Si Care Solutions Pty Ltd and Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner [2026] ARTA 431 (5 March 2026)

Si Care Solutions Pty Ltd and Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner [2026] ARTA 431 (5 March 2026)

Respondent: Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner

AGED CARE - application for approval as a provider of aged care - application refused - decision under review affirmed

Quality of Care Principles 2014 including the Aged Care Quality Standards and other instruments

Si Care Solutions Pty Ltd (the Company) is a private company. Ms Chillura is its sole shareholder and sole director. The Company has traded in recent years as a sub-contractor / partner with other organisations in the aged care field (principal contractors). More specifically, Ms Chillura has established a business in preparing and administering plans and packages for elderly people to receive care in their own homes: 'home care'. The Company's principal contractors have received Commonwealth funding for the provision of those services, including services associated with the creation and administration of the home care packages. The revenue of the Company is from a proportion of the management fees.
In her oral evidence, Ms Chillura explained that she had noticed that some aged care providers in this area had become very large, with many thousands of clients. She felt there was an opportunity for a smaller to medium size business to provide better levels of service to clients. To this end, Ms Chillura developed a plan for the Company to provide home care services directly to clients, rather than only preparing and administering plans and arranging for those services to be provided by the principal contractors.
For the Company to directly receive Commonwealth subsidies for the provision of aged care services, the Company must acquire the status of an "approved provider" under Chapter 3 of the Aged Care Act 1997 (the Aged Care Act). The Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner (the Commissioner) administers the assessment and approval of persons as providers of aged care under the Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission Act 2018 (the Commission Act).
In this regard, the objects of the Aged Care Act include the provision of funding of aged care that takes into account the quality of the care and the type of the care, the need to ensure the accountability of the providers of the care for the funding and the outcomes for recipients, and to promote high quality care, and to protect the health and wellbeing of the recipients of aged care services.[1]
On 10 April 2024 the Company lodged an application to the Commission for approval as a provider of aged care.[2] Following a request for further information on 26 April 2024, and the payment of an assessment fee, the application proceeded to a formal assessment on 6 May 2024. On 31 July 2024, a delegate of the Commissioner decided not to approve the application to become an approved provider.
A statement of reasons[3] indicates that in considering the matters provided for in section 63D(3) of the Commission Act (elaborated upon later), the decision maker was not satisfied that the Company had demonstrated understanding of its responsibilities as a provider of the type of aged care for which the approval was sought, and was not satisfied that the Company has or would implement and maintain the requisite systems to operate as an approved provider of aged care. In this way, the decision-maker was not satisfied the Company was suitable to provide aged care.
The Company communicated with Commissioner on 13 August 2024, providing an updated application form, updated policy documents and updated business templates. This communication was treated as a request for review.[4]
On 11 November 2024, a reconsideration of the decision to reject the application for approval to provide aged care was completed. The notification of the outcome and the statement of reasons[5] records that the delegate affirmed the decision to refuse the application for approval as a provider of aged care as he was not satisfied the requirements of subsection 63D(2) of the Commission Act were met by reference to the matters listed in subsection 63D(3) of the Commission Act.
Specifically, the delegate identified concerns regarding the experience of some (but not all) of the key personnel of the company and the arrangements described in the application regarding the Company's arrangement with its partners and principal contractors as approved providers of aged care. The delegate also identified concerns regarding the Company's understanding of its responsibilities as a provider of aged care by reference to the Aged Care Quality Standards[6] in the Quality of Care Principles 2014 and Part 4.3 of the Aged Care Act. The delegate also expressed concerns regarding the systems proposed to meet the responsibilities as a provider of aged care, identifying discrepancies in the organisational chart and expressing concerns about the financial management policy, workforce governance, and clinical governance.
On 2 December 2024, the Company applied to the Tribunal for review.
It is necessary to summarise the procedural path this matter has taken in the Tribunal to the conclusion of the hearing.
Directions were issued by a Conference Registrar on 10 March 2025 and 25 August 2025. On 23 October 2025, the Commission lodged a statement of facts issues and contentions based on the evidence lodged by the Company to that point in time. The Commission had observed that key personal and organisational structures had changed since the reconsideration decision, and that at the time the statement of facts issues and contentions had been lodged noted that key personnel were not identified. This state of affairs was the basis of the Commission's contention at that time that the decision should be affirmed.
Upon the matter being constituted to me, I convened a telephone directions hearing on 15 December 2025. Ms Chillura represented the Company at the directions hearing. Noting that there was no statement of contentions or similar complete record of the Company's case, I directed Ms Chillura to lodge a statement setting out the Company's case in the proceedings. A statement was lodged on 22 December 2025, taking issue with the process within the Commission, describing it as inconsistent and subjective, and mentioning that the Company had responded to evolving expectations rather than a clear and consistent basis for refusal.
The hearing was listed to commence on 28 January 2026. Overnight on 27 January 2026, correspondence and supporting documentation was provided to the Tribunal's registry by a solicitor engaged by the Company in the preceding week, foreshadowing that counsel would appear for the Company at the hearing. The Company also filed and served documentary evidence indicating it had engaged (subject to the outcome of these proceedings) three key personnel: the Director of Operations, the Director of Finance, and the Director of Clinical Services, providing letters of engagement and curricula vitae.
The hearing proceeded as listed on 28 January 2026, initially without a request that these persons be called as witnesses or be produced for cross-examination. It must be noted however that the introduction of this evidence cut across the Commission's articulated position in its Statement of Facts and Contentions and took everyone by surprise despite the lengthy pre-hearing procedures mentioned above. Although the Commissioner did not seek further time to investigate or respond to the new evidence, the Commissioner did foreshadow a submission would be made that the newly identified personnel were not qualified for the positions they had been earmarked for. The evidence and issues in the review, in my perception, began to orbit around the key personnel now identified and I was concerned that the individuals had not provided witness statements, were not being called to give evidence in chief and were not required for cross-examination, particularly as the Commissioner had foreshadowed a submission the individuals were not qualified for the roles they were proposed to fill. Ultimately, the Company indicated that it did wish to lead evidence from the individuals, and I formed the view that as a matter of procedural fairness, and in any event for the proper consideration of the review, notwithstanding the very late introduction of the evidence of the engagement of key personnel that the individuals should give evidence to the Tribunal and be available for cross-examination.
It was therefore necessary to adjourn the hearing at the conclusion of Ms Chillura's evidence. I issued directions for witness statements to be filed and served and for the individuals to be available to give evidence to the Tribunal.
The evening prior to the resumption of the hearing, the Company lodged information indicating that the formerly proposed Director of Clinical Services was no longer available for the role, and introduced another individual (Ms AC) with whom discussions were being had about taking on the role. The individuals thus proposed for the identified key roles in the Company gave evidence to the Tribunal and were cross-examined on 5 February 2026.
The Hearing Bundle helpfully prepared by the Commission at my request contained 1637 folios, with a very significant volume of policy documents prepared for the Company by a consultant. The Company's response to adverse decisions from the Commission had in part involved revision and amendment to these policy documents. As I understand it, in compiling the Hearing Bundle, Ms Chillura had requested that all versions be included as a means of demonstrating the Company's reaction to what she had perceived to be the inconsistent approach of the Commissioner in assessing the application. The difficulty for me in executing my role in reviewing the decision is that it had thus become unclear what version or iteration of the policy document was now relied upon. I directed the Company to lodge brief written submission after the hearing to identify with precision what documents in the Hearing Bundle constituted the Company's policy documents now relied upon. A table identifying extracts of the Company's policy documents to which I should have regard was filed and served on Friday 6 February 2026. I have referred to that table in undertaking my consideration of the policy documents of the Company when having regard to the matters I must have regard to.

The legislation in this important area of public policy has recently been the subject of reform. I find however that the Aged Care (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Act 2024 has the effect that I must undertake the review by reference to the legislative framework in place on the date of the Commission's reconsideration decision of 11 November 2024 prior to the Aged Care Act 2024 coming into force[7]; that is, 'the old legislation.'
The following legislation is relevant:
- The Aged Care Act;
- The Commission Act;
- Corporations Act 2001
- Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission Rules 2018 (Cth) (the Rules);
- Quality of Care Principles 2014 (the Quality of Care Principles) incorporating:
  - Aged Care Quality Standards (the Quality Standards);
- Accountability Principles 2014 (Cth) (the Accountability Principles);
- Charter of Aged Care Rights;
- Code of Conduct;
- Records Principles 2014 (Cth) (the Records Principles); and
- User Rights Principles 2014 (Cth) (the User Rights Principles).
The responsibilities of approved providers are set out in Chapter 4 of the Aged Care Act and are subject to ongoing regulatory oversight:

3-4 Responsibilities of approved providers (Chapter 4) > > Approved providers have certain responsibilities under Chapter 4. These responsibilities relate to: > > (a) the quality of care they provide; and > > (b) user rights for the people to whom care is provided; and > > (c) accountability for the care that is provided, and the basic suitability of their *key personnel. > > Failure to meet these responsibilities can lead to the imposition of sanctions on an approved provider under Part 7B of the *Quality and Safety Commission Act, which may affect amounts of *subsidy payable to the approved provider.

