• the end date of the period in the second point on page 1 and the second point on page 22 point under the heading 'Decision', is corrected (from 30 December 2026) to 31 December 2026; and
• the end date in the second point at paragraph 122 is corrected (from 30 December 2026) to 31 December 2026.

Decision: The Tribunal set aside the decision under review and substituted its decision that:

• for the period 21 March 2024 to 30 June 2025, the ATI for Mr Hargreaves is set at $71,159;
• for the period 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026, the ATI for Mr Hargreaves is set at $73,934;
• from 21 March 2024 to 31 December 2024 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves is to be increased by $3,255 in recognition of his contribution towards the child's education costs (annualised) for the whole of the 2024 academic year;
• from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves is to be increased by $4,056 in recognition of his contribution towards the child's education costs;
• from 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2026 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves is to be increased by $4,214 in recognition of his contribution towards the child's education costs; and
• from 21 March 2024 to 31 December 2026 the self-support component in the assessment formula for Mr Hargreaves is to be reduced to $7,978.

CHILD SUPPORT - departure determination - costs of education - educated in a manner as previously agreed by the parties - deliberate non-disclosure of financial circumstances - adverse inference drawn that higher income is available - decision under review set aside and substituted

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision and replaced with generic information pursuant to subsection 16(2AB) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

1. Ms Serales and Mr Hargreaves are the separated parents of [Child A] born [in] September 2018, who is reflected as being in the above primary care (100%) of Ms Serales for the purposes of child support.
2. A case has been registered with Services Australia - Child Support (Child Support) since 28 December 2018, and child support has been collectable by Child Support from that date, where Mr Hargreaves is the payer of child support and Ms Serales the payee.
3. At the time the relevant application was made, the following child support assessment was in place:
   • for the period 1 October 2023 to 31 December 2024, an annual rate of $1,632 based on a deemed income of $21,552 for 2022/2023 for Mr Hargreaves and a 2022/2023 adjusted taxable income of $64,120 for Ms Serales.
4. On 17 November 2023, Ms Serales applied for a departure determination on the basis that the child support assessment was unfair on the following grounds:
   • the costs of maintaining the child are significantly affected by the costs of caring for, educating or training the child (called Reason 3 by Child Support);
   • the child support assessment is unfair because the paying parent has given money, goods or property to the child, to the receiving parent or to another person for the benefit of the child (called Reason 5 by Child Support);
   • the childcare costs for the child exceed 5% of Miss Serales' adjusted taxable income (ATI) (called Reason 6 by Child Support);
   • Ms Serales' necessary expenses for self-support significantly reduce her ability to support the child (called Reason 7 by Child Support);
   • Mr Hargreaves' income, property and financial resources make the child support assessment unfair (called Reason 8A by Child Support);
   • Mr Hargreaves' earning capacity makes the child support assessment unfair (called Reasons 8B by Child Support); and
   • Miss Serales' capacity to support the child is significantly reduced because she is responsible for supporting a resident child in her household (called Reason 10 by Child Support).

