Shahnaz & Shahnaz [2025] FedCFamC2F 1490 (28 October 2025)

1. The wife to retain Motor Vehicle 1 and indemnify the husband against the liability attached to same.
2. The husband retain the Country D insurance policy;
3. Unless otherwise specified in these orders and except for the purposes of enforcing the payment of any money due under these or any subsequent orders:

(a) Each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all property (including choses-in-action) in the possession of such party as at this date

(b) Monies standing to the credit of the parties in any joint bank account are to become the property of the applicant and the respondent in equal shares but otherwise such monies shall be the property of the owner of the account;

(c) each party forego any claim she/he may have to any superannuation benefits belonging to or earned by the other and she/he will retain for her/his sole use and benefit any superannuation entitlement inclusive of any work-related superannuation entitlement currently owned by her/him;

(d) any insurance policies shall become the sole property of the beneficiary named therein;

(e) each party shall be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders; and

(f) any joint tenancy of the parties in any or real or personal property shall be expressly severed.

1. All extant applications be otherwise dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. This is a matter concerning parties who are in dispute about their property division.
2. The applicant wife, Ms Shahnaz ("the wife"), and the respondent husband, Mr Shahnaz ("the husband"), were in a long relationship from 2006 which produced two children, now aged 16 and 11 years of age.
3. Unfortunately, a large percentage of funds that the parties accumulated during the relationship has been spent. There is now only about $117,000 remaining from the proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home. Otherwise, aside from funds transferred overseas being $47,550, which the wife argues should be included in the pool, there is only a small insurance policy, some minimal savings, and very modest superannuation.
4. The wife seeks 65 per cent of the non-superannuation pool based on her contributions during the relationship, including caring for the husband following a workplace injury. The husband seeks 80 per cent of the non-superannuation pool because of his contribution by way of a large personal injury payment, the ongoing income earning disparity, and his primary care of the children.

1. The parties were both born in Country D - the husband in 1980, and the wife in 1987.
2. The parties married in Country D in 2006. The wife had just finished secondary school and was 19 years old. The husband was 25 years of age and working as a professional.
3. The parties' first child, X was born in 2009.
4. In late 2011, the husband obtained a skilled migrant visa to work in Australia, and the parties immigrated to Victoria where the husband began working as a professional.
5. In 2012, the wife began working part-time in a retail business.
6. In 2013, the parties' second child, Y was born.
7. In 2014, the parties purchased a property at B Street, Suburb C ("the Suburb C property") for about $380,000.
8. In 2015, the husband suffered a workplace injury to his shoulder. The husband remained at work, however, his condition continued to worsen.
9. In late 2017, the husband ceased working completely due to his workplace injury.
10. In 2020, the wife took on a second job working as a transport worker.
11. In June 2020, the husband received a lump sum compensation payment due to his workplace injury of $363,936 ("the compensation payment").
12. The parties separated in about January 2022. X and Y (collectively "the children") have remained in the husband's care since that time.
13. On 17 February 2025, before his Honour Judge Glass, the parties agreed to final parenting orders which provide for the children to live with the husband, and to have limited daytime and afternoons with the wife ("the final parenting orders").

1. The wife relied upon the following:
   • her case outline filed 27 August 2025;
   • her further amended initiating application filed 15 August 2025;
   • her trial affidavit filed 15 August 2025; and
   • her updated financial statement filed 15 August 2025.
2. The husband relied upon the following, noting that he did not file a case outline:
   • his amended response to final orders filed 26 August 2025;
   • his trial affidavit filed 26 August 2025; and
   • his financial statement filed 26 August 2025.
3. In addition, the following exhibits were tendered into evidence on behalf of the parties in the matter as follows:
   • W1 - E Bank car loan statement dated 18 August 2025;
   • H1 - Minute of proposed orders provided by the husband dated 29 August 2025;
   • W2 - PEXA document generated 28 March 2024; and
   • W3 - Medical report by Orthopaedic surgeon, Mr F of the husband, dated 23 July 2019.