The provisions of Part 4.1 of the Aged Care Act are directed towards Quality of Care, and to that end section 54-1 of the Aged Care Act requires approved aged care providers to (among other matters) provide care and services as specified in the Quality of Care Principles, comply with the Quality Standards and provide care and services to a standard of quality consistent with the rights and principles set out in the User Rights Principles.
The provisions of Part 4.2 of the Aged Care Act pertain to User Rights, with specific matters pertaining to user rights in the context of Home Care set out at section 56-2 of the Aged Care Act.
The provisions of Part 4.3 pertain to the accountability of approved providers of aged care in relation to matters including governance and the suitability of key personnel.
These provisions pertaining to the responsibilities of approved providers contained in the Aged Care Act clearly provide the context and purpose behind the provisions on the Commission Act pertaining to approval.

The approval process for aged care service providers is set out in Part 7A of the Commission Act and is administered by the Commissioner.
Section 63D(2) of the Commission Act sets out the minimum requirements for approval for a person to provide aged care:

(2) The Commissioner must not approve the person as a provider of aged care unless the Commissioner is satisfied that: > > (a) the person is a corporation; and > > (b) the person is suitable to provide aged care; and > > (c) each individual who is one of the key personnel of the person is suitable to be involved in the provision of aged care.

The Company is obviously a corporation, as it must be. Throughout these reasons when summarising statutory references to a 'person' therefore, I will substitute the term 'the Company'. When referring to a natural person, I will use their name or the term 'the individual'. The reason for care to be taken in this regard will become apparent shortly.
The key question for me to decide in this review is whether the Company "is suitable to provide aged care".
In order to ultimately approve the Company as a provider of aged care I must also be satisfied that each individual who is one of the key personnel of the Company is suitable to be involved in the provision of aged care. I must take care not to conflate that question with an assessment of whether the Company is suitable to provide aged care by reference to the matters in section 63D(3). The focus in the evidence on the qualifications and 'suitability' of proposed key personnel readily invites the conflation of these concepts, and so it is necessary to set out with precision the legislative tests and how they apply to this matter.
To explain further, for the purposes of determining suitability of the Company to provide aged care, I may also consider a matter in paragraph 63D(3)(a),(b),(d)(e) of (f) of the Commission Act in relation to any or all of its key personnel. This is provided for by subsection 63D(4) of the Commission Act. It is not the same enquiry as considering whether each individual who is one of the key personnel of the Company is suitable to be involved in the provision of aged care, which as mentioned, is a separate test which must be applied and satisfied before the Company can be approved as a provider of aged care.
In the context of the criterion at paragraph 63D(2)(c) of the Commission Act, the meaning of suitability of key personnel is regulated by 'the suitability matters' defined at section 8C of the Commission Act. These are not the same as the matters which must be considered at subsection 63D(3) of the Commission Act in order to decide if the Company is suitable to be a provider of aged care, or the matters which I may also consider in relation to any or all of the Company's key personnel in paragraph 63D(3)(a),(b),(d),(e) or (f) of the Commission Act.
The 'suitability matters' at section 8C of the Commission Act involve an assessment of an individual against a range of criminal and disciplinary processes in addition to the individual's experience in providing, at any time, aged care or other relevant forms of care, thus duplicating to an extent the matter at paragraph 63D(3)(a) of the Commission Act. In this regard, it can be seen that paragraph 63D(2)(c) of the Commission Act was amended in 2021 to introduce a broader regime (provided through the definition of the 'suitability matters' in section 8C of the Commission Act) for the assessment of suitability of key personnel than previously in existence, where personnel were assessed against the requirement that they not be a 'disqualified individual'.
As ultimately (and as explained later in these reasons) I have concluded that the Company is not a suitable person to provide aged care, it turns out that it is not necessary for me to decide whether each individual who is one of the key personnel of the Company is suitable to be involved in the provision of aged care through undertaking the assessment against the 'suitability matters' in section 8C of the Commission Act. It remains the case that I may (and will) consider matters in paragraph 63D(3)(a),(b),(d)(e) of (f) of the Commission Act in relation to any or all of the Company's key personnel in deciding if the Company is a suitable person to provide aged care. If I were to approve the Company as a provider of aged care, it would be necessary for me to address each of the 'suitability matters' in section 8C of the Commission Act against each of the key personnel.
Two further matters arise on this point. First, the very late introduction of a number of individuals who might be key personnel of the Company means that the range of supporting documents that ought to be provided by such people have not been provided, and administrative checks that the Commission might conduct in the background in order to discharge its function to assess key personnel against the 'suitability matters' in section 8C of the Commission Act have not been done. It follows that the Commission submits that I cannot be satisfied in the absence of those documents and checks that an individual is suitable to be involved in the provision of aged care by reference to the suitability matters in section 8C of the Commission Act. I accept that submission.
Accepting that submission would permit me to affirm the decision under review on that basis alone, and this would demonstrate why a substantial turnover of personnel at the last minute and the case for the Company being presented as somewhat of a moving feast was not a sound foundation upon which to proceed with merit review proceedings at this level. However, given the time invested in these proceedings to this point, I do not think that would be an appropriate or desirable basis on which to proceed. Furthermore, I observe that if the criterion at paragraph 63D(2)(c) of the Aged Care Act was the only remaining criterion to be satisfied before approval of the Company as a provider of aged care, I could adjourn the review for those matters to be addressed or perhaps remit the matter to the Commission with directions to address those matters. In this way, it remains the case that the key question for me to decide in this review is whether the Company is suitable to provide aged care. This is so even though the Commission is correct to say that I cannot be satisfied that key personal are suitable to be involved in the provision of aged care when they were essentially unknown to the Commission and the Tribunal at the beginning of the hearing, and the essential background checks against the range of disciplinary and criminal concerns provided for in section 8C of the Commission Act have not been fully undertaken.
Second, it would be and is necessary to identify the 'key personnel' for both purposes in any event. That exercise is also regulated by a statutory definition at section 8B of the Commission Act. Without reproducing the entirety of that definition, I summarise by observing in the case of the Company that 'a member of the group of persons who is responsible for the executive decisions of the entity', 'any person who is likely to be responsible for the nursing services to be provided by the service and who holds a recognised qualification in nursing' and 'any person who is likely to be responsible for the day‑to‑day operations of the service' will be captured by this definition.
I find that Ms Chillura, the sole shareholder and sole director of the company is one of the key personnel. I also find that Ms JD, the person 'likely to be' the Operations Manager of the company is one of the key personnel. I find that Ms CC, the person 'likely to be' the Director of Finance of the company is one of the key personnel of the company.
Ms AC was introduced immediately prior to the resumed hearing. Ms Chillura explained that she had not yet been engaged by the Company but was considering it. This position was confirmed by Ms AC in her evidence. Ms Chillura explained that she was introduced as a witness to demonstrate the kind of person the Company would look to appoint as a Director of Clinical Services. After the hearing concluded, correspondence was provided to the Tribunal by the Company to show that Ms AC had subsequently been offered and had accepted the role of Director of Clinical Services in the same manner as the other identified key personnel. I received this evidence without objection from the Commissioner. It follows that I now proceed on the basis that she too is one of the key personnel of the Company.
Returning to the key determinative issue, subsection 63D(3) of the Commission Act sets out the matters the Tribunal must have regard to in determining whether under s 63D(2)(b), the Company is suitable to provide aged care:

(3) In deciding whether the person is suitable to provide aged care, the Commissioner must consider the following matters: > > (a) the person's experience in providing, at any time, aged care or other relevant forms of care; > > (b) the person's demonstrated understanding of the person's responsibilities as a provider of the type of aged care for which approval is sought; > > (c) the systems that the person has, or proposes to have, in place to meet the person's responsibilities as a provider of the type of aged care for which approval is sought; > > (d) the person's record of financial management and the methods that the person uses, or proposes to use, in order to ensure sound financial management; > > (e) if, at any time, the person has been a provider of aged care or other relevant forms of care - the person's conduct as such a provider and the person's compliance with: > > (i) the person's responsibilities as a provider of that care; and > > (ii) the person's obligations arising from the receipt of any payments from the Commonwealth for providing that care; > > (f) any other matters specified in the rules.

