Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 2077

1. This decision is about whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) fell into jurisdictional error in affirming a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's delegate (Delegate) not to grant the applicant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa (Partner Visa).
2. For the reasons that follow, this Court has determined that no jurisdictional error arises from the Tribunal's decision.

1. The background to this matter is derived from the submissions of the parties and, unless otherwise indicated, does not appear to be in dispute.

1. The Applicant is a citizen of India who first arrived in Australia in December 2008 as a dependent on his previous spouse's student visa. This visa was cancelled in September 2012 upon the couple separating. The Applicant's review of this cancellation decision was affirmed in June 2013.[1]
2. On 31 July 2013, the Applicant applied for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa (Partner Visa).[2] The application stated that Mr Singh had met an Australian citizen (Sponsor) in January 2013 and married her in July of that year; it was in respect of this relationship which the Partner Visa was sought.[3]
3. The visa application included the following documents:

(a) the application (Form 47SP), completed by Mr Singh with the assistance of a migration agent;[4]

(b) the sponsorship document (Form 40SP), completed by the Sponsor with the assistance of that same migration agent;[5]

(c) a statutory declaration by two supporting witnesses affirming the genuineness of the relationship;[6] and

(d) photographs from the Applicant and Sponsor's wedding.[7]

1. On 12 May 2014, the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection emailed the Applicant requesting more information in respect of the Application; a request checklist was attached.[8] The Department informed the Applicant that because he did not hold a substantive visa at the time the Partner Visa was lodged, he would need to satisfy the additional "Schedule 3 Criteria (specifically, each of criteria 3001, 3003 and 3004)". [9] Significantly, criterion 3001 required that the application be lodged within 28 days of the Applicant's substantive visa having ceased; this was not satisfied. The Department notified the Applicant that "the Migration Regulations allows the Schedule 3 criteria to be waived where there are compelling reasons" for them not to apply; these circumstances included, inter alia, where at the time of application there were Australian-citizen children born from the relationship. [10]
2. On 10 June 2014, the Applicant's migration agent requested that the Schedule 3 Criteria be waived on the basis that the Sponsor was due to give birth to the couple's child on 15 June 2014.[11] The Department's response requested that the migration agent supply a birth certificate upon the baby being born.[12]
3. On 8 July 2014, the Applicant's migration agent emailed the Department to inform it of the birth of the couple's baby on the 16 June 2014. The email provided the details of the child and informed the Department that a birth certificate would not be available until after 5 August 2014.[13]
4. On 22 August 2014, the Department was sent the birth certificate. It listed the Applicant and Sponsor as the child's parents.[14]
5. On 2 September 2014, the Department invited the Applicant again to comment on information for the Partner Visa. In short, it was requested that the Applicant provide further evidence of his relationship with the Sponsor; a form listing documentation examples was provided.[15]
6. On 29 September 2014, the Applicant's migration agent responded to the request.[16] Several documents were submitted including:

(a) photographs of the Applicant, Sponsor and child;[17]

(b) copies of bank statements and utility bills in the couples' name;[18]

(c) a copy of a tenancy agreement signed by the Applicant and Sponsor;[19] and

(d) a copy of the Applicant and Sponsor's marriage certificate;[20]

1. On 17 June 2015, the Applicant was invited to attend an interview scheduled for 1 July 2015.[21] The Applicant confirmed he would be in attendance with the Sponsor and their child; a Punjabi interpreter was requested.[22]
2. The hearing went ahead as scheduled, during which the Sponsor asserted that the relationship between herself and the Applicant was not genuine, had never been genuine, that they had never lived together and that the Applicant was not the biological father of the child as had been claimed.[23]
3. On 7 July 2015, in order to "ensure [the Applicant] had a fair opportunity to respond to all of the adverse information" raised at the hearing, the Department invited the Applicant to provide a response; he was given seven days to do so.[24] No response was received by the Department.

1. Clause 820.226 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Migration Regulations) requires that, at the time of a visa decision, the Applicant for a subclass 820 visa satisfies public interest criteria 4020 and 4021.
2. These public interest criteria are to be found in Schedule 4 of the Migration Regulations. Relevant, criteria 4020 (PIC 4020) provides:

(1) There is no evidence before the Minister that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, an officer, the Tribunal during the review of a Part 5 reviewable decision, a relevant assessing authority or a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth, a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to:

(a) the application for the visa; or

(b) a visa that the applicant held in the period of 12 months before the application was made.

