[2024] FWC 1275
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2024-05-21
Original judgment source is linked above.
s.424 - Application to suspend or terminate protected industrial action - endangering life etc.
Application to suspend or terminate protected industrial action - endangering life, etc - whether the industrial action has threatened, is threating, or would threaten to relevantly endanger - evidence does not presently support that contention - application dismissed - observations made about future bargaining and potential impact of industrial action.
"424 FWC must suspend or terminate protected industrial action - endangering life etc.
Suspension or termination of protected industrial action
(1) The FWC must make an order suspending or terminating protected industrial action for a proposed enterprise agreement that:
if the FWC is satisfied that the protected industrial action has threatened, is threatening, or would threaten:
(c) to endanger the life, the personal safety or health, or the welfare, of the population or of part of it; or
(d) to cause significant damage to the Australian economy or an important part of it.
(iia) if the industrial action is being engaged in, or is threatened, impending or probable, in a State that is a referring State as defined in section 30B or 30L - the Minister of the State who has responsibility for workplace relations matters in the State;
(iib) if the industrial action is being engaged in, or is threatened, impending or probable, in a Territory - the Minister of the Territory who has responsibility for workplace relations matters in the Territory;
(3) If an application for an order under this section is made, the FWC must, as far as practicable, determine the application within 5 days after it is made.
(4) If the FWC is unable to determine the application within that period, the FWC must, within that period, make an interim order suspending the protected industrial action to which the application relates until the application is determined.
(5) An interim order continues in operation until the application is determined."
(1) This section applies if the FWC is required or permitted by this Division to make an order suspending protected industrial action.
(2) The FWC must specify, in the order, the period for which the protected industrial action is suspended.
(3) The FWC may specify, in the order, a longer period of notice of up to 7 working days for the purposes of paragraph 430(2)(b) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances justifying that longer period of notice.
"[7] Section 424 provides that Fair Work Australia (FWA) must make an order suspending or terminating protected industrial action if it is satisfied that the action threatens to endanger the life, the personal safety, health or welfare of the population or part of the population or to cause significant damage to the Australian economy. The effect of making an order suspending or terminating protected industrial action is to bring to an end the right to take protected industrial action. This is achieved by the removal of the protection or immunity which would otherwise attach to the action. The termination of protected industrial action may also lead to FWA making a workplace determination under Part 2-5 of the Act (see ss.266 and 267).
[8] Within the scheme of the Act, the powers in relation to the suspension or termination of protected industrial action are intended to be used in exceptional circumstances and where significant harm is being caused by the action. This is clear from the Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008:
"The Bill recognises that employees have a right to take protected industrial action during bargaining. These measures recognise that, while protected industrial action is legitimate during bargaining for an enterprise agreement, there may be cases where the impact of that action on the parties or on third parties is so severe that it is in the public interest, or even potentially the interests of those engaging in the action, that the industrial action cease - at least temporarily.
It is not intended that these mechanisms be capable of being triggered where the industrial action is merely causing an inconvenience. Nor is it intended that these mechanisms be used generally to prevent legitimate protected industrial action in the course of bargaining" [paras. 1708-1709].
[9] The provisions in the Act for the suspension or termination of protected industrial action are in certain respects similar to the scheme in the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (the WR Act) providing for the suspension and termination of bargaining periods. Under that legislation, the power given to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission was to terminate a bargaining period with the result that all industrial action being taken in support of claims would become unprotected.
[10] In the present case, it was submitted by the NTEU that the power in s.424 of the Act is significantly different from that relating to the termination of bargaining periods under the WR Act. It was said that the power in s.424 is a much more confined and precise power which is directed at the prevention of particular forms of third party harm. It is therefore only industrial action which causes the requisite harm that may be terminated or suspended by FWA under s.424 of the Act.
[11] We do not agree with this construction of the power in s.424. The use of the words "suspension" and "termination" of protected industrial action in the section may be contrasted with the power given to FWA in s.418 in relation to the making of orders to "stop" industrial action. The suspension of protected industrial action is to be construed as a suspension of the protection or immunity which attaches to the industrial action under the Act provided it is authorised in a protected action ballot etc. (see s.409). A reference in s.424 to the making of an order "suspending or terminating protected industrial action for a proposed enterprise agreement" would therefore seem to apply to protected industrial action which was authorised by the ballot, and not to the particular industrial action which is being taken as part of what might be a series of actions authorised by the ballot and which is having the requisite harmful effect.
