Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 231

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or

grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)

(General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to

r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law)

1. These are the reasons for judgment delivered ex tempore on 13 February 2026, revised from transcript only to include extracts of cited documents and to make corrections of typographical errors or minor matters to reflect the intention of the Court.
2. The factual background is that the Applicant is a citizen of India. On 1 August 2023, the Applicant applied for a Medical Treatment (Visitor) (Class UB) (Subclass 602) visa (Medical Treatment Visa). The visa was sought ostensibly so that the Applicant could obtain treatment for depression.
3. On 2 August 2023, a Delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (Delegate) invited the Applicant to comment on adverse information received in relation to the application. More particularly, the letter expressed concerns as to whether the Applicant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia for the purposes for which the visa was granted. Those concerns arose primarily out of the Applicant's previous migration history. Furthermore, in his application, Mr Singh failed to provide evidence in support of his claim that he possessed sufficient funds to undergo the sought treatment, nor did he provide evidence regarding the strength of his ties to India.
4. On 7 September 2023, the Delegate notified the Applicant that his Medical Treatment Visa application had been refused. In short, the Delegate was not satisfied that the Applicant satisfied clause 602.215 of the Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). This is known as the genuine temporary entrant criteria. It is not necessary for me to outline the basis of the decision by the Delegate. That is because this Court has no power to review the decision of the Delegate.[1]
5. On 25 September 2023, the Applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a review of the Delegate's decision. The application was acknowledged by the AAT on 27 September 2023, appended to the acknowledgement with a fact sheet entitled Information for Migration Review Applicants, MR Division.[2]
6. In between the lodgement of the application for review and the hearing of the application, the AAT was abolished and subsequently replaced by the Administrative Review Tribunal (Tribunal).
7. On 18 July 2025, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend a hearing scheduled for 1 September 2025. Appended to that invitation was an Information About Hearings fact sheet and a blank Response to Hearing Notice form.[3]
8. On 21 August 2025, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend a test session on Microsoft Teams. The test session was arranged to ensure the scheduled hearing ran smoothly. On 26 August 2025, the Applicant emailed the Tribunal. He stated:

Hi Sir/Madam,

I won't be able to attend the hearing due to some personal reasons. Can you please give us your decision? It would be greatly appreciated.

Thanks,

Raghbir Singh.

1. On 27 August 2025, the Tribunal responded to the Applicant's email. The response sought:

...to clarify if the Applicant wished to dispense with the hearing scheduled for 1 September 2025 and have a decision made on the papers.

Importantly, the Applicant did not respond to that email.[4]

1. On 28 August 2025, a test session was to be conducted. The Applicant did not appear. Subsequently, a Tribunal officer phoned the Applicant in order to inquire whether he wished to reschedule. The Applicant declined and hung up.[5]
2. The Applicant did not attend the scheduled hearing on 1 September 2025. Accordingly, on 15 September 2025, the Tribunal decided to dismiss the application without further consideration of that application or the information before the Tribunal. This is known as the Dismissal Decision.[6] Importantly, the Applicant was notified by the Tribunal on that same day, and the letter notified the Applicant that he had until 13 October 2025 to seek reinstatement of his application.
3. The Applicant did not seek reinstatement of the application. Consequently, on 15 October 2025, in the absence of a reinstatement application, the Tribunal confirmed its decision. This is known as the Confirmation Decision. The Applicant was notified of the same on 15 October 2025.[7]
4. This factual background is important. All of it was put to the Applicant before the Court as presently constituted, and the Applicant confirmed the factual background.
5. On 13 October 2025, before the Confirmation Decision, the Applicant filed an application in this Court to have the Tribunal's dismissal decision judicially reviewed (Originating Application). The Originating Application enumerates four grounds of review, which are as follows (reproduced without amendment):

GROUND 1: BREACH OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

1. I believe the Tribunal failed to provide me with procedural fairness because my intentions regarding the hearing were unclear and needed clarification. On 26 August 2025, I sent an email saying: "I won't be able to attend the hearing due to some personal reasons, can you please give us your decision it will be greatly appreciated." (paragraph 3 of the Tribunal's decision).

2. The next day, on 27 August 2025, the Tribunal sent a follow-up email asking me to confirm whether I wanted to "dispense with the hearing" and have "a decision made on the papers" (paragraph 4). However, I did not respond to that email.