(2) The Minister is satisfied that during the period:

(a) starting 3 years before the application was made; and

(b) ending when the Minister makes a decision to grant or refuse to grant the visa;

the applicant and each member of the family unit of the applicant has not been refused a visa because of a failure to satisfy the criteria in subclause (1).

(2AA) However, subclause (2) does not apply to the applicant if, at the time the application for the refused visa was made, the applicant was under 18.

(2A) The applicant satisfies the Minister as to the applicant's identity.

(2B) The Minister is satisfied that during the period:

(a) starting 10 years before the application was made; and

(b) ending when the Minister makes a decision to grant or refuse to grant the visa;

neither the applicant, nor any member of the family unit of the applicant, has been refused a visa because of a failure to satisfy the criteria in subclause (2A).

(2BA) However, subclause (2B) does not apply to the applicant if, at the time the application for the refused visa was made, the applicant was under 18.

(3) To avoid doubt, subclauses (1) and (2) apply whether or not the Minister became aware of the bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular because of information given by the applicant.

(4) The Minister may waive the requirements of any or all of paragraphs (1)(a) or (b) and subclause (2) if satisfied that:

(a) compelling circumstances that affect the interests of Australia; or

(b) compassionate or compelling circumstances that affect the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen;

justify the granting of the visa.

(5) In this clause:

information that is false or misleading in a material particular means information that is:

(a) false or misleading at the time it is given; and

(b) relevant to any of the criteria the Minister may consider when making a decision on an application, whether or not the decision is made because of that information.

1. On 21 July 2015, the Delegate notified Mr Singh of the refusal of his Partner Visa application.[25] This power of cancellation is conferred on the Minister (and their delegates by extension)[26] by s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).
2. Based on the assertions of the Sponsor, the Delegate concluded that the Applicant had provided both bogus documentation - specifically, the birth certificate and cohabitation documents - as well as information that was false or misleading in a material particular.[27] On this basis, the Department was not satisfied that the applicant satisfied PIC 4020 and, by extension, clause 820.226. Accordingly, the Delegate concluded that "the criteria for the grant of [the Partner Visa were]... not met by the" Applicant, and the application refused.[28]
3. By operation of the s 476(2)(a) of the Act, this Court has no power to review the decision of the Delegate.[29]

1. On 10 August 2015, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision.[30]
2. On 19 July 2016, the Applicant attended a Tribunal hearing.[31] That same day, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision (First Tribunal Decision).[32]
3. The decision was appealed to this Court, differently constituted. On 21 November 2017, in proceedings before Judge Nicholls, it was conceded by the Minister that the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness, amounting to jurisdictional error of the kind found in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh,[33] because a certificate had been issued by the Minister pursuant to s 375A of the Act (375A Certificate), and the existence of this certificate had not been disclosed to the Applicant.[34]

1. On 27 November 2017, the Tribunal informed Mr Singh that his application had been remitted by this Court.[35]
2. On 5 July 2019, the Applicant was invited to attend a hearing before a differently constituted Tribunal. The hearing was scheduled for 24 July 2019.[36] The Applicant indicated he would attend the hearing.[37]
3. On 19 July 2019, the 375A Certificate was revoked by a delegate of the Minister because it "did not provide sufficient reasons for non-disclosure on 'public interest' grounds".[38] That same day, a new 375A Certificate was reissued.
4. On 23 July 2019, a certificate was issued pursuant to s 376 of the Act.[39]
5. On 24 July 2019, the hearing proceeded as scheduled; the Applicant appeared without representation, assisted by a Punjabi interpreter.[40]
6. On 28 August 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision not to grant the Applicant a Partner Visa (Second Tribunal Decision).[41]
7. The decision record began by identifying the visa sought and briefly outlining the matters procedural history.[42] The member then went on to describe the hearing, specifically:

(a) that they explained the s 375A and 376 Certificates and that the Applicant was satisfied as to the validity of both. Moreover, the Applicant was also:

(i) advised that "whilst the documents specified in the [375A Certificate were] not to be released, he would be invited to comment on or respond to the gist of the information contained" therein;[43]

