austlii:qld/QBCCMCmr/2026/101
General information, not legal advice.
QBCCMCmr
2026-04-01
Original judgment source is linked above.
Sherwood Residences [2026] QBCCMCmr 101
The Body Corporate for Sherwood Residences (respondent)
Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (Act), sections 227(1)(b) and 229(3)(a)
Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020 (Accommodation Module)
I hereby order that, until further or final order:
[1] The Body Corporate for Sherwood Residences has denied an occupier's request to keep her two Toy Pomeranians, Foxy and Lula, within her lot. She argues that this denial is unreasonable, and accordingly seeks interim relief primarily to enable Foxy and Lula to remain within her lot, and to resist any by-law enforcement action that seeks their removal.
[2] The scheme, Sherwood Residences CTS 51109, comprises 51 lots and common property. It is regulated under the Act and Accommodation Module.
[3] The applicant is the occupier of Lot 311. The respondent is the body corporate.
[4] On 10 January 2026, the applicant, who was at the time considering entering into a tenancy agreement over Lot 311, submitted a request to the body corporate to keep Foxy and Lula, within her lot.
[5] Having not heard from the body corporate for 21 days i.e., by 31 January 2026, the applicant believed the application to have been deemed as approved. Accordingly, she proceeded to enter into the tenancy agreement.
[6] On or about 3 February 2026, the body corporate verbally advised the applicant that her pet application was refused. The applicant states that the reasoning provided by the body corporate for the refusal was on the basis of a one-pet-per-lot policy at the scheme purportedly under the by-laws.
[7] On 5 February 2026, the applicant received formal refusal in writing, without any recorded reasons.
[8] The applicant states that had the body corporate promptly communicated its refusal, she would have secured alternate accommodation.
[9] The applicant states that according to the body corporate, the 21 day timeframe commences once the request is internally forwarded to the secretary - in the sense that if the body corporate manager receives the request, the clock starts running from when the body corporate manager forwards the request onto the secretary.
[10] The applicant states that her dogs are not causing a nuisance to anyone at the scheme. She adds that she has taken all reasonable steps to manage them well, by closely monitoring them with bark collars, pet cameras and by being present within the lot as often as she or the other co-occupier can. She also states that the dogs will be carried at all times when on common property, and that the lifts can be avoided.
[11] On 13 March 2026, the body corporate issued contravention notices against the applicant with respect to the keeping of Foxy and Lula purportedly in breach of By-laws 2 and 13.
(a) An owner or occupier of a Lot and their servants or agents must not make, or permit, any noise in the Lot or upon Common Property which is likely to interfere in any way with the peaceful enjoyment of other owners or occupiers of Lots or any person lawfully using the Common Property.
(b) In the event of unavoidable noise in a Lot at any time, the owner or occupier of a Lot must take all practical steps to minimise the effect of the noise on other owners or occupiers of Lots by closing all doors, windows and curtains of its Lot and such further steps as may be necessary.
(c) All musical instruments, radios, television receivers and sound equipment must be controlled so that the sound is reasonable and does not cause any annoyance to any other owner or occupier of a Lot.
(d) An owner or occupier of a Lot must request guests leaving after 10:00 pm to leave quietly.
[13] Further By-law 13 on 'Keeping of Pets' states as follows:
13.1 Occupiers keeping Pets must comply with the following conditions, as applicable to their Pet:
(a) a photo of each Pet must be provided to the committee of the Body Corporate before the Pet is brought onto the Scheme;
(b) Pets must wear an identification tag, tattoo or micro chip;
(c) if applicable, Pets must be licensed or registered;
(d) clean and remove any mess left on Common Property;
(e) ensure that Pets are appropriately restrained while on Common Property;
(f) ensure Pets are at all times kept clean, quiet, controlled and within their Lot;
(g) Pets must not be left unattended within a Lot for more than 24 consecutive hours;
(h) any damage caused to Common Property or any Lot must be repaired at the cost of the relevant Occupier;
(i) if there is an alternated means of access (goods lift or via car park) then Pets must not access their Lots via foyer area and must use those alternate means; and
(j) Pets are not allowed in any recreation area, unless designated for Pet recreation use.
13.2 An Occupier who fails to comply with the conditions in sub-clause 1, must remove their Pet from the Scheme if directed by the Body Corporate.
13.3 Occupiers mentioned in section 5 of the Guide, Hearing and Assistance Dogs Act 2009 (Qld) have the right to be accompanied by a guide dog while within the Scheme.
13.4 Animals which are not Pets may not be kept within the Scheme.
13.5 In this by-law, Pets:
(a) includes dogs, cats, birds and other animals normally kept as pets; and
(b) do not include exotic animals or other animals which are inappropriate for residential uses such as the Scheme, for example, farm animals, snakes or wildlife.
13.6 An occupier must not permit an animal to enter the pool and the immediately surrounding area.
[14] In these circumstances, the applicant seeks the following final orders (to be determined at a later stage if the dispute persists):
For the body corporate to approve the applicant to keep two small dogs without further conditions or enforcement action.
[15] Further, the applicant seeks the following interim orders (that is the subject of this decision):
[16] An adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances to resolve a dispute about a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the Community Management Statement ('CMS')[1] or about the exercise of rights or powers or performance of duties under the Act or CMS.[2] Further, an order may require a person to act, or prohibit a person from acting in a manner stated.[3] An order may also contain ancillary and consequential provisions the adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate. [4]
[17] I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to determine the dispute in question by virtue of section 276(1) of the Act (read together with section 227(1)(b) of the Act).
[18] This application for interim orders was lodged on 19 March 2026.
[19] On 20 March 2026, the Commissioner's delegate requested the applicant to provide further information under section 240 of the Act.
[20] By 27 March 2026, the applicant provided the requested information, and accordingly the dispute was referred to an adjudicator under section 247 of the Act.
[21] I have made this decision on an ex parte basis. However, this does not prevent the body corporate from making a request for the interim orders to be varied or cancelled.
[22] An adjudicator may make an interim order only if satisfied it is necessary due to the nature or urgency of the circumstances.[5] Accordingly, an applicant must satisfy the adjudicator that serious or irreparable damage would be caused without the interim order.
[23] An interim order has effect for a period stated in the order, not to be longer than one year, and may be extended, varied, renewed or cancelled by the adjudicator until a final order is made, and otherwise lapses when an application is finally determined or withdrawn.[6]
[24] An interim order is usually made in the form of a temporary injunction - an order not to do something, pending a final determination of an application.
[25] In deciding whether an interim order is warranted, adjudicators often adopt the approach taken by courts to considering interlocutory injunction applications.[7] The first issue is whether the applicant has made out a 'prima facie case' or raised a 'serious legal question', in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is some probability that the applicant will succeed at the final determination stage. The second issue is whether any inconvenience or injury which the applicant would be likely to suffer if an interim order were refused outweighs or is outweighed by any inconvenience or injury which the respondent would suffer if an interim order were granted. Those two issues of serious legal question and balance of convenience are parts of one ultimate question - whether an interim order is warranted - and therefore should not be addressed mechanically or in isolation from one another.
[26] The questions of law and fact raised by the application do not need to be finally decided at the interim order determination stage, and doing so is not appropriate where the evidence is potentially incomplete, or questions of law require opposing arguments and unhurried consideration. That said, if the answer to a question of fact or law is clear on the evidence and issues as presented in the interim application, it may be appropriate and beneficial to decide such questions at the interlocutory stage.[8]
[27] Even if the considerations of urgency or balance of convenience favour the applicant, it is not inappropriate for an interim order application to be dismissed if there is little or no prospect of success on the legal arguments and the uncontroversial facts, at the final determination stage.
[28] Ordinarily, an interim injunction should do no more than maintain the status quo for a limited time or until the determination of the main application, usually in the form of a restraining injunction. An interim order in the form of a mandatory injunction, i.e., an order requiring a respondent to do something (as opposed to a restraint) which is not needed to preserve an existing interest of the applicant and which imposes a non-compensable burden or loss on the respondent is a special case. It is rarely made by courts and calls for particularly careful consideration, with the effect that the balance of convenience is shifted in the respondent's favour (all other things being equal).[9]
[29] The only question before me at this stage is whether an interim order is warranted.
[30] The applicant has provided evidence of contravention notices issued against her on the basis of a contravention of By-laws 2 and 13, with correspondence from the body corporate urging the removal of Foxy and Lula from her lot.
[31] I am satisfied that the nature of the circumstances warrants interim relief.
[32] I will provide a basic summary on the law applicable to the keeping of animals within a lot in a community titles scheme, for the benefit of both parties, in the hopes that it will further any attempts at internal dispute resolution.
[33] The Act and regulation module empowers a body corporate to make by-laws for the administration, management and control of its common property and body corporate assets; for the regulation of the use and enjoyment of lots, common property, body corporate assets, and services and amenities supplied by the body corporate, and for other matters permitted under the Act.[10]
[34] This power is however not unlimited and unfettered. For e.g., a body corporate cannot make by-laws that are oppressive or unreasonable having regard to the interests of all owners and occupiers and the use of common property.[11] Additionally, a by-law cannot discriminate between types of occupiers;[12] and a by-law (other than an exclusive use by-law) cannot impose a monetary liability on the owner of occupier of a lot.[13] Further, if a by-law is inconsistent with a provision of the legislation, the legislative provision prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.[14] Similarly, if a by-law is inconsistent with another provision of the CMS that is not a by-law, the said other provision prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.[15]
[35] Historically, Queensland courts have distinguished between the power to regulate and the power to prohibit an activity. The view has been that the power to regulate implies that the activity will be capable of continuing, rather than being completely prohibited. However, the prohibition of an activity in part, in a particular case or circumstances may be necessary to achieve effective regulation.[16]
[36] In 2023, Parliament enacted new provisions in relation to the keeping of animals at community titles schemes by way of an amendment to the Act. In the Explanatory Note to the Body Corporate and Community Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2023 ('2023 Amendment'), the following was noted:
Australia has a high level of pet ownership and the keeping of animals in community titles schemes is a pertinent issue as more people choose to live in these schemes.
While there is no explicit guidance in the [Act] about how a body corporate may regulate animals, decisions of adjudicators, QCAT and courts have resulted in a well established body of interpretation about how the general provisions about by-laws in the [Act] and the requirements for bodies corporate to act reasonably apply in relation in animals. These decisions have established that by-laws that prohibit pets, or restrict the size, type or quantity of pets, are unreasonable. Also, to act reasonably, bodies corporate must consider each request to keep an animal on its merits, concerning all relevant facts and circumstances and ignoring irrelevant factors.
...
[emphasis added]
[37] Accordingly, section 169B(2) of the Act which was introduced by the 2023 Amendment sets out further limitations on a body corporate's power to make by-laws specifically in relation to animals (except for guide, hearing or assistance dogs), as follows:
A by-law must not -
(a) prohibit the keeping or bringing of an animal on a lot or the common property of the community titles scheme; or
(b) restrict the number, type or size of an animal that an occupier of the lot may keep or bring on the lot or common property for the scheme.
[emphasis added]
[38] However, section 169B(3) of the Act states that:
However, a by-law may provide that an occupier must not without the written approval of the body corporate for the scheme, or the committee for the body corporate -
(a) keep or bring an animal on the lot or the common property; or
(b) permit an invitee to keep or bring an animal on the lot or the common property.
[39] Section 169B(4) of the Act reads as follows:
If a by-law requires the written approval of the body corporate for the scheme, or the committee for the body corporate, to keep or bring an animal on the lot or the common property, the body corporate, or the committee -
(a) must, after receiving a request for approval, within the period prescribed by the regulation module applying to the scheme decide whether to grant the approval; and
(b) may, in writing, grant the approval subject to conditions, that are, in the circumstances, reasonable and appropriate; and
Examples of conditions that may in particular circumstances be reasonable -
[40] Further, Section 50A(2) to (5) of the Accommodation Module states as follows in relation to requests made under the by-laws for the keeping of an animal on a lot:
The request must be in writing and given to the secretary or, in the secretary's absence, the chairperson.
(a) as a motion for consideration by the committee; and
(b) within the period prescribed under section 50B (the prescribed period)
If the committee does not decide the request within the prescribed period the committee is taken to have decided to approve the request (the deemed decision).
The committee must give the person written notice of -
(a) a decision made under subsection (3) as soon as practicable after the decision is made; or
(b) a deemed decision as soon as practicable after the prescribed period ends.
[41] The prescribed period referred to above is '21 days after the request is made to the committee', as per section 50B of the Accommodation Module.
[42] The remainder of section 169B of the Act which encapsulates other important principles, states as follows:
To remove any doubt, it is declared that the body corporate's or the committee's refusal to approve an owner's or occupier's request to keep or bring an animal on the lot or the common property on the grounds that no pets are allowed is unreasonable.
The body corporate, or the committee, may refuse to grant approval under subsection (4) only if the body corporate, or the committee, is satisfied, on reasonable grounds, of any of the following matters -
(c) keeping the animal would pose an unacceptable risk to the health and safety of an owner or occupier of a lot because -
(i) the owner or occupier is unwilling or unable to keep the animal in accordance with reasonable conditions that address the risk; or
(ii) the risk could not reasonable be managed by conditions imposed on the keeping of the animal:
An owner or occupier of a lot has a severe allergy to a particular type of animal and it is not possible to impose a condition that would manage the person's risk of exposure to the allergen.
A local law that prohibits certain types of animals being kept at a lot or restricts the number of animals that may be kept at a lot
(c) the animal is a regulated dog under the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008;
(d) keeping the animal would unreasonably interfere with an occupier of another lot's use and enjoyment of the lot or common property and the interference could not be reasonably managed by conditions imposed on the keeping of the animal;
(e) keeping the animal would unreasonably interfere with native fauna that live on, or visit, the scheme land and the interference could not reasonably be managed by conditions imposed on the keeping of the animal;
(f) the occupier does not agree to reasonable conditions proposed by the body corporate for keeping the animal;
(g) another matter prescribed under the regulation module applying to the scheme.
Also, the body corporate's approval may be withdrawn if the occupier does not comply with the conditions stated in the written notice given under subsection (4)(b).
[43] The Act provides a limited and exhaustive list of grounds on which a body corporate can deny a request to keep or bring an animal on a lot or common property. A blanket limit on the number of animals that may be kept in a lot, without taking into account the relevant circumstances, is unreasonable.
[44] In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the applicant has raised a serious legal question and made a prima facie case, given her claim that the body corporate failed to make a decision within the prescribed period of 21 days, and the body corporate's refusal of her request on the basis of a blanket one-pet-per-lot policy.
[45] However, more importantly, I would like to draw the attention of both parties to the absence in their by-laws of a requirement for any occupier to seek the approval of the body corporate or its committee to keep a pet within their lot. Rather, its focus is on the conditions that any occupier who keeps a pet must comply with, and the consequences of a failure to do so. Accordingly, I would like the parties to consider that if this is indeed the case, the body corporate has no authority to require its owners and occupiers to seek its approval when keeping a pet within their lot (see sections 169B(3) and 169B(4)(a) of the Act). Consequentially, if this is correct, the applicant does not need the body corporate's approval to keep Foxy and Lula within her lot. Rather, she must only comply with By-law 13 in this regard. This is my preliminary view.
[46] I note that based on the evidence provided in the application, the only reason provided by the body corporate for refusing to allow Foxy and Lula to remain in Lot 311 is the said one-pet-per-lot policy. The evidence also indicates that the dogs have been kept within the lot for several weeks at least.
[47] Whilst I acknowledge that I have not invited a submission from the body corporate, I am at this stage satisfied that the balance of convenience favours the preservation of the status quo until this matter can be resolved at conciliation or final order adjudication.
[48] However, I must emphasise that if the body corporate is of the view that some pertinent information which I have not had receipt of in making this decision, warrants a variation or cancellation of the interim orders, it may make such a request in writing to the Commissioner's Office.
[49] In these circumstances, I make the following interim orders:
[50] I am unable to make an order precluding the body corporate from taking by-law enforcement action with respect to other matters such as noise, at this stage. However, I wish to clarify that where a body corporate does pursue such action, the onus lies with itself to demonstrate with sufficient evidence a contravention of the relevant by-law.
[51] In these circumstances, I am satisfied that interim orders are warranted.
[1] The CMS includes the scheme's by-laws
[2] Sections 276)(1)(a) and (b) of the Act
[4] See Brighton on Broadwater Breezes [2018] QBCCMCmr 243 at [8]
[7] For general principles see for e.g., Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46 and SDW2 Pty Ltd v JLF Corporation Pty Ltd & Ors [2017] QSC 1
[8] Cohen v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 70 at [6]
[9] Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity: Doctrines & Remedies (J.D. Heydon, M.J. Leeming, P.G. Turner) (Fourth Edition) (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002) at [21-395]; Bingham & Anor v 7-Eleven Stores P/L [2003] QCA 402 at [106]-[108]
[16] McKenzie v Body Corporate for Kings Row Centre CTS 11632 [2010] QCATA 57, para 17 and 18, citing Mineralogy Pty Ltd v The Body Corporate for "The Lakes Coolum" [2002] QCA 550; [2003] 2 Qd R 381, at paras 6-8; see also Body Corporate for River City Apartments CTS 31622 v McGarvey [2012] QCATA 47 and Crystal Waters Permaculture Village & Ors v Boyle [2020] QCATA 80 - as cited in Macleay Tower & Villas [2022] QBCCMCmr 237 at [16]