Simons (a pseudonym) v R [2026] NSWCCA 78 | Case summary | Zoe

NSWNSWCCA

Simons (a pseudonym) v R

[2026] NSWCCA 78

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)|2026-06-17|Before: Kirk JA at [1] McNaughton J at [2] McGuire J at [84]

View on NSW Caselaw

At a glance

Source facts

Court

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)

Decision date

2026-06-17

Before

Kirk JA at [1] McNaughton J at [2] McGuire J at [84]

Catchwords

CRIME — appeals — appeal against sentence — offence of sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years — whether sentencing judge erred in the assessment of moral culpability — no error in assessment of moral culpability — appeal dismissed CRIME — appeals — appeal against sentence — offence of sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years — whether sentence imposed was manifestly excessive — sentence not manifestly excessive — appeal dismissed

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

CRIME — appeals — appeal against sentence — offence of sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years — whether sentencing judge erred in the assessment of moral culpability — no error in assessment of moral culpability — appeal dismissed CRIME — appeals — appeal against sentence — offence of sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years — whether sentence imposed was manifestly excessive — sentence not manifestly excessive — appeal dismissed

Judgment

Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.

Medium Neutral Citation: Simons (a pseudonym) v R [2026] NSWCCA 78

Hearing dates: 9 March 2026

Date of orders: 17 June 2026

Decision date: 17 June 2026

Before: Kirk JA at [1]
McNaughton J at [2]
McGuire J at [84]

Decision: (1) Leave to appeal granted.
(2) Appeal dismissed.

Catchwords: CRIME — appeals — appeal against sentence — offence of sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years — whether sentencing judge erred in the assessment of moral culpability — no error in assessment of moral culpability — appeal dismissed
CRIME — appeals — appeal against sentence — offence of sexual intercourse with a child under 10 years — whether sentence imposed was manifestly excessive — sentence not manifestly excessive — appeal dismissed

Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 66A, 91G, 91H
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 21A

Cases Cited: AT v R [2020] NSWCCA 178
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
DS v R; DM v R (2022) 109 NSWLR 82; [2022] NSWCCA 156
EG v R [2015] NSWCCA 21
Hancock v R [2025] NSWCCA 213
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Hughes v R [2018] NSWCCA 2
Kural v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 502; [1987] HCA 16
Paterson v R [2021] NSWCCA 273 PS v R [2015] NSWCCA 20 R v JP [2015] NSWCCA 267 R v ND [2016] NSWCCA 103 RC v R; R v RC [2020] NSWCCA 76 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; [1990] HCA 56 Skelton v R [2015] NSWCCA 320 Weir v Regina [2011] NSWCCA 123

The applicant was sentenced on the basis of agreed facts. They were summarised by the sentencing judge in the Reasons for Sentence to the following effect.
The applicant was born in 1975 and was raised in a loving home. Whilst she experienced problems during her childhood, including abuse, she received full parental support and continues to receive such support. She married in 2002 and had four children, the youngest of whom was a son (the victim) born in 2013. The offending occurred in 2020 when the victim was six years old.
The applicant’s marriage had a number of ups and downs. At the end of 2016 she and her husband agreed to have “an open relationship”. During that time, she met “John”. The applicant and John met in person several times and communicated via social media.
In April or May 2020, whilst alone with her (then) husband at their home in rural New South Wales, the applicant said, “I have done something wrong … I made a video for John where I sucked [the victim]”. The applicant’s husband said “Why did you do that?” She replied that John had asked her to do that. Her husband then said, “It better not happen again”.
A few days later the applicant told a female friend, “I’ve done something stupid. I sucked [the victim]. I did it for John because John asked me to do it”.
The applicant and her husband separated in 2022 and she moved with her two youngest children (including the victim) to the Illawarra region. During the July 2023 school holidays those children visited the town in rural New South Wales where they used to live. While he was there, the victim spoke to the applicant’s female friend. He told her, “Something yucky happened but I don’t want to talk about it”. The friend replied, “That’s fine, we don’t have to talk about it. You can talk to dad”. She thought that the victim was referring to what she had been told happened in 2020. The victim’s sibling also told her, “I know about it”. The female friend then raised what was said with the victim’s father. Shortly after, the matter was reported to the police.
The police spoke to the victim on 5 September 2023 and he was asked: “If somebody told me that mum did something with your private part, what can you tell me about that?” The victim replied, “Oh, that. So, there was a third person that she was talking to, and he told her to do it. And I really wish that it never happened. I really wish I didn’t have to say it”. The victim then became visibly upset. He did not want to tell police what had happened, however, he wrote on a piece of paper: “She sucked my private part” (emphasis added). It is clear from police enquiries that he meant his penis.
The victim’s sibling had found some related material on their mother’s phone and told police she had some memory of seeing messages.
Police had come into the possession of the applicant’s phone because of an unrelated enquiry on 5 September 2021. In September 2023, police conducted a Cellebrite download of the phone and following the victim’s disclosures, that download was reviewed. The phone contained a video file created at 12:36am on 5 March 2020 with GPS data indicating that it was made at the family home in rural New South Wales. The file is a video that depicts the applicant, whose face can be seen, performing fellatio on a pre-pubescent boy. The video runs for 13 seconds.
The applicant was arrested on 5 September 2023 and was cautioned. She stated, “I don’t understand, I have done nothing wrong”. She spent two days in custody before being released on conditional bail.