(ii) given a copy of the email referred to in the s 376 Certificate with irrelevant information redacted;[44]

(b) the oral evidence provided by the Applicant. This included:

(i) assertions that he and the Sponsor did have a child together, and continue to live together in a genuine relationship;[45]

(ii) claims that the Applicant and Sponsor had been "living together up until he moved to Melbourne to live with a cousin one or two months" before the hearing. When asked about the inconsistency of this information, the Applicant conceded they no longer lived together, because the Sponsor refused to take him back;[46]

(iii) that any misinformation on the child's birth certificate was attributable to the Sponsor;[47]

(iv) that he had not supplied "documentary evidence in support of his claims in the four-year period since he applied... for a review of the" Delegate's decision, because no one had asked;[48] and

(c) that they had contacted the Sponsor to ascertain the truth of the Applicant's statements. The Sponsor affirmed that what she had told the Delegate about the falsity of the parties' relationship was true.[49]

1. The Tribunal subsequently went on to consider the substance of the Applicant's claims and evidence. In essence, the Tribunal considered that the Applicant had provided implausible and inconsistent explanations for why the Sponsor had told the Delegate in 2015 that the relationship was not genuine and had been contrived for relationship purposes.[50] The Tribunal ultimately found that "the Applicant was at no stage in a genuine spousal relationship with the woman who sponsored him and consider[ed] his claims to the contrary to be dishonest and unreliable".[51] On this basis, the Tribunal:

(a) was not satisfied that the requirements of s 5F of the Act were met at the time of the decision; accordingly, the Applicant did not meet cl 820.221, or its alternative criteria;[52] and

(b) concluded that there was evidence that the Applicant had given, or caused to be given, information that was false or misleading; therefore, the applicant did not meet PIC 4020(1).[53] The Tribunal was not satisfied that the requirement of this provision should be waived.[54]

1. On 19 September 2019, the Applicant applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision dated 28 August 2019 (Originating Application).
2. The application was made within the 35-day prescribed time limit[55] and brought pursuant to section 476 of the Act, which confers upon this Court, in relation to migration decisions, the "same original jurisdiction as the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution". That is, the Court may undertake judicial review, in respect of matters "where a writ of mandamus or prohibition, or an injunction, is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth."[56]
3. The Applicant seeks:

(1) an order that the decision of the Tribunal be quashed (writ of certiorari);

(2) a writ of mandamus directed to the Tribunal requiring them to determine the Partner Visa application according to law; and

(3) an injunction restraining the Minister, by himself or by his Department, officers, delegates or agents, from making the future decision or taking the other action the subject of the proceedings.

1. The Originating Application lists eight grounds of alleged error, reproduced without alteration below.

1. On 14 October 2019, the First Respondent (Minister) filed its response and opposed the making of the orders sought by the Applicant. The Minister submitted that the application failed to articulate or establish any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
2. On 16 December 2019, the Minister filed a bundle of relevant documents (Court Book).
3. On 14 May 2025, a Registrar of this Court issued an Order (Registrar's Order) directing, inter alia, that the:

a) Applicant file any amended application with proper particulars, written submissions and further evidence at least 28 days before final hearing; and > > b) Minister file any written submissions and further evidence in reply at least 14 days before final hearing.

4. On 21 November 2025, the Minister complied with the orders by filing written submissions. The Applicant did not file any further materials.
5. Therefore, the materials before the Court are as follows:

(a) the application for judicial review filed 19 September 2019;

(b) a Court Book numbering 260 pages filed 16 December 2019 (marked as Exhibit R1); and

(c) an outline of written submissions filed by the Minister on 21 November 2025.

(a) allocated to the Court as presently constituted on 22 October 2025 and listed that day for hearing; and

(b) heard on 4 December 2025 in person at the Court's Melbourne Registry.