3. Even though I hadn't replied, the Tribunal went ahead and dismissed my application without taking any further steps to clarify what I meant in my email, or to give me more time to respond.

4. The Tribunal even stated in paragraph 9 that it tried to "engage the applicant to ensure his application was progressed in a procedurally fair manner," but I believe that dismissing the application when my position was still unclear was unfair. A fair and reasonable decision­ maker would have followed up further before using their power under section 99 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 to dismiss my application.

GROUND 2: FAILURE TO CONSIDER RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS

1. The Tribunal didn't properly consider the "personal reasons" I gave for not being able to attend the hearing. In paragraph 3, the Tribunal mentioned that I said I couldn't attend due to personal reasons. But nowhere in the decision does it show that they thought about what those personal reasons were, whether they were serious enough to justify not attending, or whether they could have justified an adjournment.

2. I believe the Tribunal was required to consider all relevant circumstances before deciding to dismiss my application.

3. In paragraph 9, the Tribunal said that I had "chosen not to participate in that process," but I did participate - I emailed them explaining that I couldn't attend and asked for a decision to be made.

4. The Tribunal failed to treat my email as a possible request for either an adjournment or an alternative arrangement (like a decision on the papers), and they didn't consider whether my personal reasons were serious enough to warrant a different approach rather than outright dismissal.

GROUND 3: UNREASONABLE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

1. In paragraph 9, the Tribunal said it had "acted appropriately" by sending one clarification email on 27 August 2025, and then dismissed the application just five days later, on 1 September 2025.

2. I believe that was an unreasonable use of discretion. My email from 26 August showed that I was still engaging with the process. Just because I didn't reply to one email over a five-day period (especially when I had personal issues going on), does not mean my case should have been dismissed.

3. The Tribunal's statement in paragraph 9 that I had "chosen to not participate in that process" was not accurate. I had engaged with them and had not been given enough time or opportunity to clarify my intentions before the hearing date.

GROUND 4: CONSTRUCTIVE FAILURE TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION

1. I believe the Tribunal failed to properly exercise its jurisdiction by misinterpreting my email from 26 August 2025. They treated it as grounds to dismiss the case, instead of seeing it as a request to proceed without a hearing, or as a possible request for an adjournment.
2. In that email, I asked the Tribunal to "please give us your decision," which clearly could be understood as asking for a decision on the papers. The Tribunal even recognised this possibility in its clarification email on 27 August, where they asked if I wanted to "dispense with the hearing" (paragraph 4).
3. But instead of treating my silence as agreement with that option or trying to contact me again for clarification (for example, by phone or follow-up emails), the Tribunal just dismissed the case. According to paragraph 5, a Tribunal officer called me on 28 August to discuss rescheduling the test session, and I ended the call - but the decision doesn't say whether they tried to clarify my position on the hearing.
4. By failing to properly interpret and respond to my email, and by not choosing a less drastic option (like making a decision on the papers or adjourning), the Tribunal failed to exercise its powers in reviewing my case, as it was supposed to do under the jurisdiction granted to it.

