Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 2128

The applicant genuinely intends to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted, having regard to:

(a) whether the applicant has complied substantially with the conditions to which the last substantive visa, or any subsequent bridging visa, held by the applicant was subject; and

(b) whether the applicant intends to comply with the conditions to which the Subclass 600 visa would be subject; and

1. As the applicant applied for the visa under the Tourist stream, he was also required to meet the criteria for that particular stream, including (at cl 600.221 of the Regulations):

The applicant intends to visit Australia, or remain in Australia:

(a) to visit an Australian citizen, or Australian permanent resident, who is a parent, spouse, de facto partner, child, brother or sister of the applicant; or

(b) for any other purpose that is not related to business or medical treatment.

1. The delegate considered, in refusing to grant the visa, that the applicant's stated reason for further stay in Australia was not consistent with the purpose of tourism activities for which the visa is intended (CB 64).
2. On 14 October 2020, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision (CB 70-71).
3. On 29 October 2021, the applicant (via his authorised representative) was invited to attend a hearing scheduled for 22 November 2021 (CB 77-81).
4. On 12 November 2021, the Tribunal invited the applicant to provide further information in support of his application (CB 89-90). On 18 November 2021, the applicant's representative provided the Tribunal with a number of documents in response to that invitation (CB 97-106, 111-116).
5. On 22 November 2021, the applicant attended the Tribunal hearing along with his authorised representative (CB 140-142).
6. On 26 November 2021, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant the visa (CB 148-153). The Tribunal notified the applicant and his representative of that decision on 30 November 2021 (CB 146-147).
7. On 3 December 2021, the Tribunal published a corrigendum correcting typographical errors in its decision record (CB 160). The Tribunal notified the applicant and his representative of that corrigendum on 10 December 2021 (CB 158-159).
8. On 23 December 2021, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in this Court. That application seeks review of the Tribunal's decision pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

1. To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is thus useful to outline the Tribunal's decision in some detail.
2. The Tribunal began by identifying the visa under review, noting that the applicant applied for the visa on 10 March 2020. The Tribunal observed that, at the time of application, the visa contained one subclass, Subclass 600 (Visitor), with a number of different streams. The applicant applied for the visa under the Tourist stream (at [2]).
3. The Tribunal explained that a delegate of the Minister had refused to grant the visa as the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily for the purpose for which the visa is granted, as required by cl 600.211 in Schedule 2 of the Regulations (at [3]-[4]).
4. The Tribunal noted that the issue before it was whether the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa would be granted, having regard to whether the applicant had complied with previous visa conditions, whether he intended to comply with the conditions of this visa, and any other relevant matter (at [11]).
5. The Tribunal noted that the applicant sought the visa in the tourist stream to allow time for his divorce proceedings to be finalised. The applicant confirmed at the Tribunal hearing that his divorce proceedings were now finalised and that there were no children of the marriage or property to be divided. The applicant gave evidence that he now sought the visa to allow him time to sell his car and settle his affairs, including with respect to taxation and superannuation matters. He also said it was too risky to return to India because of the COVID-19 pandemic and that he required a further stay of two to three months (at [12]-[13]).
6. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant sought the visa for a purpose which was appropriate under the Tourist stream (at [13]).
7. The Tribunal then considered whether the applicant satisfied each of the subclauses in cl 600.211 for the grant of the visa (at [15]-[22]).
8. In considering cl 600.211(a), the Tribunal found that the applicant had substantially complied with the conditions of his last substantive visa and bridging visa, and it placed some weight on this factor (at [15]-[16]).
9. In considering cl 600.211(b), the Tribunal observed that the applicant would be subject to condition 8101 (must not work in Australia) and condition 8201 (must not engage in study or training in Australia for more than 3 months) as imposed by cl 600.611(3). The Tribunal accepted that the applicant did not intend to undertake any studies in Australia. However, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant intended to comply with condition 8101 on the basis that his present finances did not provide adequate means for him to support himself for the proposed stay of approximately three months, and on the basis of the applicant's own oral evidence that he wanted to find work and needed to work to make a living (at [17]-[19]).
10. In considering cl 600.211(c), the Tribunal had regard to the applicant's circumstances in India and in Australia (at [20]-[29]). The Tribunal found that the applicant did not have a strong incentive to return to India in circumstances where he has no significant assets, property or work history in India, and although his parents remain in India, he also has family in Australia. By comparison, the applicant has worked for several years in Australia and is currently employed. He has a motor vehicle and has leased a property (at [30]). Indeed, the applicant's own evidence was that he wanted to apply for a working visa and continue working for his current employer (at [24]).
11. The Tribunal ultimately took the view that the applicant did not intend to comply with condition 8101 due to his lack of finances and express desire to apply for a working visa. The Tribunal observed that the applicant had had over 20 months to organise his taxation and superannuation affairs after his divorce was finalised. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant was attempting to use the visa to maintain ongoing residence in Australia (at [31]).
12. The Tribunal was therefore not satisfied that the applicant genuinely intends to stay in Australia temporarily for the purpose for which the visa would be granted in accordance with cl 600.211 in Schedule 2 of the Regulations (at [32]).
13. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant the visa (at [33]).
14. On 10 December 2021, the Tribunal notified the applicant (via his representative) of its corrigendum dated 3 December 2021 which corrects three typographical errors in the Tribunal's decision (CB 158-160). The corrigendum did not form the basis of any issues in dispute before this Court.