1. At the hearing, the Applicant appeared before the Court on his own behalf, assisted by a Punjabi interpreter. The Minister was represented by Nicholas Dour, of counsel, instructed by Mills Oakley.
2. The Court confirmed with the Applicant that they had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions.
3. To assist the Applicant, the Court explained that this Court can only turn its attention to the issue of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The Court explained that the possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap. For migration decisions of this sort however, they most commonly include (but are not limited to) the following categories:

(1) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question;[57]

(2) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material;[58]

(3) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material;[59]

(4) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures;[60]

(5) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias;[61] and

(6) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable.[62]

1. It was also explained to the Applicant that this Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal's decision or grant the Applicant the visa they seek. Rather, the role of the Court is restricted to determining if the Tribunal made a material error in arriving at the decision it arrived at.[63]
2. The explanations provided to the Applicant were interpreted. Based on the Applicant's responses the Court is confident he properly comprehended the scope and purpose of the hearing.
3. Noting that the Applicant was unrepresented, the Court gave the Applicant an opportunity to elaborate on his grounds of review and to outline any other concerns he might have with the Tribunal's decision. This is now the standard procedure in this Court following the decision in Bala v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[64]

THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

1. In Bhasker v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[65] his Honour Judge Fary summarised the role of the Court in judicial review proceedings:
   1. Section 476 of the Migration Act provides that the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under s 75(v) of the Constitution.
   2. Section 75(v) of the Constitution provides that the High Court has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Thus, subject to the statutory exceptions provided for in s 476 of the Migration Act, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Further, s 474 of the Migration Act does not preclude judicial review of decisions under the Migration Act where jurisdictional error is alleged.[66]
   3. "The task of the Court [in an application for judicial review] is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it." The court neither consider the merits of the decision nor remakes it.[67]
   4. The Court may grant relief if it is satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error.[68] Jurisdictional error by a statutory decision maker may manifest itself in a variety of ways. Recognised categories of jurisdictional error include "misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness".[69] Different kinds of error may overlap.[70] The categories are not closed.[71] The critical question is whether the decision maker has exceeded the authority or power conferred by the statute.[72]
2. In most but not all cases, for an error to be jurisdictional, the error must be material to the decision being challenged. The test is whether there is a "realistic possibility" that the decision that was made "could" have been different, but for the error.[73] This is to be determined as "a matter of reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts that have been determined".[74] It has been described as an "undemanding" standard.[75]
3. The Court as presently constituted respectfully adopts his Honour's summary of the task before it.
4. Further, disagreement with a decision, even emphatic disagreement, does not of itself give rise to jurisdictional error.[76]

1. At the hearing before this Court, the Applicant was invited to make submissions about:

(a) why he believed the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error; and

(b) each of the eight grounds of review.

1. To the extent that the Applicant made submissions in relation to the specific grounds, they are summarised below in the context of considering each of the grounds.
2. The Minister submitted that the decision of the Tribunal was not affected by jurisdictional error. The Court as presently constituted incorporates (without repetition) paragraphs 14 to 23 of the Minister's written submissions.

1. Natural justice been denied at AAT and by the delegate of Minister for Home Affairs as no chance been provided to explain the situation and no consideration been made on the provided information.

1. At the hearing, the Court asked the Applicant to elaborate upon this ground. The Applicant advanced three arguments by way of reply:

(1) that he should be "giv[en]... a chance to live [permanently] in Australia" because of having resided here for such an extended period of time;[77]

(2) an unparticularised claim that the Tribunal had not afforded him "fair justice";[78] and

(3) that the member had erroneously accepted the Sponsor's assertion that their marriage was not genuine, despite the Sponsor having made this claim in anger, as the result of a "normal" marital fight.[79]

1. To the extent that this ground is directed at the Delegate's decision, it invites the Court to exceed its jurisdiction.
2. The Applicant's first argument invites the Court to impermissibly engage in merits review. As the Court explained to the Applicant, the Court has no power to issue him with a visa. The fact that the Applicant has been in Australia for 17 years is not relevant to whether the Tribunal Decision was attended by jurisdictional error.
3. The Applicant's second contention is a bare assertion which, absent particulars, does not establish jurisdictional error. In the absence of a transcript, the Tribunal's decision is ordinarily accepted to be the best record of what occurred during the hearing.[80] That being the case, the Tribunal's decision demonstrates an orthodox and procedurally fair approach to the task undertaken by the Tribunal member when:

(a) on 5 July 2019, the Applicant was invited to a hearing;[81]

(b) on 24 July 2019, the Applicant attended the scheduled hearing assisted by a Punjabi interpreter. During this hearing, the Applicant was:

(i) explained the hearing's purpose;[82]