The Reasons were revised following the delivery of an ex tempore judgment.
The sentencing judge set out the offence, the matters on the Form 1, the maximum penalties as well as the relevant sentencing principles relating to maximum penalties and offences to be taken into account on a Form 1. His Honour noted that all relevant factors must be synthesised, and that in determining the sentence for the primary offence, motive was relevant to the assessment of objective seriousness. His Honour stated: “The offence for sentence was committed so that the video could be taken”. His Honour further noted that care needed to be taken not to double count matters, and that the primary offence’s objective seriousness was related to and impinged upon the commission of the Form 1 “use child” offence. His Honour stated that it was impossible to parse that offence from the primary offence as its facts were intrinsic to his consideration, and in order to avoid double counting, the increase for the Form 1 offending would be “modest”.
As to the other Form 1 offence, the sentencing judge noted that the video was kept until 2021, and both the length of possession and the availability of it to others for that period warranted some increase in the sentence for the primary offence. His Honour also noted that the phone was able to be accessed by a child, although there was no evidence the child saw the video recording. However, there was a strong inference from the agreed facts that John had viewed it.
The sentencing judge discounted the sentence by 25% for the early plea of guilty reflecting the utilitarian value of the plea. His Honour also noted the further significance of the plea, being that because there was no trial the child was not subject to further investigation and was saved from additional stressors.
Under the heading “Objective Seriousness”, the sentencing judge accepted that the offending was so serious that a custodial sentence “of some length” was required. His Honour stated that the starting point of determining the objective seriousness of the offence was the strictly enforced principle that there is an absolute prohibition on any sexual activity with a child, intended to protect children from the physical and psychological harm taken to be caused by premature sexual activity. Noting that some of the matters were also aggravating features referred to in s 21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), his Honour had regard to: the character of the sexual assault, being the act of fellatio; the degree of physical contact inherent in it; that it lasted at least 13 seconds; the motivation; there would have had to have been some limited planning to allow the recording to be made; the offence occurred at the victim’s home where he was entitled to feel safe and protected; the age differential between the applicant and the victim; the age of the victim, being six years old, which was in the middle of the age range encompassed in the offence (from a newborn baby through to ten) and generally the younger the child, the more serious the offence; and finally, and most importantly, the gross breach of trust inherent in the offence, given the relationship of mother and son, a child being particularly vulnerable in the hands of their mother, who is a person to whom he looked for care and protection, not abuse.
The sentencing judge assessed the offending as “grave” and as falling below the notional mid-range, noting that the offence carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. In making the assessment, his Honour noted the following common aggravating features were absent: it was a single offence rather than a pattern of offending; it was clearly a “one off” and the applicant voluntarily desisted from further offending; it did not appear to have gone on for a long period of time; the offence was committed without accompanying threats or intimidating behaviour; and there was no evidence of any coercion or threat made to prevent the victim from disclosing the behaviour.
The next heading was “Victim impact”. The sentencing judge noted that the victim’s disclosure was traumatic, and that it led to the separation of the victim from his mother.
Under the heading “Other factors”, it was noted the applicant had no criminal history and there was nothing to suggest that the absence of such a record enabled the offending. It appeared to be a “one-off” offence and past behaviour was a good indication of future behaviour.
Under the heading “Case for the offender”, the applicant’s letter and her evidence to the Court was noted, including that she said she took full responsibility for what she did. Whilst she said she would live with the deep pain and regret of what she did to her son for the rest of her life, she had trouble articulating why she did what she did and whether she understood the harm she had caused. The sentencing judge, however, accepted that the applicant appeared to understand the gravity of her actions and its impact, but struggled to articulate it.
The sentencing judge received references from people who knew the applicant and reports from a forensic psychologist, Dr Fritchley, and from treating psychologist, Dr Sidhu. There was also a report from a drug and alcohol service attended by the applicant.
The sentencing judge noted that her family were still supportive, although struggled to understand what she had done and why. The applicant reported being sexually abused, as a child, by a family member, about which she had told her parents. She had needed to move schools as a child, and once having done that, she did well. She qualified as a schoolteacher and worked as a primary school teacher. She married and had children and took time off paid work to raise her children and then worked casually as a teacher. She would not be able to work as a teacher again.
The sentencing judge noted she had suffered from post-natal depression and anxiety when she was living in rural New South Wales, for which she had sought treatment. Her marriage had difficulties at times, and she sometimes drank too much. That behaviour corresponded with experiencing symptoms of depression. His Honour set out that she told the report writers of what she called her “open relationship” and her depression. She had also fallen victim to online scammers. It was noted that there was still some controversy in the history given she made limited disclosure about the history of her relationship with John.
Since her arrest, there had been significant changes, including re-engaging with her church, seeing a drug and alcohol service, and commencing regular counselling with Dr Sidhu.
The sentencing judge noted that Dr Fritchley diagnosed the applicant with Major Depressive Disorder and noted that if the applicant received treatment there was a positive prognosis and she was at a low risk of reoffending. There were many protective factors in her past and she had future support available. It was noted that Dr Fritchley stated that the applicant “is a woman of sound intelligence with reflective capacity” and some “insight”.
The sentencing judge set out paragraphs [47] and [48] from Dr Fritchley’s report, which included an account by the applicant. The applicant described John as having power over her, and that she was highly focused on pleasing him. She began to depend on his attention as a way to regulate her own emotions. At the time of the offences, the applicant reported that she was dependent upon alcohol, drinking throughout the day, highly distressed and anxious. She presented as having it all together but inside was spiralling out of control. She also stated that she gained validation and pleasure from providing John with something he would be happy with. The applicant further stated she did not gain any sexual pleasure or gratification from her offending behaviour but felt disgust towards herself and she had attempted to suppress her memory of her offending behaviour.
Under the heading “Diminished moral culpability” the sentencing judge stated (at [49]-[51]):

