WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; appeal by employer from 19% whole person impairment assessment in psychological injury case; whether Medical Assessor (MA) failed to adequately consider factual material; whether MA gave adequate reasons regarding psychiatric impairment rating scale categories of travel and employability; Held - MA function not to adjudicate or arbitrate; Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak considered and applied; matters of credit that involve disentitlement to compensation are not defined as medical disputes per section 319; Bayside Council v Ware considered and applied; MA function limited to medical expertise; Cheers v Mid Coast Council applied; Medical Assessment Certificate confirmed.

1. On 7 August 2025 the appellant employer, Serco Australia Pty Ltd, lodged an Application to Appeal Against the Decision of a Medical Assessor. The medical dispute was assessed by Dr Clayton Smith, a Medical Assessor, who issued a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) on 10 July 2025.
2. The appellant employer relies on the following grounds of appeal under s 327(3) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act):
   • the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria, and
   • the MAC contains a demonstrable error.
3. The delegate is satisfied that, on the face of the application, at least one ground of appeal has been made out. The Appeal Panel has conducted a review of the original medical assessment but limited to the ground(s) of appeal on which the appeal is made.
4. Rule 128 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the PIC Rules) and Procedural Direction PIC7 - Appeals, reviews, reconsiderations and correction of obvious errors in medical disputes set out the practice and procedure in relation to the medical appeal process under s 328 of the 1998 Act. An Appeal Panel determines its own procedures in accordance with r 128(1) of the PIC Rules.
5. The assessment of permanent impairment is conducted in accordance with the SIRA NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th ed

1 March 2021 (the Guides) and the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th ed (AMA 5). "WPI" is reference to whole person impairment. "Baseline WPI" is a reference to the total WPI assessed before deduction for the effect of pre-existing injury, condition or abnormality pursuant to s 323 of the 1998 Act. "Assessor" is reference to Medical Assessor".

1. On 27 May 2025 an amended referral was made to the Medical Assessor for an evaluation of psychiatric/psychological disorders that occurred on 12 June 2022 following consent orders made by Member Adam Halstead on 23 May 2025.
2. We note that in the Application to Resolve a Dispute Mr Ghazan ticked the box indicating that the claim was a deemed date of injury.
3. Mr Ghazan and his family migrated to Australia in 2013. He commenced employment with the appellant employer in 2014 as a Corrections Officer at the Silverwater facility, where he worked until 2022. Relevantly to the issues in this case, in 2017 he and his wife started an Immigration Consultancy Business referring nurses to Canada. The business premises that he operated in Harris Park recently closed when Mr Ghazan was able to pay outstanding rent.
4. The Medical Assessor recorded that Mr Ghazan was operating the Immigration Consultancy Business with his wife. The business referred nurses to a registered immigration consultant in Canada for a 15% commission.
5. In any event whilst he was working at Silverwater he experienced some physical harm dealing with detainees and he also came into workplace conflict with the manager. As a result his shifts were frequently cancelled without notice and by June 2022 his psychological symptoms had deteriorated to the point where he could no longer work.
6. He attempted a return-to-work trial in November 2023 in a different location but when he was advised that he would need to return to the Villawood Detention Centre under the previous manager, he decompensated again.
7. The Medical Assessor reported that nine days after he ceased work, he experienced acute suicidal ideation and on 21 March 2024 sent concerning emails to the insurer which resulted in police involvement. On 22 March 2024 he was conveyed to Westmead Hospital Emergency Department by the New South Wales Police.
8. The Medical Assessor found 19% WPI.

1. The Appeal Panel conducted a preliminary review of the original medical assessment in the absence of the parties and in accordance with the Procedural Direction PIC7.
2. As a result of that preliminary review, the Appeal Panel determined that it was not necessary for the worker to undergo a further medical examination as although we found an error in one aspect of the PIRS, we were able to correct it without the need for a re-examination.

1. The Appeal Panel has before it all the documents that were sent to the Medical Assessor for the original medical assessment and has taken them into account in making this determination.