(ii) invited to give evidence and present arguments;[83]

(iii) provided a copy of the ss 375A and 376 certificates and invited to comment on their validity;[84]

(iv) put on notice as to the issues that the Tribunal had with the Applicant's claims and evidence. The Applicant was subsequently invited to comment on these perceived issues.[85]

1. In a more specific sense - contrary to the Applicant's third contention - the Member did not deny the Applicant natural justice and/or procedural fairness in ascribing weight to the Sponsor's assertion that the relationship was illegitimate. This is because:

(a) the member clearly identified that it was necessary to "determine the weight that should be accorded to the information provided to the Department" by the Sponsor that the relationship was not genuine;[86]

(b) the Tribunal put the Applicant on notice as to the Sponsor's assertion;[87]

(c) the Tribunal invited the Applicant to explain why:

(i) the Sponsor had "told Departmental officers in July 2015 that the relationship was non-genuine and that it was contrived for migration purposes";[88]

(ii) he had claimed to have lived with the Sponsor "in a genuine relationship since their marriage" and, contradictorily, that he had "moved to live with relatives in Melbourne some months" before the hearing because the Sponsor would "not accept him back into the relationship";[89]

(iii) in the "four-year period since he asked for a review of the [Delegate's] decision to refuse his application for the Partner visa, [the Applicant had failed to] provided further evidence in support of his claim that the relationship is genuine";[90] and

(d) having regard to the plausibility of the explanations provided by the Applicant in response, the Tribunal made the reasonable and cogent conclusion that the Applicant and sponsor were "at no stage in a genuine spousal relationship".[91]

1. The lack of weight or credibility given to the Applicant's explanation is unsurprising. Plainly, it is difficult to envisage how the Sponsor's claims could credibly be understood as a lie made in the heat of a marital dispute when this same "lie" had been made to the Delegate some four years earlier.
2. Grounds One fails to establish jurisdictional error.

2. There is a jurisdictional error made by both the Tribunal and the delegate as they wrongly applied cl.820.226 as no factual consideration been given on the information provided to them. The delegate and the member were predetermined to refuse the visa.

3. The decision is based on mistaken presumptions and or erroneous findings.

1. At the hearing, the Applicant submitted, once again, that the Tribunal should not have given weight to the Sponsor's assertion that their relationship was not legitimate. No further particulars were advanced in respect of either ground.
2. To the extent that Ground Two is directed at the Delegate's decision, it invites the Court to exceed its jurisdiction.
3. As explained above, the Tribunal's reasoning evinces close consideration of the evidence before it. Accordingly, there is no indication that the Tribunal erroneously concluded that the relationship was not legitimate nor that in making this conclusion, the Tribunal had "no factual consideration" to the material before it. It had the direct evidence of the Sponsor, and it preferred her evidence. In the face of the inconsistencies in the Applicant's evidence, it was open to the Tribunal to prefer the evidence of the Sponsor.
4. Because the Tribunal was justified in concluding the relationship was not legitimate, there is no basis for asserting that the Tribunal wrongly determined that the "information the applicant has given... [to the Tribunal] was false or misleading in a material particular as defined in PIC 4020(5)" such that PIC 4020 - and clause 820.226 by extension - were wrongly applied.[92]
5. There is also no indication that the Tribunal's decision was pre-determined. Indeed, in phoning the Sponsor to verify her claims, and in considering the evidence and arguments raised by the Applicant in the Tribunal hearing, the member evinced a willingness to consider the visa's refusal afresh. The fact that both the Delegate and Tribunal reached equivalent conclusions is merely reflective of the difficulty the Applicant faced in satisfying either decision maker that the relationship was legitimate despite the Sponsor's assertions to the contrary.
6. Neither Ground Two nor Three establish jurisdictional error.

4. The decision maker made an error by not exercising their power to give a fresh look to my case. AAT just rubber-stamped the decision of DHA/DIBP.

1. When invited to elaborate upon Ground Four, the Applicant expressed his belief that the Tribunal had failed to afford him "justice". The Applicant went on to reiterate his belief that the Tribunal should not have given weight to the Sponsor's claims.
2. As stated above in relation to Grounds Two and Three, this Court is satisfied the Tribunal considered the refusal afresh, and with close, critical attention to the materials before it. There is no indication the Tribunal merely "rubber stamped" the Delegate's decision.
3. Ground Four does not establish jurisdictional error.