1. The application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 23 December 2021 contains 24 grounds of review as follows (without alteration):
   1. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error in failing to lawfully apply the relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958, in particular Part 600 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) relevantly to this case, they include cl 600.211.
   2. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it failed to lawfully apply the criteria for a Visitor visa as set out in the Migration Act 1958, relevantly to this case, they include cl 600.211.
   3. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it failed to give proper weight to the Applicant's genuine intentions as a prospective visitor.
   4. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error in concluding that the Applicant would work in Australia if granted a visitors visa.
   5. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it misinterpreted and/or misapplied cl 600.211(b).
   6. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error in concluding that the Applicant would not comply with condition 8101 (cl 600.611(3)).
   7. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it failed to consider all the relevant matters as required by Cl 600.211(c) before arriving at its decision and/or orders.
   8. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it failed to consider all the evidence before arriving at its decision and/or orders.
   9. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it considered irrelevant matters and/or evidence.
   10. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it failed to consider relevant matters and/or evidence.
   11. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it improperly considered evidence or "created" evidence or improperly excluded evidence in or before arriving at its decision and/or orders.
   12. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it didn't afford the Applicant a fair hearing.
   13. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it exhibited bias against the Applicant.
   14. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it misread or misapplied the law.
   15. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it failed to apply existing case law or binding precedent.
   16. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it acted beyond the limits of its powers.
   17. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it lacked jurisdiction.
   18. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it failed to provide natural justice.
   19. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it acted in bad faith.
   20. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it failed to engage in an actively intellectual process while considering the application.
   21. The Tribunal erred in law and/or in fact and/or committed a jurisdictional error when it unreasonably exercised a discretion.
   22. The decision overall has jurisdictional errors and errors of law.
   23. The decision of the Tribunal is not a decision according to law and failed to lawfully assess the Applicant's application.
   24. Further reasons shall be given upon receipt of the Court Book.
2. The applicant appeared before the Court on 18 August 2025 without legal representation but with the assistance of a Punjabi interpreter. The Court confirmed with the applicant that he had received copies of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions. The applicant had not filed an amended application or any written submissions.
3. The materials before the Court include the application for judicial review and supporting affidavit affirmed and filed on 23 December 2021 (the affidavit being taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 18 August 2025), a Court Book numbering 160 pages (marked as Exhibit 1), and written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 24 July 2025.
4. The applicant was not represented at the hearing and the Court was thus mindful of the comments of Colvin J in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [8] and Feutrill J in BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 at [55] that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review). That sensible and appropriate course is now the standard procedure in this Court: see, by way of recent example, Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 931 at [10]. Accordingly, at the hearing of this matter, the applicant was invited to tell the Court what he believed to be wrong with the Tribunal's decision and/or procedure.
5. The Court also took some time to explain that it could not undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's decision (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Wu Shan Liang)) and could only consider whether or not the Tribunal's decision revealed jurisdictional error. The Court explained that in migration decisions such as the decision being challenged, common categories of alleged jurisdictional error include:

(a) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question (Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 178 (Craig));

(b) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material (Craig at 178);

(c) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material (Craig at 178);

(d) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures (SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 354-355);

(e) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias (SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]); and

(f) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable (Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at 27-28; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 648; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]- [28]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 445).