1. The matter ran in person at the Melbourne Registry over two days. The only people to give evidence were the parties themselves. The parties were both also assisted by Country D interpreters for the duration of the trial.
2. Whilst there were various aspects of the parties' evidence which were problematic, this is not a case where it is necessary to make credit findings.

THE LAW WITH RESPECT TO PROPERTY DIVISION IN A MARITAL RELATIONSHIP

1. Section 79(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") authorises the court to make such orders between the parties as it considers appropriate. Section 79(2) of the Act states that the court cannot make an order for property settlement unless it is just and equitable to do so. Full Court authorities have identified a four-step process to assist the court in reaching a just and equitable decision.[1]
2. Pursuant to section 79 (3) of the Act, the court must first identify the parties' legal and equitable interests in the assets arising from their relationship. The court should then assess each party's contributions during the relationship in accordance with sections 79(4). The third step requires the court to consider the factors relating to the parties' current and future circumstances which are set out in section 79(5). The court should then consider its findings and what order, if any, is just and equitable.
3. The Full Court in Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 at [86], made it clear that the four-step process provides a structure to ensure that a property settlement order is only made when the court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to do so, and that the terms of the order itself are also just and equitable.

1. The parties agreed that the asset pool consisted of funds held in trust in the amount of $117,000, the wife's savings of $1,700, the husband's life insurance policy of $5,000, and their superannuation. The husband also conceded that the wife's car, and its associated loan, should be excluded from the pool.
2. The parties were, however, in dispute about an amount of $47,550 ("the transferred funds"), which it was common ground was transferred by the husband overseas. The wife argued that the court should find on the evidence that those funds still existed, and therefore should be included in the pool.
3. The husband conceded, under cross-examination, that his case was that the transferred funds included large amounts to temples in Country D and to a former teacher who, he says, needed assistance. The wife believes that the husband still holds those funds in one of various bank accounts, in London and/or Country D. The wife urged the court to find that the funds still exist and, on that basis, should be included in the pool. The wife says the husband has provided no evidence that the transferred funds were donated to anyone. Furthermore, the wife says the husband has failed to disclose a number of bank accounts, including accounts in Country D, and has not provided any bank statements from those accounts. The wife relied upon the first instance decision of Harper J in Wei & Xia (No 5) [2023] FedCFamC1F 679, which helpfully summarised authorities concerning non-disclosure. At [175] Harper J said as follows:

... the Court may be persuaded that it would be appropriate to make an order beyond the ascertained property; provided that any order made on this basis can be seen to achieve substantial justice relative to the subject non-disclosure (Hicks & Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Hicks [2021] FamCAFC 19; (2021) FLC 94-006 at [87]), or all known assets should be awarded to the innocent party, on the basis that the party who refuses to disclose the assets is in fact hiding them (Chang v Su [2002] FamCA 156; (2002) FLC 93-117 at [60]). But also the authorities show any inference that a defaulting party is hiding property must be founded upon established facts. Concluding that other assets exist is, like any other fact, a finding, or requires findings, of fact about which the Court must feel "an actual persuasion".

(Emphasis added)

