Sica v Crime and Corruption Commission [2025] QSC 118

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE - COSTS - where the applicant made an application to review the decision of the Crime and Corruption Commission to not investigate a complaint about police conduct - where the applicant withdrew the application by consent save for the question of costs - where the applicant brought an application under s 49 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 for an order that the parties each bear their own costs of the applications - where the Crime and Corruption Commission oppose the second application and seek that the applicant pay its costs of the applications - where the applicant is impecunious and submits that the original application was in the public interest - whether the parties should bear their own costs

Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld), s 15, s 46, s 49

Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s 1, s 672A, s 671AC

Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 4, s 20, s 48, s 49

Alliance to Save Hinchinbrook Inc v Cook [2005] QSC 355, cited

Anghel v Minister for Transport (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 454; [1994] QCA 232, followed

Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493; [1980] HCA 53, cited

Boe v Criminal Justice Commission (1993) 1 QAR 167; [1993] QSC 186, cited

Burragubba v Minister for Natural Resources and Mines (No 2) [2017] QSC 265, followed

Foster v Shaddock & Ors [2016] QCA 163, followed

Goodchild v Legal Services Commissioner [2018] 1 Qd R 454; [2017] QSC 117, cited

Gould v R [2023] NSWCCA 103, cited

Grierson v R (1938) 60 CLR 431; [1938] HCA 45, cited

Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99; [2005] HCA 7, followed

Hastwell v Legal Services Commissioner [2020] NSWSC 1008, cited

Holzinger v Attorney-General (2020) 5 QR 314; [2020] QCA 165, cited

Leadpoint Pty Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner [2015] QSC 254, cited

Lonergan v Stilgoe & Ors (No 2) [2020] QSC 146, cited

Meizer v Chief Executive, Dept of Corrective Services & Anor [2005] QSC 351, cited

Murphy v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] QSC 174, cited

Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (1981) 149 CLR 27; [1981] HCA 50, cited

Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; [1998] HCA 11, cited

R v Katsidis ex parte Attorney-General (Queensland) [2005] QCA 229, cited

R v Nudd [2007] QCA 40, cited

R v Sica [2014] 2 Qd R 168; [2013] QCA 247, related

R v Stafford [2009] QCA 407, cited

R v Upson [2013] QCA 76, cited

Sharples v Council of the Queensland Law Society [2000] QSC 392, cited

Walles v Victorian Legal Services Commissioner [2022] VSC 435, cited

A D Scott KC and K A McGree briefed directly by the Crime and Corruption Commission

• [1] Massimo Sica made a complaint to the Crime and Corruption Commission concerning the conduct of police. He sought judicial review of the Commission's decision to take no action upon his complaint. Ultimately, that application was discontinued.
• [2] The only remaining question is that of costs. The Commission applies for its costs. Mr Sica resists that order and seeks relief pursuant to s 49 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld).

• [3] In April 2003, three siblings aged between 12 and 24 were found deceased in their home at Bridgeman Downs.[1] On 3 July 2012, Mr Sica was convicted of their murder after a lengthy trial. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. He unsuccessfully appealed those convictions[2] and has always maintained his innocence.
• [4] Until amendments to the Code came into force on 1 September 2024,[3] second or subsequent appeals were not available,[4] although there were exceptions and qualifications to that rule, as explained by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Gould v R.[5] Generally though, a convicted person's only remedy once their appeal was dismissed was to seek a favourable exercise of the prerogative power of pardon, which is expressly preserved by s 672A of the Code. That requires a convicted person to petition the Governor of Queensland. In practice, the Governor relies on the advice of the Attorney-General in exercising the prerogative power.
• [5] Section 672A provides a mechanism whereby the Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions[6] may refer a petition for pardon to the Court of Appeal.[7] The Court of Appeal considers the matter as if it was an appeal against conviction.[8] A decision not to refer a petition for pardon to the Court of Appeal is not a "decision of an administrative character made under an enactment",[9] and is not a judicially reviewable decision.[10]
• [6] The September 2024 amendments to the Code[11] introduced a regime whereby a convicted person who had failed on appeal can mount a second or subsequent appeal if they can identify "fresh and compelling evidence or new and compelling evidence".[12]
• [7] In late 2018, Mr Sica retained a solicitor, Mr Johnson, to assist him in seeking a pardon, which at that stage was his only avenue to challenge his convictions.
• [8] On 28 March 2023, Mr Sica made an oral complaint to the Commission, and that complaint was later supplemented by the provision to the Commission of correspondence and supporting materials. The essence of Mr Sica's complaint was that police officers investigating the murders planted evidence, investigated selectively rather than exhaustively, and were in possession of exculpatory evidence which they did not disclose. It was also alleged that the prosecutor at trial did not call relevant exculpatory evidence.