As mentioned, for the purposes of determining suitability of the Company to provide aged care, the Tribunal may also consider a matter in subsection 63D(4) of the Commission Act in relation to any or all of its 'key personnel'. While it is not mandatory that I do so, given the way it is expressed in legislation, the evidence before me and the matters relied upon by both parties in practice obliges me to consider various matters in subsection 63D(3) of the Commission Act in relation to identified individuals put forward as key personnel; namely Ms Chillura, Ms JD, Ms CC and Ms AC.
In Aged Care Quality and Safeguards Commission v Amana Community Services Pty Ltd[8], the Court (Lee J) as an aside rejected criticism made of the former Tribunal's reasons as being too brief, but did observe that it was less than ideal that the AAT in the statement of reasons before the court had adopted a form of expressing its decision as other than explicitly or clearly identifying when it had moved from one mandatory consideration to the next. It follows therefore that the structure of these reasons will follow the list of mandatory considerations in subsection 63D(3) of the Commission Act. Where applicable and relevant, I will also consider the matter in relation to the key personnel I have identified.
Paragraph 63D(3)(f) requires the Tribunal to identify and have regard to other relevant factors, in addition to the mandatory factors listed at paragraphs 63D(3)(a) to (e) as specified in the Rules. There are no further matters specified in the Rules.
Subsection 63D(6) of the Commission Act states I am not limited by subsection 63D(3) to the matters I may consider in deciding whether the Company is suitable. In this case, no additional relevant factors have been identified by either party for consideration. To the extent that Ms Chillura has raised as a grievance her criticisms of the decision-making process within the Commission and the time it has taken for the matter to progress to this point, I acknowledge that she has expressed this grievance but these are not material matters to the question of whether the Company is suitable to provide aged care.
Reflecting on the nature of the documentary evidence before the Tribunal in the context of the Company which is not at present an approved provider of aged care, paragraphs 63D(3)(c) and 3(d) both use the phrase 'has or proposes to have' which means that I am to evaluate proposed systems and/or records which are not yet in place. Indeed, Ms Chillura made the point in her evidence and arguments to the effect that a company seeking approval as a provider of aged care by definition will be unable to directly demonstrate many of the matters to be considered in determining whether the company is suitable.
As a general observation, it is challenging to know how to appropriately assess the weight to be attributed to the presence or absence of references to concepts in bulky policy manuals prepared by a consultant, including governance structures that are proposed and appear on diagrams, but do not actually yet exist or function in practice. This is particularly so noting that such documents have been amended from time to time in apparent response to criticisms from the Commission in refusing the application and affirming that decision under internal review. The reality is that much of the documentary evidence is aspirational in nature. Inevitably assertions in examination and cross-examination as to understanding of various matters critical to demonstrating suitability on behalf of the Company are assertions.
As accepted by Deputy President Sosso in Aussie Care Foundation Pty Ltd v Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner,[9] the fact that an applicant had missed a couple of lines in a policy is not determinative of an applicant's suitability to provide aged care, and to engage in an exercise of finding minor errors and omissions and to then conclude that an applicant has not met the requirements of subsection 63D(3) would be incorrect. Errors and omissions in the completion of a form may be a matter to be taken into account, and could sometimes result in an applicant being found not meeting the suitability requirements of subsection 63D(3) of the Commission Act.
Likewise however, and in my view, an impeccably expressed policy manual addressing seriatim the range of standards, principles and safeguards established by the legislative scheme cannot be conclusive as to the suitability of an applicant for approval as a provider of aged care. A decision maker is indeed required to take into account all of the evidence and weigh it together with other considerations.
Before embarking upon an assessment of the mandatory matters in subsection 63D(3) of the Commission Act, it is convenient to provide an overview of the evidence and submissions of the Company and the Commissioner.

In opening submissions, counsel for the Company outlined that a significant issue in the Company's case for recognition as a suitable person to provide aged care was the appointment of officers with suitable qualification and experience, and the late material addressed this. Counsel also referred to a substantial body of evidence pertaining to Ms Chillura's qualification and experience, and the history of the Company in providing its current services, particularly with culturally and linguistically diverse clients.
It was submitted that the Company had provided detailed policy documents in good faith to address issues raised by the Commission from time to time, and that these documents should be accepted by the Tribunal as meeting the threshold.
In response to a question I put as to whether my task was to merely assess policy documents prepared for the Company by a consultant against the legislation, counsel for the Company submitted that I should take the documents into account but also the evidence of Ms Chillura in particular was of critical importance.
In relation to other key personnel, the point was again made as to the impracticality of engaging and employing key personnel prematurely in the absence of assurance of approval, and submitted that the letters of appointment were significant evidence that I should take into account.

In her statement lodged on 22 December 2025, Ms Chillura emphasised that the Company had been operating for more than four years as an aged care case management service in partnership with an identified aged care provider (I note the arrangement is a sub-contracting arrangement - see folio 1394). Ms Chillura contends that under this arrangement it was neither practical nor efficient to duplicate governance systems or employ additional senior staff, and the Company relied on its principal contractor (my term) to provide clinical oversight and financial governance.
Ms Chillura pointed out that the original decision of the Commission had noted that the application appeared generic leading to concerns the material did not reflect the Company's own understandings of its responsibilities, and noted the Commission had considered that references to systems and policies were statements of intention rather than practical operational systems. Ms Chillura did however note that the Commission had accepted the Company was a properly constituted corporation, identified key personnel held appropriate qualifications and experience and that financial management and available capital were adequate.
Ms Chillura stated that the Company substantially revised its material ahead of its request for reconsideration and did so solely in response to the feedback provided. Ms Chillura observed that the basis of the subsequent refusal shifted considerably, moving to deficiencies in the experience and suitability of key personnel, technical criticism of clinical governance, dementia care, dignity of risk, regulatory engagement and compliance systems - matters which had not been identified earlier.
Ms Chillura noted that the Commission in these proceedings (at the time of lodging its statement of facts issues and contentions) had relied on the absence of named individuals in senior roles, but argued this did not reflect the reality of establishing a new provider given the approval process was lengthy.
Ms Chillura argued that the Company's senior case manager and case managers have extensive practical experience in aged care service coordination, and the Company was fully aware of its ongoing obligations under the Aged Care Act to assess suitability of key personnel, and pointed to plans to contract with consultancies in HR matters.
As to criticisms in the review decision about the absence of a dementia care policy, Ms Chillura explained that dementia care had been expressed in other policies, and there was no express requirement for a stand-alone dementia care policy.
Ms Chillura took issue with the Commission's concerns about historical issues in organisations the Company had partnered or sub-contracted with, emphasising the Company had no control over these matters and sought its own approval to ensure its clients received care under structures reflecting its own standards and practice.
In her oral evidence to the Tribunal, Ms Chillura described the 'gap in the market' she had perceived while undertaking her work managing home care packages generally and specifically for her mother. Ms Chillura said she felt she could do it better than other providers in the sector. Ms Chillura said that she gained operational experience working with identified other providers, referring to paperwork, procedures and compliance in that regard.
Ms Chillura described her current day to day work in arranging home care packages for clients, pointing out that she is a smaller business than other providers and can be more agile in responding to clients. Ms Chillura said she currently had about 210 clients.
Ms Chillura confirmed that providers who provide direct care to her clients are contracted with her principal contractors directly and not with her. Ms Chillura confirmed that her business strategy in seeking approval as a provider of aged care is to be able to contract directly with the people providing services to her clients and to retain the entirety of the management fee. Ms Chillura explained that her motivation was not from a monetary point of view, but that it would free her from restrictions in dealing with larger providers and improve timeliness and service to her clients. Ms Chillura is essentially looking for autonomy in this regard. Ms Chillura also elaborated on her contention that she was particularly well suited to dealing with linguistically and culturally diverse groups.
Turning to the issue of key personnel, Ms Chillura confirmed that she considered the individuals she had put forward were suitable people to be appointed, and indeed considered them more than appropriate people to be engaged in those roles, but could not pay their salary pending approval. Ms Chillura also pointed to areas where she had filled gaps in relation to matters such as governance using external agencies and her accountant.
Ms Chillura confirmed that Ms CC was already working for her business, and although she works full time elsewhere, she planned to cease her current work and commence full time with the Company if approved.
There were not yet any written contracts or settled terms in relation to salary with any of the proposed key personnel. Ms Chillura confirmed she was aware of the Company's obligations to inform the Commission if any of its key staffing changed.
On questions concerning managing risk, clinical oversight, internal audits, incident and complaint handling Ms Chillura referred to the policies and the position holders who would manage their own areas of risk. In relation to financial strategies and the appropriate management of Commonwealth funds, Ms Chillura confirmed that she doesn't presently pay service providers directly, and relies on her principal contractor, but she and Ms CC reconcile payments.
As to the Director of Finance, Ms Chillura confirmed that Ms CC had been appointed to undertake the role, confirming Ms CC was a Chartered Accountant who had acquired that qualification in December 2025. Ms Chillura explained that Ms CC had worked as a casual accountant for the Company, and was currently employed full time with another firm in the position of Senior Commercial Analyst.
Ms Chillura was taken to the Company's updated application for approval[10]and its indication that a dedicated finance manager would be appointed given budget handling, expenditure tracking and financial reporting was being handled by the Company's partners / head contractors. Ms Chillura was asked whether Ms CC, as a newly qualified Chartered Accountant who had undertaken casual accountancy functions for the Company, could perform the role and Ms Chillura indicated her confidence that Ms CC could do so. In response to further questions, Ms Chillura confirmed that Ms CC had not been managing home care package funds for clients, but rather had been attending to the Company's accounts.
I will summarise the evidence given by Ms CC later in these reasons.
As to the Director of Clinical Services role, Ms Chillura confirmed that the role would be responsible for clinical compliance, reflecting consumer preferences and ensuring the organisation's staff were properly trained. In addition, Ms Chillura said that the role would be responsible for monitoring service delivery, monitoring dementia specific care practices and managing the organisation's risk register.[11]
Ms Chillura was asked about the Company's plans to establish a board of directors with an assertion that there was an absence of evidence as to who would be on the board. Ms Chllura pointed to her original application and a list of people she proposed to appoint to a board of directors, but conceded she would need to approach the people she proposed to find out if they remained interested. Ms Chillura responded in the affirmative to a series of questions regarding the function of the board of directors; specifically confirming that the board would take an active role in reviewing client incidents, improving service to consumers, monitoring quality of care, monitoring risk, maintaining a culture of safety, and ensuring compliance with the Aged Care Act.
I queried with Ms Chillura whether notions of a board of directors for a private company where she was the sole director and shareholder was actually applicable, and similarly questioned the notion of her, as a CEO, appointing a board of directors when normally one might expect arrangements to be the other way around. Ms Chillura explained that the particular governance model involving a board of directors was something she had understood to be required from the application form, but she intended to remain as the sole director shareholder. She had not intended for people who joined the board of directors to actually be directors of the company. Rather, she had envisaged them to be external people with lots of other experience, and perhaps some internal representatives on the board as well, and perhaps also family members of some clients would be invited. I asked Ms Chillura whether she was perhaps describing a consultative board rather than a board of directors per se, and Ms Chillura agreed that was what she had in mind but emphasised the terminology of board of directors had come from the application process, and she had understood it to be a requirement.
Upon the resumption of the hearing for its second day, Ms Chillura gave evidence that she had contacted the people she had previously proposed as members of the board of directors and all remained willing to participate on the governing board. There was one exception, a registered nurse, who could not be contacted. Ms Chillura also indicated she had contacted a client and a client's family member to ascertain their interest in participating on the board, and the individuals she had contacted indicated they were interested. Ms Chillura was able to identify the individuals she had referred to.[12]

