Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1765

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographic, clerical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 of the Rules.

1. By an application to show cause filed with the Court on 5 February 2021, the applicant seeks review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant him a Partner (temporary) (class UK) visa (visa).

1. The following background has been derived from the written submissions of the first respondent. Unless otherwise indicated, it does not appear to be in dispute.
2. The applicant is a male citizen of India who first arrived in Australia on 22 April 2009 as the holder of a student visa. On 11 August 2011, the applicant was granted a further student visa which ceased on 1 August 2014. On 6 June 2014, he applied for a partner visa (sponsored by a previous spouse, whom he divorced on 16 August 2015), which application he withdrew in August 2015. In September 2015, the applicant applied for a medical treatment visa, which was also refused. The Tribunal (differently constituted) affirmed the refusal of that medical treatment visa application on 12 January 2016 (CB 1434).
3. On 2 February 2016, the applicant applied for the visa the subject of these proceedings, on the basis of his marriage in August 2015 to another Australian citizen (sponsor) (Court Book (CB) 1 to 29).
4. It was a criterion for the grant of the visa that, if the applicant did not hold a substantive visa at the time of the application, he must satisfy criteria 3001, 3003, and 3004 of Schedule 3 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations), unless the Minister is satisfied that there were compelling reasons for not applying those criteria: see sub-s 820.211(2)(d)(ii) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. Criterion 3001 required that the visa application be made within 28 days from the "relevant day". In this case, the relevant day was the last day the applicant held a substantive visa, namely 1 August 2014.
5. By his visa application, the applicant claimed his compelling reasons for lodging a partner visa application onshore were that (CB 1):

(a) the sponsor's family had not accepted him as their son-in-law;

(b) the sponsor had left her family to live with him;

(c) the sponsor was studying and the applicant was supporting her financially; and

(d) she would not be able to survive financially if the applicant lodged his application offshore.

1. On 14 November 2017, the first respondent's Department wrote to the applicant to say that, because he was not the holder of a substantive visa at the time he lodged the partner visa application, and because his application was not made within 28 days of the cessation of his last substantive visa, he would need to demonstrate compelling reasons why additional Schedule 3 criteria (3001, 3003 and 3004) should not be applied in his case (CB 1403 to 1407).
2. On 19 March 2018, the delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy cl 820.211(2)(d) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations, because he applied for the visa more than 28 days after his last substantive visa ceased, and there were no compelling reasons to not apply the Schedule 3 Criteria (CB 1429 to 1439). The delegate found there to be no evidence to support the applicant's claims that the sponsor's family did not accept him as their son-in-law, nor that the sponsor could not support herself if the applicant were offshore.
3. On 5 April 2018, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision and appointed his registered migration agent as his authorised recipient (CB 1440 to 1441).
4. On 24 June 2020, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant by email (via his authorised recipient) to request that he provide a detailed description of any compelling reasons or circumstances which he said would justify waiver of the Schedule 3 criteria, together with evidence in support of those circumstances, within 14 days (CB 1524).
5. In response, the applicant provided statutory declarations made by each of himself and the sponsor, together with numerous supporting documents (CB 1525 to 1572). The applicant relied on the following as constituting compelling reasons:

(a) he and the sponsor had been together for five years;

(b) the applicant had been helping the sponsor to repay a personal loan;

(c) they were trying to have a baby;

(d) they had bought a dog from an animal shelter, and it was the applicant who walked him every day; and

(e) due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there was "so much uncertainty regarding travel to Australia from offshore" that it would be unfair to require the applicant to apply for a partner visa offshore.

1. On 13 November 2020, the Tribunal invited the applicant (via his authorised recipient) to attend a hearing by video-link (due to COVID-19 restrictions) scheduled for 8 December 2020 (CB 1579 to 1588).
2. In advance of the hearing, the applicant submitted additional supporting documents (CB 1595 to 1604) including a second statutory declaration made by the sponsor, in which she claimed that had not enjoyed living with her mother and step-father prior to her marriage to the applicant because she was being sexually abused by her step-father, that she was "scared of being on [her] own", and that she needed the applicant's support emotionally and financially. The applicant also provided a letter from a doctor dated 30 November 2020, which said the sponsor had attended a medical centre that day "regarding her planning for pregnancy".
3. On 3 December 2020, the applicant's representative provided written submissions to the Tribunal (CB 1609 to 1620) which set out the following additional upon reasons which the applicant relied as being sufficiently compelling so as to waive the Schedule 3 criteria:

(a) the applicant and sponsor would suffer significant financial hardship if he was forced to lodge the Partner visa application from overseas;

(b) the application was lodged onshore because the sponsor suffered sexual abuse from her stepfather and lacked confidence in herself to move out of her parents' home;

(c) the threat to the applicant's health associated with travelling during the COVID-19 pandemic;

(d) the applicant and sponsor were trying to conceive a child; and

(e) the longstanding relationship of the applicant and the sponsor.

1. The applicant and sponsor attended the hearing on 8 December 2020 (CB 1621 to 1623). Following the hearing, the applicant and sponsor provided additional statutory declarations made by them (CB 1624 to 1641). The applicant provided further details about the couple's financial circumstances and claimed that he would not be able to get a job if he had to return to India because of "economic difficulties in coronavirus lockdown". The sponsor claimed that she was "very emotional and scared at the thought of [the applicant] having to leave [her] for two years", and was not emotionally strong.
2. On 7 January 2021, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review on (essentially) the same basis as had the delegate (CB 1642 to 1662 and CB 1645 to 1658).

1. The Tribunal summarised the evidence given by the applicant and the sponsor at the hearing as follows (CB 1646 to 1649 at [7] to [25]).
2. The applicant said that the parties paid $440 per week in loan and credit card re-payments and lived in a four-bedroom house, for which they paid $520 a week in rent (CB 1647 at [10]).
3. The Tribunal recorded the applicant's concern with the number of COVID-19 cases in India, the lack of medical facilities there, whether he would be able to get a flight to India because there were not many flights given that Amritsar and Delhi Airports were closed, and the uncertainty about how long the pandemic might last (CB 1647 at [12]).
4. The sponsor gave evidence that she earned $50,000 per year and that it would hard for her to find a cheaper place to live because she now had a dog, and was unwilling to take in housemates to share expenses because she had issues with strangers (CB 1649 at [22] to [23]).
5. The sponsor said she did not have a good relationship with her mother, who was still in a relationship with the man who had abused the sponsor and that, if it were not for the applicant, she would still be stuck living with them because could not trust strangers because of what she had endured (CB 1649 at [24] to [25]).
6. The Tribunal identified the issue on review as being whether the applicant met the Schedule 3 criteria and, if not, whether those criteria should not be applied (CB 1650 at [29]).
7. The Tribunal observed that it was not in dispute that the applicant did not have a substantive visa at the time of application and thereafter outlined the requirements of criterion 3001 (CB 1650 at [30] to [33]). The Tribunal found that, because the application was not made within 28 days of the relevant day, the applicant did not satisfy criterion 3001 (CB 1650 at [34]).
8. The Tribunal identified that it was required to consider whether there were compelling reasons for not applying the criteria (CB 1650 at [35]) and observed that while the term "compelling reasons" is not defined, authority from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia identified that compelling reasons could continue to arise including at any time after the visa application was made (CB 1651 at [36]): see Waensila v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 32; (2016) 241 FCR 121.
9. The Tribunal found that much of the documentary evidence which had been provided by the applicant related to the existence of a genuine relationship between the parties which would not, in and of itself, establish that compelling reasons existed for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria, because they were simply necessary criterion for the grant of a partner visa (CB 1651 at [38] to [39]). The Tribunal found that the 'mere fact' of the parties being separated or 'some level of hardship' would also not, and in and of itself, constitute a compelling reason to justify the waiver (CB 1651 at [39]). Although it made no finding about the genuineness of the relationship, the Tribunal accepted that at the time of application, the parties' relationship had been long-standing (CB 1651 at [40]). However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that this fact alone amounted to a compelling reason to justify not applying the Schedule 3 criteria (CB 1652 at [41]).
10. The Tribunal acknowledged the parties' financial situation but observed that they had shown little, if any, willingness to reduce their living costs in response to their circumstances. The Tribunal found the purchase of an 'expensive vehicle' and a pet, decreased their chances of moving into a smaller residence, and appeared to be unwise decisions which were made not only after the visa application was lodged, but even after the visa was refused by the delegate. The Tribunal took the view they were undoubtedly on notice of the real possibility that the applicant might have to return to India if the visa was not granted (CB 1652 at [43]).
11. In assessing the parties' financial circumstances, the Tribunal found:

(a) it was open to the sponsor to move to a smaller residence with less rent, or to take in housemates and her unwillingness to bring housemates into her current residence could be overcome with a 'degree of due diligence' in profiling or screening potential candidates (CB 1652 at [44]);

(b) the sponsor could use $10,000 which she had withdrawn from her superannuation account to pay down one or more of her debts, which would also reduce her interest repayments (CB 1652 to 1653 at [45]); and

(c) calculations provided by the parties after the hearing appeared to show that the sponsor would suffer a shortfall of $262 per week based on a salary of $1,000 per week (CB 1653 at [46]), but because that calculation was based on the applicant living by herself and spending $200 per week on groceries (which the Tribunal found was implausible), it was reasonable to believe that there was potential to eliminate the shortfall or get a second job, as she had done in 2018/2019, at a time where she earnt more than $76,000 (CB 1653 at [47]).

1. Overall, the Tribunal accepted that the sponsor may suffer from not having the applicant onshore to support her financially, but found that she could take steps to lessen any hardship by modifying her lifestyle (CB 1653 at [48]). The Tribunal was not satisfied that the circumstances relating to the financial impact of the applicant's absence were compelling reasons for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria (CB 1653 at [49]).
2. The Tribunal considered a claim (raised by the applicant at the hearing) that he would need to support his family while in India because his father had been involved in protests by farmers from the Punjab region, in Delhi (CB 1653 at [50]). The Tribunal acknowledged that there was evidence that said protests had been taking place. However, it found that other than the applicant's assertion, there was no evidence that his father had ever been involved in those protests, or that the applicant had been supporting his father (or his family in India) during the time he claimed his father was protesting (CB 1654 at [51]).
3. The Tribunal also found that, aside from evidence given by the sponsor that she would need to support the applicant while he was in India, there was nothing to suggest that the applicant's family would be unable to support him while he was away, was not satisfied that the applicant could not be supported financially by his family and would require support from other sources such as the sponsor if he returned to India (CB 1654 at [52]). The Tribunal was not satisfied that the circumstances the applicant claimed he would face in India amounted to compelling reasons to not apply the Schedule 3 criteria (CB 1654 at [53]).
4. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the presence of COVID-19 in India (and the consequences which attended the pandemic) amounted to a compelling reason, finding it reasonable to consider that the applicant, a young male who did not suffer from any respiratory conditions, was at a very low risk of developing serious symptoms which would require extensive medical support.
5. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant would be unable to travel to his home in the Punjab region because of the farmers' protests and blockades of the land routes. Additionally, the Tribunal found that, at the time of its decision, Amritsar Airport remained open and was receiving flights from Delhi, and internationally (CB 1654 at [55]).
6. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the parties' plans to start a family was a compelling reason to not apply the Schedule 3 criteria. The Tribunal took the view that a delay of two years would not pose problems for the parties' physical ability to conceive a child. While it accepted the need for the applicant to pay another visa application fee would be another cost on top of existing debts and expenses which may delay their plans to start a family, this could be addressed by prudent financial management (CB 1655 at [58] to [59]).
7. The Tribunal accepted the applicant's support had been a reason why the sponsor had been able to move out of the home which she had previously shared with her alleged abuser. It also accepted that the applicant's support had been important to the sponsor when she had been 'effectively shut out' by her mother and stepfather, and in circumstances where her biological father and brother were offshore in Fiji (CB 1655 at [61]). While it found this support to be to the applicant's credit, the Tribunal did not consider it constituted a compelling reason for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria, because the parties would have the technical means by which to communicate with one another during their physical separation, would be able to continue their relationship and the applicant could continue to offer support. The Tribunal also noted that the sponsor travelled to remote locations for two-week periods every month as part of her job, and found those regular periods apart from each other would have given the parties ample opportunity to experience living separately while still offering support to one another (CB 1655 at [62]). For these reasons, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the support given by the applicant to the sponsor did not constitute a compelling reason to not apply the Schedule 3 criteria (CB 1655 at [63]).
8. Having considered all the evidence, and the parties' circumstances, the Tribunal was not satisfied there were compelling reasons for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria, either individually or cumulatively (CB 1655 to 1656 at [64] to [65]). The Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not meet cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations and therefore affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant the visa (CB 1656 at [67] to [69]).