(a) said that the allegations, if true, would establish "corrupt conduct" as defined by s 15 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001; but

(b) considered that after a review of the material supplied there was "insufficient evidence to raise a reasonable suspicion that corrupt conduct has occurred"; and

(c) gave reasons for that conclusion.

• [11] On 23 February 2024, Mr Sica sought internal review of the decision of the Commission. On 6 September 2024, Kathryn McMillan KC, Deputy Chairperson of the Commission, affirmed the decision of the Commission to take no action on Mr Sica's complaint. In the meantime, and as I have already observed, the 2024 amendments to the Code came into force. That occurred on 1 September 2024.
• [12] On 2 October 2024, Mr Sica filed his application for a statutory order of review seeking judicial review of the Commission's decision. The application sought review of the "decision" described as follows:

"Application to review the decision of the Respondent that, in relation to the Applicant's complaints, that there was not sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable suspicion that members of the Queensland Police Service (QPS) engaged in corrupt conduct, and that taking any action with respect to the allegations constituting the complaints would not be a justifiable use of resources."[13]

• [13] Various grounds of reviewable error were identified in the application and Mr Sica then claimed, by way of relief:

"1. An order that the matter be referred back to the Respondent to be dealt with according to law.

• [14] There are obvious problems with Mr Sica's application for judicial review. The application purports to identify why he is allegedly "aggrieved by the decision": [14]

"The applicant is aggrieved by the decision because -

1. As foreshadowed by s 20 (2)(a) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 a breach of the rules of natural justice happened in relation to the making of the decision;
2. As foreshadowed by s 20 (2)(b) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 the procedures that were required by law to be observed in relation to the making of the decision were not observed;
3. In deciding that there was not sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable suspicion that members of the QPS engaged in corrupt conduct and that taking any action with respect to the allegations constituting the complaints would not be a justifiable use of resources the Respondent has improperly exercised the powers conferred by the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (the CCC Act).
4. In arriving at the decision the Respondent has:

(a) based that decision on matters that were irrelevant to the review of the complaints and the evidence upon which those complaints were based;

(b) failed to follow proper decision making procedures in arriving at the decision;

(c) failed to conduct the review independently;

(d) failed to take into account significant evidence of documented corruption provided in support of the complaints against members of the QPS

(e) failed to take into account relevant matters that supported a finding that members of the QPS had engaged in corrupt conduct requiring the exercise of investigative powers provided for in the CCC Act

1. The Respondent has particulars of the matters raised in paragraph 4 of this Application in the the documents and correspondence provided with the complaints and in the episodes of the podcast "Loose Ends- The Singh Family Tragedy" identified as being relevant to the allegations of corruption against members of the QPS in correspondence between the Applicant and the Respondent. The documentary evidence is identified in the affidavit of Jeffrey Douglas Johnson filed in support of this application."[15]