1. The parts of the medical certificate given by the Medical Assessor that are relevant to the appeal are set out, where relevant, in the body of this decision.

1. Both parties made written submissions which have been considered below by the Appeal Panel.

1. The procedures on appeal are contained in s 328 of the 1998 Act. The appeal is to be by way of review of the original medical assessment but the review is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.
2. In Campbelltown City Council v Vegan [2006] NSWCA 284 the Court of Appeal held that the Appeal Panel is obliged to give reasons. Where there are disputes of fact it may be necessary to refer to evidence or other material on which findings are based, but the extent to which this is necessary will vary from case to case. Where more than one conclusion is open, it will be necessary to explain why one conclusion is preferred. On the other hand, the reasons need not be extensive or provide a detailed explanation of the criteria applied by the medical professionals in reaching a professional judgement.
3. The appellant employer challenged the class 2 rating for the travel category of the psychiatric impairment rating scale (PIRS), and the class 5 rating for the employability category.

1. In dealing with Mr Ghazan's work history, the Medical Assessor noted:[1]

".....He denied having worked in the migration consultancy business since his capacity was downgraded in November 2023."

1. In considering Mr Ghazan's activities of daily living, the Medical Assessor said:[2]

"His main driving is limited to local school runs and his children's tuition classes. His car insurance lapsed due to financial constraints and poor concentration, further limiting his mobility. He requires his wife to handle most of his transportation needs. He can manage familiar local routes but experiences anxiety with long distances or unfamiliar locations. He has done no independent recreational travel. He had previously travelled internationally with his family including recent trips to India in 2022 and 2023. In October 2023, a solo trip to India for his aunt's funeral was difficult and stressful. He has had one weekend trip to Wollongong with his family in the past year otherwise no recreational travel."

1. The Medical Assessor also noted that "Mr Ghazan drinks alcohol to excess two to three times a week. His weekend pattern is similar but with longer sleep periods.."[3]
2. The Medical Assessor summarised Mr Ghazan's condition at [7] of the MAC:[4]

"Mr Ghazan is a 46-year-old man who presents with symptoms consistent with a DSM-5 major depressive disorder with anxious distress, characterised by persistently depressed mood, anhedonia, weight changes, insomnia, psychomotor agitation, fatigue, feelings of worthlessness, impaired concentration and impairment in social, occupational and other important areas of functioning. He experiences anxious distress including feeling keyed up and tense, restless, difficulties concentrating due to rumination.

He has an alcohol use disorder of moderate severity."

1. As to Mr Ghazan's consistency of presentation, the Medical Assessor noted:

There was no evidence of exaggeration, hyperbole, or malingering. He has provided context to the allegations raised by the Respondent with respect to business activities and credit card statements."

"In the supplementary statement by Mohit Ghazan dated 6 June 2025, Mr Ghazan submitted comments in relation to the Respondent's reference sheet, referencing business activities and credit card transactions."

1. In referring to an Earning Capacity Assessment report of 4 October 2024 the Medical Assessor noted that Mr Ghazan was said to have had:

"Two near-misses as a result of impaired driving due to difficulty concentrating as a result of drowsiness...."

1. In commenting on progress notes from Dr Ben Dickson, the Medical Assessor stated:

"Improvements in his mental state were noted during a visit to India which was attributed to a change in environment, behavioural activation, family gatherings sightseeing, increased social interactions and family support Anxiety and depression symptoms recurred on return. Excessive alcohol use was noted."

1. The Medical Assessor then addressed the Insight Intelligence Desktop investigation report, which indicated "that Mr Ghazan had an active ABN and was actively working in the immigration visa industry and engaging in activity inconsistent with his alleged injuries or impairment".
2. The Medical Assessor then referred to a supplementary statement by Mr Ghazan of

15 May 2025 which addressed the allegations concerning his business which was called UniGlobe Advisory. 3. The Medical Assessor said:[5]

"He noted the insurer had alleged he was working as an immigration consultant through the period of his claim and treatment.