1. As noted above, the proceedings were commenced on 5 February 2021. On 25 March 2021, a Registrar made orders for the preparation of the proceedings for hearing, which were to be listed on a date yet to be fixed. The proceedings were placed immediately in the central migration docket upon their commencement. The applicant has been unrepresented throughout the proceedings. By the aforementioned orders the applicant was given the opportunity to amend his application by 17 June 2021. He did not avail himself of that opportunity. The proceedings were next called-over before a Registrar on 8 January 2025. The applicant appeared by telephone on that occasion, with the assistance of an interpreter in the Punjabi language. Again, timetabling orders were made, including another grant of leave to the applicant to amend, referable to any hearing to be fixed.
2. The proceedings were docketed to me on 2 June 2025, on which date I made orders listing them for hearing today. The parties appeared before me this morning. The applicant remains unrepresented. The first respondent is represented by a solicitor. An interpreter in the Punjabi language has been available throughout the hearing and is assisting via Microsoft Teams. The connection has been clear throughout, and I am satisfied that the applicant and the interpreter have been able to understand each other. At the commencement of the hearing, it was apparent that the applicant was fluent in English. He indicated that he was content to undertake the hearing in English and would consult the interpreter if required. During this morning's hearing, I adjourned briefly so that a copy of the Tribunal decision and the originating application could be emailed to the interpreter, in order that he could have those documents before him.
3. Despite the fact that the applicant has been granted several opportunities to amend his application, he has not done so. Accordingly, the grounds which will be considered by the Court are those contained in the originating application. An Affidavit in support of that application, which was filed at the same time, was not read in circumstances where it served only to annex a copy of the Tribunal's decision which is in the (subsequently filed) Court Book. An Affidavit of Service of the solicitor for the first respondent was also read, in circumstances where the applicant claims not to have received the Court Book in hard copy. However, he did acknowledge that he had received the Court Book by email.
4. I am satisfied, that the documents in the Court Book:

(a) have been received by the applicant by email; and

(b) he is in any event familiar with their content;

such that there is no particular prejudice to the applicant in the Court Book being received.

1. Accordingly, the six volumes of the Court Book were tendered and (collectively) marked Exhibit "1R".

1. In the absence of any amendment, the grounds of review are as follows:
   1. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal misconstrued the expression compelling reasons

PARTICULARS

The Tribunal decision record at paragraph 41 states "Notwithstanding, while the Tribunal accepts that the parties have been in a long-standing relationship, it is not satisfied that this fact alone amounts to compelling reasons to justify not applying the Schedule 3 criteria. Other incidents of the separation and hardship, either individually or cumulatively, must cause the Tribunal to be satisfied that those compelling reasons exist". Whereas a single circumstance may compel the decision maker to exercise the discretion.

1. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal acted in an unreasonable manner in assessing the evidence concerning compelling reasons.

PARTICULARS

1. The Tribunal failed to give proper regard to the evidence given by the Applicant in that the sale of assets, such as their cars, will not lessen their financial hardship for reasons of low resale value and outstanding loan.
2. The Tribunal failed to give proper regard to the evidence given for compelling reasons. Specifically, the partner visa application would allow the Sponsor to live with the Applicant following their marriage. Thereby, the Sponsor would be removed from an abusive environment.

1. I briefly adjourned to allow the grounds to be interpreted in full to the applicant and he was given the opportunity to address them in turn.

