1. On 4 September 2025 Serco Australia Pty Ltd, the appellant, lodged an Application to Appeal Against the Decision of a Medical Assessor. The medical dispute was assessed by

Dr Himanshu Singh, a Medical Assessor, who issued a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) on 7 August 2025. 2. The appellant relies on the following grounds of appeal under s 327(3) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act): * the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria, and * the MAC contains a demonstrable error. 3. The delegate is satisfied that, on the face of the application, at least one ground for appeal has been made out. The Appeal Panel has conducted a review of the original medical assessment but limited to the grounds for appeal on which the appeal is made. 4. Rule 128 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the PIC Rules) and Procedural Direction PIC7 - Appeals, reviews, reconsiderations and correction of obvious errors in medical disputes set out the practice and procedure in relation to the medical appeal process under s 328 of the 1998 Act. An Appeal Panel determines its own procedures in accordance with r 128(1) of the PIC Rules. 5. The assessment of permanent impairment is conducted in accordance with the SIRA NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th ed

1. The appellant employed Srikanth Mamidyala, the respondent, as a detainee services officer. On 15 March 2023 the respondent, whilst working for the appellant at the Villawood detention centre, was verbally harassed by a detainee who also threw a water bottle at him, hitting his head and causing him a physical injury as well as a psychological injury.
2. On 7 June 2024 psychiatrist Dr Richa Rastogi examined the respondent, at the request of the respondent's solicitors, for the purpose of providing a forensic medical report on matters relating to the respondent's psychological injury, including the degree of his permanent impairment from that injury. In a report Dr Rastogi provided on that day she advised she assessed the degree of the respondent's permanent impairment from his psychological injury is 24% whole person impairment (WPI). She advised her diagnosis of the respondent's injury is chronic post-traumatic stress disorder with exacerbation. She provided the following reasons for making her diagnosis:

"Mr Mamidyala worked as a detainee service officer at Villawood since 2012. The incident of 15th March 2023 where he was assaulted by a detainee sustaining laceration to his occipital region culminated into post-traumatic stress disorder. He sought counselling and was able to reattempt work gradually in suitable duties after three montsh [sic] resuming preinjury duties by December 2023 whilst still experiencing residual anxiety and emotional vulnerabilities. He alleged his manager belittled him and spoke in a derogatory manner in front of his colleagues that retriggered him. He reported exacerbation of anxiety with panic, feeling of dread and unsafe at work with amplification of flashbacks and images of detainee assaulting him. This lead to incapacitation of work since January 2024.

He presented with marked decline in his functioning associated with PTSD and entrenched anxiety with fears, avoidance and safety behaviours as well as cognitive deficits. He holds a guarded prognosis. He has poor tolerance to social situations.

This has had repercussions on his social functioning, personal relationships and toll on his functioning."

1. On 20 June 2024 the respondent's solicitors wrote to the appellant's insurer advising it that the respondent claimed compensation from it for permanent impairment from his injury of the order of 24% WPI. They provided the insurer with their correspondence a copy of

Dr Rastogi's report. 2. Following that, the appellant's solicitors arranged for the respondent to be examined by a psychiatrist Associate Professor Gordon Davies on 1 October 2024. In a report dated

25 October 2024 Associate Professor Davies advised the appellant's solicitors that he diagnosed the respondent had major depression. He considered that the trauma to which the respondent was subjected on 15 March 2023 and from which the respondent's injury arose did not meet the primary criteria of severity for a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. He also advised that he considered that "there are elements of both primary and secondary injury". He advised that he was of the view that the respondent's condition was unstable and because of that the respondent could not be considered to have achieved maximum medical improvement. He did not assess the degree of the respondent's permanent impairment. 3. On 1 November 2024 the appellant's solicitors wrote to the respondent's solicitors advising them that the appellant would not be making an offer to settle the respondent's claim for compensation for permanent impairment and that this was because the respondent had not reached maximum medical improvement and his permanent impairment is not fully ascertainable. They enclosed with their correspondence a copy of Associate Professor Davies report of 25 October 2024. 4. On 30 May 2025 the respondent commenced proceedings in the Personal Injury Commission (Commission), seeking the Commission determine his claim for compensation for permanent impairment. In its reply the appellant lodge with the Commission, the appellant provided a further report of Associate Professor Davies dated 17 June 2025. That report related to a further consultation Associate Professor Davies had with the respondent on