He denied this based on the fact that neither he nor his wife hold a licence or immigration consultant certification in Australia or Canada noting that resumes were sent to the regulator, Canadian Immigration Consultant in Canada who processed visa applications for the clients referred to them. He noted Uniglobe operated as an intermediary between the clients and the consultants in Canada. He said as their business was the first point of contact with the clients to receive resumes and therefore collecting fees in the first stages of the visa processing and as he was the point of contact for the clients to pass on any information to and from the regulated Canadian immigration consultant, many of the clients misunderstood the scope of the work they conducted and used his name as the one providing services. The specific review mentioned the Section 78 notice was written on Tuesday, 16 December 2014 (sic - 2024). He noted since being certified with no capacity to work, he had not undertaken any work in the business as he missed critical deadlines for several clients as his cognitive function was hindered due to his psychological injuries. He noted that the business statements showed a history of outgoing expenses confirming that they utilised the business account for personal expenses and, after he stopped working at Serco, he would often go to the business office to avoid his family to seclude him and be alone hoping to relax but most of the time drinking until 2:00 am. He noted that many of the expenses found in the company's business statements were Uber Eats and alcohol purchases that he ordered to the business address. He noted that he incurred $35,000 in debt. On receiving a TPD claim he noted that he had paid off the rent for their business premises and gave up the office at Harris Park. He noted that at the time he approached the Centre of Addiction Medicine in Cumberland and commenced treatment for alcohol use disorder including a acamprosate and weekly face-to-face sessions with a psychologist at the Centre for Addiction Medicine in Cumberland Hospital."

1. Relevantly, in his PIRS rating form the Medical Assessor assessed a class 2 rating for the category of travel.
2. As to the category of employability the Medical Assessor assessed a class 5 rating saying, "He is totally incapacitated and unable to work at all."

1. The appellant employer appealled the categories of travel and employability. It was alleged that the "Medical Assessor failed to consider the factual evidence that demonstrates that the respondent is able to work, concentrate and travel."
2. It alleged a failure by the Medical Assessor to provide his path of reasoning as to why the evidence relied on by the appellant employer was not relevant to the assessment.
3. It submitted that the reliance only on the statements by the applicant in response to the evidence it relied on amounted to a demonstrable error.
4. We were referred to the references by the Medical Assessor to Mr Ghazan's consultancy business and the appellant employer set out the evidence on which it relied:[6]

"10. The Appellant refers to the desktop report of Insight Intelligence Group dated 17 April 2025. The Appellant also refers to the ASIC company extract and ASIC personal extract of InfoTrack as well as information publicly available on the company website and google. All of this information was included in the relevant information before the MA in preparation of the MAC.

1. An ASIC search of the company Uniglobe Advisory Pty Ltd confirms the Respondent is the Director and the company was established in 2017. On review of the website, the Respondent is listed as the owner and CEO of the company. The website also contains a number of testimonials which specifically name the Respondent and indicate he was performing an active role within the business.
2. There are also 23 Google reviews of the company, which name the Respondent as being the person to provide the service offering to the reviewer. These reviews date back two years.
3. On page 8 of the MAC, the MA refers to the desktop investigation reports and confirms the information obtained indicated that the Respondent had an active ABN and was actively working in the immigration visa industry and engaging in activity inconsistent with his alleged injuries or impairment. However, he goes on to refer to the Respondent's supplementary statement dated 15 May 2025 and stated that the Respondent 'addresses the allegations regarding his business, Uniglobe Advisory'."
4. With regard to the challenge to the travel category, the appellant employer again relied on the findings by the Medical Assessor that we have reproduced above, which indicated travel was by Mr Ghazan with his family to India in 2022 and 2023 together with a solo trip in October 2023 to India for his aunt's funeral.
5. We were referred to the American Express statements which were before the Medical Assessor and it was submitted that those statements demonstrated that payments were made to Air India and that expenses were incurred in Kathmandu, Singapore and New Delhi. No explanation had been given for those expenses and further an incoming passenger card signed by Mr Ghazan dated 12 November 2023 was before the Medical Assessor.
6. The appellant employer referred to the finding by the Medical Assessor that there was no evidence of exaggeration, hyperbole or malingering and that context had been provided by Mr Ghazan.
7. We were referred to Wentworth Community Housing Ltd v Brennan [2019] NSWSC 152, in support of its submission that where a Medical Assessor relies on a subjective report of a worker's symptoms during examination, a demonstrable error occurs.
8. In the present circumstances the "over reliance" on subjective reporting combined with the failure to give enough weight to the extensive factual evidence illustrated a demonstrable error, it was submitted