1. However, it was also explained to the applicant that this was not an exhaustive list and he should attempt to tell the Court why he said the Tribunal had fallen into error.
2. Against this background, the applicant told the Court that the Tribunal's decision was "unfair" because he was affected by the conduct of his migration agent. The applicant said that, although the agent attended the Tribunal hearing by video conference, she had in fact told him what to say and did not speak for him at the Tribunal hearing. He further stated that the agent was continuously sending him WhatsApp messages throughout the hearing and he was confused about what to say. The applicant indicated that he felt he did not get any real assistance from his agent at the hearing and that he did not get a fair opportunity to present his case.
3. The applicant said that he felt the Tribunal just wanted to make a quick decision and that it did not listen to his explanation, namely, that it was risky for him to return to India because of the COVID pandemic and he therefore needed more time to stay in Australia. He also said that the hearing was very early in the morning for him because of the time difference between him in Western Australia and the Tribunal member in Victoria. He said he was underconfident and nervous and that he had had a sleepless night prior to the hearing. All of these things, the applicant said, meant he did not have a fair chance to present his case.
4. Following the hearing before this Court on 18 August 2025, the applicant later that day unilaterally sent an email to my Chambers, seeking to raise issues that were not before this Court or before the Tribunal, including a request to "consider drawing this matter to the attention of the Minister for Immigration for possible Ministerial Intervention under the Migration Act". My associate replied to remind the applicant that his matter had been formally reserved and that the Court could not consider any new claims without the consent of the other party. The applicant was also reminded of his obligations with respect to appropriate communication with the Court. In any event, the Minister opposed the Court having regard to the contents of the applicant's email on the basis that it was irrelevant to the Court's task. The Court accepted the Minister's position on that material and, accordingly, did not consider it. The applicant is encouraged to seek his own advice about making an application for Ministerial Intervention. Of course, the outcome of any such application would be a matter for the Minister.
5. On 21 August 2025, the applicant sought to file supplementary written submissions (without leave of the Court) addressing:

(1) technical difficulties during the hearing which he said limited his ability to present parts of his argument clearly and which were not fully acknowledged;

(2) a clarification to his submission in ground 13 that the Tribunal demonstrated bias, noting his broader concern that "the immigration and education system in Australia sometimes operates unfairly" by issuing qualifications for people with minimal skills while others with genuine skills often face systemic barriers; and

(3) that his intention is not to disparage the Court but to explain his experience of unfairness within the system as context for his claims.

1. The Minister consented to the Court considering the applicant's supplementary submissions subject to a clarification about whether "technical difficulties during the hearing" was intended to refer to the Tribunal hearing or the Court hearing. The applicant clarified by reply email that he was referring to the Tribunal hearing where there were disruptions to the video and audio connections which limited his ability to fully present his case.
2. The next day, on 22 August 2025, the applicant filed another supplementary written submission seeking to further clarify his claims concerning procedural fairness. The Minister consented to the Court accepting this submission for filing, noting that it would not consent to any further submissions or substantive correspondence on the basis that judgment is reserved and the applicant has had ample opportunity to present his case. By that submission, the applicant submitted that his agent was not asked to speak or contribute at any meaningful stage of the Tribunal hearing. He stated that the Tribunal only asked her to speak at the very end of the hearing "when it was too late to properly address the evidence or questions raised earlier" which undermined his ability to present his case fairly and which deprived him of a genuine opportunity to be heard. The Court has had regard to both of the written post-hearing submissions filed by the applicant.

1. As outlined above, the application for judicial review contains 24 grounds asserting jurisdictional error. The Court will adopt the Minister's helpful approach in written submissions by grouping and addressing related grounds together. Noting that the applicant was unrepresented in this matter, the Court has endeavoured to interpret his grounds as broadly as possible (as per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 239 FCR 158).