The sentencing judge then set out his findings in relation to alcohol use, remorse, good character, the impact of custody, and loss and detriment.
As to alcohol, his Honour noted that at the time of the offending, the applicant was using alcohol to excess “as a maladaptive coping mechanism” for her mental health and relationship problems. That could not mitigate or excuse her offending, albeit it helped the sentencing judge to understand that at the relevant time her capacity to exercise sound judgement was reduced. His Honour noted that she admitted that she had done the wrong thing to her husband and her friend, and whilst she did not disclose the offending to law enforcement authorities, she allowed them to keep and test her phone which contained evidence of the offence.
The sentencing judge found there was powerful evidence of genuine remorse and also noted that the wrongness of her actions was confessed voluntarily to family members, within months, which led to disclosure to police. She entered a guilty plea in the Local Court and accepted responsibility in her evidence in the sentence proceedings. His Honour gave full weight to remorse.
The applicant’s remorse went to her positive prospects for rehabilitation and the unlikelihood of further offending.
His Honour found that her prior good character should be given full weight.
The sentencing judge also noted that custody would be difficult for the applicant and would impede her progress with her psychologist. He noted the lack of the availability in custody of specific treatment for women convicted of offending of a sexual nature.
As to “loss and detriment”, his Honour found that was extreme here, “even well if [sic] deserved”. The applicant was aware her younger children were suffering from the loss of their mother, which was a direct result of the offence. His Honour stated he would take into account her loss and detriment.
The sentencing judge determined there should be a significant finding of special circumstances, albeit qualified by the necessity for the minimum period to properly reflect the gravity of the offending. The ratio was altered substantially to 50%.
Under the heading “Synthesis”, the sentencing judge noted the conflicting purposes of punishment. His Honour also noted the need here for a sentence to deter others, to vindicate the dignity of the victim, and express the community’s disapproval. There was no need here to protect the community from the applicant, as it was unlikely she would offend again and she had stopped offending of her own volition. His Honour stated that the applicant’s “moral culpability was impaired by depression but there is no hint of any sexual deviant interests” and that she had been in treatment, which would continue after her release.
Although a short incident in an otherwise blameless life, his Honour noted the offending had potentially devastating impacts on her son. The victim “was as vulnerable as is possible to be. It was done with full awareness of the child for a base motive – to impress a lover”.
Finally, after setting out the sentence, the sentencing judge noted that the applicant would be classified as a High Risk Sex Offender.