1. Mr Ghazan referred to Chapter 1.6 of the Guides which provides that an assessment involves a clinical assessment of the claimant as they present on the day of assessment as well as taking into account the claimant's relevant medical history and information.
2. We referred to the oft-cited authority of Ferguson v State of New South Wales[7] and _Jenkins v Ambulance Service of New South Wales[8] r_elating to the emphasis on the clinical assessment that is part of the process and function of a Medical Assessor.
3. With regard to the weight to be accorded to internet searches and the like, we were referred to Hellesey v MetLife Insurance Limited[9] and Cheers v Mid Coast Council.[10] In particular dicta from Basten AJ in Cheers as to the manner in which a Medical Assessor had to deal with such records as bank statements.
4. Whilst the appellant employer regarded this evidence as compelling, Mr Ghazan observed that the Medical Assessor had engaged with the material in detail, had considered it and based his opinion on other grounds.
5. Mr Ghazan referred to Bojko v ICM Property Service Pty Limited[11] where Handley AJA discussed the question of a court not being concerned with looseness in language or unhappy phrasing in the reasons of an administrative decision-maker. The reasons were not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.
6. The Medical Assessor discussed the evidence over two pages, Mr Ghazan said, so that it could not be said that he failed to provide his path of reasoning.
7. The Medical Assessor had clearly engaged with the worker on the material and formed his own clinical judgment.

1. The PIRS is established as the rating system for assessing psychiatric/psychological impairment, by virtue of Chapter 11 of the Guides. Chapter 11 sets out six categories of behaviour to be considered, each being divided into five classes, ranging in seriousness from 1 to 5. Class 1 relates to a situation where there is no psychological deficit, or a minor deficit attributable to the normal variation in the general population. Class 5 pertains to a person who is totally impaired.
2. Chapter 11.12[12] provides:

"Impairment in each area is rated using class descriptors. Classes range from 1 to 5, in accordance with severity. The standard form must be used when scoring the PIRS. The examples of activities are examples only. The assessing psychiatrist should take account of the person's cultural background. Consider activities that are usual for the person's age, sex and cultural norms."

1. The assessor is required to classify each category, and to apply the resulting scores as set out in Chapter 11.[13].
2. The assessment of psychiatric disorder has been considered in a number of cases. In Ferguson v State of New South Wales[14] Campbell J was concerned the case where the Medical Appeal Panel had revoked the MAC on the basis that the finding by the AMS had been glaringly improbable. His Honour found that the Panel had fallen into jurisdictional error. He said at [23]:

"By reference to NSW Police Force v Daniel Wark [2012] NSWWCCMA 36, the Appeal Panel directed itself that in questions of classification under the PIRS:

'... the pre-eminence of the clinical observations cannot be underrated. The judgment as to the significance or otherwise of the matters raised in the consultation is very much a matter for assessment by the clinician with the responsibility of conducting his/her enquiries with the applicant face to face'.

The Appeal Panel accepted that intervention was only justified: if the categorisation was glaringly improbable; if it could be demonstrated that the AMS was unaware of significant factual matters; if a clear misunderstanding could be demonstrated; or if an unsupportable reasoning process could be made out. I understood that all of these matters were regarded by the Appeal Panel as interpretations of the statutory grounds of applying incorrect criteria or demonstrable error. One takes from this that the Appeal Panel understood that more than a mere difference of opinion on a subject about which reasonable minds may differ is required to establish error in the statutory sense.