1. Before addressing the applicant's written grounds, counsel for the Minister responded to the applicant's claims in oral submissions as outlined above. In response to the issue concerning the conduct of the applicant's agent at the Tribunal hearing, the Minister submitted that this complaint rises no higher than a criticism of the service which the applicant believed he ought to have been afforded by his agent, or even that his agent had acted negligently. Further, the applicant alleged that his agent's conduct contributed to him being denied a meaningful hearing opportunity because he was nervous and he was distracted by the agent constantly messaging him during the hearing.
2. The Minister submitted that these complaints are not enough to establish a jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal or to establish that he was denied a meaningful hearing opportunity. There is nothing in these points raised by the applicant to suggest that he was unable to understand the questions put to him or that he was unable to give evidence and present arguments to the Tribunal. The Minister submitted that that is what the Court must consider in whether the agent's conduct gave rise to jurisdictional error. The Court accepts that submission and finds that no jurisdictional error arises in that respect.
3. The applicant further submitted that he was denied a meaningful hearing opportunity because of the time difference between the states. The Minister accepted that the applicant was residing in Western Australia and that the hearing record indicates the Tribunal hearing began at 9.47am Victorian time (CB 140). The Minister accepted that it would have been very early in the morning for the applicant and submitted that the time in Western Australia would have been 7.47am; however, it would have in fact been 6.47am for the applicant owing to a three-hour time difference between Victoria and Western Australia due to the operation of Daylight Savings at that time of the year. In oral submissions in reply, the applicant said that he took a call from his migration agent at 6.00am and it took him a while to set up his laptop and equipment for the hearing. He said he was "half asleep" at the time and he could not focus on some of the questions that the Tribunal asked him. The applicant submitted that if the Tribunal hearing had been at a different time, it would have been helpful for him.
4. Nevertheless, the Minister submitted this does not establish that the applicant was denied a meaningful hearing opportunity. The applicant's submissions do not indicate or provide any evidence to support a claim that he was prevented from presenting his case to the Tribunal. It is apparent from the hearing record that he and his agent appeared before the Tribunal at the relevant time. The Tribunal's decision record shows that the applicant responded to questions put to him and presented evidence in support of his case. The Court accepts the Minister's submission that there is nothing to support the applicant's claim that the early start time impacted his ability to understand and respond to the issues before the Tribunal or prevented him from presenting his case.
5. The applicant also submitted that he was denied a fair hearing opportunity because the Tribunal member did not listen to him and just wanted to make a quick decision. The Minister submitted that this claim should be rejected and that the evidence suggests the Tribunal did not in fact rush the hearing. As already noted, the Tribunal hearing commenced at 9.47am (Victorian time). The hearing record also shows that the hearing concluded at 11.23am, indicating that the hearing ran for over an hour and a half. The Court accepts the Minister's submission that the evidence does not support the applicant's claim that the Tribunal wanted to make a quick decision. Importantly, there is nothing to suggest that the Tribunal did not diligently apply itself to the task before it.
6. With respect to the applicant's claim that the Tribunal did not listen to what he had to say, the applicant specifically referred to his argument that he wanted to stay in Australia because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The applicant submitted that the Tribunal did not listen to this argument. However, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal did indeed address that aspect of the applicant's evidence at [27] of its decision where it found the applicant had initially stated that he wanted to remain in Australia because of the pandemic but then later told the Tribunal that he had no reasons not to return to India, including because of COVID-19. The Tribunal found that he had given inconsistent and conflicting evidence about this issue, leading to a further finding that the applicant was highly evasive and not a credible or honest witness. The Court agrees that it is not the case that the Tribunal failed to consider this aspect of the applicant's evidence; rather, it is the case that the Tribunal simply did not accept it.
7. It is clear from the Tribunal's reasons and from the hearing record that the Tribunal took the time to listen and to consider the applicant's arguments, including with respect to his desire to remain in Australia because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Tribunal considered the applicant's evidence on that point but ultimately decided not to accept it, as it was entitled to do.
8. None of the issues raised by the applicant in oral submissions give rise to a jurisdictional error.

1. By these grounds, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal failed to lawfully apply cl 600.211 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. That clause sets out the factors which the Tribunal was to have regard to in considering whether the applicant genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily for the purpose for which the visa would be granted. Clause 600.211 is set out in full at [7] of these reasons.
2. The Minister submitted that the applicant's complaint is unparticularised and does not reveal how the Tribunal misapplied the relevant clause, nor is there any apparent error in the Tribunal's application of that clause. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal considered the matters required of it and made findings which were reasonably open to it.
3. The Court accepts the Minister's submission. The Tribunal was correct to identify that the issue before it was whether or not the applicant met the criteria in cl 600.211. The Tribunal considered each of the factors in subclauses 600.211(a), (b) and (c) at [15]-[21] of its reasons. It found that the applicant had substantially complied with the conditions of his previous visas, but that this was outweighed by the Tribunal's findings that he would not comply with future visa conditions having regard to the applicant's circumstances in Australia and in India. It is clear that the Tribunal appropriately considered and applied the factors in cl 600.211, and that in doing so, the Tribunal reached findings that were reasonably open to it.
4. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of these grounds.