• [15] Nothing in the application identifies a right of Mr Sica's which has been affected by the determination of the Commission to not to pursue an investigation of his complaint. The determination of the Commission did not affect Mr Sica's right to pursue his petition for pardon and did not affect his right to seek a second appeal. At best for Mr Sica, the determination of the Commission to not conduct an investigation potentially denied him the possibility that the investigation might reveal "fresh and compelling evidence" or "new and compelling evidence" upon which to mount a second appeal, or might reveal evidence which might be of assistance in the prosecution of his petition for pardon.
• [16] In response to the application, the Commission flagged an intention to bring an application for summary dismissal of the judicial review application pursuant to s 48 of the Judicial Review Act. The proposed application was based on the fact that no right of Mr Sica's was affected by the decision and which was, therefore, not one which was amenable to judicial review.[16]
• [17] On 15 October 2024, Cooper J made directions for the filing and management of such an application and on 1 November 2024 the application was filed by the Commission.
• [18] Also on 1 November 2024, Mr Sica received notification that the Governor of Queensland had rejected his petition for pardon.
• [19] On 28 January 2025, Mr Sica, in reliance upon the 2024 amendments to the Code, filed an application seeking a second appeal.
• [20] On 24 February 2025, Mr Johnson offered to the Commission to withdraw the judicial review application on the basis that each party bear their own costs. That offer was rejected and attempts to settle the issues between the parties failed. The Commission's application to strike out the judicial review application was listed to be heard by the Court on 12 March 2025. However, on 11 March 2025, Kelly J made orders by consent giving Mr Sica leave to discontinue the judicial review application save as to the question of costs. Directions were given for the exchange of material on the question of costs.

"That pursuant to s 49(1)(e) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 that the parties to the review application bear only that party's own costs of the proceeding, regardless of the outcome of the proceeding."

• [22] In its application brought for the summary dismissal of the judicial review application, the Commission sought an order that Mr Sica pay the costs of the proceedings. That claim for relief is pressed.
• [23] Therefore, presently before me is one application brought by Mr Sica for orders under s 49 of the Judicial Review Act relieving him of any liability for costs, and the Commission's application that Mr Sica pay the costs.

• [24] In civil proceedings the starting point is that costs follow the event.[18] That position is modified by s 49 of the Judicial Review Act which provides:

(1) If an application (the costs application) is made to the court by a person (the relevant applicant) who -

(a) has made a review application; or

(b) has been made a party to a review application under section 28; or

(c) is otherwise a party to a review application and is not the person whose decision, conduct, or failure to make a decision or perform a duty according to law, is the subject of the application;

(d) that another party to the review application indemnify the relevant applicant in relation to the costs properly incurred in the review application by the relevant applicant, on a party and party basis, from the time the costs application was made; or

(e) that a party to the review application is to bear only that party's own costs of the proceeding, regardless of the outcome of the proceeding.

(2) In considering the costs application, the court is to have regard to -

(a) the financial resources of -

(i) the relevant applicant; or

(ii) any person associated with the relevant applicant who has an interest in the outcome of the proceeding; and

(b) whether the proceeding involves an issue that affects, or may affect, the public interest, in addition to any personal right or interest of the relevant applicant; and

(c) if the relevant applicant is a person mentioned in subsection (1)(a) - whether the proceeding discloses a reasonable basis for the review application; and

(d) if the relevant applicant is a person mentioned in subsection (1)(b) or (c) - whether the case in the review application of the relevant applicant can be supported on a reasonable basis.

(3) The court may, at any time, of its own motion or on the application of a party, having regard to -

(a) any conduct of the relevant applicant (including, if the relevant applicant is the applicant in the review application, any failure to prosecute the proceeding with due diligence); or

(b) any significant change affecting the matters mentioned in subsection (2);

revoke or vary, or suspend the operation of, an order made by it under this section.

(4) Subject to this section, the rules of court made in relation to the awarding of costs apply to a proceeding arising out of a review application.

(5) An appeal may be brought from an order under this section only with the leave of the Court of Appeal.