26 May 2025. In his report Associate Professor Davies maintained his diagnosis of the appellant's injury remained moderate depression, and that this correlated with a diagnosis of major depression based on DSM IV. Associate Professor Davies advised that the respondent's "major psychiatric symptoms appear to be predominantly secondary". He advised that the three factors involved in the onset of the respondent's psychiatric illness are "the circumstances of the injury, the reported lack of support in his return to work and his medical advice". He advised that he considered the respondent had still not reached maximum medical improvement and this was because he considered a change in the structure of the respondent's psychological management could lead to a significant improvement in his condition. He advised that the respondent "psychological issues appear to have arisen as a secondary effect of his chronic pain following the injury". 5. On 25 June 2025 a delegate of the President of the Commission issued a referral to the Medical Assessor to assess the medical disputes between the parties relating to the respondent's claim for compensation for permanent impairment. They included whether the degree of the respondent's permanent impairment is fully ascertainable, and whether his impairment is permanent, and what the degree of his permanent impairment is as a result of his injury. 6. In the MAC the Medical Assessor issued he certified that the respondent's impairment is permanent and that the degree of his permanent impairment is fully ascertainable. The appellant has raised no issue regarding that aspect of the MAC. 7. The Medical Assessor advised in the MAC that his diagnosis of the respondent's injury is post-traumatic stress disorder. He detailed the circumstances relating to the incident from which the respondent suffered injury and also detailed the respondent's current symptoms to reveal how they met the criteria stipulated in DSM-5 for a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder to be made. 8. The Medical Assessor referred to the opinions Dr Rastogi and Associate Professor Davies expressed in their respective reports. The Medical Assessor indicated that he agreed with

Dr Rastogi's opinion that the respondent's diagnosis is post-traumatic stress disorder and that the respondent had achieve maximum medical improvement and that his permanent impairment is 24% WPI. The Medical Assessor stated that his opinion differed from that which Associate Professor Gordon Davies had expressed with respect to the respondent achieving maximum medical improvement and whether the respondent's impairment is permanent. The Medical Assessor also noted, when contrasting his opinion with the opinion of Associate Professor Gordon Davies, that he considered the respondent had sustained a primary psychological injury, thereby distinguishing his opinion from Associate Professor Davies' opinion that the respondent had suffered a secondary psychological injury. 9. The Medical Assessor certified that he assessed the degree of the respondent permanent impairment is 24% WPI. He detailed his ratings of the respondent's impairment in the several categories of function and behaviour comprising the psychiatric impairment rating scale (PIRS) and also explained his reasons for his ratings. No issue has been raised by the appellant in its appeal against the MAC regarding the Medical Assessor's ratings of the respondent's impairment in the several PIRS categories.

1. The Appeal Panel conducted a preliminary review of the original medical assessment in the absence of the parties and in accordance with the Procedural Direction PIC7.
2. As a result of that preliminary review, the Appeal Panel determined that it was not necessary for the respondent to undergo a further medical examination. This is because the Appeal Panel came to the view that the appellant had not established either of the grounds for appeal on which it relied, and consequently the Appeal Panel had no reason or power to examine the respondent.[1]

1. The Appeal Panel has before it all the documents that were sent to the Medical Assessor for the original medical assessment and has taken them into account in making this determination.