The Appeal Panel also, with respect, correctly recorded that in accordance with Chapter 11.12 of the Guides 'the assessment is to be made upon the behavioural consequences of psychiatric disorder, and that each category within the PIRS evaluates a particular area of functional impairment': Appeal Panel reasons at [37]. The descriptors, or examples, describing each class of impairment in the various categories are 'examples only': see Jenkins v Ambulance Service of New South Wales[15]. The Appeal Panel said 'they provide a guide which can be consulted as a general indicator of the level of behaviour that might generally be expected': Appeal Panel reasons at [37]."

1. In Glenn William Parker v Select Civil Pty Ltd,[16] another case regarding assessment of psychiatric disorder, Harrison AsJ cited [23] of Ferguson with approval at [65]. Her Honour said at [66]:

"In relation to Classes of PIRS there has to be more than a difference of opinion on a subject about which reasonable minds may differ to establish error in the statutory sense. (Ferguson [24])....."

"It was a matter for the clinical judgment of the AMS to determine whether the impairment with respect to employability was at the moderate level, as he did, or at some other level. But, in seeking judicial review, a mere disagreement about the level of impairment is not sufficient to demonstrate error of a kind susceptible to judicial review."

1. It is accordingly a useful approach for the Panel to enquire whether the assessment by the AMS in this category involved one of the following matters (to use the reference by Campbell J in Ferguson):

(a) if the categorisation was glaringly improbable;

(b) if it could be demonstrated that the AMS was unaware of significant factual matters;

(c) if a clear misunderstanding could be demonstrated, or

(d) if an unsupportable reasoning process could be made out.

1. In Lancaster v Foxtel Management[17] Basten AJ noted at [88-89] that these four considerations, although not inaccurate, were not a statement of legal principles, and that care should be taken in applying the explanation in place of s 327(3) and s 328(2).
2. The thrust of the appellant employer's submissions was that the Medical Assessor had failed to consider the factual evidence on which it relied. We assume that the appellant employer intended to argue that the Medical Assessor had failed to "adequately" consider the factual evidence. As can be seen from the extract at [32] above, the Medical Assessor spent some time considering it.
3. The appellant employer referred to the desktop report of Insight Intelligence Group dated

17 April 2025.[18] It referred to an ASIC extract, noting that Mr Ghazan's company, Uniglobe Advisory Pty Ltd had been established in 2017. It noted that the company's website contained a number of testimonials. It also referred to 23 Google reviews, submitting that "these reviews date back two years." They showed that Mr Ghazan was a person providing the service noted by the reviewer. It noted that Mr Ghazan had an active ABN and it submitted that Mr Ghazan was actively working in the immigration Visa industry and engaged in activity "inconsistent with his alleged injuries or impairment." This report was comprehensive and extended over 77 pages. Also before the Medical Assessor were bank statements and statements from American Express, and an 11 page report from "Equifax Commercial Apply", which appeared to be a credit rating organisation.[19] There were Google searches of Uniglobe Advisory in India, which featured advertising by Mr Ghazan[20] and there were tax returns. 4. The bank statements related firstly to Mr Ghazan's personal account with the Commonwealth Bank. They covered the period from1 November 2019 to 23 April 2024, and consisted of 253 pages.[21] Mr Ghazan's account in the name of Uniglobe Advisory Pty Ltd, also with the Commonwealth Bank, consisted of 173 pages of statements, covering the period

30 April 2020 to 14 April 2024.[22] The American Express statements consisted of 222 pages, covering the period 5 June 2022 to 28 March 2025.[23] The tax returns related to the 2022 and 2023 income. 5. The date of injury was given as 12 June 2022, as noted above. The ARD form indicated that the date of injury was a "deemed date" as the appropriate box had been ticked.[24] The parties appear to have approached Mr Ghazan's claim on the basis that it was a disease case, contrary to the terms of the Consent Orders of 23 May 2025 but no point has been raised in that regard. 6. The Consent Orders also provided for the lodgement of "reference sheets".[25] The documents to be referred to the Medical Assessor included:

"...(f) The 'Reference Sheet' prepared by the respondent and the reply to that document prepared by the applicant, lodged in accordance with the related Directions made today.