1. By this ground, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal failed to give proper weight to his genuine intentions as a prospective visitor. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal was entitled to accept or reject or give such weight to the applicant's evidence as it deemed appropriate in the circumstances (Lee v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464 at [27]).
2. The Court agrees with the Minister's submission. It is a well-established aspect of the Tribunal's fact-finding function that it may attribute weight to various factors or evidence as it deems appropriate (Wu Shan Liang at 281-282). It is clear that the Tribunal did so in this instance.
3. To the extent that the applicant expresses mere disagreement with the Tribunal's findings, the Court accepts the Minister's submission that this represents an impermissible invitation to engage in merits review, which the Court explained to the applicant it cannot do (Wu Shan Liang at 272).
4. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of this ground.

1. By these grounds, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal erred in concluding that he would work in Australia if granted the visa and, accordingly, that he would not comply with condition 8101. Ground 5 specifically alleges that the Tribunal misinterpreted or misapplied cl 600.211(b). These grounds are all directed to the Tribunal's findings with respect to whether the applicant intended to comply with the conditions of the proposed visa.
2. The Minister submitted that these grounds do not allege any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal and merely seek to cavil with the Tribunal's finding that the applicant intended to work in Australia if granted the visa, contrary to condition 8101 (at [18]-[19]). The Minister submitted that that finding was open to the Tribunal on the applicant's own oral evidence at the hearing that he intended to work and that he "needs to work to make a living" (at [19]).
3. In the Court's view, it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant did not intend to comply with the 'no work' condition imposed by condition 8101 on the proposed visa since the applicant had in fact given oral evidence that he intended to work in Australia. It is therefore clear that the Tribunal had regard to whether the applicant intended to comply with the conditions of the visa, as it was required to do by cl 600.211(b). There is nothing to suggest that the Tribunal misinterpreted or misapplied cl 600.211(b).
4. Again, to the extent that these grounds invite the Court to engage in merits review of the Tribunal's factual findings, it would be impermissible for the Court to do so (Wu Shan Liang at 272).
5. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of these grounds.

1. By these grounds, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal failed to consider all relevant matters or evidence. Whilst grounds 8 and 10 are broad allegations in that respect, ground 7 is specifically directed to the Tribunal's consideration and application of cl 600.211(c). That clause simply indicates that the Tribunal must have regard to "any other relevant matter" in determining whether the applicant intends to genuinely stay in Australia temporarily for the purpose of the proposed visa.
2. If the Tribunal failed to take account of cogent evidence which substantially supported the applicant's case, then the Tribunal would fail to perform its duty of review and therefore commit jurisdictional error (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 at [111]- [112]). Similarly, if the Tribunal failed to take account of a substantial and clearly articulated argument which the applicant had advanced in support of his case, then the Tribunal would commit jurisdictional error by failing to perform its duty of review (Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 at [24]-[25]).
3. The Court finds that the Tribunal fell into no such error in this case because there was no evidence before it that the Tribunal failed to consider. The Tribunal considered all of the relevant evidence before it, including the documents provided by the applicant's representative and the applicant's own oral evidence at the hearing with respect to his stated reasons for seeking to remain in Australia. As the Minister submitted, the applicant has not pointed to any specific evidence which the Tribunal did not consider and there is accordingly no error in the Tribunal's approach.
4. It is clear from the Tribunal's reasons that it considered all other relevant matters as it was required to pursuant to cl 600.211(c), including the applicant's travel history, his circumstances in both India and Australia, his work history, his employment prospects, his family situation, and the influence of COVID-19 on his visa plans (at [20]-[30]). The applicant did not point to any particular matter which he says the Tribunal failed to consider. Accordingly, the Tribunal has not failed to perform its duty in that regard.
5. No jurisdictional error arises with respect to these grounds.