1. In short, they are that (1) there was a breach of natural justice or procedural fairness; (2) there was a failure to consider relevant considerations; (3) there was an unreasonable exercise of discretion; (4) there was a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.
2. The application was filed within a 35-day time limit prescribed by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)[8] and brought pursuant to section 476 of that Act. That section confers upon this Court in relation to migration decisions the "same original jurisdiction as the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution". That is, the Court may undertake judicial review, in respect of matters "where a writ of mandamus or prohibition, or an injunction, is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth."[9]
3. The Originating Application sought two orders. First, that the decision of the Tribunal be quashed, that is, a writ certiorari, and two, a writ of mandamus directed to the Tribunal requiring it to determine the Applicant's application according to law.
4. On 19 November 2025, the Minister filed a response which sought, amongst other orders, that the application be summarily dismissed with costs.
5. On 25 November 2025, a registrar of this Court made orders programming the summary dismissal application for hearing on 13 January 2026. The orders directed the Minister and the Applicant to file additional materials by 12 December 2025 and 2 January 2026, respectively. In compliance with the orders, on 12 December 2025, the Minister filed written submissions. The Applicant filed no materials.
6. The summary dismissal hearing took place on 13 January 2026. The Applicant appeared for himself. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Registrar made the following orders:
   1. Pursuant to r 8.09 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules) the applicant be granted leave to amend the originating application so as to seek review of the decision of the first respondent made on 15 October 2025 [i.e. the Confirmation Decision] and the requirement to file an amended application be waived.
   2. Pursuant to s 143(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), and r 23.08(1)(a) of the Rules, there be judgment for the respondents against the applicant for the whole of the applicant's claim.
   3. The application for judicial review filed on 13 October 2025 be dismissed.
   4. The applicant pay the first respondent's costs fixed in the sum of $4,553.02.
7. On 28 January 2026, the Applicant applied for a review of the Registrar's decision. The review application was brought 15 days after the decision in question and is thus within the 21-day prescribed time limit.[10] The review application sought orders to set aside the Registrar's decision, including the decision to order costs against the Applicant. On 2 February 2026, my Chambers emailed the Applicant and the solicitors for the First Respondent, notifying them that the review hearing was listed for hearing on 13 February.
8. The matter was heard on 13 February by this Court in the Melbourne Registry. At the commencement of the hearing, the Court explained to the Applicant that:

(1) unlike the Delegate or Tribunal, the Court is unable to grant the Applicant a visa or review the merits of his application;

(2) that the Court understood that the Applicant in his Originating Application sought review of the Tribunal decision dated 13 September 2025. However, it seems to me, in fairness to the Applicant, the Court should treat the application as also a review of the confirmation decision made on 15 October 2025;

(3) the review of a registrar's decision is a hearing de novo, that is to say that this Court is not concerned with correcting any error on behalf of the registrar; and

(4) that in a review matter, the Court is concerned with whether there exists a real or genuine dispute that might reasonably be resolved in the Applicant's favour, and that this inquiry is distinct from substantively considering the grounds of review enumerated in the Originating Application.

1. For the purposes of determining whether there existed a real or genuine dispute that might reasonably be resolved in the Applicant's favour and noting that the Applicant was unrepresented, the Court gave the Applicant an opportunity today to elaborate on the grounds for judicial review disclosed in his Originating Application, as well as to outline any other concerns he might have about the Tribunal's dismissal decision and the confirmation decision. This is now the standard procedure in this Court following the decision in Bala v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[11] The question of whether judicial review application ought to be summarily dismissed is required in this instance to be considered on a de novo basis.
2. Section 143 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) sets out the relevant provisions for summary judgment, and the Court incorporates those without repetition.
3. The Court's power to give summary judgment is also provided in rule 23.08 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules). The Minister bears the onus in an application for summary judgment of establishing and satisfying the Court that the claims for relief made by the Applicant in the proceeding have no reasonable prospects of success.
4. In Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship,[12] her Honour Judge Mansini reviewed a registrar's decision to summarily dismiss an application for judicial review on the basis that it lacked a reasonable prospect for success. Her Honour made the following statements about the role of the Court, which the Court respectfully adopts (citations omitted):

39. ... [I]t is worth noting that the task on judicial review is not to undertake a general review of the Tribunal's decision or substitute it with a decision which the Court considers ought to have been made. The jurisdiction, being supervisory, allows for a decision to be quashed on established grounds, the most important of which is jurisdictional error. And, where appropriate, to order that the matter be remitted and reconsidered according to law.

40. ... [T]he Court is concerned with whether the case raises a real or genuine dispute that might reasonably be resolved in an applicant's favour as distinct from the identification of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision...

41. The onus is on the party seeking the summary dismissal to persuade the Court that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of success.