Ms JD is the subject of exhibit A2, a letter of 23 December 2025 confirming her appointment for the purposes of Tribunal proceedings as Director of Operations Exhibit A3 is her curriculum vitae.
In her written statement,[13] Ms JD recounted her understanding of the role as responsible for ensuring operational practices are supported by appropriate policies, procedures, monitoring systems and risk management processes, and is a separate role from clinical governance and financial oversight. Ms JD pointed to her background in aged care and home care governance operations and service delivery, combined with her clinical training as a registered nurse with executive level leadership in complex aged care organisations. In this regard, Ms JD holds degrees in nursing and business administration and has held senior leadership roles including that of general manager, executive general manager, head of customer experience and operations manager with identified aged care providers.
In her oral evidence, Ms JD explained she was excited for the opportunity to work at the Company, and she has accepted the position pending the Company's approval as a provider of aged care. After outlining her work experience in more detail, Ms JD emphasised her experience in handling 'Commonwealth monies' in the context of her former work in the pharmaceutical industry and handling monies associated with the pharmaceutical benefits scheme.
In cross examination, the Commission highlighted aspects of the responsibilities of the Director of Operations that Ms JD had not expressly mentioned, such as responsibilities for maintaining records. Ms JD gave evidence that she was aware that she would have responsibilities for records management. It was put to Ms JD that she did not have the skills to be the Director of Operations, a proposition with which Ms JD disagreed, providing examples from her working life where she had fulfilled tasks associated with that position.
Further in Ms JD's cross examination, she was asked to identify various requirements in relation to the charging of fees and other matters arising under legislative requirements. Ms JD could not recite matters from the legislation in response to these questions, but I draw no adverse inference from her inability to recite matters in this way.

Ms CC is the subject of exhibit B2, a letter confirming her appointment as Director of Finance for the Company, for the purposes of Tribunal proceedings, dated 23 December 2025. Ms CC's curriculum vitae is exhibit B3.
In her written statement, Ms CC describes the role of Director of Finance as being part of the organisation's governance framework to ensure effective financial oversight, accountability and compliance with applicable aged care funding and prudential requirements. She states that the role is responsible for the oversight of financial management systems, budgeting financial reporting, internal controls, financial risk management and support transparency, responsible stewardship of client funds and ongoing monitoring of financial risks.
In her oral evidence, Ms CC confirmed she had accepted the position as she found the position rewarding and in an industry she looked forward to joining. She considered that it was the right move for her as she completed her studies as a chartered accountant. Ms CC outlined her educational background, which includes a Bachelor of Business majoring in accounting, and the post graduate qualifications required to be a chartered accountant. Ms CC said she had been undertaking reconciliations each month for the company as it functioned as a business in care management.
Ms CC confirmed she was currently employed on a full-time basis in a different industry, where she had headed a project automating financial reports and was involved in pricing, tendering and contractual arrangements with customers. Ms CC confirmed she would resign that position to take on the role of Director of Finance full-time if the Company was approved.
Ms CC described the software systems she was familiar working with, and her current role requiring involvement in improving processes. Later in her evidence, Ms CC confirmed she had completed an in-house leadership program with her current employer.
Ms CC confirmed she has not dealt with 'Commonwealth money' as part of her previous roles, but pointed out she had worked in industry with a heavy focus on regulatory compliance (heavy transport).
In response to my questions, Ms CC said that she had not had and did not currently have a role involving responsibility for overall financial governance of her employers, although had been involved in mitigating risk associated with irregular transactions.
In cross examination, Ms CC conceded that her role with the Company at present did not involve handling budgets, tracking expenditures, ensuring accurate financial reporting because this was attended to by the Company's principal contractor, but emphasised the Company undertakes its own internal analysis and engages an external accountant to prepare financial reports.
Ms CC was asked if she was aware of specific legislative provisions in the Aged Care Act and the Accountability Principles regarding auditing requirements and the preparation of financial reports. Ms CC was not able to confirm that she had an operating awareness of those specific provisions, but would get across those provisions once in the role. Ms CC pointed to her current role as one involving substantial regulation, and explained she did not know anything about those strict regulations when she started the role.
When it was suggested to Ms CC that she was not suitable for the role of Director of Finance for the Company, Ms CC pointed to her qualifications as a Chartered Accountant, her experience in her current role in an industry with a heavy regulatory framework to assert that she was suitable for the role. Ms CC said she had a high level understanding of the responsibilities of the role, notwithstanding that she may not be able demonstrate precisely her understanding of the accountability principles or recite the code 'line by line'.

Ms AC was introduced as the potential Director of Clinical Services very late in the proceedings, in between the first and second hearing, in circumstances where the second hearing was convened in any event somewhat at my insistence in order for the key personnel of the company to give evidence in the proceedings. At the time of her evidence, Ms AC said she had not been offered the role and had not accepted the role but merely expressed interest in it. Ms Chillura had explained that Ms AC was produced as a witness to demonstrate the kind of candidate that the Company would look to engage for the role. Ms AC's engagement in the role, in the sense documented by a letter with heading 'confirmation of appointment' has come after the final submissions, albeit without objection from the Commissioner.
Ms AC's curriculum vitae demonstrates that she is a very experienced nurse, but most recently has worked as an ACAS (Aged Care Assessment Service) Assessor and community-based nurse. In her evidence, Ms AC said in response to my questions that in her role as an ACAS Assessor and in her role as nurse she had not held any team leadership or management positions involving the supervision or management of other staff. Ms AC acknowledged that she did not have seven years of senior clinical leadership as mentioned in the job description.
Ms AC was asked a number of questions regarding policies and procedures in the abstract, including involvement in financial management, but was unable to engage meaningfully with the questions in the abstract given her limited involvement in the process to date.
Ms AC expressed her understanding of the responsibilities of the role in cross-examination, including responsibility for clinical records, incident reports and risk documentation, and clinical compliance. Ms AC conceded she may need support in that regard and would be learning on the job. Ms AC was not aware that her responsibilities included managing the organisation's risk register.
In cross-examination it was suggested to Ms AC that she did not have the requisite experience to fulfill the obligations of the role, and Ms AC conceded that it was possible she didn't have the clinical leadership qualifications. Ms AC also appeared to be generally unfamiliar with the legislative framework around the obligations of a provider of aged care.