In making that finding, the applicant submitted that the sentencing judge was relying upon paragraphs [5]-[7] of the agreed facts, which included the admission to her then husband (sometime between April and May 2020) that “I have done something wrong”, and the admission to her friend (a few days after that) that “I’ve done something stupid”. It is contended that the sentencing judge misconstrued what the applicant had said in that regard.
The applicant accepted the Crown’s contention that Ground 1(a) was really a complaint about a finding of fact. The applicant submitted that there was an absence of evidence as to how her mind was operating at the time of the offence, and the only evidence was of her state of mind one to three months afterwards.
The applicant’s argument is not persuasive. The highest it can be put is that there was no direct evidence as to the applicant’s state of mind at the time of the offending. However, making an assessment as to someone’s state of mind at the time of an act almost always involves the drawing of inferences from primary facts: Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; [1990] HCA 56; Kural v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 502 at 505; [1987] HCA 16.
In my view, it was reasonably open to the trial judge to draw the inference at [51] that the applicant was fully cognisant at the time of the offence that what she was doing was wrong (House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40*; Hancock v R* [2025] NSWCCA 213 at [73]). The applicant admitted clearly and unequivocally within a few weeks of the offence to her then husband that what she had done was “wrong” and “stupid”, and there was nothing to suggest that the applicant’s understanding of the wrongfulness of her actions may have changed in the short time between the offence and her admissions. It is also notable that in the applicant’s written submissions before the sentencing judge, the timing of the confession was referred to as “immediate” and “contemporaneous” and was called on in aid of the submission that the swift admission supported the making of a favourable finding of remorse. Further, in oral submissions to the sentencing judge, the applicant’s counsel described the confession as having taken place “almost immediately”.
Further, there was no evidence of any intellectual impairment. The applicant had trained as a teacher and had completed tertiary qualifications in education. As noted, she was described as “a woman of sound intelligence with reflective capacity” and some “insight” by Dr Fritchley. Dr Fritchley also opined that the applicant’s orientation at the time appeared to have centred upon “not losing John”. Dr Fritchley recorded that although the applicant reflected that she had disagreed with John, she was more oriented towards pleasing John and not losing him.
I also note that sexual activity with a child is readily recognised by an overwhelming majority of people in our society as self-evidently wrong. I agree therefore with the respondent’s submission that “the act itself, being unequivocally an act of sexual intercourse committed by the applicant upon her young son, is of such a nature that the applicant cannot have been unaware of its wrongful and abhorrent nature”. Further, the evidence before the sentencing judge, referred to above, provides a clear basis for drawing the inference that the applicant was well aware, at the time, that engaging in sexual activity with children was wrong, was something she disagreed with and was disturbed by, yet acquiesced to due to her fear of losing John.
The sentencing judge did not “misconstrue” the applicant’s evidence. The finding of the sentencing judge was well open to him.