1. By these grounds, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal considered irrelevant matters or evidence and that the Tribunal improperly "created" evidence. The applicant has not specified which evidence he says the Tribunal created, although the Minister's submissions have understood these grounds to refer to the Tribunal's reliance on, firstly, the applicant's oral evidence that he intended to work in Australia, and secondly, the Tribunal's rejection of his later attempt to recant that evidence (at [24]).
2. It would indeed give rise to jurisdictional error if the Tribunal were to consider something which the law prevented it from considering, however that is not what happened in this matter. As already discussed with reference to the previous grounds, the applicant's future intention to work in Australia was plainly relevant to the question of whether the applicant genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily. That was the issue for the Tribunal to determine.
3. . There is nothing in the Tribunal's reasons to suggest that it relied on any irrelevant matters or evidence in reaching its findings. The applicant's own oral evidence about his intention to work in Australia was relevant to the Tribunal's task, and the Tribunal was entitled to rely on any such evidence before it, including documentary evidence submitted by the applicant and his representative, and any statements made by the applicant himself at the hearing. The Tribunal therefore did not create any evidence or improperly consider irrelevant matters or evidence in making its decision.
4. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of these grounds.

1. By these grounds, the applicant asserts that he was not afforded a fair hearing or "natural justice". The Minister submitted that these grounds should be rejected on the basis that the applicant attended the hearing with his agent and he was able to address the Tribunal on the dispositive issue before it, namely, whether he genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily.
2. The Court agrees with the Minister's position that there was no error in the Tribunal's approach to how it conducted its hearing. The applicant attended the Tribunal hearing on 22 November 2021 at which he was accompanied by his migration agent. The applicant was on notice of the dispositive issue in this matter and he was given an opportunity to present evidence and arguments on that issue (as required by s 360 of the Act). He gave oral evidence at the Tribunal hearing about his reasons for seeking to remain in Australia (at [13]) and the Tribunal made its own enquiries by putting relevant considerations to the applicant for comment (at [19]-[21], [24] and [26]-[27]). Importantly, when the applicant gave evidence that he intended to work in Australia, the Tribunal put the applicant on notice that such a factor would be relevant to its assessment of the dispositive issue and he was afforded an opportunity to address the Tribunal's concerns (at [19] and [24]). There is nothing in the Tribunal's decision or hearing record which suggests the applicant was not afforded "natural justice" or a fair hearing, or that he was otherwise denied an opportunity to make his case and respond to any issues before the Tribunal.
3. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of these grounds.

1. By these grounds, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal was biased or acted in bad faith.
2. The Minister submitted that these are serious allegations which must be distinctly made and clearly proven in order for such an argument to succeed (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [69]). In the absence of any particulars or evidence in support of that allegation, the Minister submitted that the applicant's claim should be rejected.
3. The Court accepts the Minister's submission. It is indeed a serious allegation to put that the Tribunal was biased or that it acted in bad faith. The applicant has not expanded on this claim or otherwise attempted to explain how the Tribunal was biased or acted in bad faith. The applicant's allegation is therefore nothing more than a bald assertion and cannot be made out. Furthermore, there is certainly no suggestion of bias, actual or apprehended, which arises on the materials before the Court.
4. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of these grounds.

1. By these grounds, the applicant alleges the Tribunal misapplied the law, failed to apply binding precedent, acted beyond the limits of its power, or failed to engage in an active intellectual process when considering his application. The Minister submitted that these grounds again lack particularisation or meaningful detail and should be rejected.
2. The Court accepts the Minister's submission. Whilst these grounds all contain the recognisable language of jurisdictional error and, if proven, could establish jurisdictional error by the Tribunal, the applicant has not pointed to anything in the Tribunal decision and/or process that reveals such error. Absent any further detail, these grounds are essentially meaningless and cannot succeed. The Court is otherwise unable to identify how the Tribunal misapplied the law, failed to apply binding precedent, acted beyond the limits of its power, or failed to engage in an active intellectual consideration of the applicant's claims.
3. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of these grounds.

1. By this ground, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to make its decision. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal plainly had jurisdiction pursuant to ss 338(2), 347 and 348 of the Act (as in force at the time).
2. The decision under review by the Tribunal was a valid Part 5-reviewable decision (s 338(2)). The application for review was made in the proper way (s 347) and the Tribunal was therefore required to review the decision (s 348). It is plain that the decision of the delegate was a reviewable decision under the Migration Act and the Tribunal therefore had jurisdiction to review it.
3. The Court accepts the Minister's submission and finds that the Tribunal did not lack jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision, or to perform its functions or duties in doing so.
4. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of this ground.

