[2007] WASCA 81
General information, not legal advice.
Court of Appeal (WA)
2007-04-20
Smith JA
Original judgment source is linked above.
1 ROBERTS-SMITH JA: This is an application for extension of time within which to appeal and for leave to appeal against conviction. The applications relate to the appellant's conviction following trial before Blaxell DCJ (as his Honour then was) and a jury in the District Court at Perth in 2004.
2 The convictions date back a long time. It was on 6 July 2004 that the appellant was convicted on 15 counts of gross indecency; two counts of administering a stupefying drug in order to commit an offence; one count of attempted sexual penetration; and two counts of indecent assault.
3 He was sentenced to imprisonment for 9 years 2 months with an order that he be eligible for parole.
4 The time within which the appellant was required to file his appeal notice (or notice of appeal) was 27 July 2004. It was not filed until 12 December 2006. It is accordingly some two years four months out of time. The delay may be described as inordinate or "gross". Where there is delay of that kind, exceptional circumstances must be shown before an extension of time will be granted, unless it is demonstrated that there would be a miscarriage of justice if the extension is not granted (Peck v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 20 per Roberts-Smith JA (Steytler P and Wheeler JA agreeing) at [6] - [9]; Buckland v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 980144; 3 April 1998, at 3 - 4; BPR v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 41). Such an application accordingly rests entirely on the merits of the appeal (Butler (1989) 44 A Crim R 215; Gavin v The Queen (1991) 6 WAR 195).
5 The appeal notice sets out one ground of appeal, as follows:
Material obtained post-conviction, which amounts to new evidence, establishes a miscarriage of justice occurred:
(i) The credibility of the two complainants was central to the Respondent's case;
(ii) The new evidence shows Counts 10-12 occurred at a time when the first complainant was not involved in umpiring football with the Appellant;
(iii) The new evidence shows Counts 20-24 occurred at a time when the second complainant would not have known the Appellant."
6 The application for extension of time is supported by the affidavit of Paul Lothar Ralf Meyer, sworn and filed on 12 December 2006. There were 20 annexures to that affidavit, mostly items of correspondence between the appellant's current and previous solicitors about his case, between the appellant and his current and former solicitors (including correspondence containing legal advice and opinion), but also including correspondence from a medical practitioner to the appellant's lawyers and what are described as "Subiaco/Wanneroo Umpires' Panel Grand Final List" for each of the years 1985, 1986 and 1987 ("the umpire lists").
7 The Appellant's Case was also filed on 12 December 2006.
8 The short point sought to be made by the appellant is that the umpire lists contradict the evidence of the two complainants as to the time and circumstances in which they said he committed the sexual offences upon them. Each of them related the offence to times when they were associated with the appellant in umpiring football matches.
9 The offences were committed over a period between 1985 and 1992 upon two (then) young male victims, B and K.
10 The appellant had faced trial on an indictment containing 26 counts. He was found not guilty on six counts, five in respect of B and one in respect of K.
11 The appellant previously appealed against the convictions entered in respect of counts 16, 17 and 18. They all related to the complainant B. The appeal was upheld and the convictions were quashed (Sherwood v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 123).
12 The remaining offences concerning B occurred over a period between 31 March 1985 and 1 August 1992. At trial the appellant denied any of the offences occurred at all.
13 B's date of birth was 13 January 1971. His evidence was that the first year he umpired junior football was in 1986, when he was 15 years of age. Counts 10, 11 and 12 were alleged to have occurred in 1987 when B and the appellant travelled in the appellant's care to Moora to umpire football. B testified that trip occurred at a time when his father became ill, which was in June or July 1987.
14 The appellant now submits that the new evidence obtained by him "establishes and supports the fact" that B was removed from the umpires' list in May 1987. It is submitted this evidence goes to the question of B's credibility which was the central issue at trial.
15 The offences concerning K occurred over a period between 1 February 1985 and 31 December 1986. His date of birth is 21 January 1971.
16 K testified he met the appellant through umpiring junior football and that the appellant was in charge of umpiring back in 1985, which was the year K started umpiring.
17 The offences in counts 19 to 23 are said to have occurred between 1 February 1985 and 31 December that year.
18 It is submitted that the new evidence obtained by the appellant "establishes and supports the fact" K did not umpire in 1985, but was umpiring in 1986, the year he turned 15.
19 In accordance with the practice of the Court, I directed the matter be listed ex parte before me on 2 March 2007. When it came before me on that day, I pointed out to Mr Watters, counsel for the appellant, that it would be impossible for a single Judge, much less the Court of Appeal, to deal with the ground of appeal as presented, since it purported to rely wholly on new evidence when there had been no application for leave to adduce additional evidence on the appeal. Mr Watters sought to rely upon the three umpire lists annexed to Mr Meyer's affidavit. However, these were not original documents, each was simply a one page photocopied, typed, numbered list of names and the only material saying anything about their provenance was a letter dated 5 December 2006 from the appellant to Mr Watters, which was annexure PLRM 21 to Mr Meyer's affidavit. That letter was in the following terms:
"Dear Simon,
Further our [sic] telephone conversation on Tuesday 5th December 2066 [sic], with further documentation as requested.
20 Leave to appeal is required for each ground of appeal (s 27(1) Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA)). The court must not grant leave unless satisfied the ground has a reasonable prospect of success (s 27(2)). The application of this statutory test was explained in Samuels v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473, [50] - [60]). That is the approach I take here.
21 It was patently clear on 2 March 2007 that the appellant's sole ground of appeal had absolutely no prospect of succeeding on the material then before the court. Following further submissions from Mr Watters, and on his application, I accordingly ordered that the applications be adjourned until 28 March 2007 and relisted on notice to the respondent; that leave to file an application to adduce additional evidence be granted; that leave to file any affidavit in support of such application be granted; that any such affidavit or affidavits to be filed and served by 21 March 2007; and that any affidavits in reply by the State were to be filed by 4 pm on 27 March 2007.
22 On 21 March 2007 the appellant filed an application supported by an affidavit of Valma Doreen Taylor, sworn 16 March 2007 and an affidavit by the appellant dated 14 March 2007. This latter document has not been sworn - the jurat is not completed. For present purposes however, I will treat it as a proper document.
23 The application seeks an order that in this appeal the appellant be permitted to rely upon additional material, being the "Subiaco/Wanneroo Umpires Grand Final Lists" for each of the years 1985, 1986 and 1987.
24 On 28 March 2007, I gave leave to the appellant to amend his ground of appeal by deleting from particular (3), the references to counts 20 - 24 and substituting a reference to counts 19 - 23 and to include a particular specifying that the new evidence sought to be relied upon was the affidavit of the appellant and Ms Taylor dated 14 and 16 March 2007 respectively. I also ordered that the appellant file an amended ground of appeal, and having heard submissions from Mr Watters in support of the applications, I reserved my decision.
25 In fact, an amended ground of appeal was filed on 29 March 2007, but the only amendment made was the reference to the counts. Nonetheless, it is at least clear now upon what new evidence the appellant seeks to rely.
26 It is convenient - and sufficient - to set out at this point the relevant parts of the appellant's affidavit. They are as follows:
"3. From 1985 - 1988 I was the Umpires adviser for the Subiaco Junior football district ('the district'), which district came under the umbrella of the Subiaco Football and Sporting Club Inc ('Subiaco Club').
Annexed hereto and marked with the letters 'PNS5' is a copy of [B's] deposition dated 18 October 2000.
27 In her affidavit Ms Taylor deposes that sometime in approximately September 2006 the appellant contacted her and asked her to go to the "Removal Man" in Osborne Park where he had various personal possessions stored. He asked her to retrieve and forward to him various legal documents and football-related material. She deposes that she went to the storage unit, located the requested material, took it home and shortly thereafter, sent it to the appellant by post.
28 It is beyond question that the evidence now sought to be relied upon by the appellant is "new" evidence and not "fresh" evidence. The distinction between the two was explained in Mickelberg v The Queen [2004] WASCA 145; (2004) 29 WAR 13 at [411] - [416] per Steytler J (as his Honour then was). "Fresh" evidence is evidence which either did not exist at the time of trial or which could not then with reasonable diligence have been discovered. "New" evidence is evidence which was available at the trial or which could, with reasonable diligence, then have been discovered. In this case the appellant, as the person in charge of the umpires during the relevant years, according to his own affidavit, was well aware of the availability of this evidence. Even if the umpire lists themselves were not physically available to him because he had (just) put them in storage, he could have given evidence to the same effect and surely could, with reasonable diligence, have obtained evidence to support the facts (if they were so). Where the evidence is "fresh", a conviction will be set aside having regard to it, if it established that there is a significant possibility that, in the light of all of the admissible evidence (including that given at the trial), a jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted the appellant (Mickelberg (supra) [417] per Steytler J, Malcolm CJ concurring at [31]). However, as was explained by Pullin JA in de la Espriella-Velasco v The Queen [2006] WASCA 31; (2006) 31 WAR 291 at [158]:
"... if the evidence is 'new' evidence, then it is not enough merely to show an increased chance of acquittal, Tkacz v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 108 at [49]. The 'new' evidence must be strong enough to show that the appellant is innocent or raises such a doubt that the court concludes that the accused 'should not have been convicted'; Lawless (at 676); Mickelberg v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 13 at [413]; Nolan (at 62 - 63); Easterday v The Queen [2003] WASCA 69; (2003) 143 A Crim R 154 at [371]; Hillstead v The Queen [2005] WASCA 116 at [61]."
29 A trial will not be unfair because the accused of his own volition did not call evidence which was available to him at the time (Ratten v The Queen [1974] HCA 35; (1974) 131 CLR 510, 517 per Barwick CJ). In relation even to an application to adduce "fresh" evidence, the Court of Appeal has some responsibility to examine its probative value to ascertain whether the evidence is cogent, plausible and relevant (Craig v The King [1933] HCA 41; (1933) 49 CLR 429, 439). In undertaking that exercise, it is necessary for the court to keep in mind the possibility that a jury, acting reasonably, might come to a different view than the court on the credibility of the witness or the cogency of the fresh evidence (Pileggi v The Queen [2001] WASCA 260 at [49] per Parker J (Malcolm CJ and Wallwork J agreeing); White v The Queen [2006] WASCA 62 per Wheeler JA at [146] - [147]).
30 There is a real issue here about the cogency and potential evidentiary value of the evidence. These are not original documents. The only explanation of their provenance comes from the appellant himself. They are not otherwise supported by any evidence. Rather than the umpire lists supporting the evidence of the appellant (which he did not give at trial but now says he would), acceptance of them as genuine documents and of what (he says) they mean, depends entirely on acceptance of the appellant's evidence about them. He gave evidence at his trial. The jury clearly disbelieved him. They rejected his testimony. It did not occasion the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt.
31 The umpire list for 1985, which is said to go to the counts concerning B, has two gaps. There is no name against two of the numbers. That is entirely unexplained.
32 Furthermore, on the appellant's own affidavit, these documents were produced at the end of each football season (in late August each year) and show those persons who had umpired during the season and who were qualified to umpire for the grand final. The necessary implication therefore is that there were (or may have been) persons who umpired during the year but did not qualify to umpire for the grand finals and so were not on the umpire list for that year. There was evidence at trial, for example, that B did umpire in the 1987 season, but did not qualify for the finals. The documents therefore do not show the offences could not have occurred at the times alleged.
33 In addition, in his evidence at trial, the appellant accepted that B finished umpiring in the mid-1987 season - which is the time at which B said the offences occurred during that year.
34 Likewise, in relation to K, although the appellant now seeks to argue the umpire lists show the offences in relation to him could not have happened because he was not umpiring in 1985, that is contrary to the evidence the appellant gave at trial. There, he accepted that K began umpiring in 1985 (t/s 433).
35 In short, the new evidence now sought to be relied upon, does not "show" either that counts 10 - 12 were alleged to have occurred at a time when B was not involved in umpiring football with the appellant, nor that counts 19 - 23 had occurred at a time when K would not have known the appellant.
36 The evidence lacks cogency in any relevant sense.
37 There is no reasonable prospect that the Court of Appeal would conclude that this "new" evidence establishes a miscarriage of justice, in that it shows the appellant is innocent of those offences or raises such a doubt that the court would conclude that he should not have been convicted. That being so, leave to appeal would have to be refused.
38 Given that conclusion, the application for extension of time must be dismissed.
(2005) 30 WAR 473
(2004) 29 WAR 13
(2006) 31 WAR 291
(1991) 6 WAR 195
(1974) 131 CLR 510
(1933) 49 CLR 429