The applicant contended that not only was the applicant not questioned during the course of giving evidence before the sentencing judge about whether she knew that what she was doing at the time of the offending was wrong, but that no submissions were made during the sentence proceedings about this issue by either party. It was submitted that there was a denial of procedural fairness because the sentencing judge did not give the applicant an opportunity to dissuade the sentencing judge that the applicant’s moral culpability should be reduced to a lesser degree than otherwise because of what the applicant told her then husband one to three months after the offence.
Both parties relied on Weir v R**egina [2011] NSWCCA 123 at [64]-[67], where it was stated that the key to determining whether there had been a breach of procedural fairness in a sentencing appeal was whether any unfairness had resulted. It is accepted that a common basis of demonstrating practical injustice and unfairness is where a person has lost the opportunity to make submissions to the decision maker in opposition to a proposed course.
Again, I find the applicant’s argument unpersuasive. One problem for the applicant is that it was never part of the applicant’s case at sentence that she was not fully aware of the wrongfulness of the actions at the time, and there was positive evidence (as set out above at [49]-[50]) that she was so aware.
Further, the Crown submitted in writing before the sentencing judge that “[t]he offending involved a conscious and deliberate act which was done in the absence of her partner” (emphasis added) and that it was “difficult to comprehend how a person of ‘sound intelligence and reflective capacity’ chose to engage in sexual acts with her youngest child which she recorded and shared” (emphasis added).
In the context of this material, it is fair to assume that it was a forensic decision by the applicant’s counsel not to address on the issue.
Given the considerations set out above, no procedural unfairness has been established.

Apart from the finding in relation to moral culpability, the applicant does not otherwise cavil with the findings of the sentencing judge.
In arguing the sentence is manifestly excessive, the applicant pointed to the following matters:
The admissions made to the applicant’s then husband and to her friend (which led to her arrest), being an indication of early contrition and remorse;
The applicant’s surrender of her phone (in relation to an unrelated matter) which contained inculpatory material, well before she was suspected by the police as being involved in the offence;
The applicant’s early plea of guilty, again indicating contrition and remorse, and also relevant to her prospects of rehabilitation;
The applicant’s age and absence of criminal history, indicating that she is of good character;
The applicant’s reduced moral culpability was such that less emphasis should be placed on general and specific deterrence;
The applicant’s mental conditions are also relevant to her conditions of custody, noting that treatment programs are not available to her in custody;
The applicant does not cavil with the sentencing judge’s findings of objective seriousness as “below some notional mid-range”, noting that implicit in this finding is that the offence was an isolated, one-off offence of short duration without accompanying threats or intimidating behaviour;
The applicant has no deviant sexual interests in children and she received no sexual gratification;
The applicant had a difficult early life, having been sexually abused at a young age and a history of problems with emotional regulation;
The applicant has demonstrated contrition and remorse;
The applicant is likely to be receptive to treatment for her mental health problems in the future;
The applicant has good prospects of rehabilitation and is unlikely to ever reoffend; and
The applicant has been separated from her children since being charged and has been suffering from this separation.
The applicant then drew to this Court’s attention some other decisions contended to show this sentence was manifestly excessive.
The decisions relied upon by the applicant included the following, the first three of which involved, as here, a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.
In EG v R [2015] NSWCCA 21, the applicant was the grandfather (aged approximately 65 at the time of the offending) of the two-year-old victim, who he licked once on the outside of the vagina whilst changing her nappy. He pleaded guilty, had no criminal history and was suffering from the effects of a stroke and cerebrovascular disease where his judgment and inhibition were affected. His conditions in custody were more onerous due to his age, and his physical and mental health. This Court reduced his sentenced to 2 years with a non-parole period of 12 months.
In R v JP [2015] NSWCCA 267, the respondent to a Crown appeal performed cunnilingus on her 6-week-old baby, recorded the act and disseminated the images to a male co-offender. The respondent had pleaded guilty and was originally sentenced to 1 year and 9 months imprisonment, with the sentence suspended. The respondent had served 3 months in custody prior to sentence. The acts were brief, involved no sexual gratification, and were committed under pressure from the male co-offender. The respondent suffered from epilepsy, had an intellectual disability, was vulnerable and isolated and suffered from anxiety and depression. Two of the three appeal judges found the sentence to be manifestly inadequate, but the Court exercised the residual discretion not to intervene.
In RC v R; R v RC [2020] NSWCCA 76, RC was 74 years old when he digitally penetrated his almost six-year-old grandson while the victim was having a bath. The victim suffered pain. The offending was spontaneous, fleeting and isolated, and there was no evidence to establish sexual gratification. The offending involved a breach of trust and the child was under RC’s authority. RC had pleaded not guilty. This Court found the original sentence of an 18-month community correction order to be manifestly inadequate and considered that a sentence of 3 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 months was appropriate. The Court, however, exercised its residual discretion not to intervene.
The two further sentences relied upon by the applicant both involved maximum penalties of 25 years imprisonment, rather than life imprisonment. The first was R v ND [2016] NSWCCA 103, a Crown appeal against sentence. ND (who had pleaded not guilty and had one prior conviction for unrelated offending) was resentenced by this Court to a head sentence of 6 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years for a one-off offence by the five-year-old female victim’s uncle of digital penetration which caused pain. The second was AT v R [2020] NSWCCA 178. AT (who had a criminal history of unrelated offending) was convicted after trial and sentenced in the District Court to a head sentence of 8 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years for digitally penetrating the 19-month-old female victim causing redness, abrasions and bleeding. AT was the victim’s mother’s then partner. On appeal, AT was resentenced by this Court to a term of imprisonment of 6 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months.