1. In accordance with the approach taken in Patel and other similar matters, it is not necessary for the Court to engage in a detailed consideration for grounds advanced by the Applicant as it would be required to do so in a substantive judicial review hearing. Notwithstanding, this afternoon the Court has taken some time to explore with the Applicant each of his four grounds of review.
2. Turning then to the grounds, the Applicant presses four grounds of review. The Minister submits that the Applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the application and that there is no real question of law or fact which should be decided at the final hearing.
3. First, the Court will have regard to the correctness of the Dismissal and Confirmation Decisions. There is no error in the Tribunal's Dismissal Decision. The Court is satisfied that the Applicant was properly notified of the hearing pursuant to the relevant section in the Act. He was notified of the consequences of any failure to appear, and it is very clear that the hearing invitation was sent to the email address provided by the Applicant, something he confirmed this afternoon. The Applicant failed to attend the hearing. The Tribunal, being satisfied that the Applicant had received appropriate notice of the date, time and place of the hearing, was empowered to dismiss the application pursuant to section 99 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act).
4. In relation to the Confirmation Decision, it too is free from error. That is because the Tribunal notified the Applicant of the Dismissal Decision by email on 15 September 2025, and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act, put him on notice that he had until 13 October 2025 to apply to reinstate the review application. The Court confirmed with the Applicant this afternoon that he had received that notice. The Court further confirmed with the Applicant this afternoon that he did not seek to reinstate the application which had been dismissed for non-appearance.
5. The Applicant did not apply for reinstatement within the prescribed 28-day period. That is a matter for him. It is no fault of the Tribunal. Having not applied for reinstatement, the Tribunal was required to confirm the non-appearance. That is to say, the Tribunal made the only decision open to it, and there was no error.
6. Coming then to the grounds for review, the first ground of review is that there was a breach of natural justice. As already indicated, the Court is satisfied that the Tribunal took all the necessary steps to invite the Applicant to the hearing and to notify him of the consequences of not attending.
7. The Applicant did write to the Tribunal on 26 August, indicating that he could not attend for personal reasons. He did not otherwise explain what those personal reasons were, a matter the Court confirmed with the Applicant this afternoon. Notwithstanding, the Tribunal did take further steps in an attempt to clarify what the Applicant meant in his 28 August email. The Applicant did not respond to that email. That is a matter for him and demonstrates no error on behalf of the Tribunal. As previously discussed, the Tribunal in accordance with the ART Act properly invited the Applicant to attend a hearing. The Tribunal positively attempted to clarify what was meant by the Applicant's email of 26 August.
8. It appears to the Court that there was no obligation on the Tribunal to make any further attempt to clarify the meaning of the email of 28 August beyond the efforts it made by emailing the Applicant on 27 August. The Tribunal, therefore, in its reasons discloses a cogent and intelligible exercise of its discretion under section 99 of the ART Act (reproduced without amendment):
   1. On 26 August 2025, the applicant emailed the Tribunal and advised 'I won't be able to attend the hearing due to some personal reasons can you please give us your decision it will be greatly appreciated.'
   2. On 27 August 2025, the Tribunal contacted the applicant by email and advised; Noting the contents of your email, the Tribunal seeks to clarify if you wish to dispense with the hearing scheduled for 1 September 2025 and have a decision made on the papers. The effect of this, is that the Tribunal will determine your matter based upon the information it has on file. The Tribunal did not receive a response to the email.
   3. On 28 August 2025, the applicant did not attend the test session on Microsoft Teams. He was contacted by a Tribunal officer and asked if he wish to reschedule. It was noted the "applicant declined and hung up.'
   4. The review applicant did not appear before the Tribunal on the day and at the scheduled time and place. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the applicant called the telephone number in the hearing notice and used the unique conference ID at the scheduled time, as instructed to do in the hearing notice. There is also no record of the applicant contacting the Tribunal by any other means at the scheduled time to explain why they had not used the telephone number and unique conference ID to attend the hearing.
   5. Having reviewed the Tribunal file, the Tribunal is satisfied that the review applicant was properly invited to a hearing in accordance with s 379A(5) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the notice has not been returned to sender.
   6. The Tribunal is satisfied that the review applicant received appropriate notice of the date, time, and place of the hearing.
   7. The Tribunal is satisfied it acted appropriately in seeking to clarify the applicants request of the Tribunal in his email dated 25 August 2025. The Tribunal has sought to engage the applicant to ensure his application was progressed in a procedurally fair manner The applicant has chosen to not participate in that process.
9. Having found that the Applicant was appropriately notified of the hearing, it was open to the Tribunal to exercise the power it did to dismiss for non-attendance. Ground One discloses no error.