1. Having heard the evidence in this case, I am so persuaded that on the balance of probabilities the funds transferred overseas are still in the power and control of the husband. This is primarily because, despite the evidence of the husband, the parties do not have a history of donating large sums of money to charities and the like. The parties are of the Buddhist faith and did make regular donations, but along the lines of smaller amounts of $20 per month, not thousands of dollars. The second point is that at the time the funds were transferred in 2020, the husband knew that he needed those funds to survive going forward. He knew he had no income earning capacity and would ultimately be reliant on the disability pension. It simply makes no sense that he would donate the money to temples in another country, and especially not to a former teacher, in lieu of keeping them to meet his own needs. Thirdly, he has known since at least November 2023 that he was required to provide proof of these donations. Even if he did not have receipts, he would have had some sort of communication trail with the organisations and/or his former teacher to evidence the donation. He has not provided so much as a thank you email from the temple, nor his former teacher. Nor has the husband provided any evidence that he has even attempted to get such proof.
2. In regard to being unable to provide copies of his bank statements, the husband said in evidence that the statements were all going to his wife's parent's address, and that he was unable to change this because he did not know the account number. I do not accept this provided an insurmountable barrier to the husband being able to access his own bank statements. Even if I accept that it was necessary for physical attendance at the bank in Country D, it was evident that he had family members that reside in Country D that he could have authorised to attend on his behalf.
3. In such circumstances, I find it is more likely than not that the husband has parked the transferred funds in a bank account, either in Country D or London, and still has access to same. He could readily have disproved this assertion by either producing evidence of the transfers, and/or his bank statements, and he has done neither. I therefore propose to include the transferred funds in the pool for division between the parties.
4. The wife also accuses the husband of retaining rare coins he has failed to disclose. The husband in turn says the wife removed the coins and jewellery, worth about $30,000, which was left in the home in a safe. I am unable to resolve this issue.
5. Accordingly, I find the asset pool consists of the following:
   • Monies in trust $117,000
   • Husband's overseas funds $47,550
   • Wife's savings in bank $1,700
   • Husband's life insurance $5,000
   • Wife's superannuation $10,400
   • Husband's superannuation $26,000
   • Total: $207,650

IS IT JUST AND EQUITABLE THAT AN ORDER BE MADE?

1. As per the High Court decision of Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52 ("Stanford"), the court must now determine whether it would be just and equitable to make an order altering those interests pursuant to section 79 of the Act. No party has the unalienable right to have an alteration of property interests, no matter how long the relationship. Furthermore, although both of the parties urge the court to make orders that alter their interests in their property, the court must still be satisfied that making such an order would indeed be just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.
2. In Stanford, the court considered the expression "just and equitable" at [36] and noted that it:

... is a qualitative description of a conclusion reached after examination of a range of potentially competing considerations? It does not admit of exhaustive definition. It is not possible to chart its metes and bounds.

1. As expounded by Strauss J in the Full Court decision of In the Marriage of Ferguson [1978] FamCA 70; (1978) 34 FLR 342, 358, section 79(2) of the Act, "is directed to both the questions whether an order should be made at all, and what the order should be, if one is made".
2. In this matter, where the parties' finances are intermingled and they both argue they have made financial and non-financial contributions, I find that it is just and equitable to make an order.
3. As to what order is just and equitable, this will ultimately be determined after the considerations in sections 79(4) and 79(5) of the Act.
4. Section 79 of the Act states as follows:

...

Considerations relation to contributions

(4) For the purposes of subparagraph (3)(b)(i), the court is to take into account the following considerations, so far as they are relevant:

(a) the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last‑mentioned property, whether or not that last‑mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them;

(b) the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last‑mentioned property, whether or not that last‑mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them;

(c) the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the marriage and any children of the marriage, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent;

(ca) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the marriage has subjected or exposed the other party, on the ability of a party to the marriage to make the kind of contributions referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c);

(d) the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the marriage;

(f) any other order made under this Act affecting a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage;

(g) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the marriage has provided for a child of the marriage.

Considerations relating to current and future circumstances

(5) For the purposes of subparagraph (3)(b)(ii), the court is to take into account the following considerations, so far as they are relevant:

(a) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the marriage has subjected or exposed the other party, on the current and future circumstances of the other party, including on any of the matters mentioned elsewhere in this subsection;

(b) the age and state of health of each of the parties to the marriage;

(c) the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties to the marriage and the physical and mental capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment;

(d) the effect of any material wastage, caused intentionally or recklessly by a party to the marriage, of property or financial resources of either of the parties to the marriage or both of them;

(e) any liabilities incurred by either of the parties to the marriage or both of them, including the nature of the liabilities and the circumstances relating to them;

(f) the extent to which either party to the marriage has the care of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years, including the need of either party to provide appropriate housing for such a child;

(g) commitments of each of the parties to the marriage that are necessary to enable the party to support themselves and any child or other person that the party has a duty to maintain;

(h) the responsibilities of either party to the marriage to support any other person;

(i) the eligibility of either party to the marriage for a pension, allowance or benefit under:

(i) any law of the Commonwealth, of a State or Territory or of another country; or