5. The decision maker has failed to identify and consider the elements of the case.

7. The decision maker did not provide enough weight to the situation I had tried to explain while they had put more weightage on disposing of the case before them rather quickly than exercise any fact finding and gathering evidence from us the visa holders.

8. The decision maker did not consider the Federal Circuit Court order dated 21/11/2017 and the evidence provided so it has fallen in to 'Jurisdictional error".

1. The Applicant gave the same response to Grounds Five, Seven and Eight as he did to Ground Four.
2. In the absence of further particulars, these grounds merely reiterate claims already rejected by this Court.
3. Grounds Five, Seven and Eight do not establish jurisdictional error.

6. The decision maker failed to accord to the applicant procedural fairness and natural justice.

1. When invited to elaborate upon Ground Six, the Applicant asserted that it was not his "fault" that his relationship with the Sponsor deteriorated. This Court subsequently made clear to the Applicant that it was only concerned with flaws in the procedures followed by the Tribunal. The Applicant responded by alleging that the Tribunal had "only listened to" the Sponsor. That claim must be rejected. The Tribunal afforded the Applicant procedural fairness and gave him ample opportunity to present evidence and arguments in support of his case.
2. Absent further particulars, there is nothing to indicate that broader considerations of natural justice were denied by the Tribunal.
3. Ground Six does not establish jurisdictional error.

1. Mindful of the Court's obligations towards unrepresented litigants as outlined in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[93] at [59]-[77], [100] and [112]-[113], the Court has scrutinised the application, the materials before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's decision to identify any jurisdictional error. The Court has also read the Applicant's grounds as broadly as possible and remain alive to the possibility of jurisdictional error on the Tribunal's part. Nevertheless, the Court is of the view that error has not been disclosed on the Tribunal's part and, for the following reasons, the Court is not persuaded that a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error arises out of the substantive application.

1. For the reasons set out above, this Court is satisfied that the Tribunal's reasons were not affected by jurisdictional error.
2. Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

1. At the hearing, Mr Dour explained that the Minister, in relation to the application for judicial review, was seeking costs in the amount of $6,000.00. Mr Dour noted that this amount did not include an additional sum in relation to judgment delivery.
2. The Court as presently constituted explained to the Applicant that:

(1) it had not made a decision in relation to his application;

(2) the Minister was seeking costs in the event that it was successful;

(3) in deciding the question of costs, the Court is required to consider:

a) whether it is appropriate that the applicants should pay any costs at all, noting that the usual rule in courts in Australia is that an unsuccessful party pays the party/party costs of the successful party; and

b) if the Court is so satisfied that the applicants should pay costs, what the reasonable quantum is.

1. The Court then invited the Applicant to make submissions about costs in the event he was unsuccessful. In response, the Applicant claimed that the sought amount was too high and requested that it be reduced.
2. The Court is satisfied that costs ought to follow the event, and that it is appropriate to make an order in the amount sought by the Minister given the amount of work undertaken as evidenced by the court file.

I certify that the preceding eighty-two (82) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns.

[26] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 496.

[29] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476(2)(a), 476(4).

[33] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2016] FCAFC 183.

[55] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 477(1).

[56] EDO19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 826, [64].

[57] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198 ('Craig').

[60] SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294, [207]-[208].

[61] SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80, [2].

[62] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, [131]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332, [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437, [44].

[63] Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272.

[64] [2019] FCA 600 at [7].

[65] [2025] FedCFamC2G 620.

[66] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.

[67] Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 Allson CJ, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ at [17].

[68] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.

[69] LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 418 ALR 152 (LPDT) at [3].

[70] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 2006 CLR 323 at [82].

[72] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 at [82].

[74] MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506 per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [38].

[75] Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80 per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ (at [33]).

[76] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at [40].

[77] Transcript of Proceedings, Hardeep Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2), Judge Johns, 4 December 2025) 6, line 11-3 ('Transcript').

[80] SZVUP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection & Anor [2015] FCCA 1287 at [13] to [14], citing

Applicant NAFF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] HCA 62; (2004) 221 CLR 1 and

Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 771 at [44].

[93] [2015] FCA 1391.