Court of Appeal (WA)|2005-11-28|Before: McLure JA

Shire of Augusta�margaret River v Gray & Anor [2005] WASCA 227 (28 November 2005)

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

CITATION : SHIRE OF AUGUSTAMARGARET RIVER -v- GRAY & ANOR [2005] WASCA 227

Appeal No 37 of 2004 between ROY ALBERT GRAY (Appellant) and the WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION (Respondent) and the SHIRE OF AUGUSTAMARGARET RIVER (Application for joinder and leave to make submission)

MATTER : Applications for Writs of Certiorari and Writs of Mandamus against the TOWN PLANNING APPEAL TRIBUNAL

Jurisdiction : TOWN PLANNING APPEAL TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Citation : GRAY v WAPC [2004] WATPAT 42

Town planning and development - Competency of appeal under s 67 of Town Planning and Development Act (Planning Act) - Meaning of "proceeding" - Whether Town Planning Appeal Tribunal erred in dismissing Shire's application to be made a party, alternatively, to make submissions in an appeal under the Planning Act - Power to order joinder of Shire - Whether State Administrative Tribunal has power to re-hear Shire's applications and if so, the law that applies - Construction of s 167 of State Administrative Tribunal Act.

State Administrative Tribunal (Conferral of Jurisdiction) Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA)

In CIV 1438 of 2004, order nisi for writ of certiorari made absolute

Second Respondent : Mr G T W Tannin SC & Mr S M Murphy

Third Respondent : Mr G T W Tannin SC & Mr S M Murphy

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223

Attorney-General (Qld) v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2002) 76 ALJR 1502

Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v The Commonwealth of Australia (1980) 146 CLR 493

Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v Commonwealth [1990] HCA 38; (1990) 94 ALR 641

Beverage Holdings Pty Ltd v Greater Pacific Investments Pty Ltd (1990) 3 ACSR 743

Blake v Norris (1990) 20 NSWLR 300

Braeside Bearing Pty Ltd v Brignell [1996] VicRp 3; [1996] 1 VR 17

Bridgetown-Greenbushes Friends of the Forest Inc v Executive Director of the Department of Conservation and Land Management (1997) 18 WAR 126

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194

Didasko Technologies Pty Ltd v Comtel Services Pty Ltd & Anor [2005] WASCA 54

Dossett v TKJ Nominees Pty Ltd [2003] HCA 69; (2003) 78 ALJR 161

Esber v Commonwealth of Australia [1992] HCA 20; (1992) 174 CLR 430

Falc Pty Ltd v State Planning Commission (1991) 5 WAR 522

Harding and Read v Shire of Chittering & Ors [2003] WATPAT 147

Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84

Melsom v Deputy President Forrest (1996) 42 ALD 261

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24

Onesteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (2005) SASR 67

Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd [1981] HCA 50; (1981) 149 CLR 27

Pitt v Environment Resources and Development Court (1995) 66 SASR 274

R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd [1979] HCA 62; (1979) 144 CLR 45

Re Marks and Secretary, Department of Defence (1987) 11 ALD 456

Re Melbourne and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1988) 14 ALD 415

Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165

Reynolds v Panten (1999) 23 WAR 215

Riley v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 190

Robinson v Western Australian Museum (1977) 138 CLR 283

Williams v Minister for Environment and Heritage [2003] FCA 535; (2003) 74 ALD 124

Australian Real Estate Investment Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2003] WATPAT 121

Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163

Hicks v City of Melville (1994) 11 SR (WA) 280

Varney v Parole Board of Western Australia [2000] WASCA 393; (2000) 23 WAR 187

1 MCLURE JA: This is the return of an order nisi for writs of certiorari and mandamus in relation to decisions of the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal ("Planning Tribunal") refusing applications made by the Shire of Augusta-Margaret River ("Shire") to be joined as a party to an appeal to which the second and third respondents are parties ("the subdivision appeal") and alternatively for leave to make submissions in that appeal. The Shire also seeks to appeal the decisions.

2 On 5 August 2002 Mr Roy Gray (the first respondent in the appeal and the second respondent in the judicial review application) applied to the Western Australian Planning Commission ("Commission") (the second respondent in the appeal and the third respondent in the judicial review application), under s 20(1)(a) of the Town Planning and Development Act 1928 (WA) ("Planning Act"), for approval to subdivide land owned by him in Margaret River. Mr Gray had previously applied (unsuccessfully) to the Shire to alter the zoning of his property from Rural to Special Rural.

3 Under s 24(1) of the Planning Act, the Commission referred Mr Gray's subdivision application to the Shire as the relevant local government authority. The Shire informed the Commission in writing that it objected to the subdivision application, giving detailed reasons.

4 The Commission refused Mr Gray's subdivision application. In a letter dated 23 December 2003 to the Shire the Commission advised:

1 The [Commission] is not prepared to support the proposed subdivision of the land into 'Rural Residential' and 'Conservation' lots until adequate land use, land management and development controls are introduced through the appropriate rezoning of the subject land.

ADVICE TO APPLICANT & SHIRE OF AUGUSTA-MARGARET RIVER:

The [Commission] is of the view that Council [of the Shire], through its current scheme review, should rezone the land and introduce the necessary planning controls to facilitate the future subdivision, development and management of the subject land as envisaged by the latest subdivision proposal."

5 On 16 February 2004 Mr Gray lodged a notice of appeal with the Planning Tribunal from the Commission's refusal of his subdivision application. Mr Gray had a right of appeal under s 26(1)(a)(i) and Pt V of the Planning Act.

6 At a directions hearing before the President of the Planning Tribunal on 10 March 2004, the Shire applied to be joined as a party to the subdivision appeal and, in the alternative, to make submissions to the Planning Tribunal under s 62 of the Planning Act which provides:

"The Tribunal may receive or hear submissions from a person who is not a party to an appeal in respect of the appeal if the Tribunal is of the opinion that that person has a sufficient interest in the appeal."

7 On 15 March 2004 the President of the Planning Tribunal refused the Shire's applications to be made a party or to make submissions.

8 On 7 April 2004 before any hearing of the substantive matters in the subdivision appeal, this Court granted an order nisi for a writ of certiorari. It also ordered that the order nisi operate as a stay of the subdivision appeal until the hearing of the order nisi or further order of the Court.

9 After the order nisi was made, but before the matter was heard by this Court, significant legislative changes occurred which have resulted in, among other things, the abolition of the Planning Tribunal. A right of review by the State Administrative Tribunal ("SAT") has replaced the right of appeal to the Planning Tribunal.

10 The grounds of challenge to the decisions in the judicial review application and the appeal are the same. As clarified during the course of the hearing, they are that the Tribunal erred in law:

(1) in applying the wrong test in refusing to order joinder or alternatively submissions;

(2) by taking into account irrelevant considerations;

(3) in that the material before the Planning Tribunal compelled joinder of the Shire.

11 Other matters also arise for determination. They include:

(a) the law that applies to the determination of the matters in this Court and the law that would apply if the Shire is successful;

(b) whether this Court can or should substitute its decision for that of the Planning Tribunal;

(c) whether the appeal is competent.

12 In the determination of the judicial review application and the appeal, it is necessary to have regard to the pre and post SAT amendments.

13 On 1 January 2005 the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) ("the SAT Act") and relevant provisions of the State Administrative Tribunal (Conferral of Jurisdiction) Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA) ("the SAT Conferral Act") came into effect.

14 Part 2 Div 126 (ss 1191 - 1228) of the SAT Conferral Act repealed some, and amended other, provisions of the Planning Act. Relevant changes include:

• the abolition of the Planning Tribunal (s 1202 of the SAT Conferral Act);

• previous rights to appeal to the Planning Tribunal became rights to apply for review to SAT (including, for example, s 26(1)(a) of the Planning Act as amended by s 1199 of the SAT Conferral Act);

• the right to appeal to the Supreme Court on questions of law from the Planning Tribunal was repealed and the generally applicable power to appeal by leave from SAT decisions on questions of law to the Supreme Court became applicable (former s 67 of the Planning Act repealed by s 1215 of the SAT Conferral Act and s 105 of the SAT Act).

15 Further, a provision of the Planning Act relied on by the Shire for its joinder application was repealed and the SAT power to join third parties was expressly excluded (by ss 1192(1) and 1213 of the SAT Conferral Act respectively).

16 I start with the provisions of the Planning Act as they applied before 1 January 2005 ("former provisions"). There was no express power in the former provisions of the Planning Act for the joinder of additional parties in an appeal to the Planning Tribunal. However, the Planning Tribunal concluded it had such a power, relying on the definition of "party" in s 2 and on s 51(1)(e) and (f). "Party" was defined as follows:

(a) the appellant;

(b) the person who made the decision or direction appealed against; and

(c) any person joined as a party to the appeal by the Tribunal."

17 Section 51 dealt with the procedure of the Planning Tribunal and relevantly provided:

"(1) In the performance of its functions the Tribunal, however constituted -

(a) - (d) ...

(e) is to deal with each appeal with as little formality and technicality, and determine each appeal with as much speed, as the requirements of this Act, the regulations and the rules and a proper consideration of the matter before it permit; and

(f) subject to this Act, the regulations and the rules, may deal with appeals, and receive submissions and representations in relation to any appeal before it, as it thinks fit."

18 With one reservation, the parties accepted that the Tribunal had the (implied) power to join additional parties in an appeal. However, the respondent contended that the Planning Tribunal did not have power to join persons to whom the Commission was obliged to refer matters under s 24(1) of the Planning Act.

19 Material changes were made by the SAT legislation. The definition of "party" in the Planning Act was repealed by s 1192(1) of the SAT Conferral Act. Under s 37 of the current (ie, post-SAT) provisions of the Planning Act, "party" has the meaning given to that term in s 36 of the SAT Act. Section 36(1) of the SAT Act provides:

"(1) A person is a party to a proceeding before the Tribunal if the person is -

(a) the applicant;

(b) a person joined under section 38 as a party to the proceeding;

(c) a person intervening in the proceeding; or

(d) specified by this Act or the enabling Act to be a party to the proceeding."

20 If the proceeding is in SAT's review jurisdiction, the decision-maker is also a party (s 36(4)).

21 Under s 37(3) of the SAT Act, SAT has a discretion to give leave at any time for a person to intervene in a proceeding on conditions, if any, that SAT thinks fit. Section 38 deals with joinder as a party and provides:

"(1) [SAT] may order that a person be joined as a party to a proceeding if [SAT] considers that -

(a) the person ought to be bound by, or have the benefit of, a decision of [SAT] in the proceeding;

(b) the person's interests are affected by the proceeding; or

(c) for any other reason it is desirable that the person be joined as a party.

(2) [SAT] may make an order under subsection (1) on the application of any person or on its own initiative."

22 However, s 63 of the current provisions of the Planning Act excludes the application of s 38 of the SAT Act. It provides:

"63 Section 38 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 does not apply in a proceeding for a review in accordance with this Part."

23 The reference to "this Part" is to Part V of the Planning Act which now deals with applications for review.

24 Section 167 of the SAT Act deals with transitional matters. It raises challenging construction issues. The section was amended in the course of its passage through Parliament so the second reading speech and explanatory notes are of little assistance. Section 167(1) provides:

"Regulations or rules may prescribe any matter that is necessary or convenient to be prescribed in relation to issues arising when a written law confers on the Tribunal jurisdiction to deal with a matter (a 'devolved matter') that -

(a) is of a kind that is substantially similar to a kind of matter that could, before that jurisdiction was conferred, be dealt with by another tribunal, court, body, or person (the 'former adjudicator'); and

(b) after that jurisdiction is conferred on the Tribunal, no longer comes within the jurisdiction of the former adjudicator except under this section."

25 At the time of writing, no relevant rules or regulations have been made. The State Administrative Tribunal Regulations 2004 (WA) and the State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA) are silent on the topic. Subsection (1) of s 167 defines a devolved matter. In essence, it arises where (1) a written law confers on SAT jurisdiction to deal with a matter and (2) the matter is of a kind that is substantially similar to a kind of matter that could, before conferral of that jurisdiction on SAT, be dealt with by another decision-maker (defined as "the former adjudicator").

26 It is not in dispute that the subdivision appeal is a devolved matter. The transfer of that matter to SAT would cover all pending applications in the subdivision appeal, including pending applications which result from Planning Tribunal decisions being set aside or quashed (before or after the transfer date). The Shire contended that its application for joinder and its application for leave to make submissions in the subdivision appeal were themselves devolved matters. In my view, that conclusion is not supported by the language of s 167(1). The definition of a devolved matter is in terms of "jurisdiction" in relation to a matter. Jurisdiction is the authority a body has to decide the range of matters that can be litigated before it; in the exercise of that jurisdiction, a body has such express or implied powers as are conferred on it: Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84 at 136 per Toohey J. A decision by the Planning Tribunal to order joinder of a party to an appeal or to permit a person to make submissions in an appeal is the exercise of the Planning Tribunal's powers which are incidental to the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to appeals. To adopt the statutory language in subs (4)(e) of s 167, the Shire's applications were "in respect of" a devolved matter. If that were not so, the joinder application would not be a devolved matter because that jurisdiction has not been conferred on, or transferred to, SAT.

27 Section 167(4) is relevant in the determination of:

(a) the law that applies to the disposition of the review and the appeal; and

(b) whether, if the decisions are quashed, the applications can be determined afresh by SAT and, if so, do the former or current provisions of the Planning Act apply?

"(4) On the day on which jurisdiction is conferred on the Tribunal (the 'transfer day') -

(a) any devolved matter the hearing, consideration or determination of which has been sought or initiated in any way but not commenced before the former adjudicator is transferred to, and takes place before, the Tribunal;

(b) unless otherwise provided in the regulations, if the former adjudicator does not continue to exist any devolved matter that has been partly or fully heard before, but not determined by, the former adjudicator is transferred to, and continues before, the Tribunal;

(c) if the former adjudicator continues to exist, any devolved matter that has been partly or fully heard before, but not determined by, the former adjudicator is to continue to be dealt with and determined by the former adjudicator unless it is transferred to the Tribunal under subsection (5) in which case it continues before the Tribunal;

(d) any devolved matter that has been determined by the former adjudicator but -

(i) would have been appealable had the law in force immediately before the transfer day continued to apply; or

(ii) was the subject of an appeal that was not determined before the transfer day,

is to continue to be dealt with as if the law in force immediately before the transfer day had continued to apply; and

(e) anything ordered, decided, or otherwise done by a former adjudicator in respect of a devolved matter before the transfer day becomes of the same effect as if, and enforceable as if, it were ordered, decided, or done by the Tribunal under the provisions authorising the Tribunal to order, decide, or do corresponding things after the transfer day."

29 Subsection (4)(a) applies to the subdivision appeal. On any view, that has been transferred to SAT. Further, it cannot have been intended that subs (4)(e) applies to decisions of the Planning Tribunal that have been quashed or set aside on appeal

30 Subsections (5), (6) and (7) of s 167 apply when the former adjudicator continues to exist and are not relevant for present purposes. The Shire relied on subs (8) and (9) which provide:

"(8) The law in force before the transfer day continues to apply to enable a former adjudicator to continue to deal with and determine a matter under subsection (4)(c) and to enable an appeal to be made, or continued, and dealt with according to subsection (4)(d) or (7) and implemented.

(9) In subsections (4)(d), (7) and (8) -

'appeal' includes a review and a case stated to a court."

31 The effect of subs (8) and (9) is that the law in force before the transfer day continues to apply to devolved matters to which subs (4)(c), (4)(d) or (7) apply. It has no broader application.

32 Subsection (13) of s 167 is also relevant. It provides:

"(13) Where a matter is transferred to the Tribunal under subsection (4)(b) or (5) -

(a) the practice and procedure, and any hearing or other fees, applicable to the matter when it was being dealt with by the former adjudicator continue to apply to the matter when it is being dealt with by the Tribunal; and

(b) the Tribunal has the powers that the former adjudicator had in dealing with the matter,

if and to the extent that the regulations or rules so provide."

33 As previously noted, no regulations or rules have been made.

34 We were not referred to any other relevant transitional provisions. Thus, the SAT legislation is silent on the law that applies in the determination of the appeal and the judicial review proceedings. In those circumstances, s 37 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) applies. Section 37(1)(c) and (f) of the Interpretation Act materially provide:

"(1) Where a written law repeals an enactment, the repeal does not, unless the contrary intention appears -

...

(c) affect any right, interest, title, power or privilege created, acquired, accrued, established or exercisable or any status or capacity existing prior to the repeal;

...

(f) affect any ... legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, interest, title, power, privilege, status, capacity, duty, obligation, liability, burden of proof, penalty or forfeiture,

and any such ... legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced, and any such penalty or forfeiture may be imposed and enforced as if the repealing written law had not been passed or made."

35 It was not contended that the Shire's rights to have its applications considered and determined according to law and to challenge the refusal by way of appeal or review were procedural not substantive. Thus, in the determination of the matters before this Court, the former provisions of the Planning Act apply.

36 The parties also made submissions on what this Court could and should do if the Shire succeeded in its review application relating to the Planning Tribunal's joinder decision. The Shire contended that if the Planning Tribunal decision is quashed, this Court should order SAT to join the Shire to the subdivision appeal (notwithstanding SAT is not a party and prima facie lacks the power to do so). The difficulty with this contention is that generally, the most a court can do when it finds a ground of review established is to nullify the impugned decision. However, on the very rare occasion when the facts leave the decision-maker with no legally available alternatives, the Court still has to remit the matter, although it may order the decision-maker to reach a specific result: Attorney-General (Qld) v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2002) 76 ALJR 1502 at [43]; Aronson Dyer & Groves Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 3rd ed (2004), p 157 - 158.

37 The respondent contended that even if the Planning Tribunal erred, prerogative relief should be refused because the current law applies and that prevents joinder. Both parties' submissions are based on the premise that SAT cannot order joinder of the Shire. If that is correct, it would also affect the appeal. Assuming the appeal is competent and this Court has the power to vary the Planning Tribunal's decision, the Court would have to apply the law as it stands as at the date of the hearing of the appeal, it not being an appeal stricto sensu: Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194 at 203. That law includes the relevant transitional provisions.

38 Thus, the issue is whether, having regard to the abolition of the former adjudicator, SAT can and must apply the law as it stood before the transfer day, notwithstanding it would be beyond its power under the new statutory regime. There is no fundamental impediment to such a course; it is simply a question of whether that is what the legislature intended: Esber v Commonwealth of Australia [1992] HCA 20; (1992) 174 CLR 430. In that case, a newly created statutory decision-maker was established to administer an amended Commonwealth employees' compensation scheme. Prior to the commencement of the new arrangements, the appellant had been unsuccessful in an application to the former decision-maker for the redemption of weekly payments and had appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("AAT"). The new scheme contained no provision for redemption. The High Court held that on the proper construction of the amended compensation legislation, s 8 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (the equivalent of s 37 of the Interpretation Act (WA)) applied and the appellant had a substantive right to have the decision reconsidered and determined by the AAT in accordance with the former law. If this Court had the power, either in the appeal or in the review application, to substitute its decision on the merits for that of the Planning Tribunal, the facts would be in line with Esber. The question now is whether SAT has the power.

39 I have already concluded that, if the decisions are set aside or quashed, the joinder and submission applications are part of the subdivision appeal transferred to SAT under s 167(4)(a). Accordingly, SAT has the power (and duty) to determine those applications. Whether or not SAT must apply the law in force before the transfer is also a question of construction. It is arguable that subs (8), (9) and (13) are intended to cover the field so that, by implication, the law in force before the transfer to SAT does not apply where a transfer is effected under subs (4)(a) of s 167. That appears to be the intention in relation to the devolved matter. However, the section is silent in relation to pending applications in a devolved matter.

40 There is a presumption against the alteration or abolition of accrued rights, privileges or entitlements and clear language is required to overcome that presumption: Dossett v TKJ Nominees Pty Ltd [2003] HCA 69; (2003) 78 ALJR 161. The failure of s 167 to expressly deal with pending applications, together with the existence of s 37 of the Interpretation Act, leads me to the conclusion that the legislature intended s 37 to apply. That can only be achieved in all relevant circumstances if SAT has the same powers as those of the former adjudicator under the law in force before the transfer day. As the applications were made and determined under the previous law and their legality determined by this Court by reference to that law, the Shire has an accrued right. If one or more of the decisions are quashed, the matter can be remitted to, and heard and determined by, SAT applying the law in force before the transfer day.

42 The respondent contended that the Shire does not have a right of appeal under s 67 of the former provisions of the Planning Act. Section 67 materially provided:

"(1) Subject to subsection (2), a person aggrieved by a direction, determination, or order of the Tribunal in proceedings to which the person was a party may appeal to the Supreme Court against the direction, determination, or order.

(2) No appeal lies against a direction, determination, or order of the Tribunal except on a question of law."

43 According to the respondent, only a party to an appeal to the Planning Tribunal has a right of appeal to the Supreme Court.

44 The Shire submitted that "proceedings" in subs (1) is wider than an appeal and that the applications for joinder and leave to make submissions were proceedings to which the Shire was a party. "Proceeding" is not defined in the Planning Act. The Court was not referred to any authority on its meaning. That question was comprehensively considered by Steytler J in Reynolds v Panten (1999) 23 WAR 215 at 225 - 227. Referring to Smart J's reasons in Blake v Norris (1990) 20 NSWLR 300, Steytler J said at p 226:

"His Honour also mentioned that in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (5th ed) ... some 55 instances are given of the use of the word 'proceeding' or 'proceedings' in legislation, rules of court or documents having legal significance. In each case, as might be expected, the meaning depended upon the context in which the word was used. Smart J went on to say (at 306):

'The Oxford Companion To Law (1980) by Professor Walker states (at pp 1002 - 1003) that "proceedings" is sometimes used as including, or meanings, an action or prosecution, and sometimes as meaning a step in an action. The word "proceeding" is capable of such a variety of meaning that dictionary definitions as to its ordinary or natural meaning are not of much use. They tend to highlight the number of meanings which the word can bear.

Any assistance as to its meaning has to be derived from the statutory context and the objects of the legislation in question.'

That must, in my opinion, plainly be so.

The last of the cases to which I was referred in this respect is that of Pasdale Pty Ltd v Concrete Constructions [1995] FCA 1471; (1985) 131 ALR 268. In that case Finn J had to consider the phrase 'proceeding in a court against the company' in s 440D(1) of the Corporations Law. His Honour there said (at 270):

'It is the case that the word "proceeding" can, as a matter of express definition or of proper construction in a given setting, both include or exclude the initiation in a court of a step in an application or action. ...'

It is apparent from these and other like cases decided in different contexts that the meaning of words such as 'proceedings' ... will, as might be expected, ordinarily be coloured by the context in which the word is found."

45 Section 67 was in Div 4 of Pt V of the former provisions of the Planning Act. Part V was headed "Appeals". Division 4 of Pt V was headed "Proceedings of Tribunal". Matters could come to the Tribunal by way of appeal or by reference (s 47(1)). Further, in limited circumstances, the Tribunal could review a direction, determination or order upon a matter involving a question of law (s 66). There being a number of ways a matter could come before the Tribunal, there is no justification for confining the word "proceedings" in s 67 to an appeal. The former definition of "party" in subs (2) (set out above) does not have that effect.

46 In context, in particular the wide variety of decisions (a direction, determination or order) in proceedings that can be the subject of an appeal, the term "proceeding" in s 67 refers to the action or matter, in this case the appeal, not a step in the action. Further, the term refers to the means or vehicle by which the subject matter for determination is brought before the Planning Tribunal for determination, not the subject matter itself: see Braeside Bearing Pty Ltd v Brignell [1996] VicRp 3; [1996] 1 VR 17.

47 The joinder and submissions applications were made in pending (appeal) proceedings. That is, the Shire used the subdivision appeal as the means or vehicle for seeking the order for joinder alternatively submissions. The Shire was not a party to that appeal. We were not referred to, and I am unaware of, any other means or vehicle by which the Shire could originate proceedings (to which it would be a party) for the relief sought. Accordingly, as the Shire was not a party, it had no right of appeal under s 67 and the appeal is incompetent.

48 The Commission referred Mr Gray's subdivision application to the Shire for its comments under s 24 of the Planning Act. The subdivision proposal was for the creation of 20 rural residential lots.

49 The Council of the Shire resolved to object to the subdivision application and to provide its reasons for objecting. It did so in a letter dated 26 February 2004 to the Commission. It stated 11 grounds of objection. In summary, the Shire asserted that the subdivision proposal was inconsistent with (1) the land use classification in the Leeuwin Naturaliste Statement of Planning Policy No 7 ("the Leeuwin Naturaliste Policy") because it would have significant detrimental impacts on remnant vegetation on the land; (2) the land use statements in, and the general policy of, the Leeuwin Naturaliste Policy; (3) Statement of Planning Policy No 11 (because the land was potentially capable of productive rural activity); and, finally, with the objectives of the Shire's Town Planning Scheme No 11 ("TPS 11").

50 The broad flavour of the opposition can be gleaned from reasons 9, 10 and 11 as follows:

"9 The Council believes that rural residential subdivision should only occur where areas of landscape quality cannot be comprised [sic], where productive agricultural land will be conserved and where areas of natural remnant vegetation are protected to the fullest possible extent in the interest of rural character, landscape amenity and as a backdrop to agricultural activity.

10 The type of development proposed for this location merely serves to perpetuate the sprawl of rural residential development across an area, which should be conserved for all of the beneficial community and amenity values that it presently possesses.

11 All the while there is some encouragement offered to landowners [to] subdivide into special rural holdings there will be a demand for additional subdivision. The impact of extensive areas allocated to this [sic] purposes have already been witnessed adjacent to Margaret River at the expense of the more desirable rural character which is appreciated by those who are resident within the area and which tourists come and seek to enjoy. Further proliferation of this form of development is recognised as being inconsistent with the more desirable planning objectives of retaining the rural character amenity and quality of the area."

51 The Leeuwin Naturaliste Policy and Statement of Planning Policy No 11 are policies made by the Commission under s 5AA of the Planning Act.

52 The Commission's delegate, the South West Regional Planning Committee ("Committee"), considered the subdivision application on 19 December 2003. It had before it a lengthy report by a Commission officer that addressed in detail, and refuted, the Shire's grounds of opposition. The report concluded that the subdivision proposal was consistent with, inter alia, the Leeuwin Naturaliste Policy, Statement of Planning Policy No11 and TPS 11 and ought to be supported. However, the Committee resolved to refuse the application on the grounds given in the Commission's letter of 23 December 2003.

53 The Shire contends (and deposes thereto) that its absence from the subdivision appeal would mean there would be no evidence or submissions in support of its position that the proposed subdivision was inconsistent with the Leeuwin Naturaliste Policy, State Planning Policy No 11 and TPS 11.

54 Mr Gray's notice of appeal to the Planning Tribunal sets out his grounds of appeal. They include claims, inter alia, that the subdivision proposal is consistent with the Leeuwin Naturaliste Policy and TPS 11.

55 The Commission filed a responsive statement in the Planning Tribunal. It repeats its ground for refusing the subdivision application, namely that to support the subdivision proposal without appropriate zoning and land management controls is inconsistent with other planning policies. That is, the Commission does not contest Mr Gray's claims that his proposal is consistent with the Leeuwin Naturaliste Policy and TPS 11. Further, the Commission does not intend to call a witness from the Shire to put its evidence and case.

56 If joined as a party, the Shire would support the Commission's refusal of the subdivision application but not its reasons for doing so. The Shire wants the opportunity to persuade the Planning Tribunal to uphold the decision on the ground that the subdivision application is inconsistent with the planning instruments referred to in its submissions to the Commission. In effect, the Shire would adopt the position of a cross-appellant. Its concern is heightened by its view that the Commission cannot refuse a subdivision application on zoning grounds.

The Tribunal's Reasons and the Grounds of Challenge

57 The President gave written reasons for decision. He concluded that the Planning Tribunal had power to join an additional party to an appeal. He applied the test for joinder adopted by the Planning Tribunal in Harding and Read v Shire of Chittering & Ors [2003] WATPAT 147 as follows:

"... if the tribunal thinks fit in order for it to adequately deal with the proper disposition of the appeal, then a party may be joined for that purpose.

The proposition is that there may be circumstances in which merely to receive submissions without more does not adequately give the Tribunal all that is required to effect the proper disposition of an appeal."

58 The President rejected a submission that the test of joinder is whether a party has a sufficient interest. He did so because that is the statutory test for enlivening the discretion in s 62 relating to submissions. He concluded that "it will only be in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances that a person is permitted to be joined as a party to an appeal" and that the power should be exercised sparingly.

59 The Shire contended the President applied the wrong test, relying on the decision of the South Australian Full Court in Pitt v Environment Resources and Development Court (1995) 66 SASR 274. In that case a hospital had applied to the Environment Resources Development Court from the refusal of planning approval. The Court had express unfettered statutory power to order joinder of parties to an appeal. The appellants applied to be joined as parties to the hospital's appeal. They were unsuccessful at first instance, the Judge concluding that an order for joinder should only be made in special or exceptional circumstances. On appeal, the Full Court held that the Judge had applied the wrong test and ought to have permitted joinder.

60 Doyle CJ said (at 276) that the test which an applicant for joinder must pass necessarily embraces both the establishment of a sufficient interest and the establishment of factors that make it appropriate for an order for joinder in the particular case. He identified the important factors (at 275) as the nature and strength of the interest of the applicant for joinder in the decision under appeal, the contribution which the applicant for joinder is likely to be able to make to a proper resolution of the issues before the Court, whether the interest which the applicant for joinder represents in the material to be advanced by that person will be adequately dealt with by the parties already before the Court, the impact upon the proceedings of the joinder and the interests of the parties before it as of right and the public interest in the prompt and efficient despatch of proceedings.

61 In reaching his conclusion on joinder, the President of the Planning Tribunal took into account the fact that, if joined, the "Shire would effectively be running a de facto appeal" and that:

"The role of the Shire in the approval of an application for subdivision is necessarily subservient to the role of the [Commission]. It seems to me odd, if not wrong, in principle to reverse the positions."

62 The Shire contends that both matters are irrelevant considerations that invalidate the decision.

63 Finally, the Shire contended that, applying the correct test to the facts (including the Shire's stated desire to adduce evidence and make submissions in relation to the planning instruments), compelled the conclusion that the Shire ought to be joined as a party to the subdivision appeal. Although not formulated in traditional administrative law terms, I infer this is a challenge based on Wednesbury unreasonableness (based on the principles in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223) or the closely related ground of "irrationality or illogicality" explained in Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 ("S20"). In this context it is relevant to note that the President was not satisfied that the Planning Tribunal would be denied relevant evidence or submissions on the application and interpretation of the planning instruments if the Shire's applications were unsuccessful (see [25] and [48]).

64 I turn now to the Shire's alternative application to make submissions under s 62. The President noted that the role of the Shire was to participate in the statutory planning process both before and after any determination made by the Commission or the Planning Tribunal on appeal and that the Shire had an interest in the outcome of the appeal because it would result in subdivisional activities necessarily involving the Shire. The President continued:

"44 That, however, is merely the consequence of the decision. The notion of sufficient interest necessarily connotes in the determination of that question whether there might be some prejudice to such a party if such a party were not permitted to participate in some way in the process.

45 Can it therefore be said that the Shire's interests are in any way prejudiced by it not being able to make a submission under section 62?"

65 The President then repeated his view that he was not persuaded the Planning Tribunal would be denied relevant evidence if the Shire was not involved. He continued:

"49 The only remaining issue is whether there are further submissions or arguments to be advanced by the Shire which are in some way different from the [Commission] and which if not granted would be in some way prejudicial to the Shire.

50 The Shire's position on the statutory approval process is as I have described. Its concern about the outcome does not lead to the result that it has within the context of section 62 a sufficient interest for it to make a submission. It has already made its submissions, that is to the [Commission]. The fact that the [Commission] has acted in the way that it does does not lead to the result that there is a further right of review to be pursued by the Shire. Again it seems to me that to permit the Shire to play a role is to subvert the process in which the primacy of the role played by the [Commission] is not denied."

66 The Shire contends the President erred by, in effect, concluding that an interest in the outcome of the subdivision appeal is insufficient to enliven the discretion in s 62 and that he again took into account the irrelevant considerations to which he had regard in the joinder decision.

67 I start with the Commission's submission that the Planning Tribunal had no power to join the Shire.

Whether the Planning Tribunal had the Power to Join the Shire

68 As already noted, there was no express power in the Planning Act for the Planning Tribunal to join an additional party to an appeal. The power was implied.

69 Mr Gray applied for subdivision approval under s 20 of the Planning Act. The Commission is given the power to determine s 20 applications.

70 The respondent relies on s 24 of the Planning Act as narrowing the implied power to exclude authorities consulted under that section ("referral authorities"). Section 24 materially provides:

"(1) When, in the opinion of the Commission, the plan of subdivision may affect the powers or functions of any local government or public body other than the Commission, or any Government department, the Commission shall forward the plan or a copy thereof to such local government, public body, or Government department, as the case may be, for objections or recommendations.

(2) Any such local government, public body, or Government department receiving such plan or copy thereof shall, within 42 days, forward it to the Commission with -

(a) a memorandum in writing containing any objections to, or recommendations in respect of, the whole or part of that plan; and

(b) in the case of a local government receiving a plan or copy relating to land within the area to which an assessed scheme applies, advice of any relevant environmental condition to which the assessed scheme is subject.

(3) After receiving a plan or copy and accompanying memorandum and any advice of a relevant environmental condition forwarded to it under subsection (2) and considering any objections or recommendations contained in the memorandum and any such advice the Commission shall approve or refuse to approve the plan or require the applicant for approval to comply with such conditions as the Commission thinks fit to impose before approving the plan."

71 It is clear from the terms of s 24 that the Commission is obliged to consider referral authority responses when exercising its discretion under s 20 of the Act. In administrative law terms, they are relevant considerations to which the Commission must give "proper, genuine and realistic consideration": Williams v Minister for Environment and Heritage [2003] FCA 535; (2003) 74 ALD 124.

72 Section 26(1)(a) confers a right of appeal from a decision of the Commission under s 20 of the Planning Act. Only an applicant for approval is given a right of appeal. An appeal to the Planning Tribunal under s 26 and Pt V of the Planning Act was an appeal de novo. That means the matter is heard afresh by the Planning Tribunal and a decision is given on the material presented at the appeal and without the need to demonstrate that the Commission erred. That is, the Planning Tribunal carries out a merits review of the Commission decision.

73 In the performance of its appellate function the Planning Tribunal was not bound by the rules of evidence, could inform itself on any matter as it thought fit, was empowered to encourage parties to reach agreement on some or all of the issues in the appeal and was required to deal with each appeal as speedily as possible (s 51(1)(b), (c), (d) and (e) respectively).

74 Subject to two qualifications, it is clear from s 51(1)(d) that the parties had control over the identification of the issues for determination in the appeal and thus the hearing was primarily adversarial in nature. The first qualification stems from s 61(1) which required the Planning Tribunal to have due regard to any approved statement of planning policy under s 5AA of the Planning Act. In my view, s 61(1) required the Planning Tribunal to give its consideration to planning policies notwithstanding any concession or admission of the parties to the appeal. Whether or not that obligation is complied with by the Planning Tribunal satisfying itself that relevant concessions are properly made was not argued before us. (See the approach taken by the AAT in Re Marks and Secretary, Department of Defence (1987) 11 ALD 456 at 459 and Re Melbourne and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1988) 14 ALD 415.) The second qualification stems from s 24. As the Commission is obliged to consider the responses from referral authorities in reaching its decision under appeal and the appeal is a hearing de novo, I infer that the responses of referral authorities under s 24 are also relevant considerations in the appeal and that the Commission would need to put the s 24 responses before the Planning Tribunal.

75 That is the statutory context in which the issue of power arises. The question is did the legislature intend the Planning Tribunal to have the power to join a referral authority as a party to an appeal. There are indications that it did not. Firstly, it is precisely because referral authorities' powers or functions will (or are likely to) be materially affected by the decision that the Commission is required to obtain and consider their position before determining the subdivision application. Secondly, in that context, the omission to give them any express right to appeal or to be joined in the appeal is significant; the implication being that they are not intended to have party status in the appeal so as to enable them to advocate their position. Thirdly, it is unlikely the legislature intended that the statutory authorities and other governmental agencies whom the Commission is obliged to consult should, as a matter of policy, have the opportunity to have party status to challenge the merits of the decision of the statutory decision-maker, being the Commission. It would be surprising if the legislature intended the Planning Tribunal to resolve intra-governmental disputes, particularly when joinder has the almost inevitable result of increasing the costs and length of an appeal (see Melsom v Deputy President Forrest (1996) 42 ALD 261). In my view, these are compelling reasons for concluding, as I do, that the Planning Tribunal did not have the power to join the Shire as a party to the appeal.

76 If that conclusion is incorrect and the Planning Tribunal did have the power to join a referral authority as a party, I am not persuaded the President erred in the exercise of the discretion. In my view, the Pitt test does not apply because of the different statutory context, in particular s 62 and s 24. It is to be expected that the test of joinder would be different, and more onerous, than the requirement for a "sufficient interest" that enlivens the discretion in s 62. The appropriate test of joinder is that contained in the rules of court which relevantly require that the person's presence be necessary to enable the Court effectually and completely to determine all questions arising (see O 18 r 6(2)(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court). As to the application of that test, see Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v Commonwealth [1990] HCA 38; (1990) 94 ALR 641 at 644 - 645. That is in substance the Chittering test relied on by the President. Further, if there is such a power, the relevant considerations flowing from the terms and effect of s 24 detailed earlier would have the practical result that a referral authority would be joined only in exceptional circumstances. I am not persuaded the President applied the wrong test.

77 As to the irrelevant considerations ground, the Shire does not challenge the accuracy of the President's characterisations (of a de facto appeal and subservience) but only their relevance. If, contrary to my view, the Planning Tribunal had a discretion, those factors derive from the statutory context and are relevant in the determination of the joinder application.

78 Wednesbury unreasonableness is made out if it is shown that no reasonable person could have reached the decision under challenge, a test aimed at ensuring the Court does not exceed its supervisory role by reviewing a decision on its merits: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41 - 42. It follows from the correct test, the relevant considerations and the unchallenged conclusion of the President that he was not satisfied the Planning Tribunal would be denied relevant evidence or submissions that the Shire must fail in its assertion that the only reasonable outcome is joinder. Further, the decision is not irrational or illogical as those concepts are explained in S20.

Submissions Under Section 62

79 The parties accepted that s 62 of the Planning Act conferred power on the Planning Tribunal to allow a referral authority to make submissions. I will therefore proceed on the basis, as did the President, that the Planning Tribunal had a discretion.

80 On my reading of the reasons, the President does not assert that an interest in the outcome is always insufficient to enliven the discretion under s 62. I understand him to say no more than the Shire's interests that enliven its entitlement to be consulted and heard by the Commission under s 24 would, in the circumstances of this case, be insufficient to justify the grant of leave to make the same submissions to the Planning Tribunal. Having regard to the fact that the Commission and the Planning Tribunal were required to take the Shire's objections into account, that must be right unless the Shire had an additional basis of interest apart from its powers and functions. It is in that context I understand the President to be referring to the identification of some prejudice to the Shire. There is no suggestion the Shire has any interest beyond its powers and functions referred to in s 24.

81 The President does not characterise the application to make submissions as a de facto appeal. However, he does refer to the primacy of the Commission's role and that to permit submissions is to subvert the process. That observation is consistent with the statutory context. For the reasons given in relation to joinder, it is a relevant consideration arising from the terms and effect of s 24. However, that is not to say the Planning Tribunal could not seek or receive additional input from the Shire if it was necessary to enable the Tribunal to fulfil its statutory duty. The President was not so persuaded. I am not satisfied that the President erred in the exercise of the discretion in s 62 of the Planning Act.

82 I am not persuaded that the President made an error of law so as to enliven this Court's power to grant prerogative relief or to succeed in the appeal which is incompetent in any event. Accordingly, I would discharge the order nisi and dismiss the appeal.

83 PULLIN JA: This was the combined hearing of an appeal and prerogative writ proceedings concerning the decision of the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal dismissing an application by the Shire of Augusta-Margaret River for an order joining it as a party to the appeal which had been instituted by Mr Gray against the decision of the second respondent ("WAPC"). The Tribunal also dismissed the application by the Shire for the right to make submissions in the Gray appeal.

The jurisdiction of the State Administrative Tribunal ("SAT")

84 Before I consider the facts, I should record at this point that I agree with McLure JA's conclusion that if the appeal is competent, and one or more of the decisions are quashed, and if the case is remitted to SAT, then it would have jurisdiction to determine the applications applying the law in force before the transfer day. I would add, however, that the appeal was subject to the provisions of the now repealed O 65 r 10 which read:

"1. ... the appeal shall be in the nature of a rehearing, and the Judge hearing the appeal may confirm, quash or vary the decision of the tribunal against which the appeal is made or remit the matter to the tribunal for rehearing, with or without directions."

85 Thus if the Court holds that the appeal is competent it is not bound to remit, but may itself decide the applications rather than send them to SAT for that purpose.

Conclusion on competency of the appeal and the hearing of the appeal

86 I have reached a different conclusion from McLure JA about the competency of the appeal. In my opinion, the appeal is competent for the reasons I give below. I would allow the appeal and vary the orders of the Tribunal by ordering that the Shire be joined as a party to the Gray appeal.

87 McLure JA has set out some of the facts. They include the dates of the application by Mr Gray to the second respondent (WAPC) for subdivisional approval, the fact that WAPC referred the application to the Shire, the fact that the Shire objected to the subdivision and that WAPC refused Mr Gray's subdivision application. Her Honour has also recorded the reasons given by WAPC for the refusal, the fact that Mr Gray appealed against that decision, the fact that at a directions hearing in the Gray appeal the Shire applied to be joined as a party to the Gray appeal or, in the alternative, to make submissions and that the Tribunal dismissed the Shire's application. Her Honour also records the date of the grant of the order nisi which operates as a stay of the Gray appeal until the hearing of the order nisi or further order of the Court.

88 I should also observe that Miller J, who made the order nisi, also ordered that the appeal by the Shire should be heard before the Full Court at the same time as the return of the order nisi. No issue was raised about the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to hear the appeals. I also note that the first respondent chose not to make any submissions to this Court.

89 It is necessary for the purpose of my reasons to set out further facts which appear from the papers. The detail of Mr Gray's application for subdivisional approval is set out in a report to a committee of WAPC which was considering the application. It was an application to subdivide the subject land, namely part of Sussex Location 482, Burnside and Caves Road, Margaret River into 19 rural residential lots of between one to 3.1 hectares, one rural small holding lot for conservation (32 hectares) and the balance of the rural land for general agriculture (80 hectares).

90 As required by law, the application was referred to Western Power, the Department of Health and Main Roads WA. Those departments raised no objection to the subdivision. The application was also referred to the Department of Conservation and Land Management ("CALM") which raised no objection "subject to the preparation of a flora survey and the imposition of a mechanism for conservation of ... remnant vegetation".

91 The application for subdivision was also referred to the Shire. It objected. The decision of the Shire was reached at an ordinary meeting of the council of the Shire on 29 October 2003. The content of the resolution was set out in a letter dated 26 February 2004 from Ms Sandra Boulter, the Director of Sustainable Planning for the Shire. I will set out some parts of the letter. I have slightly amended the content to define terms which in the letter are not defined. It reads:

"... Council advise the WAPC that ... Council wishes to reiterate its objections to the subdivision in the strongest possible terms for the following reasons:

1. The proposal is inconsistent with the land use classification applied to the subject land in the Leeuwin-Naturaliste Ridge Statement of Planning Policy (LNRSPP) ... The proposed subdivision and the resultant development will have significant detrimental impacts on the remnant vegetation of the land and thus to the Regional Environmental Corridor status of the land in the LNRSPP.

...

4. In the Landscape Classes Map of the LNRSPP that land is designated Travel Route Corridor within Natural Landscape Significance and Rural Landscape Significance. P52 of the policy states 'these Regional Environmental Corridors contains significant stands of remnant vegetation that are important for biological diversity of flora and fauna, as landscape back drops to agricultural areas and for conservation and cultural values.' The proposed subdivision will have significant direct impacts upon the areas of remnant vegetation on the land especially when consideration is given to the impact of fire breaks and introduced human activity together with the importation of domestic animals.

...

9. The Council believes that rural residential subdivision should only occur where areas of landscape quality cannot be comprised, where productive agricultural land will be conserved and where areas of natural remnant vegetation are protected to the fullest possible extent in the interest of rural character, landscape amenity and as a backdrop to agricultural activity.

10. The type of development proposed for this location merely serves to perpetuate the sprawl of rural residential development ..."

92 There were other reasons advanced by the Council in its letter, including adverse effect on amenity.

93 The committee of the WAPC considered the application for subdivision on 19 December 2003. Placed before the committee was a report prepared by Mr Frank Scibilia, an officer or agent of the WAPC. The report noted the Shire's opposition to the proposed subdivision, noted that the Shire considered the proposal would have a detrimental impact on remnant vegetation and perpetuate the sprawl of rural residential development, noted that Western Power, the Water Corporation, the Department of Health and Main Roads WA raised no objection, noted CALM's attitude (referred to above), set out relevant parts of the LNRSPP and then discussed the issues. Under the heading "Council's argument" Mr Scibilia set out each argument raised by the counsel and dealt with it.

94 In relation to the Shire's submission that the proposal would have significant direct impact upon areas of remnant vegetation by reason of activities such as fire-breaks, introduction of human activity and the importation of domestic animals, Mr Scibilia's report read:

"The control of domestic animals and land uses which may be detrimental to the remnant vegetation can be addressed by Council through a town planning scheme amendment and Local Laws. Notwithstanding, these issues could also be addressed through the impost of covenants."

95 The reference to covenants appears to be a reference to an earlier observation that CALM "supports and would enter into conservation covenant agreements for Lot 20 (large rural smallholding lot for conservation) and Lots 3 and 4 as they form part of the Regional Environmental Corridor." As to the Shire's argument that the proposed development perpetuated the sprawl of rural residential development, the officer's comment was that the proposal "does not represent rural-residential sprawl as it was envisaged under the LRS since the early 1990s". As to the argument of the Shire that it was inconsistent with amenity of the area, the officer simply disagreed. In effect, the officer's report rejected all of the Shire's reasons for opposing the subdivision.

96 The officer recommended approval subject to conditions. One condition was that no vegetation should be cleared within a lot. However, this proposed prohibition would have permitted clearing for the purpose of compliance with the requirements of the Bushfires Act, clearing for compliance with approved fire management plans, clearing for construction of vehicular access ways, clearing of approved building envelopes and clearing for compliance with approved "vegetation management plans". Grazing of animals was recommended as being prohibited "other than is necessary for fuel reduction purposes for fire-fighting prevention purposes" in a manner approved by the Shire and CALM. The recommended conditions also made it clear that transformer and high voltage switch gear sites, underground power and drainage might be installed on the land.

Shire of Augusta�margaret River v Gray & Anor [2005] WASCA 227

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment (295 paragraphs)

Shire of Augusta�margaret River v Gray & Anor [2005] WASCA 227 (28 November 2005)

Parties

Legislation Cited (8)

Cases Cited (21)