1. On 16 April 2024, the original decision maker found Reason 3 and 8A established in Ms Serales' application. The assessment was changed as follows:
   • from 21 March 2024 to 30 June 2025 the ATI for Mr Hargreaves is to be set at $47,472;
   • from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026 the ATI for Mr Hargreaves is to be set at $49,323;
   • from 21 March 2024 to 31 December 2024 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves is to be increased by $7,731 in recognition of his contribution towards the child's education costs (annualised) for the whole of the 2024 academic year;
   • from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves is to be increased by $6,240 in recognition of his contribution towards the child's education costs;
   • from 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2026 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves is to be increased by $6,427 in recognition of his contribution towards the child's education costs; and
   • from 21 March 2024 to 31 December 2026 the self-support component in the assessment formula for Mr Hargreaves is to be reduced to $12,312.
2. On 13 May 2024, Mr Hargreaves objected to this decision.
3. On 10 July 2024, an objections officer allowed the objection, and set aside the original decision, replacing it with the following:
   • For the period 21 March 2024 to 30 June 2025, the ATI for Mr Hargreaves is set at $47,472;
   • For the period 1 July 2025 to 30 December 2026, the ATI for Mr Hargreaves is set at $49,323; and
   • For the period 21 March 2024 to 30 December 2026, the self-support component of the assessment formula for Mr Hargreaves is to be reduced to $7,978.
4. The impact of the objections officer's decision on the child support assessment was as follows:
   • For the period 21 March 2024 to 30 December 2026, the annual rate payable by Mr Hargreaves will change to $6,532.
5. The effect of the objections officer's decision will result in the arrears owed by Mr Hargreaves being reduced by $1,977.07.
6. On 6 August 2024, Ms Serales made an application to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) for an independent review of Child Support's decision.
7. From 14 October 2024, the AAT became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (the Transitional Act), applications for review to the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are taken to be an application for review to the Tribunal. The Transitional Act gives the Tribunal the authority to continue and finalise any aspect of the review not already completed by the AAT. This decision and statement of reasons is made by the Tribunal.
8. A directions hearing was conducted by the Tribunal on 17 January 2025, on which date the parties spoke to the Tribunal by MS Teams audio. Directions were issued to the parties to provide specified documents by 10 February 2025. The Tribunal's direction to the parties stated that failure by a party to comply with the directions may result in the following consequences: (a) if the party is the applicant, the Tribunal may dismiss the application for review; or (b) the ART may draw adverse inferences against a party if that party fails to comply with a direction to give information or evidence to the Tribunal.
9. As at 10 February 2025, the documents Ms Serales and Mr Hargreaves were directed to provide to the Tribunal had not been provided. On 26 February 2025, the Tribunal determined the applicant had ample opportunity to submit the information she was directed to provide and the Tribunal determined that in the circumstances of this matter it was appropriate, pursuant to section 100 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (the ART Act), to dismiss the application for review.
10. On 5 March 2025, Ms Serales applied under subsection 102(7) of the ART Act for reinstatement of the application. Pursuant to subsection 102(9) of the ART Act, the Tribunal reinstated the application and the matter was listed for hearing on 30 April 2025.
11. The Tribunal hearing was conducted on 30 April 2025. Ms Serales and Mr Hargreaves participated in the hearing by MS Teams audio and gave sworn evidence.
12. At the hearing the Tribunal had before it documents provided by Child Support (1 to 743); these documents had been exchanged between the parties prior to the hearing and they confirmed receipt of the documents with the Tribunal. In response to the directions issued by the Tribunal Ms Serales provided various documents. Mr Hargreaves did not provide documents as directed.
13. Subsequent to the hearing, on 5 May 2025, Ms Serales provided further information, including information from [Family Services 1] regarding child contact services family court orders and receipt of chemist costs.

1. The statutory provisions relevant to this review are contained in the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Assessment Act) and the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.
2. The rate of child support payable by a liable parent is usually based on an administrative assessment under Part 5 of the Assessment Act. The liable parent or carer may apply to the Child Support Registrar for a determination to depart from the child support administrative assessment under Part 6A of the Assessment Act. Section 98C of the Assessment Act provides that the Registrar may make a determination to depart from the formula assessment and establishes a three step process. The Registrar, and the Tribunal standing in the place of the Registrar, must be satisfied that:

(i) there is a ground to depart from the administrative assessment of child support;

(ii) it is just and equitable to depart; and

(iii) it is otherwise proper to depart.

1. The grounds for departure from an administrative assessment of child support are those set out in subsection 117(2) of the Assessment Act. Each ground is prefaced by the term "in the special circumstances of the case". The term "special circumstances" is not defined in the Assessment Act. In Gyselman and Gyselman [1991] FamCA 93; (1992) FLC 92-279, the Full Family Court indicated that for there to be special circumstances, the facts of the case must establish something which is special or out of the ordinary.
2. If satisfied that a ground or grounds exist and that it would be just and equitable and otherwise proper to make a particular determination, the Tribunal may make one of the determinations prescribed in section 98S of the Assessment Act.

Issue 1 - Is there a ground established to depart from the administrative assessment of child support?

1. Ms Serales applied for a change of assessment on 17 November 2023, on the basis of multiple reasons as outlined at paragraph 4 above - subparagraphs 117(2)(b)(ii) (Reason 3), 117(2)(c)(ii) (Reason 5), 117(2)(b)(ib) (Reason 6), 117(2)(a)(iii)(A) (Reason 7), 117(2)(c) (Reason 8) and 117(2)(aa) (Reason 10).
2. The Child Support original decision maker found Reasons 3 and 8A established while the objections officer found Reason 8A established.
3. Because of the matters raised by the parties before Child Support and before the Tribunal, the Tribunal considered whether a ground for departure existed under subparagraphs 117(2)(b)(ii)) (Reason 3), 117(2)(a)(iii)(A) (Reason 7), 117(2)(c) (Reason 8) of the Assessment Act.