1. The respondent will prepare a 'Reference Sheet' that highlights certain relevant documents in the ALAD dated 19 May 2025 and the applicant may provide a reply to that document.
2. Related Directions have been made today to facilitate the lodgement of the 'Reference Sheet' and reply."

1. The Medical Assessor referred to a "reference sheet" at [10c] when he discussed

Mr Ghazan's supplementary statement, as noted above. There may have been reference sheets within the documentation, but we were unable to find them. A document was received after the MAC had issued which included a "support letter" from Mr Ghazan's GP dated "16/10/25" together with documents which appeared to be concerned with financial hardship Mr Ghazan has been facing. This additional evidence is rejected as it was not accompanied by any application pursuant to s 327(3)(b) or s 328(3) of the 1998 Act, and it does not have any appreciable relevance to the issues in the case. 2. It may be accepted therefore that the parties were aware of the complexity of the documents relied on by the appellant employer, and that the parties agreed that the "reference sheets" should be prepared to explain the significance of the 1,317 pages of material that was before the Medical Assessor. 3. The function of a Medical Assessor, however, is not to analyse the rafts of evidentiary material before him/her and adjudicate on its effect. In the often-cited High Court case of Wingfoot,[26] the plurality stated (its reference to a medical panel is applicable also to a Medical Assessor[27]) at [47]:

"The function of a Medical Panel is to form and to give its own opinion on the medical question referred for its opinion. In performing that function, the Medical Panel is doubtless obliged to observe procedural fairness, so as to give an opportunity for parties to the underlying question or matter who will be affected by the opinion to supply the Medical Panel with material which may be relevant to the formation of the opinion and to make submissions to the Medical Panel on the basis of that material. The material supplied may include the opinions of other medical practitioners, and submissions to the Medical Panel may seek to persuade the Medical Panel to adopt reasoning or conclusions expressed in those opinions. The Medical Panel may choose in a particular case to place weight on a medical opinion supplied to it in forming and giving its own opinion. It goes too far, however, to conceive of the function of the Panel as being either to decide a dispute or to make up its mind by reference to competing contentions or competing medical opinions (authority omitted). The function of a Medical Panel is neither arbitral nor adjudicative: it is neither to choose between competing arguments, nor to opine on the correctness of other opinions on that medical question. The function is in every case to form and to give its own opinion on the medical question referred to it by applying its own medical experience and its own medical expertise."

1. The parties in this case appear to have been attempting to ask the Medical Assessor to choose between particular arguments (which were intended to be put, it would seem, through the medium of "reference sheets") and to adopt an arbitral or adjudicative role. As Basten AJ said in Cheers, relied on by the respondent worker, at [28]:

"... On one view.. the nature of a clinical assessment provides a more powerful case for a face-to-face consultation between the worker and the psychiatrist..."

"The reliance on bank records... concerned the plaintiff's reliability or veracity. With respect to the assessment process itself, the error on the part of the medical assessor is implicit rather than explicit. That is a significant matter: such an assessment was quintessentially a matter for the clinician undertaking the assessment.."