Ultimately, the Company contended for what it says is a reasonable and common sense reading of section 63D of the Commission Act, pointing to the permission in subsection 63D(8) to take into account matters other than the mandatory matters in subsection 63D(3) of the Commission Act.
Arguing that the Company was very much driven by Ms Chillura, it was submitted that I should accept that she was a suitable person having regard to her experience, and indeed should place a great deal of weight on her experience in finding the Company is suitable.
It was submitted that there was a public interest in finding smaller organisations being able to be registered, and I was asked to take into account pragmatic difficulties faced by smaller entities in obtaining approval. In response to my question as to what in subsection 63D(3) of the Commission Act that submission engaged with, it was submitted on behalf of the Company that this could be taken into account as an additional matter, given I was not limited to the matters in subsection 63D(3) of the Commission Act. When tested further against this proposition, it was submitted on behalf of the Company that smaller organisations could provide services with greater agility and personalise their services better. In this regard, the evidence concerning the Company's expertise in dealing with the Italian and Greek community was referred to.
In relation to the application process, it was submitted that the Company had engaged with the process thoroughly, and the basis of the response evolved as decisions within the Commission were made based on various grounds.
On the topic of experience of providing aged care, it was submitted that the Company's involvement with its principal contractors should be viewed as sufficient. Reliance was placed on positive reviews from customers contained in the hearing bundle to which I have had regard.
The Company submitted that it had sufficient capital, as had been found by the decision-makers within the Commission.
Turning to the individuals engaged for specific roles, it was submitted that Ms JD, had a wealth of experience and was suitable for the role of Director of Operations, and that I could be satisfied she would commence in the role full time if approval were given.
In relation to Ms CC, it was submitted that she was qualified for the role of Director of Finance, with a reminder that my role was not to find the most experienced candidate for a role but rather to identify whether the Company was suitable. It was further submitted that Ms CC had been a careful witness, had impressive experience in another industry that was heavily regulated.
In relation to Ms AC, it was submitted that she had provided frank evidence to the Tribunal and had spoken about the need to treat clients with dignity, and had undertaken relevant training.
In light of these matters, it was submitted on behalf of the Company that I should be satisfied that the Company and the nominated appointees were appropriate to be involved in aged care, and I should make a decision in favour of the Company.

The Commissioner's position was that the Tribunal must be satisfied both that the Company and its key personnel was suitable to provide aged care, and in that regard the Tribunal must be satisfied, in the sense of arriving at a state of persuasion and an inclination towards assenting to the proposition.[14]

A statutory requirement that a decision-maker arrive at a state of satisfaction as a precondition to an exercise of a statutory power, like a requirement that a decision-maker hold a belief as a precondition to an exercise of a statutory power, necessitates that the decision-maker "feel an actual persuasion" - "an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition".

In respect of Ms CC, the Commissioner's position was that there was insufficient evidence for me to find that Ms CC had the requisite experience to undertake the duties of the Director of Finance for the Company. The position on that point went to the suitability of the Company itself in the sense that the Company would have an unqualified Director of Finance. Similarly, it was submitted, the finding would also go to whether the Company had systems in place to meet its responsibilities as a provider of aged care, and indicate that it would not have in place methods used or proposed to be used to ensure sound financial management.
Likewise, the Commissioner's position was that the Tribunal should not be satisfied that Ms JD was suitable to be involved in the provision of aged care, submitting that her experience pertained to marketing, communication and sales, but she had not undertaken the role of Director of Operations or similar. She had not demonstrated that she had the required skills and experience to comply with regulatory requirements, legal, safety and human resources obligations and compliance with records management obligations for the entire organisation.
In relation to Ms AC, the Commissioner submitted that as she had no experience overseeing or managing the provision of aged care, she did not have adequate experience to meet the requirements of being the Director of Clinical Services.
In relation to its contentions about the experience of the identified personnel, the Commission relied on the inability of the individuals to identify various provisions of the legislative scheme in response to questions under cross-examination.
The Commissioner submitted that the Company continued to rely on members of a governing body identified in material lodged with the application for internal review, with the exception of one individual with whom contact could not be re-established. The Commissioner points out that this individual is the only person of the nominated board of directors who had clinical experience.
In this regard, the Commissioner drew to my attention the requirements of section 63-1D of the Aged Care Act in relation to the responsibilities of certain approved providers relating to their governing bodies. I will return to this submission and the legislative requirements in the context of the Company later in these reasons.
The Commission's position in the hearing was that the Tribunal could not be positively satisfied that the Company was suitable to provide aged care, having regard to the matters in section 63D of the Aged Care Act.
The Commission's position was that the recent identification of individuals was not enough for the Tribunal to be satisfied of the suitability of those people having regard to the suitability matters,[15] noting furthermore that members of key governing structures remained unidentified. The Commission's position was that the individuals identified for key positions such as the Director of Finance and the Director of Clinical Services were not qualified, and concerns raised regarding these assertions being put to the individuals concerned was a consequence of the Company running its case in the Tribunal in the way it did. The Commission's position was that there were too many gaps in the evidence to be positively satisfied that the applicant was suitable to provide aged care.
The Commission further submitted that the compliance history of some organisations with which the Company had been associated did not support the Company's case that through these associations it has acquired relevant experience or could demonstrate suitability. While I appreciate the care with which that submission was put by the Commissioner, and there is some degree of supporting material to justify the submission, in my view I have insufficient information about the compliance history of the organisations which the Company has historically had associations, as I understand it through being a subcontracted provider of care management, to place any weight on it. Furthermore, I consider it potentially unfair and unsafe to place any adverse weight on the conduct of other organisations in assessing the Company's current suitability and did not consider the topic sufficiently probative to pursue further.

