SHIRE OF KATANNING -v- BRIDE [No 2] [2016] WASC 314 (1 November 2016)

(iii) proceedings asserting that Mr Bride, Mrs Bride or the Trust are not liable to pay to the Plaintiff rates in respect of Lot 29 pursuant to the LGA.

3 The application is for leave to apply for orders that restrain Mr Bride and Mrs Bride from commencing proceedings in their personal capacities or as trustees of the Trust.

4 The application has been opposed by Mr Bride who has filed evidence and made submissions. I will comment upon Mrs Bride's participation in this application later in these reasons.

(ii) refer to the provisions of the Act and the relevant principles that govern this application;

(iii) provide details of the claims made previously by Mr Bride and Mrs Bride against the Shire and its solicitors;

(iv) set out the basis of the claims that Mr Bride now wishes to pursue against the Shire and its solicitors;

(vi) set out my findings on the questions of whether Mr Bride and Mrs Bride have instituted vexations proceedings in the past and whether they are likely to do so in the future; and

(vii) set out the reasons why I consider that the orders sought by the Shire should be made.

6 In support of its application, the Shire read and relied upon three affidavits: an affidavit sworn by Mr Jock InnessCampbell on 2 December 2015; a further affidavit sworn by Mr InnessCampbell on 27 June 2015; and an affidavit sworn by Ms Laura Jean Groves on 17 August 2016. In addition, the Shire tendered a bundle of documents comprising copies of pleadings and court orders. The Shire also relied upon judgments published by this and other courts.

7 Mr Bride read and relied upon affidavits sworn by him on 22 December 2015, 5 January 2016, 11 February 2016 and 9 August 2016. Mr Bride's evidence was directed to establishing that the Shire and its legal advisors had pursued him and Mrs Bride for rates in respect of Lot 29 for the period between 1984 and 2005 during which period a mortgagee was in possession of the land and liable for the rates. In addition, Mr Bride tendered a letter of advice he had received from a solicitor instructed by him in which the solicitor expressed the opinion that 'consent orders' made by the Court of Appeal on 19 September 2008 constituted an estoppel that had the effect of preventing the Shire from claiming rates for Lot 29 due in respect of the period prior to 2005 from Mr and Mrs Bride.

8 The primary facts were largely not in dispute and the following findings of fact are drawn from the affidavit evidence and the published decisions.

9 Mr Bride and Mrs Bride were the registered proprietors of a number of properties in Katanning that were used for the purposes of various businesses conducted by them and related entities. The properties, including Lot 29, were mortgaged to the Australian Bank. In 1984 Mr and Mrs Bride defaulted on their mortgages and receivers were appointed by the Australian Bank. Mr Bride became bankrupt.

10 Mr and Mrs Bride vacated Lot 29 in about January 1985 and did not resume possession until late 2005.

11 Between 1984 and 2004 Mr Bride commenced over 60 proceedings concerning:

(ii) the validity of the Australian Bank mortgage C337514 over Lot 29 (and various other mortgages) and the Australian Bank's subsequent receivership (the Australian Bank subsequently merged with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, in these reasons I will refer to both banks simply as 'the Bank'); and

(iii) the conduct of Mr Bride's receivers and trustee in bankruptcy.

12 In 2004 EM Heenan J found that Mr Bride and Mrs Bride, both in their personal capacities and in their capacities as trustees of the Trust, had instituted and conducted vexatious proceedings. His Honour made an order pursuant to the Act prohibiting Mr and Mrs Bride from pursuing or instituting any legal proceedings arising from or associated with their defaults under the securities over their Katanning properties against those engaged in the enforcement of the securities or the resolution of the litigation and the disputes which followed: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Bride [2004] WASC 177.

13 The Shire's claim that Mr Bride was liable for the outstanding rates and charges in respect of Lot 29 dates back to 1994 and it has given rise directly or indirectly to the proceedings described in the following paragraphs.

(i) In 1994 the Shire commenced proceedings for the recovery of rates due in respect of Lot 29 in the Local Court but these proceedings were subsequently discontinued.

(ii) In 2002 Mr Bride and Mrs Bride, in their capacities as trustees of the Trust, commenced proceedings against the Shire, the Bank and the accountancy firm, then known as Peat Marwick Mitchell KPMG (District Court action No 2297 of 2002). In subsequent proceedings Mr Bride acknowledged that the action was brought in order to seek a determination that the Bank as mortgagee in possession was responsible for the outstanding rates but the real purpose of the action was to renew allegations against the Bank and its receivers, to the effect that the securities held by the Bank over Lot 29 were not valid and the receivers had acted unlawfully in taking possession of the property and in selling plant, equipment and stock. EM Heenan J found that this action was a plain example of the Brides instituting and attempting to prosecute an action which was plainly an abuse of process: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Bride [2004] WASC 177 at [84] [86].

(iii) In 2004 the Shire commenced proceedings (PE 19525 of 2004) against Mr Bride for the recovery of rates that were outstanding at 31 July 2004. The sum claimed was $12,489.28. The proceedings were commenced in the Local Court, (subsequently the Magistrates Court). For ease of reference, I will refer to these proceedings as the Magistrates Court proceedings.

(iv) Mr Bride's defence to the Shire's claim in the Magistrates Court proceedings included a claim that the Bank was the mortgagee in possession of Lot 29 during the relevant period and therefore it was liable for the rates. On 8 November 2005 the Shire applied successfully to strike out Mr Bride's defence on the basis that the mortgagee in possession issue had been previously decided against Mr Bride. Judgment was entered for the Shire.

(v) Mr Bride appealed unsuccessfully to District Court: Bride v Shire of Katanning [2007] WADC 116 (O'Brien DCJ).

(vi) In 2008 Mr Bride applied to this court for an extension of time within which to appeal against the District Court decision. Martin CJ granted the extension and Mr Bride commenced an appeal: Bride v Shire of Katanning [2008] WASC 131.

(vii) On 18 September 2008 Mr Bride and the Shire's solicitor signed consent orders, setting aside the orders of O'Brien DCJ and the decision of the Magistrate and remitting the matter back to the Magistrates Court for rehearing. Mr Bride's relied heavily on these consent orders in his submissions in opposition to this application and I return to this issue later in these reasons.

(viii) On 23 December 2008 Mr Bride filed a counterclaim in the Magistrates Court proceedings for $2.4 million. As a consequence of the amount claimed by Mr Bride, the counterclaim was transferred to this court and numbered CIV 2170 of 2009.

(ix) The Shire commenced proceedings in this court for the payment of rates from 1985 to 2004, these were numbered CIV 2994 of 2009. It subsequently commenced proceedings in this court numbered CIV 2853 of 2010 in which it claimed rates from 2005 (after Mr Bride re-took possession of Lot 29) to the date of judgment. It appears that the proceedings numbered CIV 2170 of 2009 and CIV 2994 of 2009 were consolidated and action CIV 2994 of 2009 became the lead action.

