or

(b) that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or

(ba) that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or

(c) that is non-disclosable information.

(5) A reference in this section to affirming a decision that is under review does not include a reference to the affirmation of a decision that is taken to be affirmed under subsection 362B(1F).

359B Requirements for written invitation etc.

(1) If a person is:

(a) invited in writing under section 359 to give information; or

(b) invited under section 359A to comment on or respond to information;

the invitation is to specify the way in which the information, or the comments or the response, may be given, being the way the Tribunal considers is appropriate in the circumstances.

(2) If the invitation is to give information, or comments or a response, otherwise than at an interview, the information or the comments or the response, are to be given within a period specified in the invitation, being a prescribed period or, if no period is prescribed, a reasonable period.

(3) If the invitation is to give information, or comments or a response, at an interview, the interview is to take place:

(a) at the place specified in the invitation; and

(b) at a time specified in the invitation, being a time within a prescribed period or, if no period is prescribed, a reasonable period.

(4) If a person is to respond to an invitation within a prescribed period, the Tribunal may extend that period for a prescribed further period, and then the response is to be made within the extended period.

(5) If a person is to respond to an invitation at an interview at a time within a prescribed period, the Tribunal may change that time to:

(a) a later time within that period; or

(b) a time within that period as extended by the Tribunal for a prescribed further period;

and then the response is to be made at an interview at the new time.

359C Failure to give additional information or comments

(1) If a person:

(a) is invited under section 359 to give additional information; and

(b) does not give the information before the time for giving it has passed;

the Tribunal may make a decision on the review without taking any further action

to obtain the additional information.

(2) If the applicant:

(a) is invited under section 359A to comment on information; and

(b) does not give the comments before the time for giving them has passed;

the Tribunal may make a decision on the review without taking any further action to obtain the applicant's views on the information.

360 Tribunal must invite applicant to appear

(1) The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if:

(a) the Tribunal considers that it should decide the review in the applicant's favour on the basis of the material before it; or

(b) the applicant consents to the Tribunal deciding the review without the applicant appearing before it; or

(c) subsection 359C(1) or (2) applies to the applicant.

(3) If any of the paragraphs in subsection (2) of this section apply, the applicant is not entitled to appear before the Tribunal.

363A Tribunal does not have power to permit a person to do something he or she is not entitled to do

If a provision of this Part states that a person is not entitled to do something, or to be assisted or represented by another person, then, unless a provision expressly provides otherwise, the Tribunal does not have power to permit the person to do that thing, or to be assisted or represented by another person.