(a) an application for a statutory order of review under section 20, 21 or 22; or

(b) an application for review under section 43; or

(c) an appeal to the Court of Appeal in relation to an order made by the court on an application mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b)."

• [25] It can be seen that, by s 49(4) of the Judicial Review Act, the costs rules in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 continue to apply, but subject to s 49. There is no doubt that a costs order made under s 49 may operate prospectively, that is, to costs not yet to be incurred. The order may, though, operate in relation to costs already incurred[19] and may be made after the application for judicial review has been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.[20]
• [26] Bond J (as his Honour then was) in Burragubba v Minister for Natural Resources and Mines (No 2)[21] made the following observations about s 49:

(a) if s 49 is engaged, then it is s 49 which governs the Court's discretion as to costs;[22]

(b) section 49, by s 49(4), admits of the operation of the ordinary rules regarding costs under the UCPR. Those rules continue to apply subject to s 49;[23]

(c) if s 49 is engaged, then the considerations prescribed in s 49(2) are mandatory;[24]

(d) the considerations prescribed by s 49(2) do not constitute an exhaustive list;[25] and

(e) the manner of disposition of the review application is a relevant consideration.[26]

• [27] I agree with his Honour's summary, in particular that a relevant consideration to the exercise of discretion under s 49 will often be the manner of disposition of the review application. His Honour's conclusion is, in my view, inevitable given that ss 49(2)(c) and (d) together require the Court, when hearing a costs application under s 49, to have regard to the strength of the review application. The strength of the application and its ultimate fate reflect upon the reasonableness of bringing the application which in itself must be a relevant consideration.

• [28] Mr Sica does not seek an order that his costs be paid. He seeks an order that each party bear their own costs.[27] Mr Sica relies upon s 49(2)(a) and asserts that he is impecunious. The unchallenged evidence is:

(a) Mr Sica has no capacity to pay a costs order;

(b) he is unlikely to acquire a capacity to pay a costs order;

(c) his own lawyers are acting pro bono; and

(d) the Commission will never recover the costs.

• [29] It is submitted that as Mr Sica has no capacity to pay a costs order, such an order will have a punitive effect.
• [30] I accept that Mr Sica is impecunious, has no capacity to pay a costs order, and that the Commission will not recover any costs ordered to be paid by him. By force of s 49(2)(a) of the Judicial Review Act, those considerations are relevant and favour Mr Sica.
• [31] I do not accept that the costs order will have a "punitive effect". They will have no practical financial effect upon Mr Sica because he cannot pay them.
• [32] Mr Sica relies upon s 49(2)(b) and submits that the review application rose for consideration an issue that had never been the subject of judicial determination, namely the proper construction of s 46(2)(g) of the Crime and Corruption Act, being the section under which the decision complained of by Mr Sica was made.
• [33] That section empowers the Commission to determine to take no action upon a complaint, if satisfied that the complaint lacks substance or credibility, or if dealing with the complaint would be an unjustifiable use of resources. It has not previously been determined whether a decision of the Commission made under s 46(2)(g) of the Crime and Corruption Act is a "decision made under an enactment" and is amenable to judicial review.[28]
• [34] Mr Sica also submits that the review proceeding disclosed a reasonable basis for relief. He submits that the Commission never asserted that the application was frivolous or vexatious, but rather that the decision made under of the was not a decision made under an enactment, and therefore was not amenable to judicial review. That, Mr Sica submits, concerns a question of the proper construction of the which dovetails into his arguments relying upon (the public interest consideration).