(ii) any superannuation fund or scheme, whether the fund or scheme was established, or operates, within or outside Australia;

(j) if either party to the marriage is eligible for a pension, allowance or benefit as mentioned in paragraph (i) - the rate at which it is being paid to the party;

(k) if the parties to the marriage have separated or divorced, a standard of living that in all the circumstances is reasonable;

(l) the extent to which an alteration of the interests of the parties to the marriage in any property would enable a party to undertake education or establish a business or otherwise obtain an adequate income;

(m) the effect of any proposed order on the ability of a creditor of a party to the marriage to recover the creditor's debt, so far as that effect is relevant;

(n) the extent to which each party to the marriage has contributed to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other party;

(o) the duration of the marriage and the extent to which it has affected the earning capacity of each party to the marriage;

(p) the need to protect a party to the marriage who wishes to continue that party's role as a parent;

(q) if either party to the marriage is cohabiting with another person - the financial circumstances relating to the cohabitation;

(r) the terms of any order or declaration made, or proposed to be made, under Part VIIIAB in relation to:

(i) a party to the marriage; or

(ii) a person who is a party to a de facto relationship with a party to the marriage; or

(iii) the property of a person covered by subparagraph (i) and of a person covered by subparagraph (ii), or of either of them; or

(iv) vested bankruptcy property in relation to a person covered by subparagraph (i) or (ii);

(s) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the marriage is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for a child of the marriage;

(t) the terms of any financial agreement that is binding on the parties to the marriage;

(u) the terms of any Part VIIIAB financial agreement that is binding on a party to the marriage;

(v) any other fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account.

1. I have taken into account each of the matters under this section. Just because I do not refer to a specific subsection does not mean I have not taken it into consideration.

1. Pursuant to the High Court case of Mallet v Mallet [1984] HCA 21, there is no presumption of equality of division of property, not even in a long relationship, and in each case the contributions of each party must be assessed on their own facts.
2. In determining what orders are to be made pursuant to section 79 of the Act, as set out in Aleksovski & Aleksovski [1996] FamCA 111 at [90] his Honour Kay J said:

The Judge must weigh up various areas of contribution. In a short marriage, significant weight might be given to a large capital contribution. In a long marriage, other factors often assume great significance and ought not be left almost unseen by eyes dazzled by the magnitude of recently acquired capital... What is important is to somehow give a reasonable value to all of the elements that go to making up the entirety of the marriage relationship.

1. Those observations were quoted with approval by the Full Court in Dickons & Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154 ("Dickons") which noted that "...the requirements of the section are met by approaching the assessment of contributions holistically..."[2] by analysing the contributions of all types and does not require "over-zealous" attention to the ascertainment of contributions nor the "the performance of a mathematical or accounting exercise."[3]

1. In this case, the parties variously argue that they have been given or lent money by family members, or that the other party has given or lent money to family members. This included the following assertions:

(1) The wife says that her father paid for the husband's accommodation in London whilst he was studying there;

(2) The wife says that her father provided the parties with $5,000 to assist them to move to Australia in 2011;

(3) The wife says that in 2014 her father lent the parties $10,000 towards the purchase of the Suburb C property;

(4) The husband says his father gifted the parties $10,000 towards the purchase of the Suburb C property;

(5) The wife says that in 2016 the husband applied $45,000 to pay for his father's cancer treatment in Australia;

(6) The husband says that in 2018 the parties refinanced their mortgage by $60,000 to sponsor the wife's parent's visit to Australia and to pay for the wife's sister's wedding; and

(7) The husband says that in 2020 they paid $10,000 of the compensation payment to the wife's father and $35,000 to the wife's "affair partner."

1. None of these family members were on affidavit and/or available to give evidence or to be cross-examined in this matter and there was no independent documentation to corroborate these transactions. I am unable to make any findings in this regard.