(x) Proceedings CIV 2994 of 2009 and CIV 2853 of 2010 were case managed together. In the course of the proceedings, Martin CJ ordered that the hearing of Mr Bride's counterclaim be deferred pending the determination of the Shire's claim. Although I have not been provided with a transcript of the hearing at which the Chief Justice made that order, in Shire of Katanning v Bride [No 4] [2014] WASC 343, Chaney J recorded that at a directions hearing before Martin CJ on 2 December 2009 Mr Bride acknowledged that should the Shire succeed in its claim for rates, then the counterclaim would fall away. At that hearing Martin CJ said:

Then it just seems to me that the most sensible thing is to try the claim for rates and leave the counterclaim over, because if the Shire succeeds then the counterclaim is history. If the Shire does not succeed, then we can worry about the counterclaim.

(xi) The Shire's claims in CIV 2994 of 2009 and CIV 2853 of 20l0 were heard by Allanson J. Conformably with Martin CJ's order Mr Bride's counterclaim was reserved for determination after the hearing of the Shire's claims. Allanson J held that the Bank was never in 'actual possession' of Lot 29. His Honour held that, at all times, Mr Bride was the registered proprietor, and, if the Bank were not in possession, he had the right of possession, and thus was the 'owner' under the LGA and responsible for the payment of rates: Shire of Katanning v Bride [No 2] [2011] WASC 248.

(xii) Mr Bride appealed unsuccessfully. The Court of Appeal found that Mr Bride was liable to the Shire for unpaid rates claimed by it, albeit on a different basis to Allanson J. In the course of its reasons, the Court of Appeal held that the Bank was a mortgagee in possession of Lot 29, at least from 1989: Bride v Shire of Katanning [2013] WASCA 154 [134] (Edelman J, Murphy & Newnes JJA agreeing). In a document annexed and marked 'E.J.B 3' to Mr Bride's affidavit of 22 December 2015 Mr Bride described the Court of Appeal's decision as resting on a technical point and added that the court ordered that the Brides were responsible for all the rates owed on Lot 29 from 1984 'to protect McLeods'.

(xiii) Mr Bride applied unsuccessfully for special leave to appeal to the High Court.

(xiv) Notwithstanding that Mr Bride had previously acknowledged that if the Shire succeeded in its claims his counterclaim would fall away, following his unsuccessful appeal to the Court of Appeal, Mr Bride pursued his counterclaim. The counterclaim was listed for directions before Allanson J but Mr Bride applied successfully to have Allanson J recuse himself from hearing the counterclaim: Shire of Katanning v Bride [No 3] [2014] WASC 143. In the course of submissions in support of the recusal application Mr Bride made scurrilous allegations about the integrity of Allanson J, (see Allanson J's reasons at [14]).

(xv) Chaney J dismissed Mr Bride's counterclaim: Shire of Katanning v Bride [No 4] [2014] WASC 343.

(xvi) Mr Bride appealed to the Court of Appeal from Chaney J's order dismissing his counterclaim, the appeal was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success: Bride v Shire of Katanning [2015] WASCA 77.

(xvii) Mr Bride appealed against a decision of a Registrar of the Court made in the course of taxing the Shire's bill of costs of the actions heard before Allanson J. Mr Bride's grounds of appeal included a contention that, in the course of the taxation process, he had discovered new evidence that disclosed that the Shire's solicitor had allegedly obtained a witness statement that was factually incorrect and that the solicitor knowingly misled the court. Chaney J dismissed the appeal and held that the appeal was an abuse of process: Shire of Katanning v Bride [No 5] [2014] WASC 470 [9].

(xviii) On 2 June 2015 Mr Bride commenced proceedings in this court against the Shire and its solicitors, McLeods. Under the heading 'indorsement of claim', Mr Bride pleaded a statement of claim that alleged various forms of fraud and misconduct against the Shire and McLeods. Mr Bride claimed general damages of $2,500,000. Mr Bride appeared to make the claim on behalf of himself, Mrs Bride and the Trust. The writ was struck out on 30 July 2015 for non-compliance with the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA).

(xix) On 2 August 2015 Mr Bride issued an originating application in the Federal Court of Australia against the Shire and McLeods. On 10 February 2016 McKerracher J dismissed the application.

(xx) On 18 January 2016 a document entitled 'Defence and Counterclaim' signed by Mr Bride and Mrs Bride was filed in these proceedings. The central allegation made in this document is that the Shire and McLeods should have pursued the Bank for rates and that they pursued Mr Bride on the basis of an argument that they knew was 'false, dishonest and untenable'.

(xxii) On 10 March 2016 I dismissed an application by Mr Bride for leave to issue subpoenas addressed to a representative of the Shire and various solicitors on the ground that no legitimate forensic purpose would be served by allowing the subpoenas to be issued: Shire of Katanning v Bride [2016] WASC 118.

(xxiii) Mr Bride applied for leave to appeal against my decision dismissing his application for leave to issue subpoenas. The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal: Bride v Shire of Katanning [2016] WASCA 106.

(xxiv) Mr Bride applied for an extension of time within which to appeal against the decision of McKerracher J's dismissing his originating application. On 26 May 2016 Siopis J dismissed the application.

The relevant statutory provisions and principles

14 Pursuant to s 4(2), an order may be made with leave of the Court on the application of:

(i) A person against whom another person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings; or

(ii) A person who has a sufficient interest in the matter.

15 The orders which the Court may make on an application are set out in s 4(1) in the following terms:

(a) a person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings (whether before or after the commencement of this Act); or

(b) it is likely that the person will institute or conduct vexatious proceedings,

the Court may make either or both of the following orders

(c) an order staying any proceedings, either as to the whole or part of the proceedings, that have been instituted by that person;

(d) an order prohibiting that person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular class, without the leave of a court or tribunal, as the case requires under section 6(1).

16 By s 3 of the Act 'proceedings' is expressly defined as:

(a) any cause, matter, action, suit, proceeding, trial, or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court, including a court of summary jurisdiction, or a tribunal;

(b) any proceedings, including interlocutory proceedings, taken in connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a court, including a court of summary jurisdiction, or a tribunal; and

(c) an appeal from a decision or determination, whether or not a final decision or determination, of a court, including a court of summary jurisdiction, or a tribunal;

17 Thus the definition of 'proceedings' includes all forms of originating proceedings, any interlocutory proceedings or any step taken in the course of a matter, action or suit or any appeal from any decision or determination whether final or interlocutory: Granich Partners v Yap [2003] WASC 206 (Granich) [28] (E M Heenan J).

18 For the reasons given by EM Heenan J in Granich at [44], except for strictly limited purposes, regard should not be had by this court to the conduct of an alleged vexatious litigant in proceedings brought by or involving the person in courts of tribunals of the Commonwealth or of another state or territory.

19 By s 3 of the Act 'vexatious proceedings' means proceedings:

(a) which are an abuse of the process of a court or a tribunal;

(b) instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for any other wrongful purpose;

(c) instituted or pursued without reasonable ground; or

(d) conducted in a manner so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve any other wrongful purpose.

20 In Principal Registrar v Chin [2012] WASC 7, Murray J said that proceedings may constitute an abuse of process:

not because of a wrongful motive on the part of the [litigant] but because of their character. They are repetitious and seek, time and again, to ventilate matters upon which there have been clear decisions showing that whatever process is employed to bring the matter before the court, the matters sought to be ventilated are without merit [140].

21 Further or collateral attempts, by proceedings, to challenge a final decision of a court binding on the party attempting the challenge will render the proceedings by which the challenge is made an abuse of process and such proceedings will constitute vexatious proceedings: Granich [46].

22 The Shire submitted, and I accept, that vexatious proceedings include:

(i) claims with unintelligible pleadings, appeals from striking out pleadings, misconceived or hopeless appeals, appeals which lack any legal basis and the institution of applications or proceedings which have absolutely no prospect of success: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Bride [2004] WASC 177 [127]; and

(ii) claims instituted by a litigant who 'sees dark conspiracies and a threat of great harm to himself or herself in wrongs of another': Attorney General v Michael [1999] WASCA 181 [126] (Anderson J).

The claims made by Mr Bride and Mrs Bride Defence and Counterclaim in Magistrates Court proceedings

23 On 23 December 2008, Mr Bride lodged two separate documents in the Magistrate's Court proceedings one a counterclaim and the other a (new) statement of defence.

24 In his new defence, Mr Bride alleged, amongst other things:

1. The Shire of Katanning and their solicitor G Owen of McLeod and Co some time before 29 October 1991 knew that the Commonwealth Bank of Australia had taken over, bought out and or acquired ownership of Australia Bank Ltd and wrote to the Mortgagee as "owner" of the property because of the Mortgagees position as "Mortgagee in Possession" of the property.
2. The Shire of Katanning, McLeod and Co, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and the solicitors for the Bank as 'Mortgagee in Possession' of the said property being 'Freehills' have from 1994 acted in concert to unlawfully and fraudulently mislead the Courts:-

Details of fraud

a/. They knowingly and with intent to gain unlawful judgements mislead the Courts into believing that the Defendant was in possession of Lot 29 Creek Street Katanning and that the Defendant was responsible for the payment of outstanding Shire rates on the property.

25 In the counterclaim, Mr Bride alleged, amongst other things, that the Shire and its solicitors:

(i) Maliciously pursued him and Mrs Bride by making claims for rates due in respect of Lot 29 notwithstanding the fact that they both knew that the Commonwealth Bank of Australia was in fact a 'Mortgagee in Possession' of Lot 29;

(iv) conspired with others to cause the Brides economic duress; and

(v) caused Mr Bride, Mrs Bride and his children trauma, loss, damage and extreme embarrassment.

Defences and counterclaims in Supreme Court proceedings and their disposition

27 In summary, in his counterclaim in CIV 2170 of 2009, which subsequently formed part of the consolidated proceedings, Mr Bride alleged that the Shire and its solicitors:

(ii) knew that Mr Bride was not responsible for paying the rates;

(iii) knew that the Bank was the mortgageeinpossession of Lot 29; and

(iv) fraudulently obtained judgments and conspired with others to inflict economic duress on Mr Bride by misleading the courts on the issue of whether the Bank had taken possession of Lot 29 as mortgagee in possession.

28 In CIV 2853 of 2010, in which the Shire claimed rates from 2005 up to the date of judgment, Mr Bride filed a defence that alleged that the Shire and its solicitors knew that he did not owe the rates and relied on his defence and counterclaim filed and served in CIV 2994 of 2009, that is in the consolidated proceedings.

29 The counterclaims in CIV 2994 of 2009 and CIV 2583 of 2010 were dismissed by Chaney J, who, in Shire of Katanning v Bride [No 4] made the following observations at [36] [38] and [43]:

Paragraph 32 of the 20 May minute pleads what is said to be 'perjury' by reason of the solicitor for the banks having possession of a document but refusing to produce the document on the basis of privilege. That plea is misconceived and in any event does not relate to any claim against the Shire. Paragraph 33 pleads that the advice given to an officer of the Shire as to possession of Lot 29 was false. Paragraph 34 complains that the Shire and the banks through their solicitors conspired to dismiss the plaintiff's application in a District Court appeal from the Katanning Local Court Magistrate's decision in relation to witnesses' subpoenas. Paragraph 35 is to the same effect. Paragraphs 36 through to 41 plead that a failure to produce the notice of appointment of Mr Fear and Mr Young as agents of the Australian Bank led to various Courts being misled. Paragraph 43 complains of a trespass by an officer of the Shire on 26 September 2007 in relation to Lot 29 to recover the unpaid rates. Paragraphs 44 to 47 plead facts related to attempts to recover the unpaid rates.

The proposed claim against the Shire appears to involve, broadly, a single proposition. That is that the Shire pursued Mr Bride for unpaid rates in the period between December 1994 and October 2005 when it knew, or should have known, that the Australian Bank, or its successor (the Commonwealth Bank), was in possession of the land and was liable for rates on it. Precisely what cause of action is said to arise from that allegation is unclear. Presumably Mr Bride is intending to assert an abuse of process which has caused him loss.

Mr Bride expressly accepted in both paragraph 28 of the 20 May minute, and in his oral submissions, that up until 19 December 1994, there was a basis for the Shire to believe that the bank was not acting as mortgagee in possession. Implicit in that concession is that Mr Bride accepts that the Shire had a reasonable basis for commencing proceedings against him for unpaid rates in 1994.

...

Mr Bride accepts that he took possession of Lot 29 in 2005. His only basis of complaint could be that Local Court action 19525/2004 was commenced in November 2004, before he retook actual possession, and that prior to his taking possession, the Shire had no reasonable basis to commence proceedings against him. That argument is untenable in the light of the history of the matter. Edelman J's conclusion that the Commonwealth Bank was no longer in possession by 2005 was at least in part based upon the position asserted by the bank since 1994, and the fact that there was no evidence of any activity by the bank after 1989. A number of decisions had been made in various courts in the years leading up to 2004 to the effect that the bank was not in possession of Lot 29. The Shire cannot be said to have had no basis to assert that Mr Bride, who remained at all times the registered proprietor of Lot 29, was not liable for rates in 2004. (emphasis supplied)

30 Mr Bride appealed against the decision of Chaney J. The appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

31 In CIV 1896 of 2015, Mr Bride alleged amongst other things that the Shire and its solicitors:

(i) falsely pursued Mr Bride for rates and charges in respect of Lot 29;

(ii) conspired with the Bank and its solicitors to 'obstruct, prevent, pervert and defeat the course of justice';

(iii) acted 'with wilful intent to deceive the Court and to obstruct [Mr Bride]' by blocking and opposing [Mr Bride's] efforts to have a judicial ruling on the subject of 'mortgagee in possession of Lot 29 from 1995' determined; and

(iv) taken 'unfair advantage of the [the Brides'] position of no legal training, legal representation and not fully understanding the legal effects and ramifications of the "Consent Orders"' and issues of estoppel.

32 Mr Bride claimed general damages of $2,500,000, aggravated damages 'by reason of the contumelious conduct of' the Shire's solicitors, special damages and interest'.

33 In the document entitled defence and counterclaim filed and served within this application, Mr Bride and Mrs Bride allege amongst other things:

(i) the Shire had 'Dishonestly, Unlawfully and Maliciously pursued and persecuted the Defendants for Shire rates on Lot 29 Creek Street, Katanning (Lot 29) causing the Defendants to suffer trauma, mental anguish, loss and damage';

(ii) the Shire and its solicitors at all times knew that the Bank was the mortgagee in possession of Lot 29; the Shire has erred in their 'basic duty to prosecute the correct party and or entity for outstanding rates and have therefore prosecuted the wrong persons';

(iii) the Shire has taken 'unconscionable advantage of the Defendants' lack of legal representation and resources and to reargue a matter that had been settled by "Consent Orders"';

(iv) the Shire has 'conducted a 3 day ... trial on the basis of and on an argument they knew was false, dishonest and untenable, causing the Defendants to suffer loss, damage, anguish and excessive costs'.

34 Mr Bride wants to pursue claims against the Shire and its solicitors that he contends arise from two aspects of the conduct of the Shire's claim for rates:

(i) first, Mr Bride argues that the consent orders made on 19 September 2008 constituted a settlement of the Shire's claim for rates for the period up to 2005 and, as a consequence of either the consent orders or the consent orders in combination with an antecedent settlement agreement made on 18 September 2008, the Shire's claim for rates up to 2005 was settled in 2008 and the Shire was prevented by an estoppel from arguing that the bank was not a mortgagee in possession;

(ii) secondly, Mr Bride argues that the Shire's solicitors were guilty of professional misconduct in the course of conducting the Shire's claim before Allanson J.

35 On 9 August 2016 Mr Bride issued a chamber summons by which he sought to agitate his case in relation to these claims within the present application. He submitted that if the issues raised by the chamber summons were resolved in his favour this would dispose of the substantive application brought by the Shire. The material parts of the chamber summons were as follows:

1. The Consent Orders of the Supreme Court in Appeal 73 of 2008 was a settlement of outstanding matters between the parties thereto in relation to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, being and having been a "Mortgagee in Possession" of Lot 29 Creek Street, Katanning from January 1987 up to about October 2005.
2. That the effect of the Consent Orders was that the parties were at law estopped from denying that the said Bank was a Mortgagee in Possession of the said land for the said period.
3. That para 2(c) of the sad Consent Orders, being:

The matter be remitted to the Magistrate's Court,

Was to hear and determine the Defendant's (Bride) Counter Claim and Claim for Damages.

1. Any other orders that this Honourable Courts deems fit.

36 Omitting the formal parts, the consent orders made on 19 September 2008 read as follows:

1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The order of Her Honour Judge O'Brien dated 6 July 2007 be set aside and in lieu thereof the following orders be made:

(a) The judgment entered in the Magistrate's Court in action 19525 of 2004 on 8 December 2005 be set aside.

(b) The order of Magistrate Pontifex in Magistrate's Court action 19525 of 2004, including the costs order, made on 8 November 2005 be set aside.

(c) The matter be remitted to the Magistrate's Court.

1. There be no order as to the costs of this appeal and the District Court appeal.

37 As I have noted Mr Bride contended that the making of the consent orders was preceded by an agreement between the Shire and himself. Mr Bride contends that the terms of this agreement were that: the Shire would not pursue him for rates for the period up to 2005; he would pay rates from 2005 onwards; and that his counterclaim would be remitted to the Magistrates Court. Mr Bride contended that this agreement was concluded by the Shire's solicitor on its behalf.

38 Mr Bride did not allege in his statement of defence lodged in the Magistrates Court on 23 December 2008 that the Shire's solicitor and he had settled the Shire's claim for rates due up to 2005.

39 At paragraph 22 of the statement of claim in CIV 1896 of 2015 Mr Bride pleaded that:

On 18 September 2008 Mr P Gillett of Mc Leods, outside the office of the Registrar put to Bride a proposal to settle the Appeal and to "Set Aside" earlier Magistrates Court Judgements and a District Court Judgement in favour of the Shire with no order as to costs, Bride only consented and agreed to the proposal on the condition that the matter be referred back to the Magistrates Court for the assessment of the Plaintiffs loss and damage claim. (emphasis added)

40 In the course of making submissions at the hearing of this application, Mr Bride said that the consent orders had not been raised by him as an issue until after the Court of Appeal's decision on his appeal against the decision of Chaney J. In oral submissions he explained the reasons for his surprising omission to raise the argument that a settlement had been reached as follows:

BRIDE, MR: I was contacted by the local Katanning newspaper and asked to give a story or give a story on what had happened. I said, "No, I will do it on Monday and over the weekend." And this is factual. I was in bed. And I woke up and I thought, "I'm missing something. I there was there was so much going on. How can I go so long and not be stopped. There's something I'm doing and I'm not seeing it properly."

And then I went through a stack of papers in my office and I found the appeal. I found the submissions and they're in here. I found the appeal, the submissions and the consent orders. What I haven't got is I haven't got the signed document between Mr that was prepared by Registrar Eldred, and how that was put out and in what terms it was put out.

But what I do and Mr Gillett signed it and I signed it. Now, somewhere on the court records would be the document prepared in the manner, in the language, which he used, I used, and she recorded, and then the consent orders are put into the legal jargon of the of the Court of Appeal Steytler J and Martin.

And the one thing that the first paragraph is that the appeal be allowed. And I'm I said, "Yes, right. I appeal." I go on. And I went on to the Magistrates Court. Re-lodged my defence and counterclaim. And then I changed a quantum of damages and it came back into the thing. I didn't understand the first part of paragraph 1 of those consent orders. The full legal effect of them and the appeal they allowed the appeal, which was one subject matter only.

41 In his affidavit sworn on 22 December 2015, Mr Bride did not depose that an agreement was made on 18 September 2008 in the terms for which he now contends.

42 In his affidavit sworn on 5 January 2016, Mr Bride deposed that:

1. On about 18 September 2008, P Gillett of McLeods asked if the Deponent would settle the matter of Appeal 73 of 2008. The Deponent agreed on the basis that the Deponent's Counter Claim for damages be referred back to the Magistrates Court.

43 Mr Bride attached to his affidavit of 5 January 2016 a witness statement prepared by him for the purposes of the proceedings numbered CIV 2994 of 2009. Paragraphs 37 to 42 of the statement read as follows:

1. On 18 September 2008 in the foyer of The Supreme Court Mr P Gillett of McLeods, made an offer to the Defendant for the following orders;

A/. That the Pontifex judgement be set aside

B/. That the O'Brien orders be set aside

C/. That the Appeal be allowed

D/. That there be no order as to costs

Mr Gillett also stated that the whole of the matter of outstanding rates would be settled if the Defendant paid the outstanding rates from the time that the Defendant retook possession of the said property, being some 3 years.

1. The Defendant agreed with the said offer on the clear understanding that the action would be returned to the Magistrates Court for rehearing.
2. The Parties were then called into the office of Registrar Eldred who took note of Mr Gillett's offer, took note of the Defendant's comments that the settlement was only acceptable to the Defendant on the condition that the action was relisted for rehearing.
3. On the above terms and conditions, Registrar Eldred had consent orders prepared and, in her presence, the said consent orders were signed by the parties.
4. The consent orders were ratified by the Full Court of The Supreme Court on the 19 September 2008.
5. The matter and a Counter Claim by the Defendant against the Shire by the Defendant is now set for hearing.

44 In his affidavit sworn on 11 February 2016, Mr Bride set out his position in relation to the consent orders as follows:

1. I say that, on 18 September 2008, outside the Registrar's office, Mr P Gillett, the Respondent's solicitor suggested and put to the Applicant proposals to settle the Appeal and to settle the action. The Applicant agreed to the proposal on the condition that the matter be referred back to the Magistrates Court to determine the Applicant's Counter Claim for loss and damages. Mr Gillett stated to the Applicant that the matter of outstanding rates would be finished and the Applicant would only be responsible for the rates from 2005.
2. Before Registrar Eldred, the Consent Orders were settled, finalised and agreed and signed by the Parties.
3. On 18 September 2008, Martin CJ and Steytler J made the Consent Orders on the papers without argument, hearing and or appearance of the Parties. Annexed hereto and marked "EJB 4".
4. I now say and truly believe that the only argument and matter of Appeal CACV 73 of 2008 was:

The situation of the Bank being a Mortgagee in Possession of Lot 29 Creek Street, Katanning;

The proposal put to the Applicant by Mr Gillett was to conclude and settle the action.

1. I say that I did not have the benefit of legal advice and that I did not even partially understand and/or comprehend the full ramifications of the Consent Orders particularly the "Estoppel Factor" in relation to Mortgagee in Possession.
2. On 23 September 2008, the Applicant filed a Counter Claim in the Magistrates Court, because the amount claimed in the Counter Claim exceeded the level of the Magistrates Court, the matter was referred back to the Supreme Court. Annexed hereto and marked "EJB 5".

1. Mr P Wittkuhn of McLeods Solicitors became the solicitor for the Respondent and replaced Mr Gillett. Wittkuhn continually ignored the Estoppel factor of the Consent Orders and falsely re-argued the settled matter of Mortgagee in Possession.
2. Ultimately, a 3 day Trial was conducted before Allanson J from 1 to 3 June 2011 whereby Wittkuhn continually argued that the Mortgagee was not and or had been a Mortgagee in Possession of Lot 29 Creek Street, Katanning.
3. On 1 June 2011, the matter of the Consent Orders was raised by myself to Allanson J, I did not understand the full legal effects of the "Estoppel Factor" which Wittkuhn would have and/or should have fully known, he failed to advise the Judge of the Estoppel and continued to argue the matter. Annexed hereto and marker "EJB 6".
4. Mr Wittkuhn and McLeods have wrongly and deliberately misinterpreted the effect of the 2008 Consent Orders and Judgment to reargue a matter that has been settled by his firms proposal to me by Mr Gillett, as stated by Mr Gillet to settle the matter (Mortgagee in Possession)
5. On the 1 May 2015, whilst I was in Perth, I was contacted by a reporter from the local newspaper for a story on the events relating to Lot 29 Creek Street, we arranged to meet at Katanning on 4 May 2015 which prompted me to examine and research my files to establish the factual position.
6. I say that over the weekend of the 2-3 May 2015, I did analyse my files and situation and the matters before the Court, On an analysis of the Appeal C A C V 73 of 2008 and the Consent Orders of the Court, the following facts now became apparent;

a/. The Notice of Appeal C A C V 73 of 2008 and the Grounds of Appeal related only to the subject of Mortgagee in Possession.

b/. The Submissions related only to the subject of Mortgagee in Position.

c/. There was at Law by consent of the Parties an "Estoppel Issue" on the then and only subject of Mortgagee in Possession.

45 In his affidavit sworn on 9 August 2016, Mr Bride deposed as follows:

1. On 18 September 2008 Mr P Gillett of Mc Leods, outside the office of Registrar Eldred, asked the Deponent if he was prepared to settle the Appeal and the question of rates owed to the Shire, the basis of Mr Gilletts offer was;

a/. That allowing the Appeal would effectively settle the long running dispute between the Shire and Brides;

b/. That the Deponent would be responsible for the Shire Rates from 2005 when he entered the property without the Bank's knowledge and or consent;

c/. That the Magistrates Court and the District Court judgments in favour of the Shire would be "Set Aside";

d/. There would be no orders for costs of this Appeal and the Appeal to the District Court.

1. I say in effect I accepted and agreed to the above offer on the basis that the matter of my Counter Claim for Damages be remitted to the Magistrates Court for determination.
2. I say that we were immediately called into the office of Registrar Eldred whereby Mr Gillett told the Registrar of the possible settlement details, to which, the Registrar took notes of Mr Gilletts offer, questioned myself as to my response and, when she was satisfied to the proposed resolution, she had a Draft Order prepared. She allowed amendments to the satisfaction of each party, she had a final order prepared and signed by Both Mr Gillett and myself as being correct.
3. On the same day, the Consent Order was sent to Chief Justice Martin and Justice Steytler who made the orders.

Assessment of Mr Bride's contentions about the consent orders and a settlement

46 Although Mr Bride appears to rely primarily on an estoppel arising from the consent orders themselves as those orders were made as a result of an agreement with the Shire, it is logical to consider the question of whether there was an agreement to settle the Shire's claim for rates due up to 2005 as Mr Bride contends before turning to the estoppel argument.

47 I find Mr Bride's contentions that there was an agreement made with the Shire to settle its claim for rates due for the period up to 2005 implausible largely because Mr Bride did not act in a manner consistent with the existence of such an agreement. The alleged agreement was not raised by Mr Bride in his defence to the Shire's claims. Mr Bride's claim that the Shire's solicitor had settled the claim for rates is a simple one. It involves no legal complexity and, on his evidence, it resolved the Shire's claim entirely. No legal training is required to understand the concept of such a settlement. Had the Shire agreed to settle its claim for rates up to 2005, I have no doubt Mr Bride would have pleaded the settlement in his defence lodged in the Magistrates Court proceedings on 23 December 2008, but he did not do so. The omission is explicable only on the basis that in December 2008 Mr Bride did not think that he had reached a settlement agreement with the Shire's solicitor to the effect that he and Mrs Bride would only be liable for rates from 2005 onwards and that the Shire had waived its claim for rates due in the period up to 2005.

48 Moreover, Mr Bride defended the Shire's claim for post-2005 rates at the hearing before Allanson J and at the subsequent appeal. This was inconsistent with the terms of the settlement Mr Bride contends was made. Mr Bride contends that it was a term of the settlement that he would pay rates due after he resumed possession in 2005 but not only did he not do so but he argued that he was not liable for those rates.

49 I also note that in paragraph 22 of Mr Bride's statement of claim in CIV 2896 of 2015, filed on 2 June 2015, (set out earlier in these reasons), Mr Bride characterised the proposal received from Mr Gillett as 'a proposal to settle the Appeal and to "set Aside"' the earlier Magistrates Court and District Court judgments, in other words Mr Bride was asserting that what was settled was the appeal rather than the claim for rates.

50 The first occasion on which Mr Bride raised the alleged settlement as a basis for contending the Shire had no claim in respect of the rates due up to 2005 was in his affidavit of 5 January 2016.

51 There is a further reason for my conclusion that Mr Bride's contentions that the Shire settled its claim for rates due in the period up to 2005 are implausible, that is that Mr Bride contends the agreement involved a settlement of the Shire's claims but not his claims. Mr Bride maintains that it was agreed that his 'counterclaim' was the matter to be remitted to the Magistrates Court.

52 There are two difficulties with this contention. First, Mr Bride's appeal concerned the striking out of his defence in the Magistrates Court and the judgement entered as a consequence. No question about a counterclaim was raised in the appeal proceedings so there was no counterclaim to remit to the Magistrates Court. Secondly, on the evidence before me, on 19 September 2008, the date on which the consent orders were made, Mr Bride had not lodged a counterclaim in the Magistrates Court proceedings. His counterclaim was not lodged until 23 December 2008. In the course of his submissions, Mr Bride maintained that he had lodged a counterclaim in the Magistrates Court proceedings before the appeal in 2008 but he was unable to direct me to it or even to a reference to it. In fact the documents put into evidence by Mr Bride support the conclusion that he did not lodge a counterclaim in the Magistrates Court proceedings earlier than 23 December 2008. Mr Bride attached to his affidavit sworn on 11 February 2016 a draft chronology prepared by him for the purposes of the 2008 appeal. In the draft chronology under the heading 'Process and Pleading' Mr Bride listed the court documents that had been generated in the course of the proceedings up to the point of the learned Magistrate's order striking out his defence. Mr Bride made no reference in his draft chronology to any counterclaim lodged by him. In written submissions filed with leave after the hearing Mr Bride referred to a counterclaim that was filed in the Local Court proceedings commenced by the Shire in 1994 and subsequently discontinued. This reference does not assist Mr Bride as the relevant question is whether as at 18 September 2008 a counterclaim had been filed in the Magistrates Court proceedings.

53 In so far as Mr Bride's claim is that the consent orders themselves, as distinct from any alleged antecedent agreement, provided the basis for an estoppel, and now provide a foundation for a claim by him, I am satisfied that they do not do so for the following reasons:

(i) The consent orders allowed the appeal from the Magistrate's decision striking out Mr Bride's defence. Mr Bride's defence was based on the proposition that the Bank was a mortgagee in possession and therefore it and not he was liable for rates. Mr Bride contends that the fact that the consent orders allowed the appeal had the legal consequence that the Bank was held to be the 'mortgagee in possession'. The consequence of allowing the appeal was that Mr Bride was permitted to raise the 'mortgagee in possession' issue as part of his defence. Mr Bride's contention misconceives the legal effect of the consent orders and this misconception is the fault line that runs through the entirety of Mr Bride's case based upon the consent orders.

(ii) It has been established by the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Bride v Shire of Katanning [2013] WASCA 154 that Mr Bride was liable for the rates due for the period prior to 2005 even though the Court of Appeal determined the Bank had been a mortgagee in possession. In the course of submissions in these proceedings, Mr Bride said that he accepted the Court of Appeal's decision. His complaint is that the Shire should have accepted that the Bank was a mortgagee in possession but his argument ignores the fact that even if the Shire had accepted that the Bank was a mortgagee in possession, on the Court of Appeal's reasoning, the Shire would still have succeeded in its claim. The critical fact that Mr Bride's argument cannot overcome is that the Shire succeeded in its claims. The manner in which it conducted its case does not give Mr Bride a justiciable cause of action or claim against the Shire.

54 Mr Bride alleges that the solicitor who conducted the trial before Allanson J on behalf of the Shire misconducted himself in two ways: first, Mr Bride alleges that the solicitor argued the Bank was not a mortgagee in possession when he was estopped from doing so; and, secondly, Mr Bride alleges the solicitor had interviewed Mr Charles Fear, one of the Bank's agents who Mr Bride says had taken possession of Lot 29 on behalf of the Bank before the trial, and the solicitor must have known Mr Fear's evidence did not support the Shire's position on whether the Bank was a mortgagee in possession. Mr Bride claims that the solicitor pursued the argument that the Bank had not entered into possession when that argument was 'false, misleading and untenable'.

55 Both allegations of misconduct against the solicitor are without any foundation. Dealing first with the misconduct claim based on the estoppel argument, for the reasons I have outlined above there was no estoppel and there is no basis for contending that the solicitor engaged in any misconduct in this respect.

56 As to the allegation that the solicitor acted improperly in maintaining the allegedly untenable argument that the Bank was not a mortgagee in possession, the fact that Allanson J considered the same evidence that was available to the Shire's solicitors and found the Bank had not entered into possession of Lot 29 demonstrates that the argument run by the Shire's solicitor was not untenable.

57 There was nothing improper in the Shire's solicitors arguing that the Bank was not a mortgagee in possession. The fact the Court of Appeal held the Bank was a mortgagee in possession does not mean the argument was untenable.

58 At the risk of unnecessary repetition even if it was assumed in Mr Bride's favour that the Shire's solicitors should have accepted that the Bank was a mortgagee in possession of Lot 29 as Mr Bride contended, this would not have changed the outcome of the claim, the Shire would have still succeeded in its claim. The Shire's solicitors' conduct confers no cause of action upon Mr Bride against them or the Shire.

59 For the reasons I have set out above I consider that the claims foreshadowed by Mr Bride are untenable and that they are not based on reasonable grounds.

Mr Bride's submissions in opposition to the application

60 Mr Bride filed written submissions on which he relied at the hearing of the application. Mr Bride submitted that, 'On the basis of the [Shire's] 'Dirty Hands & Past Misconduct' based on the rules of Equity the [Shire] is unable to bring and have heard the [Shire's] claim against the Defendants.'

61 Mr Bride developed this submission by relying upon the Shire's conduct of its claim for rates raising many of the issues referred to in my analysis of the claims he has made in the various proceedings to which I have referred above.

1. In light of the above the Shire, Mc Leods have:

a/. Opposed Brides attempts and efforts to have the (Deed) Notice of Appointment of C Fear and D Young as agents of the Bank as M/P of Lot 29 produced to the Courts

b/. From December 1994 argued a matter that they had to have known was false, deceptive and untenable

c/. Argued before Magistrate Pontifex questions of law and facts they had to have known were false

d/. Argued before DCJ O'Brien questions of law and fact they had to have known were false

e/. Reargued the question of M/P of Lot 29 that they had to have known were at law Estopped and settled.

f/. Put to Allanson J an argument that was "So wildly and obviously wrong", was false, deceptive and untenable.

63 Sub-paragraph 24 f/ of Mr Bride's written submissions exemplifies Mr Bride's tendency to misunderstand the effect of judicial observations and legal principles and to maintain arguments that are plainly not tenable. To understand subparagraph 24 f/ of the submissions it is necessary to refer back to paragraph 23 of the submissions. Paragraph 23 reads as follows:

On 17 April 2014 Allanson J (2014) WASC 143 @ Para 22 determined,

In the peculiar circumstances of this case 'was a position so wildlyit was not reasonably open for the Shire to have taken that position.

64 In fact, Allanson J made no such determination. Paragraph 22 of the judgment cited by Mr Bride reads as follows:

[22] In the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, a quite distinct issue arises. In its application to strike out the counterclaim, the Shire submits that, on whatever cause of action Mr Bride might rely, he would need to show that the Shire's position that he was the owner of the land under the Local Government Act 'was a position so wildly and obviously wrong that it was not reasonably open to the Shire to have taken that position'. The Shire relies on my finding that Mr Bride was the owner in the period covered by the counterclaim as precluding any claim that its position was not reasonably open to it. I may not agree with the Shire's statement of the issue. But when the issue for decision has been put in that way, the fair minded observer might believe that I might not be able to put aside the findings I have already made in deciding that issue. (emphasis supplied)

Disposition Have Mr Bride and Mrs Bride instituted vexatious proceedings and/or are they likely to do so?

65 I am satisfied that Mr Bride and Mrs Bride have instituted vexatious proceedings against the Shire. I identify the relevant proceedings and summarise my reasons for finding them vexatious in the paragraphs that follow:

(i) District Court action No 2297 of 2002 this action was held to have been an abuse of process by EM Heenan J in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Bride [2004] WASC 177.

(ii) The counterclaims in CIV 2994 of 2009 and CIV 2853 of 2010 - Chaney J found that the claims were unsustainable and I am satisfied that there were no reasonable grounds for bringing them.

(iii) The appeal against the decision of Chaney J dismissing Mr Bride's counterclaim - this was held to have no reasonable prospect of success.

(iv) The application for review of the decision of the taxing Registrar was dismissed by Chaney J as an abuse of process: Shire of Katanning v Bride [No 5] [2014] WASC 470.

(v) Mr Bride's 2015 Supreme Court proceedings these proceedings were instituted without any reasonable grounds and constituted an abuse of process. The liability of Mr Bride to pay the rates claimed by the Shire in respect of Lot 29 had been determined by the Court of Appeal in Bride v Shire of Katanning [2013] WASCA 154. Mr Bride's claim that the Shire had engaged in fraudulent, unlawful or unreasonable conduct in pursuit of its claim for rates had been dismissed by Chaney J in Shire of Katanning v Bride [No 4] [2014] WASC 343 and that decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Bride v Shire of Katanning [2015] WASCA 77. Mr Bride's 2015 Supreme Court proceedings sought to reagitate these issues. Although the claims advanced by Mr Bride involved new arguments based on the 'consent orders' or an antecedent settlement agreement or misconduct, fundamentally, the 2015 proceedings sought to re-agitate the very issues that had already been decided against Mr Bride, that is whether Mr Bride was liable for the rates due in respect of Lot 29 and whether the Shire and its solicitors conducted themselves in a way that entitled Mr Bride to make a claim against them. As a result I conclude that the 2015 proceedings were an abuse of process.

(vi) The application for leave to issue subpoenas this application was dismissed by me on the grounds that the proposed subpoenas had no legitimate forensic purpose and the documents sought by the subpoenas would be used to re-agitate issues that had previously been determined. I am satisfied that the application for leave was made without reasonable grounds.

(vii) Mr Bride's application for leave to appeal against my decision refusing him leave to issue subpoenas was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on the basis, amongst other things, that none of the proposed grounds of appeal were reasonably arguable. I am satisfied that the application was made without reasonable grounds.

Are Mr and Mrs Bride likely to institute vexatious proceedings against the Shire and its solicitors and representatives?

66 I am satisfied that Mr Bride and Mrs Bride are likely to institute vexatious proceedings against the Shire and its solicitors and its representatives.

67 Such proceedings have been foreshadowed by Mr Bride. In his further written submissions, in opposition to this application, Mr Bride stated:

1. Bride confirms his stated intention to commence a final action in the Supreme Court as soon as possible, limited to, and on the basis of;

a/. The Shire having reargued the matter of Mortgagee in Possession of Lot 29 that was settled and Estopped by the Consent Orders, 19 September 2008 and sealed by the Court ;

b/. The Shire having wrongly pursued Bride for rates from 1994 when the Shire knew the Banks true status as expressed by the Shire in a letter dated 29 October 1991 to the Manager Institutional Banking Section, which reads as follows

On 23 October 1991 Council resolved to notify you as owners (Mortgagees in Possession) of the neglected and dangerous building. (being Lot 29)

c/. The fact that the Shire represented by P Wittkuhn, of Mc Leods, conducted an argument before Allanson J from 1 to 3 June 2011 that they knew was and Bride would need to show;

'was a position so wildly and obviously wrong that it was not reasonably open for the Shire to have taken that position'

68 In the course of the hearing of an interlocutory application by the Shire on 5 August 2016, Mr Bride said he 'would commence proceedings tomorrow on those points only'. The 'points' were 'the estoppel factor of the consent orders' and the allegation that the Shire's solicitor knew that the argument that the Bank was not a mortgagee in possession was 'false and misleading'.

69 For the reasons I have already given, the claims that Mr Bride wishes to bring are without merit and, if he were to institute proceedings to pursue them, those proceedings would be instituted 'without reasonable grounds'.

70 Mrs Bride has not been involved in the litigation with the Shire to the same extent as Mr Bride. She was, however, a plaintiff in the District Court action No 2297 of 2002 found by EM Heenan J to have been an abuse of process. Mrs Bride also signed the document entitled 'counterclaim' filed in the course of these proceedings containing the claims Mr Bride wishes to advance. I infer from her past involvement as a co-plaintiff with Mr Bride and from the fact she signed the 'counterclaim' in these proceedings that it is likely Mrs Bride will institute vexatious proceedings against the Shire and its solicitors or representatives.

71 In the section of these reasons entitled 'Factual Overview' I have referred to the proceedings commenced by Mr Bride in the Federal Court and I have noted the disposition of those proceedings. I have not, however, taken those proceedings into account in determining the issues of whether Mr and Mrs Bride have commenced, or are likely to commence, vexatious proceedings.

Should the court make an order prohibiting Mr Bride and Mrs Bride from instituting the classes of proceedings specified in the amended notice of motion?

72 As I am satisfied that Mr Bride and Mrs Bride instituted vexatious proceedings against the Shire and its solicitors and that they are likely to do so in the future, my discretion to make an order prohibiting Mr Bride and Mrs Bride from instituting proceedings falling within the classes identified in the amended notice of motion is enlivened.

73 In approaching the exercise of this discretion, I am mindful of the observations made by Le Miere J in Attorney General v Michael [2005] WASC 203 to the following effect:

The right of an individual to commence proceedings to enforce or defend his rights is one of the fundamental rights in a free society. The rule of law requires that ordinarily a person should have access to the courts in order to invoke their jurisdiction. To limit this right represents a major restriction on the liberty of the individual for which there must be a proper and adequate justification. The effect of an order made under s 4(1)(d) of the Act does not remove the right to issue proceedings entirely. A person against whom such an order has been made still has access to the courts. However, he is required to take an additional step in the process by obtaining the permission of the court prior to any claims being issued. Nevertheless, the making of an order under s 4(1) of the Act restricts the rights of the person against whom such an order has been made and for that reason the powers conferred by the section must be exercised with caution [143].

74 In the exercise of the court's discretion, there are several matters to be weighed against the restriction on the liberty of a citizen constituted by a restrictive order made pursuant s 4(1)(d) of the Act, these include: the debilitating and damaging effect that vexatious proceedings have on those against whom such proceedings are brought; the stress suffered by those who are the subject of vexatious allegations; and the waste of the court's scarce resources in dealing with vexatious litigation and the diversion of those resources from more worthy litigation.

75 I have no doubt that the vexatious proceedings I have identified have damaged the Shire by diverting its financial and human resources away from projects that would benefit the rate payers of the Shire to the management of the vexatious litigation. I have no doubt that the repeated and quite unjustified allegations of misconduct made against the Shire's officers and its solicitors have the capacity to distress those against whom the allegations have been made. Mr Bride's claims have occupied the limited resources of this court to the disadvantage of those litigants who have genuine disputes that must be resolved in a timely manner.

76 Although in the course of making submissions, Mr Bride said, in effect, that he did not want to be involved in more litigation his actions belie his words.

77 Mr Bride's readiness to resort to litigation and his conviction that he and his wife have been wronged shows no sign of weakening. With respect to him, unfortunately for all concerned, Mr Bride's readiness to litigate is not matched by his understanding of legal principle and practice. All too often, Mr Bride's claims and the arguments he employs to support them are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of principle, practice and what has been said in authorities, (Mr Bride's reliance on the observations of Allanson J at [22] of his Honour's reasons for decision for recusing himself, ([2014] WASC 143), as constituting a finding that the Shire had maintained an argument that was 'wildly and obviously wrong' provides the best example of his tendency to misunderstand the effect of authorities).

78 Mr Bride has evident difficulty in accepting the decisions of the courts. Although he professes to accept the decision of the Court of Appeal that he is liable for rates in respect of Lot 29 for the period before 2005, his claims that the Shire should not have pursued him for rates for that period demonstrate otherwise. Not only are adverse decisions not accepted, but they are undermined by scurrilous attacks on the judicial officers who make them.

79 Although Mr Bride has been the primary protagonist in the litigation with the Shire, Mrs Bride has shown a willingness to participate in claims that have no reasonable grounds or are otherwise an abuse of process.

80 I am satisfied that a restrictive order should be made against Mr Bride and Mrs Bride in the terms proposed by the Shire. The considerations to which I have referred leave me in no doubt that unless such an order is made Mr Bride and Mrs Bride are likely to commence further proceedings against the Shire, its representatives and its solicitors of the nature foreshadowed by Mr Bride and that these further proceedings will be vexatious because they will be commenced without any reasonable grounds.

1. The plaintiff be granted leave to bring this application.
2. The first and second defendants, either personally or in a representative capacity, are hereby prohibited from instituting any action, proceeding, appeal, counterclaim or other application in any Court of the State Western Australia against the plaintiff in respect of any claim or matter:

(i) proceedings alleging fraud or unlawful conduct arising from or in connection with the Shire's conduct in Supreme Court proceedings CIV 2064 of 2007, CIV 2170 of 2009, CIV 2994 of 2009 and CIV 2853 of 2010, District Court proceedings APP 101 of 2005, CIV 2297 of 2002, Magistrates Court proceedings 19525 of 2004 and any interlocutory applications heard therein, or appeals therefrom;

(ii) proceedings relating to or arising from the Shire's conduct in asserting that the first and second defendant in their personal capacities or as trustees for the Pinwernying Trust are liable to pay to the Shire rates in respect of Lot 29 on Diagram 62969, Certificate of Title Volume 1682 Folio 357 (Lot 29) pursuant to the Local Government Act 1995 (WA) for the period of 1984 to 2011 (and continuing until such time as Mr Bride, Mrs Bride or the Trust cease to be the 'owner' of Lot 29 pursuant to s 1.4 of the Local Government Act 1995; and

(iii) proceedings asserting that the first and second defendants in their personal capacities or as trustees for the Pinwernying Trust are not liable to pay to the Plaintiff rates in respect of Lot 29 pursuant to the Local Government Act 1995.

1. The first defendant pay the costs of the amended originating motion to be taxed.