[12] This reading of s.424 would accord with the wider scheme of the Act and, in particular, with the provisions which apply to the making of workplace determinations where an order has been made terminating protected industrial action (see s.266). It would be inconsistent with that scheme if further protected industrial action was able to be taken even though the jurisdiction for the making of an arbitrated determination was in train (see Ambulance Victoria v LHMU [2009] FWA 44, Kaufman SDP). There is no valid reason for adopting a fundamentally different interpretation of s.424 in respect of the power to suspend protected industrial action than is applied in relation to the termination power.
[13] In any event, we note that even if an order made under s.424 was confined to part only of the authorised industrial action, the effect of the order would be to render the other industrial action unprotected. The common requirements that apply for industrial action to be protected industrial action are set out in Subdivision B of Division 2 of Part 3-3 of the Act. In particular, s.413(7)(a) provides that industrial action will not be protected industrial action for a proposed enterprise agreement if there is in operation "an order under Division 6 of this Part suspending or terminating industrial action in relation to the agreement".
"[48] The main issue for consideration in this matter concerns the impact that the protected industrial action being taken and threatened by the ANF and its members is having or is likely to have on the Victorian public health system and the users of the system. Subsection 424(1) requires that FWA must make an order suspending or terminating the protected industrial action that is being engaged in, or is threatened, impending or probable if we are satisfied that it has threatened, is threatening or would threaten to endanger the personal safety or health, or the welfare, of part of the population."
[49] It is clear that there must be an appropriate evidential basis to found such a satisfaction. As the High Court said in Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v AIRC in considering somewhat similar provisions in the Workplace Relations Act 1996:
"... the nature of the threat as to which a decision-maker must be satisfied under s 170MW(3) of the Act involves a measure of subjectivity or value judgment... [A] decision under s 170MW(3)(b) that industrial action is 'threatening... to cause significant damage to the Australian economy or an important part of it'... is not simply a matter of impression or value judgment... the decision-maker must have some basis for his or her satisfaction over and above generalised predictions as to the likely consequences of the industrial action in question".
[51] We were taken in the proceedings to previous decisions of FWA and its predecessors regarding the meaning of the terms in s.424(1), including the references to "welfare" of the population and the concept of endangerment. These are commonly used words and expressions which are widely understood in the community and which should be given their ordinary meaning. Conduct that puts a person's physical or mental state at risk of material detriment - or that materially hinders or prevents improvement in a person's poor physical or mental state - may qualify as conduct that endangers personal health or safety. Although the conduct might not be of such a serious nature as to amount to an endangerment to "life", it might nevertheless be such as to constitute a significant risk to "personal safety or health". Conduct that delays or puts off the efficient supply of public health services has the capacity to impact adversely upon the welfare of at least some of the persons who require those services. The impact of the conduct must, however, be more than merely to cause inconvenience to the persons concerned - it must be such as to expose them to danger."

M Minucci of counsel, with permission for Serco Australia Pty Limited.
S Blewett of counsel, with permission for the United Workers' Union.
[1] NTEIU v University of South Australia [2010] FWAFB 1014.
[2] See National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Monash University [2013] FWCFB 5982 at [20].
[3] [2011] FWAFB 8165 15. See also Tyco Australia Pty Limited T/A Wormald v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia- Electrical, Energy and Services Division - Queensland Divisional Branch [2011] FWAFB 1598.
[4] See for example Tyco Australia Pty Ltd (t/as Wormald) v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2011] FWAFB 1598 at 29.
[5] State of Victoria - Department of Health and Community Services v Health Services Union of Australia AIRC Print L9810, 3 March 1995 at para. 15.
[6] Ambulance Victoria v Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union [2009] FWA 44 at para. 29, [(2009) 187 IR 119].
[7] Victorian Hospitals' Industrial Association v Australian Nursing Federation at para. 51, [(2011) 214 IR 148].
[10] Witness Statement of Mr Roberts, Exhibit 2 (Mr Roberts was not required for cross examination.).
[11] Witness Statement of Mr Barber, Exhibit 3.
[12] Witness Statement of Mr Farmilo, Exhibit 4.
[15] Re: Coal and Allied (1998) 80 IR 14, at 33. See also State of Victoria - Department of Human Services v Health Services Union [2012] FWC 8397 at para. 80, [(2012) 225 IR 306].
[16] Health Services Union v Clinical Laboratories Pty Ltd T/A Healthscope Pathology [2014] FWC 8808 at [41] and CPB Contractors Pty Ltd T/A CPB Contractors Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, Democratic Outcomes Pty Ltd T/A CiVS [2024] FWC 1042 at [32].
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Serco Australia Pty Limited T/A Serco
United Workers' Union [2024] FWC 1275
(1998) 80 IR 14
(2012) 225 IR 306
(2009) 187 IR 119
(2011) 214 IR 148