1. Both parties made written submissions. They are not repeated in full, but have been considered by the Appeal Panel.
2. In summary, the appellant submitted that the Medical Assessor erred by failing to consider whether the respondent had suffered a secondary psychological injury and failing to disregard and exclude from his assessment of the respondent's permanent impairment any impairment that related to a secondary psychological injury the respondent suffered. The appellant referred to decisions of differently constituted Medical Appeal Panels to support its submission, specifically Canterbury Bankstown Council v Hantke[2] (Hantke) and Coco Cola Amatil (now Coco Cola EuroPacific Partners API Pty Ltd) v Pombinho.[3] The appellant submitted there is substantial medical evidence demonstrating the respondent suffers secondary psychological symptoms because of the assault on him.
3. In reply, the respondent submitted that the appellant did not dispute in its reply that he had suffered a psychological injury and did not assert that the injury he suffered was a secondary psychological injury. The respondent noted that the appellant did not seek the referral of his disputed claim to a Member of the Commission to determine any issue regarding whether he had suffered a secondary psychological injury. The respondent noted that Associate Professor Davies made a diagnosis of moderate depression and had rejected a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and had said that there were elements of both primary and secondary injury comprising the respondent's diagnosis. The appellant submitted that that is not a diagnosis of a secondary psychological injury.
4. The respondent submitted that he had not agreed that he has a secondary psychological injury.

1. The procedures on appeal are contained in s 328 of the 1998 Act. The appeal is to be by way of review of the original medical assessment but the review is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.
2. In Campbelltown City Council v Vegan [2006] NSWCA 284 the Court of Appeal held that the Appeal Panel is obliged to give reasons.
3. Campbell J observed in obiter in State of New South Wales (NSW Department of Education) v Kaur[4] (Kaur), at [22] and [23], that the question of whether an injury is a secondary or primary psychological injury is one the Commission determines and not one that arises as part of a medical dispute as defined by s 319 of the 1998 Act. Consequently, if there is any dispute between the parties regarding that, and on the Appeal Panel's analysis of the material before it, potentially there is, then that is a matter for the Commission to determine. Given what was said in Kaur, it was not a matter the Medical Assessor was required to consider, and certainly it was not a matter for him to assess or to determine.
4. Whilst it was not a matter for the Medical Assessor to consider, he nevertheless did so and came to the view that no element of the respondent's impairment or psychiatric symptoms were secondary to pain or a physical injury the respondent had suffered in the incident on

15 March 2023. Irrespective of that, and as just indicated in the immediate preceding paragraph, the Medical Assessor's role was not to apportion or exclude from the respondent's permanent impairment any component that may be due to a secondary psychological injury, absent there being an agreement between parties that the respondent had suffered a secondary psychological injury or there being a determination of the Commission that he had done so. 5. In the case of Hantke, a Commission Member had determined the worker suffered a secondary psychological injury and consequently it was incumbent upon the Medical Assessor in that case when assessing that worker's permanent impairment from a primary psychological injury to disregard any symptoms or impairment associated with the worker's secondary psychological injury. In the case of Pombinho, the Commission had issued a certificate of determination that recorded a determination the Commission had made with the consent of the parties and also a notation to that determination, to which the parties also consented, to the effect that a Medical Assessor had to exclude from the assessment of the worker's permanent impairment any impairment that related to a secondary psychological injury. Consequently, it was implicit that the parties in that case had agreed the worker had suffered the secondary psychological injury. 6. That is not the case here. The respondent's claim is based on his suffering only a primary psychological injury. No dispute was raised by the appellant regarding that. There has been no agreement between the parties that he has a secondary psychological injury. There has been no determination by the Commission that he has suffered a secondary psychological injury. Consequently, the Medical Assessor made no error by not disregarding any symptoms or impairment of the respondent that might arise from any such secondary psychological injury, if indeed it be the case the respondent had suffered such an injury, about which the Appeal Panel makes no finding. 7. For these reasons, the Appeal Panel has determined that the MAC issued on 7 August 2025 should be confirmed.

[1] New South Wales Police Force v Registrar of the Workers Compensation Commission of New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 1792 at [33]; Finnegan v Komatsu Forklift Australia Pty Ltd [2023] NSWSC 38 at [125]- [130].

[2] [2021] NSWPICMP 209.