1. His Honour then referred to the above quote in Ferguson as to the pre-eminent position of the Medical Assessor.
2. A further consideration applies in cases such as this, where an employer assumes that a Medical Assessor has power to make findings of credit. Such power exists of course when he is exercising his own medical experience and expertise in deciding the medical dispute as defined by s 319 of the 1998 Act. In Bayside Council v Ware[28] a Medical Appeal Panel considered this issue.
3. In that case, Member Sweeney, as he then was, had found that he did not believe the evidence of the applicant, but was compelled to refer the dispute to a Medical Assessor because the employer had admitted that the applicant had a psychological injury. The employer relied on a disentitling provision of the 1987 Act, s 11A, but did not succeed. Nonetheless, the applicant was found, after a fully defended hearing in which all the witnesses were cross-examined, to have no credit and was capable of earning his pre-injury earnings. The Medical Assessor then found that the applicant was totally impaired and incapable of working, notwithstanding that Member Sweeney's decision was before him.
4. The decision in Ware considered the authority of Bindah v Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd[29] and Jaffaire v Quality Castings Pty Ltd[30] in the Court of Appeal, and found that the provisions of s 319 of the 1998 Act did not give a Medical Assessor power to consider matters of causation that disentitled an applicant to compensation. The issue of credit was such a matter. The decision said at [121]:

"121. What is not set out in s 319, as can be seen, is the power to make a finding as to a claimant's credit. Such a power may be implied and indeed is a corollary to the resolution of the medical disputes that have to be determined. However a Medical Assessor is limited in his ability to do so. His decision must be made on the basis of his clinical judgment, experience and expertise, which was the basis on which we were invited by Mr Ware to accept the Medical Assessor's opinion. Such a process may indeed suffice, provided the Medical Assessor properly considers the evidence before him, and gives it appropriate weight."

1. Ware was a demonstration of the dangers of leaving controversial evidence to be decided by a Medical Assessor, whose training and experience does not extend to the analysis of complex documentary material, particularly the synthesising of many strands of evidence - none of which was concerned with the area of his expertise. A Medical Assessor has no experience in taking more than one source of information, investigating and interpreting each source and fairly making a legally sustainable conclusion. That is a function of a court or the Commission, as the decision in Ware observed at [112]:

"112. Member Sweeney permitted oral evidence to be given, and the applicant together with three respondent witnesses were sworn, and extensively cross-examined. With the assistance of submissions from counsel, Member Sweeney heard and read the evidence tendered before him, and delivered his statement of reasons. The conciliation/arbitration hearing occurred on 13 July 2021 and Member Sweeney delivered a comprehensive and reasoned judgement on 12 October 2021, which was amended on 1 November 2021, from which no appeal was made."

1. We now turn to the two impugned classifications.

1. The relevant descriptors are provided by Table 11.6 of the Guides:

"Class 2: Mild impairment: Able to work full time but in a different

environment from that of the pre-injury job. The duties require comparable skill and intellect as those of the pre-injury job. Can work in the same position, but no more than 20 hours per week (eg no longer happy to work with specific persons, or work in a specific location due to travel required).

Class 3: Moderate impairment: cannot work at all in same position.

Can perform less than 20 hours per week in a different position, which requires less skill or is qualitatively different (eg less stressful).

Class 4: Severe impairment: cannot work more than one or two days at a time, less than 20 hours per fortnight. Pace is reduced, attendance is erratic.

1. The short reasons given for the class 5 rating in the Table 11.8 PIRS rating form were:

"He is totally incapacitated and unable to work at all."

1. That conclusion must be read in the context of the consideration by the Medical Assessor of the evidence before him, reproduced above at [32], including the exculpatory statement by Mr Ghazan dated 15 May 2025.[31] No error was established in this category, as the Medical Assessor had indeed considered the evidence and, from the viewpoint of his medical expertise and experience, explained why he did not accept the respondent's submissions.

1. The relevant descriptors are provided by Table 11.3 of the Guides:

"Class 1 No deficit, or minor deficit attributable to the normal variation in the general population: Can travel to new environments without supervision.

Class 2 Mild impairment: can travel without support person, but only in a familiar area such as local shops, visiting a neighbour.

Class 3 Moderate impairment: cannot travel away from own residence without support person. Problems may be due to excessive anxiety or cognitive impairment."