1. In respect of ground 1, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal misconstrued the expression "compelling reasons" and, particularly, that in reaching a finding in [41], it misdirected itself or fettered its own discretion by finding that a single circumstance might compel the decision-maker to exercise their discretion.
2. When asked to speak to the ground, the applicant initially addressed the merits of his claims despite the fact that the Court had explained to him at the outset of the hearing that it is not assessing for itself whether the compelling reasons exist for, or otherwise whether the applicant should be given the visa. When asked to speak specifically to the allegation in ground 1, the applicant indicated that he was unable to do so, in circumstances where he now says a migration agent had prepared the application for him. That is even though the content of the footer of the originating application makes no indication that anyone else assisted in the preparation of the application.
3. Given that the particulars to ground 1 take issue with the Tribunal's reasoning at [41], it is sensible to set out in full:

Notwithstanding, while the Tribunal accepts that the parties have been in a long-standing relationship, it is not satisfied that this fact alone amounts to compelling reasons to justify not applying the Schedule 3 criteria. Other incidents of the separation or hardship, either individually or cumulatively, must cause the Tribunal to be satisfied that those compelling reasons exist. These are explored below.

1. The decision record indicates that the Tribunal was aware of the statutory test (at [36]) and it indicated that was 'mindful' that a long-standing relationship of two years or more may justify not applying the Schedule 3 criteria (at [40]).
2. Further, I accept the first respondent's submission that this not is a case in which the Tribunal incorrectly fettered its own discretion. It is apparent from the Tribunal's reasoning at [40] to [41] that it did not accept that a longstanding relationship would automatically constitute a compelling reason that justified the waiver, and that it was necessary to consider the circumstances of the particular case. As the Federal Court has held,[1] if the satisfaction by a visa applicant of one of the primary criterion was to be capable of constituting compelling circumstances giving rise to a waiver, there would be little or no utility in requiring compliance with additional criteria: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sandhu [2016] FCA 130 at [55] per Siopis J.
3. The question of whether circumstances are compelling was a matter of fact and degree uniquely for the Tribunal to determine, as it did. Properly understood, this ground seeks impermissible merits review.
4. I am not satisfied that it can be concluded that the Tribunal misdirected itself, or that there was a fetter on its discretion, in circumstances where the finding that it made was (essentially) that the basis in this particular case was insufficient, not that it was incapable of being sufficient entirely. There is no basis, on a fair and contextual reading of the Tribunal's reasons, to conclude that the Tribunal misunderstood or misapplied the test. Accordingly, ground 1 is not made out.

1. Ground 2 (essentially) alleges that the Tribunal acted in an unreasonable manner in the assessment of the evidence submitted in support of alleged compelling reasons. In respect of this ground, the applicant generally said that he and the sponsor gave the Tribunal "all the proof," from their bank accounts in respect of the financial aspects of the evidence, and (in respect of particular 2(b)), that the applicant and sponsor had given evidence about the abusive living situation of the sponsor in respect of which the applicant had assisted her in leaving. Ultimately, the applicant made submissions to the effect that the ground is an allegation that, despite the fact that the evidence was given by him, overall it was not accepted.
2. By the particulars to this ground the applicant alleges the Tribunal failed to have proper regard to the evidence given by him in relation to his financial position, and that living with him had enabled the sponsor to be removed from an abusive environment.
3. Contrary to the applicant's assertions at the hearing today, the Tribunal comprehensively considered the parties' claims concerning their financial position (see CB 1646 to 1647 at [8] to [10], [23], [42] to [48]) and accepted that the applicant had supported the sponsor in removing herself from an abusive environment (CB 1648 at [18] and CB 1649 at [25]). This ground does nothing more than disagree with the Tribunal's factual findings, and it must fail for the same reasons as ground one.
4. The solicitor for the first respondent made submissions to the effect that the ground suggested that there was an unreasonable manner in which the Tribunal reasoned, and that it failed to have proper regard to the evidence. The solicitor for the first respondent submits, and I accept, that what is really being sought is merits review. So much is clear from the submissions which were made by the applicant today. As explained to him at the hearing by the Court, that is no part of the jurisdiction in judicial review.
5. The first respondent also accepts that there was a large volume of material which was given to the Tribunal, much of which went to whether or not there was a genuine relationship between the applicant and the sponsor. However, that was not the primary issue before the Tribunal. It is worthy of note that the Tribunal did not make any adverse finding in that regard. The Tribunal considered all of the evidence before it in respect of the question of the financial aspects of the relationship, and also the surrounding circumstances of the abusive domestic situation in which the sponsor had previously been. I accept that there is nothing to suggest the Tribunal overlooked any evidence. I accept the submission of the first respondent that the Tribunal is not under an obligation to do so: see Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593.
6. It is also clear from the Tribunal's decision that it did consider both the financial aspects and the abusive relationship claims. Under the heading 'In Respect of the Financial Impacts of the Applicant's Absence', the Tribunal logically, reasonably and rationally assessed the evidence and came to a finding that this was not a compelling reason. I am satisfied that finding was open to the Tribunal, in both aspects that the particulars of this ground go, undertook a detailed and thorough task of assessing the evidence in discharging its duty in respect of the claim.
7. The same can be said in respect of particular 2(b), which takes aim at [60] to [63] of the Tribunal's decision. There the Tribunal found as follows:

The applicant's emotional support to the sponsor

60. The Tribunal has considered whether compelling reasons exist based on the emotional support given by the applicant to the sponsor.

61. The Tribunal considers that the sponsor gave very forceful and emotional testimony in relation to the parties' relationship and particularly in relation to the emotional support that the applicant has offered her. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant's support has been a reason why she was able to move out of the family home which she previously shared with the alleged perpetrator of abuse against her. This is certainly not insignificant. The Tribunal also accepts that the applicant's support has been important to the sponsor in circumstances where she has been effectively shut out by her mother and stepfather and where her father and brother are offshore in Fiji.

62. It is to the applicant's credit that he has been able to assist the sponsor in this way over the course of the parties' relationship. However, the Tribunal does not consider this support to be a compelling reason in itself for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria. It considers that the parties would have the technical means by which to communicate with one other during their physical separation from each other, and in that way would be able to continue their relationship and the applicant continue to offer the support that he has given. The Tribunal also notes that the parties have endured frequent periods apart, such as during times when one party had taken an overseas trip without the other, but significantly when the sponsor travels and works in remote locations for two-week periods every month as part of her job (as stated by the applicant in his post-hearing declaration). It reasonably considers that these regular periods apart from each other would have given the parties ample opportunity to experience living separately while offering support to one another.

63.The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are compelling reasons related to the support given by the applicant to the sponsor.

1. The Tribunal did accept that the applicant had supported the sponsor in removing herself from the abusive environment in which she previously found herself. It also accepted that the applicant's support was important to her in that regard. However, as the first respondent's solicitor correctly submits, at [62] of its reasons the Tribunal set out why, even accepting those matters to be true, they did not constitute compelling reasons.
2. It is understandable that the applicant is unhappy with the conclusions to which the Tribunal ultimately came, notwithstanding its acceptance of some of the genuineness of much of his circumstances. However, and as the first respondent's solicitor properly observes, this may be a case in respect of which reasonable minds may have differed. A different Tribunal may have come to a different conclusion in that regard. However, in and of itself, that does not mean that the findings were not open to the Tribunal in this instant case. I am satisfied, that those findings were in fact open on the material before the Tribunal.
3. I am satisfied that there is no singular claim and/or piece of cogent evidence which might have been dispositive of the original claims made by the applicant which was overlooked. I am not satisfied that the Tribunal otherwise misapplied the requisite test. Ground 2 is otherwise an attempt at impermissible merits review which otherwise does not give rise to the kind of serious legal error that would be required in order that the matter must be remitted to the Tribunal. Overall, I am satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is not affected by a jurisdictional error. It is therefore a privative clause decision, and it must be dismissed. I will so order.

1. Consequent upon the dismissal of the application, the solicitor for the Minister makes an application that the applicant be ordered to pay the Minister's costs, fixed in the sum of $6,100. Rule 25.14 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules) provides that where the Court determines that a party is entitled to costs in a migration proceeding, the party may seek costs and disbursements up to, and including, the amount specified in Schedule 2 of Part 3 to the Rules, which are is presently $9,097.93.
2. In this proceeding, I am satisfied that costs should follow the event. I am therefore satisfied that r 25.14(1) of the Rules is engaged. The amount sought by the Minister is less than the scale amount and therefore falls within r 25.14 (1). It is also less, I note, than the scale amount in the antecedent Rules, including, but not limited to, the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2011 (Cth). In all of the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that the amount is reasonable and represents a fair indemnity of his costs in these proceedings.

I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Given.

[1] Albeit in the context of a different visa criterion and waiver regime