• [37] It is accepted that Mr Sica is impecunious and that is a consideration in favour of making an order that both parties bear their own costs.
• [38] Section 49 has been present in the Judicial Review Act since its enactment. There are no illuminating comments in the Explanatory Notes to the Judicial Review Bill 1991 which shed light on the concept of "public interest" in s 49(2)(b). However, the purpose of s 49(2)(b) is, in my view, clear.
• [39] Often challenges to decisions made by the executive raise issues beyond those between the parties to the legislation. Examples can be seen in some of the cases relevant to standing.
• [40] In Boe v Criminal Justice Commission,[30] a solicitor challenged the decision of the Commission[31] to refuse to investigate the level of funding for the Legal Aid Office. While the solicitor himself would benefit from increased availability of legal aid, broader questions of the interests of criminal justice were explored.
• [41] In Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth,[32] what was sought (unsuccessfully) to be raised were issues concerning the environmental impact of a development upon a region in Central Queensland.
• [42] In Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd,[33] various issues were ventilated concerning Aboriginal rights and claims to tribal relics.
• [43] Public interest issues are not restricted to those broad, publicly important subject matters. Meizer v Chief Executive, Department of Corrective Services[34] is a case closer factually to the present. There, the applicant was a prisoner who had the benefit of being allowed to work on a particular project. He was suspended from the program and sought to judicially review that decision.
• [44] The application was summarily dismissed, pursuant to s 48 of the , on the basis that the decision to suspend the program was not a decision "made under an enactment". Douglas J applied the then recent decision of the High Court in and held that as there was no provision in the authorising the decision, it was not "one made under an enactment".

"These applications were treated as being of some general importance, likely to affect many applications that might be made by prisoners. The matter was adjourned to enable the applicant to be represented properly. The applicant is a long-term prisoner with extremely limited financial resources. This appears to be one of the first occasions that this Court has been requested to consider the effect of the decision in Griffith University v Tang on the ability of prisoners to seek judicial review of decisions of the Department of Corrective Services. It seems appropriate to me, therefore, to order, pursuant to s 49 of the Judicial Review Act, that the respondent indemnify the applicant in relation to his costs properly incurred in the review application in respect of the respondent's application pursuant to s 48 of the Judicial Review Act."[37]

• [46] In Lonergan v Stilgoe & Ors (No 2),[38] Applegarth J dismissed an application for judicial review brought by landowners who were aggrieved by a decision of the Land Court to recommend to the Minister that a mining lease be granted over their land.[39] The unsuccessful landowners resisted a costs order on the basis that the public interest had been advanced by the application. In rejecting that submission, his Honour observed:

"[12] I am not persuaded that these matters place this application for judicial review as one which affects the public interest to any greater extent than most applications for judicial review which, in one way or another, scrutinise governmental action and seek to ensure the proper administration of the laws of the State.

[13] Moreover, this was not "public interest litigation" as that term is sometimes used. Principally, it was litigation in defence of the applicants' property and business interests because they objected to the proposed granting of a mining lease over their property. Their objections were subject to independent consideration by the Land Court. Not satisfied with the Land Court's decision, they pursued an application for judicial review in proceedings in the Supreme Court because the relevant legislation does not allow for an appeal process. However, none of this means that the litigation was in the nature of "public interest" litigation.

[14] The interpretation of the relevant legislation may affect the public interest. However, that may be said in any case involving an issue of statutory interpretation." [40] (footnotes omitted)

• [47] As already observed, the review application filed by Mr Sica sought to review the decision made by the Commission under s 46 of the Crime and Corruption Act to take no action on his complaint. Section 46 is contained in Chapter 2, Part 3 of the Act entitled "Part 3 Corruption". Division 1 defines and regulates the Commission's "corruption functions". Those functions are defined by s 33(1) as being "(a) to raise standards of integrity and conduct in units of public administration; (b) to ensure a complaint about, or information or matter involving, corruption is dealt with in an appropriate way having regard to the principles set out in s 34".
• [48] Section 34 then prescribes a series of principles which guide the Commission in performing its corruption functions. The Commission's performance of its corruption functions is regulated by s 35.
• [49] Section 36 gives a right to a person to make a complaint. That section provides, relevantly, here:

(1) A person may make a complaint about corruption to the commission for the purpose of the commission dealing with the complaint under section 35.