1. In his Table 11.8 Rating Form the reasons given by the Medical Assessor for the class 2 rating were:

"His main driving is limited to local school runs and his children's tuition classes. His car insurance lapsed due to financial constraints and poor concentration, further limiting his mobility. He requires his wife to handle most of his transportation needs. He can manage familiar local routes but experiences anxiety with long distances or unfamiliar locations. He has done no independent recreational travel. He had previously travelled internationally with his family including recent trips to India in 2022 and 2023. In October 2023, a solo trip to India for his aunt's funeral was difficult and stressful. He has had one weekend trip to Wollongong with his family in the past year otherwise no recreational travel."

1. The appellant employer cited Wentworth Community Housing Ltd v Brennan. This was a claim that the Registrar (now the President), in failing to refer this matter to a Medical Appeal Panel, had committed jurisdictional error. The AMS, as Medical Assessors were then described, had not referred to a discrepancy between the claimant's evidence and the surveillance and social media reports, and the Registrar's decision was quashed. The obvious distinction in the present case, apart from the different stage in the process, is that the Medical Assessor in this case did consider the discrepancies, and gave reasons as to how he resolved them.
2. In the present case, the appellant employer maintains that, although the Medical Assessor had considered the evidence, he erred in accepting the explanation given by Mr Ghazan.
3. The appellant employer submitted that the evidence described above demonstrated that

Mr Ghazan had been engaged in conduct that showed he was able to run his business, Uniglobe Advisory Pty Ltd. (We note that it was argued that this conduct impacted the rating given in travel, but in passing we also note that, although it was alleged that Mr Ghazan's ability to concentrate had been demonstrated also, no appeal was made against the class 3 rating given in the category of concentration, persistence and pace). 4. The appellant employer relied on the evidence within bank statements, and particularly the American Express statements in the name of Uniglobe Advisory Pty Ltd to allege that

Mr Ghazan had been to various international cities, such as Dublin, London, Mumbai, San Francisco, Bangalore, and Amsterdam, to name a few. Whilst those destinations appear in the statements, we are far from convinced that they prove that Mr Ghazan actually travelled to those destinations. The amounts charged for those entries, and the entries that preceded and followed them usually, but not always, related to expenses incurred in Sydney. We note that entries concerning overseas destinations continued to appear up to August 2024, when entries were recorded about Singapore and Dublin, which might indicate a form of continuation of the business after Mr Ghazan's capacity was downgraded in November 2023. As indicated above, such an enquiry was beyond the Medical Assessor's expertise. His medical expertise was directed to Mr Ghazan's psychological condition and he found that

Mr Ghazan was consistent in his presentation, and that there was:

"...no evidence of exaggeration, hyperbole or malingering..."

1. The Medical Assessor has noted Mr Ghazan's international travel in 2022 and 2023, including a solo trip in October 2023 for his aunt's funeral, and his trip to Wollongong with his family. The methodology used to assess WPI in psychiatric/psychological cases is evaluated by the claimant's behaviour, and the fact that a claimant might feel discomfort or anxiety whilst he performs activities defined by the categories in the PIRS is not a deciding factor. That Mr Ghazan found the activity of travelling to India alone to be difficult and stressful was not a deciding factor in the evaluation of his impairment.
2. Nonetheless, the other factors mentioned by the Medical Assessor - that Mr Ghazan's driving was limited to local school runs and tuition classes, and that he can manage familiar local routes but not long distances or in unfamiliar locations- on balance aligns more with a class 2 rating than class 1.
3. For these reasons, the Appeal Panel has determined that the MAC issued on 10 July 2025 should be confirmed.

[7] [2017] NSWSC 887.

[8] [2015] NSWSC 633.

[13] See 11.15-11.21 at Guides p 65 and Table 11.7 at Guides page 66.

[14] [2017] NSWSC 887.

[15] [2015] NSWSC 633 (Jenkins).

[16] [2018] NSWSC 140 (Parker).

[17] [2022] NSWSC 929.

[26] Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak [2013] HCA 43.

[27] See e.g. Western Sydney Local Health District v Chan [2015] NSWSC 1968 at [13].

[28] [2023] NSWPICMP 473.

[29] [2014] NSWCA 264.

[30] [2018] NSWCA 88.