1. Before the parties had children, the husband studied, and the wife worked in Country D. The wife says that the husband had a heroin addiction and went to rehabilitation. He denies this. I am unable to make a finding in relation to same based on the evidence that was presented, however, given the length of the marriage it would be unlikely to have a significant impact on the outcome of this matter.
2. Upon moving to Australia, the husband worked as a professional. The wife worked part-time and cared for the children. From 2017 the husband was unable to continue to work, but it appears he received Workcover payments up and until the lump sum payout in 2020. The wife says she worked two jobs during this period. I find that it is more likely than not that during this period the wife took on a greater share of the home duties, as well as caring for the husband and the children.
3. The husband conceded that when he was assessed by an orthopaedic surgeon in 2019, that the surgeon recorded that he had little or no capacity to perform gardening or household tasks, and that he was self-medicating his anxiety and depression with tobacco and alcohol. However, I accept that it is likely that it was in both parties' interest at that time that they downplayed the husband's functioning in that assessment and his ability to contribute generally. Indeed, the husband gave evidence that the wife was primarily responsible for activities outside of the home, such as shopping, because they were concerned that he was being watched by private investigators for the insurance company. It seems likely that the husband made greater contributions than is indicated in that assessment and certainly in relation to the care of the children. This seems evident because the wife ultimately agreed to the husband having majority care of the children in January 2022, and has taken no issue since with the husband's ability to do so.
4. It is not in dispute that in June 2020 the husband received the compensation payment. The wife's counsel conceded that there was no evidence before the court about the breakdown of the compensation payment, and in particular as to whether any part of that payment was for the wife's care of the husband. It was conceded, therefore, that such a payment would ordinarily be considered to be a contribution made by the injured party, in this case the husband. I am also satisfied on the evidence that, other than the transferred funds, it was spent on the day-to-day expenses of the parties. In this regard, there need not be shown a direct connection between these funds and an asset of the parties. As was set out in Dickons at [17]:

A financial contribution can be made indirectly by, for example, the use by parties of income or assets for purpose A freeing up the use of other income or assets for purpose B. Moreover, a particular financial contribution might have been used wholly in discretionary expenditure which, but for that contribution, would not have been available to the parties or would have required borrowings or a diminution of capital. Such a contribution can also, in that way, be seen, for example, as an indirect contribution to the conservation of property.

1. It is not in dispute that the children have been predominantly cared for by the husband since separation, with the parenting orders providing for very limited day time to the wife, although the evidence showed that the wife has been spending more extensive time than provided for in the orders, including taking the children interstate and overseas. Furthermore, the wife has been paying for expenses for the children above the child support assessment, including for items intended to be retained for the children's benefit in the husband's home. Nonetheless, the husband has had the lion's share of the day-to-day care, and this should be recognised as a contribution on his behalf.

1. Weighing up all of these matters - including the wife's additional contributions during the relationship when the husband was acutely unwell, the husband's compensation payment, and his contribution by way of being the primary care of the children after separation - I assess the contributions in this small pool as favouring the husband in the amount of 65 per cent.

1. The wife is currently 38 years, and of good health. The husband is 45 years old, and it is common ground that he has significant ongoing health issues.

1. The wife works full-time in a retail business and earns about $78,000 per year. She has remarried; however, she has failed to disclose in her financial statement or her trial affidavit, her new husband's income, or contributions to her household. Nor was her new husband on affidavit. The wife gave oral evidence that her new husband works full-time as a retail worker and earns about $4,400 per month after tax.
2. The husband is reliant on a disability support pension and on child support paid by the wife. The wife accepts that the husband will be unable to perform any significant paid work. In regard to child support, I accept that the only time the wife has been in arrears was when she was reassessed at the end of the tax year, and that she has made up those arrears. It is also clear, as already noted, that the wife makes significant extra payments on behalf of the children, including for interstate and overseas holidays, as well as for food, clothing, furniture, and recreational items such as a table tennis table to be kept at the husband's home.
3. Nonetheless there is a significant income disparity between the household of the husband and that of the wife. I accept the submission that often the most valuable asset that any one party can take away from a relationship, and particularly in this case, is a significant income earning capacity.[4]
4. In terms of other property and financial resources, 65 per cent of the total pool (including superannuation) being $207,650, amounts to $134,972.50, which is unlikely to be sufficient in and of itself to meet the husband's needs, especially given the husband will also be required to continue to house the children.