10. In respect of Ground Two, which is a failure to consider relevant considerations, it is readily apparent that the Tribunal had regard to the 26 August email where the Applicant claimed he could not attend for personal reasons. However, as the Court has already stated, the Applicant failed to respond to the Tribunal's request for clarification, which the Tribunal sent on 27 August 2025. As such, there was no further information before the Tribunal in respect of the personal reasons, which purportedly prevented the Applicant from attending the hearing. The Tribunal cannot be criticised for not further considering the personal reasons for the non-attendance in circumstances where the Applicant did not explain what those personal reasons were. In light of the Applicant's non-appearance at the hearing, it was open to the Tribunal to dismiss the application, and it did so.
11. Insofar as the Applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to treat the 26 August email as a possible request for a decision on the papers, as already indicated, the Tribunal explicitly sought to clarify the Applicant's request. It took all the reasonable steps that it was required to do. In the absence of a confirmation from the Applicant, a decision was made to dismiss the application for non-attendance. That provided the Applicant with an opportunity to seek reinstatement. In that respect, it is arguable the decision to dismiss with a right to reinstatement was a more preferable option for the Applicant than the determination on the papers, which might have led to the confirmation or the affirmation of the decision of the Delegate. No error arises from Ground Two.
12. In respect of Ground Three, the Applicant claims he was engaging with the process and should have been granted more time to respond to the Tribunal's email on 27 August 2025. On 18 July 2025, the Tribunal had invited the Applicant to attend the hearing. On 26 August 2025, the Applicant indicated he could not attend. The next day, the Tribunal sought to clarify the meaning of his email.
13. Importantly in the timeline, the Applicant failed to respond to the Tribunal during the five-day period between 27 August 2025 and the hearing on 1 September 2025. The failure to respond or deal with the matter between that period and the five days is unexplained by the Applicant.
14. It appears to the Court, that consistent with the submission made by the Minister, the Tribunal was correct to find that the Applicant has chosen not to participate in the process of advising it of his position in respect of the hearing. Absent any further engagement from the Applicant, it was unclear whether he wished for a decision to be made on the papers. It was, therefore, logical and reasonable for the Tribunal to exercise its power under section 99 of the ART Act, noting that the Applicant had a right to seek reinstatement. No error arises out of Ground Three.
15. In respect of Ground Four, which contends that there was a failure to exercise jurisdiction, the Applicant contends that the Tribunal misinterpreted the 26 August email and treated it as grounds to dismiss the application. That is not what occurred. The review application was not dismissed because of the 26 August email, it was dismissed because of the Applicant's non-appearance at the hearing. To the extent that the Applicant contends that the Tribunal erred in making a decision, under section 99 of the ART Act, by not deciding the matter on the papers, the Court is satisfied the decision to dismiss the application was reasonably open to the Tribunal, and the Dismissal Decision clearly discloses the Tribunal's reasons for deciding to dismiss the application without further review.
16. The Tribunal chose to dismiss the application, as the Minister contended "in light of the ambiguity of the Applicant's request". It is the case that the Tribunal could have construed the request in the email of 26 August as a request to have the matter decided on the paper. But the Tribunal faced a dilemma. It was not clear what the Applicant's wishes were, and the Tribunal had sought to clarify those in its email of 27 August 2025. In this regard, dismissing the application with a right of reinstatement, it seems, was a less drastic option. It preserved for the Applicant a right to reinstatement. He did not seek reinstatement. That is not the fault of the tribunal. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied the Applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the application. That being the case, on review, the Court is satisfied that there is no real or genuine dispute that might reasonably be resolved in the Applicant's favour, and the application for review must be dismissed.
17. In deciding whether to order costs, there are two questions. The first is, "Should costs be awarded against the Applicant?" It is normally the case that the unsuccessful party pays the costs of the successful party. If the Court decides to order costs, the second question is "whether those costs are reasonable in all the circumstances".
18. There is a scale that is provided for the rules, and the Minister is seeking less than the scale.
19. The Court is satisfied that cost should follow the event. The Court is further satisfied that the costs sought by the Minister in the amount of $2,000 are reasonable, having regard to the fact that they are less than scale and what has been required to prepare for and attend the hearing.

I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns.

[1] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 338, 474, 476(2)(a), 476(4)(a).

[8] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 477(1).

[9] EDO19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 826, [64].

[10] Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) r 3.06(1).

[11] [2019] FCA 600, [7].

[12] [2025] FedCFamC2G 921.