I address my assessment of the evidence and the parties' positions by reference to the mandatory matters provided for in subsection 63D(3) of the Commission Act in respect of the Company, and where relevant in respect of key personnel pursuant to subsection 63D(4) of the Commission Act.
First, in relation to paragraphs 63D(3)(ea) and (eb) of the Commission Act, I find in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the Company has not been convicted of an indictable offence, and has not had a civil penalty order made against it at any time.
In relation to paragraph 63D(3)(f) of the Commission Act, and as noted in the overview of the legislative scheme above, there are no other matters specified in the Rules for the purposes of paragraph 63D(3)(f) of the Commission Act.
In relation to paragraph 63D(3)(e) of the Commission Act, I find that the Company has not been a provider of aged care, and nor has it been a provider of other relevant forms of care.
Paragraph 63D(3)(e) of the Commission Act is one of the matters where I may also consider the matter in relation to any or all of the key personnel of the Company. It is appropriate in my view to consider paragraph 63D(3)(e) in relation to Ms Chillura. In respect of Ms Chillura, I also find that she has not been a provider of aged care nor a provider of other relevant forms of care.
It follows that no analysis can be undertaken of the Company's nor Ms Chillura's conduct as such a provider or its compliance with its responsibilities as a provider of that care and its obligations arising from the receipt of any payments from the Commonwealth for providing care.
Inherent in this finding is that I do not construe the current activities of the Company in arranging and managing care plans, nor Ms Chillura's work in this regard as the provision of aged care or other relevant forms of care. It is necessary to elaborate on my reasoning in this regard as it is also important to my analysis of the matter at paragraph 63D(3)(a) which is to follow.
The Commissioner submits that the notion of the provision of aged care has a specific definition that does not incorporate the preparation and management of care plans alone. In this regard, Schedule 1 to the Aged Care Act defines aged care as care of one of three types, relevantly 'home care'.
'Home care' is defined in Schedule 1 by reference to section 45-3 of the Aged Care Act to mean: 'care, consisting of a package or personal care services and other personal assistance provided to a person who is not being provided with residential care'.
Part 3 of the Quality of Care Principles 2014 specifies the care and services that an approved provider of a home care service must provide to a care recipient. It requires that an approved provider of home care must provide a package of care and services that includes 'care management' and at least one other service that is specified in Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the Quality of Care Principles (which will be a 'care service'). Services described as a 'care service' in Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the Quality of Care Principles includes items that may be described as 'direct care' such as bathing, toileting, assistance with preparing meals, continence management and assistance relating to mobility and dexterity. In this way, the Quality of Care Principles as a whole clearly envisage that a home care service must provide more than what is described as 'care management'. I consider this is material to understanding the reference to experience and record in the provision of aged care in the matters provided for at subsection 63D(3)(e) and (a) of the Commission Act.
Part 1 of Schedule 3 of the Quality of Care Principles introduces notions of 'care services', 'support services' and 'clinical services', and indeed establishes a trichotomy between support services on the one hand and cares services and clinical care on the other.
I have taken into account that the Company has advocated in these proceedings for a broader understanding of the meaning of the provision of aged care and other relevant forms of care as incorporating the work undertaken by the Company (and Ms Chillura) in preparing and managing care plans, with the services then delivered through the Company's principal contractor. For the purposes of paragraph 63D(3)(a) and (e) however, I accept the Commission's submission that as a matter of construction, the reference to providing aged care and other relevant forms of care is not intended to encompass 'care management' alone as described in item 1A of Schedule 3 to the Quality of Care Principles, or more specifically the ongoing assessment and planning to ensure the care recipient receives the care and services they need, through the preparation and management of care plans.
Nonetheless, I accept that the Company and Ms Chillura have extensive experience in delivering services described in Schedule 1A of the Quality of Care Principles as 'care management' through the subcontracting arrangements with principal contractors. Similarly, I recognise that for some years the Company and Ms Chillura have worked extensively in the aged care and home care sector in close conjunction with the Company's principal contractors. In this way, the Company and Ms Chillura have been closely involved in the direct provision of aged care by the principal contractors, albeit neither the Company nor Ms Chillura have experience or a record in the provision of aged care or other relevant forms of care.
It is nonetheless open for me to take into account the Company's and Ms Chillura's experience in 'care management' on behalf of its clients and principal contractors through the permission contained in subsection 63D(8) of the Commission Act in that I am not limited to considering only the matters in subsection 63D(3) of the Commission Act. I consider this experience and knowledge is relevant, albeit not as directly relevant as direct provision of aged care, in the sense of 'care services'. I have favourably taken into account the positive written references from clients and their families in this regard contained at T1594 to T1620, and the fact that principal contractors have entered into subcontracting arrangements with the Company for the care management services it provides. Indeed, Ms Chillura struck me in her evidence as a person with significant familiarity and indeed expertise in relation to the care management work she has been undertaking in this regard.
However, for the purposes of paragraph 63D(3)(e) of the Commission Act, there is no analysis that can be undertaken of either the Company or Ms Chillura's record of conduct as a provider of aged care or other relevant form of care.
Similarly, for the purpose of subsection 63D(3)(a) of the Commission Act, I take into account that neither the Company, nor Ms Chillura has experience providing aged care or other relevant forms of care, with the proviso that I do take into account the Company's and Ms Chillura's experience in providing care management in accordance with subsection 63(8) of the Commission Act.
I may consider paragraph 63D(3)(a) of the Commission Act in relation to any or all of the key personnel of the company. In this regard, I have considered paragraph 63D(3)(a) of the Commission Act in relation to the individual proposed for the position of Director of Operations (Ms JD) and the individual proposed for the position of Director of Clinical Services (Ms AC).
In the case of Ms JD, and contrary to the submissions of the Commission, I consider that Ms JD through her curriculum vitae and oral evidence has demonstrate considerable experience in undertaking senior roles with approved aged care providers. In this regard, I note in particular the senior roles she held with aged care providers between April 2017 and March 2020 and between October 2022 and December 2024 as documented on her curriculum vitae.[16] The Commission's criticism that these roles were focussed on sales, marketing and communication is well founded given the description of these roles, but they are nonetheless senior roles in firms directly concerned with the provision of aged care services. I am satisfied that her experience in these senior roles is relevant and weighs in favour of the Company in circumstances where the Company proposes to engage her as its Director of Operations.
While I note that on occasion Ms JD was unable to precisely describe provisions of the legislative scheme when asked to, I do not consider this detracts from her experience as a senior manager in firms undertaking aged care, and found her responses in relation to such matters as the responsibility of the role for records management to be persuasive as to her suitability for the role.
In the case of Ms AC, I accept that she has significant experience as a clinician. However, as she herself conceded, she does not have experience in clinical leadership in any setting, and for my purposes it is significant that she does not have clinical leadership experience in providing aged care or other relevant forms of care. I am at pains however to recognise Ms AC's experience and qualifications as a nurse, but I do not consider her to be a suitable candidate for a position that carries the heavy responsibility of a Director of Clinical Services for an approved provider of aged care. Essentially, she lacks the direct experience in leading and managing other clinicians in undertaking their duties and meeting their responsibilities, which in the case of aged care are very significant indeed.
Ms AC was initially put forward by the Company as an example of the type of candidate it would look to recruit into the role, before it was clarified after the hearing that she had been offered and accepted the role. In my view, the Company's offering the role of Director of Clinical Services to a candidate who by their own recognition has no experience in managing or leading teams of clinicians raises concerns as to the Company's suitability to provide aged care.
I turn to consider the matter provided for by paragraph 63D(3)(b) of the Commission Act; namely the Company's demonstrated understanding of its responsibilities as a provider of the type of aged care for which approval is sought.
The documentary evidence before the Tribunal as to the representations made to the Commission on behalf of the Company and policy documents generated for the purpose of the application is extensive. I note that in Amana Community Services v Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner (on remittal)[17] the Senior Member observed that she was presented with a confusing jumble of versions of proposed documents, and was faced with concerns led on behalf of the Commission that in that case the policy manual was purchased as a template from a paid consultancy, and amended a number of times since the original application was lodged, with various amendments made only after deficiencies had been pointed to the Applicant[18].
There are similar features at play in relation to the policy material before me.
I have already mentioned the difficulty I face in knowing how much weight to attach to the presence or absence of representations in application forms and policy documents generated by consultants for the purpose of the application, particularly where it can be seen that the documents have been incrementally adjusted in response to the rejection of the application by the Commission previously.
I too was faced with a confusing jumble of policy documentation, a matter I raised with counsel for the Company. The Company subsequently addressed this concern by filing written submissions identifying with greater precision what policy material was relied upon.
With the clarity afforded by the applicant's submissions after the hearing identifying the policy documentation now relied upon, and comparing selected representations made in the policy documentation against the responsibilities of aged care providers as expressed in section 54-1 of the Aged Care Act, and through that legislation, the Quality of Care Principles, the User Rights Principles, the Aged Care Quality Standards and the Code of Conduct, I am satisfied that the company has made sufficient representations in those policy documentations to address the matters specified in the legislation and those legislative instruments. Similarly, I can observe through the history of the proceedings that where any of the myriad documented obligations of an aged care provider has not been specifically addressed by the Company in its policies, the Company has endeavoured to correct that oversight by providing amended policy documentation.
I note, by way of inexhaustive example that:
- the Company's recruitment and selection policy (at T1464) and workforce planning policy (at T1462) engages with its obligation to maintain an adequate number of appropriately skilled staff to ensure the care needs of recipients are met as required by paragraph 54-1(b) of the Aged Care Act;
- the Company's security of tenure and change to services policy (at T892) engages with item 17 of the User Rights Principles 2014 in relation to security of tenure;
- The Company's incident management policy (at T1529) engages with the Company's obligation to manage incidents and take reasonable steps to prevent incidents, as required by paragraph 564-(1)(e) of the Aged Care Act and Part 4B of the Quality of Care Principles;
- The Company's feedback and complaints policy (T1520) engages with the Company's obligations under Standard 6 of the Quality of Care Principles.
I do not however consider that the mere existence of a corresponding policy reference in the Company's policy documents to specific responsibilities as a provider of aged care as provided for in the identified legislative scheme of itself conclusively demonstrates the necessary understanding. However, it weighs in the Company's favour in my view that it has endeavoured on a number of occasions to ensure its policy documentation is comprehensive and complete.
I may also consider the matter provided for by paragraph 63D(3)(b) in relation to any or all of the key personnel of the company. In this regard I have reflected on the evidence in chief and the cross-examination of Ms Chillura, Ms JD, Ms CC and Ms AC as summarised in these reasons above. Although on occasion Ms Chillura, Ms JD and Ms CC were unable to satisfy questions in cross-examination by reference to specific legislative reference or by reference to legislative instruments regarding the responsibilities of a provider of aged care, I am satisfied that these witnesses nonetheless engaged with and identified satisfactorily the themes and principles that would underpin the Company's responsibilities as a provider of aged care. I do not consider that the oral evidence of these witnesses detracts from the Company's demonstration of its understanding of its responsibilities as a provider of aged care as set out in its policy documentation.
The exception to this analysis however is the evidence of Ms AC. I recognise that Ms AC was in a difficult position in the proceedings having only recently been approached in relation to the role of Director of Clinical Services, and indeed at the time of her evidence had expressed interest in the role but been neither offered it nor accepted it. Ms AC, despite being an experienced clinician demonstrated very little understanding of the legislative framework within which the Company was being assessed and would ultimately operate if approved, and in that sense demonstrated little by way of understanding of the Company's responsibilities as a provider of aged care including, importantly, the responsibilities that she would have the role of upholding in the context of clinical services.
In my view, the Company's case for recognition as a person suitable to provide aged care was reduced substantially by issues relating to the identification of key personnel for the role of Director of Clinical Services.
I turn to consider paragraph 63D(3)(c) of the Commission Act, which requires I consider the systems the Company has or proposes to have in place to meet the Company's responsibilities as a provider of home care.
Here again the policy documentation relied upon by the Company is relevant. The policy documentation contains a chapter on 'Information Management Systems'[19] that describes a framework for how the Company will manage information to safeguard client and staff information and uphold data integrity. The policy describes principles for collection of client information and the management of that information, recording information about service delivery, collating and maintain HR records and archiving. The document sets out policies governing IT security, responding to data breaches and restricting and monitoring access of email by staff for personal use.
To the extent that paragraph 63D(3)(c) of the Commission Act requires me to be satisfied that the Company has aspirational written policies addressing such matters, I am satisfied that matters pertaining to information management systems exist. I note the policy documentation identifies various regulatory regimes around records and privacy, in addition to the legislative framework imposing obligations on the providers of aged care.
I note also for example that the Company proposes, in its Clinical Governance framework policy,[20]that it will undertake clinical care audits, and will track Key Performance Indicators relating to infection rates, medication errors, falls and consumer satisfaction.
In relation to financial systems, the Company has a financial management policy[21] expressed to be directed towards establishing a framework of financial management, compliance with the legislative framework around the responsibilities of providers of aged care and the stewardship of public funds. The policy refers to the systems likely to be used for payroll, purchasing and procurement, including with client funds, insurance and general financial reporting and compliance.
In taking into account the financial systems the Company proposes to put in place by reference to the policy documents relied upon, it is clear that the Company has taken care to document the systems it proposes to rely on to meet its obligations.
The notion of 'systems' is not further defined in the legislation, and precisely what that term means is somewhat at large. As expressed above, I have examined material available to me in relation to business systems and financial systems described in the policy manuals which is consistent to the approach of the Senior Member in Amana (on remittal) and the Deputy President in AussieCare Foundation Pty Ltd v Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner [2023] AATA 2202 from [113]. In each of those matters, the Tribunal was to consider a clearly articulated case from the Commissioner as to why the policy documentation relied upon was inadequate. The Commissioner has articulated concerns with aspects of the Company's policy documents in its Statement of Facts Issues and Contentions.
I am conscious that the original decision of the Commission and the reconsideration decision of the Commission identified aspects of the documented policies that were, at that time, unclear or lacking rigour depending on the area of proposed operations that was the subject of the policy.[2] As mentioned above, when faced with that feedback the Company has moved to address the criticism by amending the policy.
To take financial management as an example, the reconsideration decision suggested the policy remained unclear and lacking in rigour in describing the roles between Director, Chief Financial Officer, Accountant and external accountancy firm. However, the Company lodged the iteration of the financial management policy now relied upon on 19 August 2025, well after the Tribunal proceedings had commenced. That policy introduces clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the 'board', the CEO, the Head of Finance, Senior Care Management, and External Accountants.
In the Commissions Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, the Commission argued that the Company's Compliance Policy was inadequate in that it was simply a statement of intent and commitment rather than a demonstrated description of role it intends to recruit and the timeframes within which staff would be recruited, and who those staff would report to. The Compliance Policy identified by the Commission[22] is described in the footer as 'Version 2.0 last reviewed 20 March 2025. The version of the Compliance Policy identified by the Company as relied upon,[23] is also identified as Version 2.0 last reviewed 20/3/2025, but is a wholly different document. The criticisms levied against the Compliance Policy by the Commission in my view are valid in respect of either version of the Compliance Policy.
The Commission was critical of the Company's Assessment and Planning Policy[24], arguing it did not sufficiently describe the systems the Company proposes to have in place to meet its responsibilities or how staff would comply with the policy in practice. I note the Company continues to rely on that version of the Assessment and Planning Policy. I accept the criticisms of the policy made by the Commission noting that the policy is indeed expressed in a way that summarises and states values, without one being able to specifically put one's finger on how those values will be implemented in the operations of the company, or who will be responsible for ensuring that takes place.
In relation to the business systems, finance systems and software systems discussed above, therefore there is a mixed bag. Accepting that the policy documents by their nature are aspirational and indicative for the Company which is not yet an approved provider of aged care, and recognising that in many areas of its proposed operation the policy as expressed is adequate, there remain key areas of confusion and inadequacy in the systems as expressed.
I introduce into the notion of 'systems' the proposed governance arrangements for the company, and in particular the proposed appointment of a board of directors and the composition of that board. It is first however necessary to divert back into the legislation in relation to governance.
The legislation imposes specific requirements for certain approved providers relating to their governing bodies. Subsection 63-1D(2) of the Aged Care Act requires, subject to certain exceptions, that the approved provider must ensure that a majority of the members of the governing body are independent non-executive members, and at least one member of the governing body of the provider has experience in the provision of clinical care. Logically, subsection 63-1D(2) thus requires a governing body of at least three individuals.
The exceptions are relevant, as is the definition of 'governing body'. Dealing first with the definition of 'governing body' that term is defined to mean the board of directors for a body incorporated under the Corporation Act 2001. An alternative definition of governing body is provided 'otherwise', but upon closer examination of the text of the legislation in this regard it is clear that the alternative definition of governing body would not apply to the Company, because it is a body corporate incorporated under the Corporations Act. It is not an alternative at large, but rather an alternative only if the Company were not a body corporate under the Corporations Act.
The exception to subsection 63-1D(2) of the Aged Care Act includes providers where there are fewer than 5 members of the governing body (i.e. board of directors) and the provider provides aged care for less than 40 individuals. There are other exceptions for Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations and for providers the subject of a determination that the responsibility would not apply to them.
In that regard, the Aged Care Act permits the Commission to determine that the responsibilities relating to the governing body not apply to an approved provider on application and after the Commission takes into account a range of matters provided for at section 63-1E of the Aged Care Act. It would be open to the Company to apply for exemption under that provision, and the existence of such a provision was relied upon by the Commission in response to my questions in the course of submissions as to whether the governance provisions thus indicated a statutory intention that small private companies not generally be approved as providers of aged care.
The requirements as to the governing body are in addition to a requirement that an approved provider establish a quality care advisory body (for example).
In the course of her evidence Ms Chillura addressed the board of directors issue, prompting queries from me as to why that term was being used and where the notion of the need for a board of directors had come from. Ms Chillura had indicated the requirement was brought to her attention via the application form and in discussions with Commission staff, and was to be resolved by her appointing members to a board of directors.
Upon further examination of the legislative scheme, as set out above, it is clear that a corporation that is an approved provider of aged care must have a board of directors consisting of at least 3 members, the majority of whom (i.e. at least 2) are independent non-executive members and 1 of whom has clinical experience. The legislative scheme thus integrates with the Corporations law in this regard, and then imposes additional requirements on the governance of aged care providers.
It should be remembered that the Company is a private company with a sole shareholder and sole director. A private company, generally, must have at least one director, but the Aged Care Act clearly imposes a more onerous requirement on approved providers of aged care, subject to discretionary exemption.
I am concerned that Ms Chillura in her evidence confirmed that she has no intention of changing the structure of the Company from one where she is the sole director and shareholder. That structure is at odds with the requirements of the Aged Care Act in a way that cannot be adequately addressed by the appointment of a consultative board or a quality care advisory body.
As to the available exceptions, it would appear that the exception at subsection 63-1D(2) of the Aged Care Act would be unlikely to be available or relied upon by the Company, given it is currently operating at a scale in relation to care management well in excess of 40 individuals. It would be necessary for the Company to pursue an application for discretionary exemption under section 63-1E of the Aged Care Act to be compliant with its obligations in relation to its governing body.
Ultimately, in relation to the Company's systems, in the sense of Governance systems, I am concerned that if the Company had been approved to be a provider of aged care it would have instantly upon approval been non-compliant with section 63-1D of the Aged Care Act (absent any application and favourable exercise of discretion under section 63-1E of the Aged Care Act). I am further concerned that the evidence, arrangements and solutions proposed by Ms Chillura in relation to the Company's governance suggests that the particular requirements around systems of corporate governance are not fully understood and nor was there ever a clear plan to bring the Company into compliance with section 63-1D of the Aged Care Act. Inherent in my conclusions in this regard is a construction of section 63-1D of the Aged Care Act that concludes that a 'board of directors' appointed by the sole shareholder and director of the Company, who will not in fact be directors of the Company within the meaning of the Corporations lawwould not satisfy the requirements of the provision.
I have taken into account the Company's 'Management Structure and Governance Framework' Policy,[25] but noted that it does not specifically address the issue of the members of the board of directors being directors of the Company under the Corporations law in fact, and the 'Organizational (sic) Structure' diagram shows positions such as Director of Finance, Director of Clinical Services and Director of Operations sitting outside the Board of Directors and subordinate to the Chief Executive Officer. Indeed, terminology relating to directorships and the board of directors appears to be used unsatisfactorily loosely in my view during Ms Chillura's evidence and the evidence of the Company generally given the context of the matter. References made in the policy to the role of the board governing the Company is not consistent with Ms Chillura's evidence that she intends to remain the sole shareholder and director of the Company. My examination of the policy in this regard does not address my concerns over proposed governance and compliance with section 63-1D of the Aged Care Act.
The 'board of directors' and the membership thereof as proposed by the Company may be the basis of a quality care advisory board or a consumer advisory board within the meaning of section 63-1D of the Aged Care Act, but the responsibilities of approved providers relating to their governing bodies under section 63-1D of the Aged Care Act set out arrangements regarding such bodies as additional to, and not in substitution of, the obligation to have compliant governing bodies.
This is a weighty adverse consideration in my view as to the suitability of the Company to be approved as a provider of aged care.
I turn to consider paragraph 63D(3)(d) of the Commission Act, which requires that I consider the company's record of financial management and the methods the company uses or proposes to use in order to ensure sound financial management.
I have had regard to the Company's policies in relation to financial matters, noting the existence of policies pertaining to client fees and charges including any charges in excess of funds available in the package,[26] the financial report - Aged Care policy[27] and the Financial Management policy[28].
To return again to the issue of the board of directors in the context of financial management, I note that the Financial Management policy proposes a role for the 'board' as holding ultimate financial responsibility for overseeing the financial management of the Company, including compliance with the legislative requirements, approving the budget, monitoring the financial health of the business through receiving financial reports and providing oversight of the management of care recipient funds. The Chief Executive Officer's role is said to include the provision of financial monitoring information to the board. It can be seen that if the reference to the 'board' in this policy is intended to be the board of directors of the Company as that term is understood by reference to the Corporations law, as Ms Chillura has said that she has no plans to change the structure of the corporation, the policy proposes that the board would consistent of Ms Chillura in her capacity as sole director, and thus the distinction between the board and CEO set out in the policy in relation to financial oversight would make no sense. If the reference to the 'board' is a reference to the group of individuals Ms Chillura proposes to appoint to the board, but who will not be directors of the Company under the Corporations law, the structure provides limited safeguards in relation to financial probity because the members of that board would hold their positions only through the CEO. This is an example of the concerns I have expressed in relation to governance systems manifesting in the context of methods proposed to be used in order to ensure sound financial management.
The financial management policy otherwise describes a role for a Head of Finance and a finance team, articulating roles and responsibilities and proposed methods for sound financial management. The policy describes the Company having access to external accountants, establishing prudent controls over banking, insurance arrangements, purchasing and procurement and financial reporting. The policy proposes annual audits through independent auditors.
The policy sets out financial delegations, although again the issues I have mentioned with the unclear distinction between the 'board' and the CEO raises some questions about how the proposed delegations would work in practice. The policy refers to a position of 'Chief Financial Officer' (CFO) which was not used in the course of the evidence, but it may be synonymous with the position of Director of Finance.
As to the policy documents pertaining to methods the company uses or proposes to use in order to ensure sound financial management, the concerns I have expressed in relation to general governance matters applies. In relation to other matters addressed in the policy documents pertaining to financial management, no specific criticism was advanced by the Commission, and the policy appears suitable subject to the concern I have expressed, which is somewhat fundamental.
I note the company relied on $100,000 in total capital consisting of $50,000 in start up costs and $50,000. The quantum of available funds was considered satisfactory and the issue was considered to be settled by the decision-maker in the Commission on reconsideration. This issue was not agitated in the hearing and there is no basis in the evidence for me to form a different view.
I may consider the matter in paragraph 63D(3)(d) of the Commission Act in relation to any or all of the key personnel of the Company. It is clearly appropriate that I consider this matter in relation to Ms CC who is proposed to be the Director of Finance.
In light of Ms CC's evidence of her qualifications and experience, I consider she is a sound proposition for holding the position of Director of Finance. I do not accept the submissions of the Commissioner that Ms CC is not qualified for the role. In this regard, I note her tertiary and post graduate qualifications and status as a Chartered Accountant, and have been persuaded by the reference in her evidence to the practical experience she has undertaken in large businesses working in highly regulated industries.
It may well be true that more experienced or later-career candidates would be more suitable to hold the role of Director of Finance, but having regard to Ms CC's qualification and experience I am satisfied that she is suitable to hold that role for the Company. I note she spoke about her previous roles in relation to financial management and proposed approach to directing the financial affairs of the Company in a competent manner.
There is no adverse information before me in relation to the Company's record of financial management in relation to its current or recent activities
In relation to the Company's record of financial management I have reached no conclusion adverse to the proposition that it is suitable to provide aged care. In relation to the methods the Company proposes to use in order to ensure sound financial management, I hold adverse concerns similar to those expressed in relation to its systems of governance regarding the proposed role of the board and the lack of clarity around how that structure will work in practice and how what is proposed will comply with the Aged Care Act. I do not hold adverse concerns in relation to the methods the company uses or proposes to use in order to ensure sound financial management in relation to the professional qualification and experience of the proposed Director of Finance, Ms CC.