1. The children are still only 11 and 16 years of age. Pursuant to the final parenting orders, which do not provide for any overnight time with the wife, the husband is predominantly responsible for their care. Although, as already observed, for reasons that are unclear the wife has been permitted to take the children interstate and overseas, so her time with the children is greater than would appear on the face of those orders.

1. Since separation the wife has had the benefit of $40,000 by way of part-property settlement, and the husband $50,000. The husband also sold a car, the details of which have not been disclosed in his financial statement or affidavit. The wife says this car was bought for about $25,000 in 2020. There was otherwise no documentation provided by the husband as to proceeds of sale and what became of them.
2. It is also common ground that the husband did not pay the mortgage on the Suburb C property between separation in January 2022 and its sale in March 2024, despite living in the property and an order that he do so. As a result, in 2023 the bank threatened to foreclose on the property. The husband attempts to blame the wife for this foreclosure threat, as he says she was overseas and unavailable to be contacted by the bank. However, this seems unlikely given it was the wife who was pressing for the sale of the property in 2023, and she would gain nothing from dragging the matter out.
3. Furthermore, the husband agrees he resisted signing the sale authority, and that the wife was the one who ultimately filed an application in this court for the home to be sold. He now says he did not sign the sale authority because he did not agree to the conveyancer that the wife wanted to use, but given the dire financial situation, it was incumbent on the husband to be more proactive in this regard. The end result was that the husband was able to remain in the home for two years after separation without paying the mortgage, which increased by some $60,000. The parties also incurred further legal costs as a consequence. However, I must be careful not to double count the transferred funds, which I have found could otherwise have been used to pay this mortgage and would likely have mitigated this situation.

1. In assessing the parties' current and future circumstances, including taking into account that the husband has failed to disclose the sale of a vehicle, the husband has greater needs than the wife. He will continue to be the primary carer for the children, and he will have to provide them with housing on a disability pension (albeit with child support and financial assistance of the wife), whilst the wife has her own income plus that of her partner. Given the small pool, this necessitates a substantial adjustment in his favour, from the 65 per cent I have ordered based on contributions, of a further 15 per cent, bringing the total percentage to 80 per cent in his favour.

1. Pursuant to Clauson, I must stand back and assess what 80 per cent of the pool amounts to in real terms. The husband asks the court to take a two-pool approach, applying the percentage he seeks of 80 per cent to the non-superannuation pool and otherwise leaving the superannuation where it is. In this regard he says that the superannuation is modest, and that the wife will make ongoing contributions to her super where he will be unable to do so. The wife agrees with a two-pool approach but says there should be an equalisation of the superannuation. In this case, it is my view that the approach proposed by the husband is the one which will lead to a just and equitable outcome. Whilst the parties have both contributed to superannuation during the relationship, on what appears to be a fairly equal basis, the wife is in a position to contribute to superannuation for many years to come, whereas the husband clearly is not.
2. If the husband receives 80 per cent of the non-superannuation pool, this will result in the following:
   • Monies in trust $117,000
   • Husband's overseas funds $47,550
   • Wife's savings in bank $1700
   • Husbands life insurance $5,000
   • Total $171,250
   • 80 per cent of total $137,000

• Overseas funds $47,550
• Life insurance $5,000
• Sub-total $52,550
• Payment to husband $84,450

1. The wife will be required to pay the husband the amount of $84,450. The husband is still unlikely to be able to purchase a property without a steady income, but this may assist him to continue to pay his rent and other expenses for the foreseeable future. In all the circumstances of this case, I find this to be a just and equitable result.
2. For all the aforementioned reasons I make the orders as set out at the commencement of this judgment herein.

I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Dorrat.

[1] See Lee Steere & Lee Steere [1985] FamCA 57; (1985) FLC 91-626; Hickey & Hickey & Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia [2003] FamCA 395 and In the Marriage of Omacini [2005] FamCA 195.

[2] Dickons & Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154 ("Dickons") at [21].

[4] Clauson and Clauson [1995] FamCA 10; (1995) FLC 92-595 ("Clauson") at [81,911].