(2) Subsection (1) does not limit to whom a person can complain about corruption.

1. A person may complain directly to the commissioner of police about corruption.
2. A person may complain directly to the chief executive of a government department about corruption happening within the department.

• [50] Section 45 casts responsibility for dealing with complaints upon the Commission. It provides:

(1) The commission has primary responsibility for dealing with complaints about, or information or matter involving, corrupt conduct.

(2) The commission is responsible for monitoring how the commissioner of police deals with police misconduct."

(1) The commission deals with a complaint about, or information or matter (also a complaint) involving, corruption by -

(a) expeditiously assessing each complaint about corruption made or notified to it, or otherwise coming to its attention; and

(b) taking the action the commission considers most appropriate in the circumstances having regard to the principles set out in section 34.

(a) deal with each complaint about corrupt conduct that it considers should not be referred to a public official to be dealt with;

(b) refer a complaint about corrupt conduct to a public official to be dealt with by the public official or in cooperation with the commission, subject to the commission's monitoring role;

(c) without limiting paragraph (b), refer a complaint about corrupt conduct of a person holding an appointment in a unit of public administration that may involve criminal activity to the commissioner of police to be dealt with;

(d) if it is a complaint about police misconduct notified to the commission by the commissioner of police - allow the commissioner of police to continue to deal with the complaint, subject to the commission's monitoring role;

(e) if it is a complaint about police misconduct made to the commission by someone other than the commissioner of police - give the complaint to the commissioner of police to be dealt with, subject to the commission's monitoring role;

(f) if a public official asks the commission to deal with a complaint or to deal with a complaint in cooperation with the public official -

(ii) deal with the complaint in cooperation with the public official; or

(iii) advise the public official that the commission considers that it is appropriate that the public official continue to deal with the complaint, subject to the commission's monitoring role;

(D) is made primarily for a mischievous purpose; or

(3) For taking action, or action taken, under subsection (2) for a complaint, the commission may require a public official to provide stated information about the complaint in the way and at the times the commission directs.

(4) A public official must comply with a requirement made under subsection (3).

(5) If a person makes a complaint that is dealt with by the commission, the commission must give the person a response stating -

(a) if no action is taken by the commission on the complaint or action to deal with the complaint is discontinued by the commission - the reason for not taking action or discontinuing the action; or

(b) if action is taken on the complaint by the commission -

(ii) the reason the commission considers the action to be appropriate in the circumstances; and

(iii) any results of the action that are known at the time of the response.

See section 48B in relation to limitations on the commission's findings, recommendations and statements.

(6) However, the commission is not required to give a response -

(i) the person has not given the person's name and address or does not require a response; or

(ii) the commission has given a notice, or is entitled to give a notice, under section 216 to the person in relation to the complaint; or

(b) that discloses information the disclosure of which would be contrary to the public interest.

(7) Nothing in this part limits the commission from providing information about the conduct of a person to a public official for use in the proper performance of the public official's functions."

• [52] There is nothing in the Crime and Corruption Act which empowers the Commission to confer some benefit upon Mr Sica as a result of any investigation that might be undertaken. His only right is to make the complaint[41] and to receive a response from the Commission under s 46(5).
• [53] No authority was cited to me which considered whether a decision to take no action under s 46 was judicially reviewable. While all statutes are unique and must be construed according to their precise terms, generally, applicants for judicial review complaining of a decision to dismiss a complaint have not established that their legal rights have been affected.[42] They have failed on judicial review as the decision is not one "made under an enactment".[43]
• [54] I have not been asked to finally determine whether a decision to dismiss a complaint under s 46 of the Crime and Corruption Act is a reviewable decision so I should not do so. However, I will observe that I cannot readily identify any right of Mr Sica's that was affected by the decision.
• [55] While Mr Sica's impecuniosity is relevant, other features are strongly in favour of the Commission. In particular:

(a) there were, for the reasons I have explained, significant difficulties faced by Mr Sica in establishing that the dismissal of the complaint was "a decision made under an enactment";

(b) the review application itself does not articulate a basis upon which the dismissal of the complaint affected Mr Sica's rights;

(c) the application for review was motivated purely in the interests of Mr Sica in the hope that he could ultimately press for an inquiry by the Commission which would reveal evidence to assist him in his quest to be pardoned;

(d) there was no real public interest in the application; and

(e) Mr Sica chose to vent his complaints about his conviction through another avenue and abandoned the application.