In the course of these reasons I have recognised the Company's considerable experience in providing care management services for its principal contractor and attributed signficant favourable weight in that regard. Likewise, I consider the Company has proposed suitable individuals for key roles pertaining to Operations and Finance, I have also recognised that the Company has engaged with the Commissioner in developing its policies and addressing concerns as they have arisen, although I have also identified some shortcomings in these reasons.
I have articulated some specific concerns. I am concerned that the Company has proposed key personnel for the position of Director of Clinical Services who is not qualified and not experienced for the role, and indeed engaged that person even after the individual accepted that she did not have the requisite experience. The absence of a suitable Director of Clinical Operations is a serious impediment to accepting the Company to be suitable to provide aged care in my view and demonstrates the Company may not understand the responsibilities it would have as a provider of Home Care.
In relation to the Company's systems to meet its responsibilities as an approved provider of aged care, I have accepted the limited criticisms put forward by the Commission in relation to deficiencies in its policies, but fully conscious of the nature of such policies and the demonstrated capacity of the Company to update and improve upon its policies when adverse attention is drawn to aspects of them. As was the approach in Aussie Care Foundation Pty Ltd v Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner, deficiencies in aspirational policies are not of themselves determinative of the application in my view.
The concerns I have articulated in relation to governance systems and the requirements in the Aged Care Act as to governing bodies are fundamental in my view, and I have taken those concerns into account adversely including as those concerns manifest in relation to financial management and the methods proposed to be used in order to ensure sound financial management.
I have taken into account all of the matters set out in section 63D of the Commission Act, and accept that in order to decide that the Company is suitable to provide aged care I must be satisfied that is so, in the sense that I must have arrived at a state of persuasion.
In light of the concerns I have articulated in these reasons by reference to the matters in section 63D of the Commission Act, I find I have not arrived a state of persuasion that the Company is suitable to provide aged care, and I am not satisfied that the Company is suitable to provide aged care.
It follows that I find the Company does not satisfy paragraph 63D(2)(b) of the Commission Act, and as such subsection 63D(2) prohibits the approval the Company as a provider of aged care.