1. By this ground, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal "unreasonably exercised a discretion". The Minister submitted that this ground must fail because the Tribunal did not exercise any discretionary power in reaching its decision.
2. The Court agrees with the Minister's submission. If the Tribunal had acted unreasonably in exercising a discretion, then that would give rise to a jurisdictional error. However, that is not what occurred here, and this is not a matter where the Tribunal exercised any discretionary power. The applicant did not seek an adjournment or request further time to put on evidence, or take any other such action that would require the Tribunal to make a discretionary decision. As the Tribunal did not exercise any discretionary power, it cannot be said that it did so unreasonably.
3. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of this ground.

1. By these grounds, the applicant broadly alleges that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error and that the Tribunal failed to lawfully assess the applicant's application. Ground 24 states that the applicant will provide further reasons upon receipt of the Court Book, however the applicant did not file any further material with the Court prior to the hearing.
2. The Minister submitted that these grounds are essentially meaningless without any further explanation or particularisation, and accordingly should fail.
3. The Court accepts that submission on behalf of the Minister. These grounds fail to reveal how the Tribunal's decision is affected by jurisdictional error. The applicant did not explain or expand upon what he meant by these grounds at any time prior to the hearing. To the extent that the applicant's oral submissions to the Court address these grounds, they have been addressed above (at [44]-[51]) and do not reveal jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.
4. It is clear that the Tribunal considered all of the applicant's evidence, including submissions filed by his agent as well as statements made by the applicant himself at the hearing. The Tribunal applied that evidence to the relevant law as it was required to do. The Tribunal reached a decision that was open to it and it gave clear and cogent reasons for that decision.
5. No jurisdictional error arises in respect of these grounds.
6. The Court also asked counsel for the Minister whether there were any matters which her client, who is subject to a direction to behave as model litigant, wished to draw to the Court's attention. There were none.
7. With respect to the corrigendum issued by the Tribunal, counsel for the Minister submitted that it was open to the Tribunal to issue that corrigendum for the purpose of correcting typographical errors and that this does not reflect any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The Court accepts the Minister's submission and no issue was raised by the applicant in that regard.

1. Following the hearing, the applicant sought to file supplementary written submissions on 21 and 22 August, respectively (see [40]-[42]) of these reasons. The Minister consented to the Court granting leave for the applicant to rely on those documents.
2. The applicant submitted that his Tribunal hearing was affected by disruptions to the video and audio connections which he says limited his ability to present his argument. However, there is no indication in the Tribunal decision record that the applicant sought to raise this issue at the hearing, nor was there any contact with the Tribunal post-hearing as the applicant has done with the Court. The Tribunal's decision record shows that the applicant responded to questions put to him and presented evidence in support of his case. Further to the grounds addressed above, there is no evidence that the applicant was denied a fair hearing or an opportunity to present his arguments to the Tribunal.
3. The applicant also sought to clarify and expand on Ground 13 in his written submissions, namely, that the Tribunal was biased. The applicant makes a broad allegation that the immigration and education system in Australia is unfair because people with minimal skills are often granted visas while others with genuine skills face systemic barriers. To the extent that the applicant seeks to particularise his allegation of bias against the Tribunal, the applicant's broad statement is not supported by any evidence and does not demonstrate how the Tribunal's decision in his case is affected by bias.
4. The applicant's further supplementary submission filed on 22 August 2025 simply re-agitates arguments the applicant has already made, particularly in oral submissions, that he was denied procedural fairness because his agent was not invited to meaningfully contribute at the Tribunal hearing. To a large extent, this has already been addressed at [45] of these reasons. There is nothing in the points raised by the applicant, or in any of the evidence before this Court, to suggest that the applicant was unable to understand the questions put to him or that he was unable to give evidence and present arguments to the Tribunal. It was for the applicant to make his case to the Tribunal, not for his agent. To the extent that the applicant expresses disappointment with the conduct of his agent or the level of service he feels he was entitled to, this has also been addressed at [44] of these reasons.

1. The application for judicial review and supporting affidavit, as well as the oral and post-hearing submissions advanced by the applicant, have failed to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The Court is satisfied that, even adopting the broad approach referred to at [43] of these reasons, no jurisdictional error is apparent.
2. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and three (103) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard.