Under section 75 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), the application is dismissed.

1. Kevin Shari applied to the Human Rights List at VCAT on 28 October 2024. He claimed that when he was a litigant in a proceeding before the County Court ('the Court'), Harrison Parker, who was an Associate to the Judge of the Court, discriminated against him. He said that the discrimination was on the basis of his religious beliefs and activity. He also said that Mr Parker had failed to make reasonable adjustments for him as a person with disability, and that all this occurred in the context of the provision of services, and that he engaged in religious vilification. He said that Mr Parker asked him to attend a costs hearing on a date that conflicted with a religious commitment, and that despite many emails from him requesting a change of date, the hearing went ahead in his absence.
2. The respondent made an application under section 75 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) ('VCAT Act') for Mr Shari's application to be summarily dismissed or struck out, on the basis that it was frivolous, misconceived, lacking in substance or an abuse of process.
3. In deciding applications under section 75, VCAT must be cautious. It is a serious matter to dismiss or strike out a proceeding summarily. A high threshold must be met before VCAT can summarily dismiss or strike out all or part of a proceeding.[1]
4. VCAT should only summarily dismiss or strike out a proceeding, or a part of a proceeding, where it is obvious that the proceeding cannot possibly succeed or where it is obvious that the proceeding is an abuse of process for other reasons. Otherwise, an applicant is entitled to have the case fully heard and determined at a final hearing. It must be clear that the proceeding is absolutely hopeless or so clearly untenable that it cannot succeed.[2] VCAT should not summarily dismiss an application where the outcome depends on findings of fact based on contested evidence.[3] Deficiencies in an applicant's particulars of claim are generally not a reason to strike out the claim or the particulars entirely.[4]
5. Mr Shari did not attend the VCAT hearing on 16 May 2025. He wrote to VCAT on 1 May 2025 saying that he had a commitment on 16 May 2025 and that he was happy for a decision to be made on the papers, based on his written submissions. On 15 May 2025, Mr Shari emailed VCAT confirming that he would not attend the hearing and saying: 'I maintain my position that the matter can be determined on the basis of the material I have already filed with the Tribunal'. He provided written submissions as to why, in his view, the application should not be dismissed or struck out. On the basis that Mr Shari confirmed that he was happy for the hearing to go ahead without him and as he had an opportunity to read the submissions of the respondent and reply to them, I decided that the hearing should proceed.

1. The events that were the basis of Mr Shari's application were set out in an affidavit of Anna Guglielmucci dated 15 April 2025. Ms Guglielmucci was General Counsel of Court Services Victoria. In her affidavit, Ms Guglielmucci described the events in considerable detail; what follows is a brief summary of her evidence.
2. Mr Shari was the applicant in a County Court proceeding in which he alleged that Victoria Police had been negligent in relation to charges against him. On application by the respondent in that matter, the State of Victoria, on 18 June 2024 a Judge of the County Court ordered that a summary judgement be entered in the proceeding on the basis that Mr Shari's claim had no real prospect of success. Solicitors for the State of Victoria then provided a proposal for a form of orders as to costs ('the proposed orders'). There was some correspondence between the Court and Mr Shari about this matter, including that Mr Shari indicated an intention to file an appeal.
3. On 3 September 2024, Harrison Parker, the Associate to the Judge, notified the parties that unless the parties indicated their consent to the proposed orders, the matter would be listed for a directions hearing.
4. Mr Shari did not consent to the proposed orders, and the matter was listed for a costs hearing on 13 September 2024. Mr Shari objected to this date, stating that he had an appointment then, and also that the proposed orders had included consent to him having until 16 September 2024 to make submissions. I note here that these proposed orders had not actually become orders. In subsequent correspondence, he also requested that the costs hearing be postponed until his appeal was heard, and he made allegations of bias and discrimination against the Judge.
5. On 10 September 2024, Mr Parker emailed the parties to the proceeding to confirm that the hearing remained listed for 13 September 2024 at 9:15am. When Mr Shari again objected, by return email, saying that he could not attend, Mr Parker replied asking Mr Shari to explain to the Judge why he could not attend, and to provide alternative dates. Mr Shari did not provide an explanation for why he could not attend, and did not provide alternative dates. The hearing proceeded and the Judge made costs orders.

1. The respondent submitted that the application was frivolous, misconceived, lacking in substance or an abuse of process for three reasons. First, Mr Parker did not engage in the conduct which is the subject of the claim - the setting down of the costs hearing and the making of the costs order. He was an associate to the Judge. He was not a judge or judicial registrar and did not have the power or authority to request or compel a party to attend on a particular date at a particular time, or to make an order. Only a judge or judicial officer could take these actions. The Judge was the person who did so. The second submission follows the first, that is, that the doctrine of judicial immunity applies to the Judge and therefore these claims under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) ('EO Act') and the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) ('RRT Act') cannot be brought against her. Thirdly, submitted the respondent, none of the alleged conduct is capable of contravening the EO Act because the claims do not disclose clearly established attributes, or links to direct or indirect discrimination on the basis of those attributes, or attributes in respect of which there was a failure to make reasonable adjustments. Mr Shari did not tell the Court until after the hearing was over that the reason he could not attend was because of a religious commitment. Further, neither the scheduling and holding of a hearing nor the making of an order is a 'service' within the meaning of the EO Act. Finally, there was no conduct that could possibly fall within the RRT Act.

1. Mr Shari submitted, by way of written materials provided on 1 May 2025 and 15 May 2025, that Mr Parker was not acting in a judicial capacity, but instead in an administrative role. He wrote that 'there is no evidence to suggest that Mr Parker consulted with the presiding judge before making his determination, nor has any proof been provided to substantiate such communication'. He referred to the decision of Towie v State of Victoria [2008] VSC 177 in submitting that judicial immunity applies strictly to acts performed in the exercise of judicial functions. Mr Shari submitted that the Court provided procedural and administrative services to litigants, and that in making a determination without judicial consultation and in a manner that adversely affected Mr Shari, Mr Parker had breached the EO Act in the provision of services. Mr Parker did so, said Mr Shari, knowing that Mr Shari had a religious commitment and this amounted to direct discrimination under the EO Act.

1. At the time of the events about which Mr Shari has complained, Mr Parker was an associate to the Judge who set down the costs hearing, made the decision that the costs hearing would proceed, and made the order. Mr Parker did not have the power or authority to make those decisions. The exercise of judicial power in a case remains that of the judge.[5] I am entirely satisfied that these decisions were made by the Judge, and that Mr Parker provided administrative and organisational assistance to Her Honour, as was his role. He communicated the decisions of the Judge to Mr Shari, but he did not make the decisions. There is therefore no claim that can be sustained against Mr Parker, as he did not engage in any of the conduct which is the subject of the claim.
2. As Mr Shari himself acknowledged in his written submissions, judicial immunity applies to acts performed in the exercise of judicial function. Under section 9A of the County Court Act 1958 (Vic) the Judge had immunity from liability for activities carried out in the performance of her duties. In any case, the claim is not made against the Judge.
3. For these reasons, Mr Shari's claims must fail, and I make the order set out on page 1. The respondent's representatives made detailed written and oral submissions as to several other reasons why the claims must fail, as set out in brief summary in paragraph 11 above and including that Mr Shari did not tell the Court why he was unable to attend, so the Court knew of no relevant attribute at the relevant time. While these arguments are compelling, I do not need to address them or make findings about them as, in my view, the claims cannot possibly succeed for the preliminary reason outlined above, that is that Mr Parker was not the person who made the decisions about which Mr Shari makes his claims.

[1] Towie v Victoria [2008] VSC 177 [9].

[2] Lisa Muscatello t/as Apartments Melbourne Domain v Booking.Com (Australia) Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) [2019] VCAT 914 [6].

[3] Campagnolo v Benalla and District Football League Inc [2009] VSC 228; Chan v Kostakis [2003] VCAT 951.

[4] West Homes (Australia) Pty Ltd v Crebar Pty Ltd [2001] VCAT 46 [6], [11]; Barbon v West Homes (Australia) Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 405.

[5] Bahonko v Moorfields Community & Ors [2012] VSCA 89 [at para 32].