In my view, none of the comparative sentences pointed to by the applicant provide any assistance in establishing that the applicant’s sentence is manifestly excessive. It can be noted that not only is the sample very small, three of the five involved Crown appeals against the original sentence, and two a different maximum penalty. The combined effect of them do not indicate that the sentence imposed on the applicant was outside the permissible range. A further sentence pointed to by the Crown of PS v R [2015] NSWCCA 20 further supports this conclusion. In PS (which involved a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment), the Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against a sentence of 6 years and 6 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years 6 months. PS was the uncle of the six-year-old victim on whom he performed cunnilingus. He confessed to the child’s mother and pleaded guilty. He had intellectual and cognitive disabilities and long-standing substance abuse issues. He was also intoxicated at the time of the offence.
In my view, the applicant has failed to establish that her sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust. This case involves the most serious and extreme abuse of power and breach of trust by a mother against her six-year-old son in his home. The victim was entitled to be safe and protected. As the sentencing judge stated, a child is particularly vulnerable in the hands of their mother, who is a person to whom a child looks for care and protection, not abuse. Instead, she performed fellatio on him for at least 13 seconds and recorded herself doing so. He was fully aware of the conduct and described it as “yucky” and he “really wished it never happened”. The offence attracts a maximum penalty of life imprisonment with a standard non-parole period of 15 years. The sentence imposed by the sentencing judge appropriately reflected the grave nature of the offending whilst balancing the subjective circumstances of the applicant. The sentencing judge also made a favourable finding of special circumstances and varied the statutory ratio from 75% (4 years and 6 months) to 50% (3 years).
In my view, in light of the maximum penalty, the standard non-parole period, the number of offences (the primary charge as well as charges on the Form 1), the objective seriousness of the offending, and the importance of general deterrence and denunciation, the sentence imposed on the applicant was well within the discretion of the sentencing judge.
This ground of appeal is not made out.

Simons (a pseudonym) v R

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment

HEADNOTE

JUDGMENT

Factual background

Reasons for Sentence

Grounds of appeal

GROUND 1 - The sentencing judge erred in the assessment of moral culpability by:

(a) Misconstruing what the applicant had said to the persons [her then husband] and [her friend] in relation to the wrongfulness of her actions concerning her state of mind at the time of the offence.

(b) Denying the applicant procedural fairness in relation to the finding concerning the wrongfulness of her actions.

(c) Not considering the applicant’s capacity to reason and her ability to control her conduct.

Submissions in relation to Ground 1

1(a) The sentencing judge misconstrued the wrongfulness of the applicant’s actions at the time of the offence

1(b) Denial of procedural fairness in relation to the finding concerning the wrongfulness of the applicant’s actions

(1)(c) Failure to consider the applicant’s capacity to reason and her ability to control her conduct

GROUND 2 - The sentence is manifestly excessive.

Consideration of Ground 2

Conclusion

Parties

Legislation Cited (2)

Cases Cited (33)