• [56] For those reasons, I dismiss Mr Sica's application for relief under s 49 of the Judicial Review Act. I see no reason why costs should not follow the event. I award costs in favour of the Commission.

• [57] It is ordered that:
  1. The applicant's application for orders under s 49 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 is dismissed.
  2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs of the proceedings including the applicant's application for orders under s 49 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 on the standard basis.

[1] The circumstances are described in R v Sica [2013] QCA 247.

[2] R v Sica [2013] QCA 247.

[3] Criminal Code and Other Legislation (Double Jeopardy Exception and Subsequent Appeals) Amendment Act 2024.

[4] Grierson v R [1938] HCA 45; (1938) 60 CLR 431; R v Upson [2013] QCA 76; and R v Nudd [2007] QCA 40.

[5] Gould v R [2023] NSWCCA 103.

[6] See definition of "Crown Law Officer": Code, s 1.

[7] R v Stafford [2009] QCA 407 is an example of a re-trial being ordered upon referral of a pardon.

[9] Judicial Review Act 1991, s 4; and see generally Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99.

[10] Holzinger v Attorney-General [2020] QCA 165; (2020) 5 QR 314.

[11] Which created Division 3 of Chapter 67.

[12] Code, s 671AC; and as to the distinction between "new" and "fresh" evidence, see R v Katsidis ex parte Attorney-General (Queensland) [2005] QCA 229.

[13] Faithfully reproduced, notwithstanding obvious errors.

[14] A necessary precondition to standing to seek judicial review; Judicial Review Act 1991, s 20(1).

[15] This extract has been faithfully reproduced notwithstanding the appearance of obvious errors.

[16] Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99.

[17] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 304(2).

[18] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 681; and Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72 at [67]- [69].

[19] Anghel v Minister for Transport (No 2) [1994] QCA 232; [1995] 2 Qd R 454 at 461.

[20] Foster v Shaddock & Ors [2016] QCA 163.

[21] [2017] QSC 265.

[22] At [12]; following Anghel v Minister for Transport (No 2) [1994] QCA 232; [1995] 2 Qd R 454.

[25] At [14]; following Sharples v Council of the Queensland Law Society [2000] QSC 392 at [25]- [26]; Alliance to Save Hinchinbrook Inc v Cook [2005] QSC 355 at [4].

[27] Judicial Review Act 1991, s 49(1)(e).

[28] Judicial Review Act 1991, s 4.

[29] Section 49(2)(c).

[30] (1993) 1 QAR 167; decided before Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99.

[31] Then called the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC).

[33] [1981] HCA 50; (1981) 149 CLR 27.

[34] [2005] QSC 351.

[35] [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99.

[36] Predecessor to the Corrective Services Act 2006.

[37] Meizer v Chief Executive, Dept of Corrective Services & Anor [2005] QSC 351 at [14].

[38] [2020] QSC 146.

[39] Mineral Resources Act 1989, s 269(1).

[40] Lonergan v Stilgoe & Ors (No 2) [2020] QSC 146 at [12]- [14].

[41] Section 36.

[42] Walles v Victorian Legal Services Commissioner [2022] VSC 435; Hastwell v Legal Services Commissioner [2020] NSWSC 1008; Leadpoint Pty Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner [2015] QSC 254; Murphy v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] QSC 174; and Goodchild v Legal Services Commissioner [2017] QSC 117; [2018] 1 Qd R 454.

[43] Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99.