[1] See further section 2-1(1) of the Aged Care Act

[6] Referring to Schedule 2 to the Quality of Care Principles 2014 made under section 96-1 of the Aged Care Act 1997

[7] Subsection 58A(1) of Schedule 2 to the Aged Care (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Act 2024. I further note the legislative mechanism for outcome of the Tribunal's review favourable to the company to be implemented under the new law at subsection 58A(3) of Schedule 2 to the Aged Care (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Act 2024.

[8] [2024] FCA 1241, a judicial review of a decision of the former AAT which remitted the matter to the Tribunal, to be subsequently decided in Amana Community Services Pty Ltd and Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner [2025] ARTA 1495

[11] Ms Chillura was referred to T1164, Dignity of Risk Protocol, in relation to the role of the Director of Clinical Services responsibility for documenting risk

[12] And I note the proposed board members are identified in the amended application form of 13 August 2024 T680 (alternatively numbers as folio 672)

[14] Plaintiff M64 of 2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 2015 HCA 50 at [64]

[15] Not clear if this is a reference to

Care Quality and Safety Commission Act 2018

Care (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Act 2024

Care Quality and Safety Commission Rules 2018

Si Care Solutions Pty Ltd and Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner [2026] ARTA 431 (5 March 2026)

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (38 paragraphs)

Si Care Solutions Pty Ltd and Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner [2026] ARTA 431 (5 March 2026)

Legislation Cited (5)