Evidence before the Tribunal in relation to the costs of maintaining a child are significantly affected by the high costs of caring for, educating or training the child in the way both parents intended (Reason 3)

1. Ms Serales told the Tribunal that the parties had a mutual intention that their two children would have a private school education and the parties had many conversations during their relationship about this. There were text messages supporting this was the case. A text message dated 3 November 2021 from Mr Hargreaves states, "So let's shift the focus to the [children], I'll sign the documents for the [children] for private school and help where I can. Sound ok?"
2. Ms Serales gave evidence that Mr Hargreaves attended an elite private school and he expressed the intention that their children would also attend a private school. Ms Serales told the Tribunal it was a clear intention of the parties that both their children attend private school and they were both placed on the waiting list for [School A], which both parents agreed and signed off on.
3. Ms Serales told the Tribunal that when the relationship ended, and Mr Hargreaves formed a new relationship, he changed his mind about this, although he initially paid for some expenses including school shoes, some extracurricular costs and one term's school tuition fees for [Child B], who unfortunately passed away. Ms Serales told the Tribunal that the parenting situation changed and Mr Hargreaves changed his mind when their child, [Child A], was ready to start prep in 2024, but the changed intention was not mutually agreed between them.
4. Ms Serales gave evidence that they had family court proceedings on foot in 2022, and they did not have a conversation about the child's schooling. The child had been placed on a waiting list and she needed to enrol the child and there was a private school near her home, which was cheaper and more affordable. Mr Hargreaves refused to sign the enrolment forms saying that he simply changed his mind and offered no alternatives. As Mr Hargreaves would not sign the enrolment and the child needed to be enrolled so as to start school, Ms Serales told the Tribunal that her lawyer suggested she sign the enrolment form and pay for the enrolment. She did this so the child can attend school and there was no change in the mutual intention of the parties. Ms Serales submitted that Mr Hargreaves changed his mind after re-partnering and there was never a mutual change in the intention.
5. In the absence of an agreement by both parties to change the intention for private school education for the child, Ms Serales submitted that the original plan should be maintained. While she has 100% care of the child she is seeking 50% contribution to the school fees from Mr Hargreaves. At present she is working two jobs as [an Occupation 1] to meet this financial commitment of the child's school fees which she submitted is not fair. Ms Serales told the Tribunal she has also incurred significant costs for legal proceedings in the family court and has borrowed from her parents to meet these costs.
6. Ms Serales told the Tribunal that the child's school fees for "prep" at [School A] were $5,000 in 2023. She withdrew the child from [School A] in January 2024 and the child commenced at [School B] at a cost of $1,627.50 per term. The fees for 2025 are $2,028 per term. Ms Serales provided invoices to support her evidence in relation to the school fees. Ms Serales referred to other costs she has incurred including extracurricular activities undertaken by the child, such as [language] classes and [instrument] lessons; both have ceased as Ms Serales cannot afford these extra costs. Her focus is on paying school fees and she also pays for swimming lessons.

1. Mr Hargreaves has acknowledged to Child Support and to the Tribunal that he signed the enrolment for the child to attend private school in 2019, and there was an initial mutual intention for their children to be educated at a private school. He told the Tribunal that it was a competitive process to obtain a place for the child in private school and he signed the initial acceptance so they had the option of private school for the child. He submitted he later changed his intention and that door closed because he did not sign the actual enrolment forms when a place was offered for the child and it was time for the child to commence school.
2. Mr Hargreaves told the Tribunal that there were other suitable school options in the [Town 1] area and had the parents not separated the child would have attended a public school. Mr Hargreaves clarified that he attended public school until Year 9 before attending private school from Year 10.
3. He submitted that the mutual intention between the parties ceased after the separation when he looked at his income and the cost of private school and determined that it was not financially viable for him to contribute to private school education at either [School A] or the less expensive [School B].
4. Mr Hargreaves told the Tribunal he discussed the issue with his parents and attempted to discuss the issue with Ms Serales as he came to the view that it was not within his financial capacity to pay for private school fees. It has been an ongoing issue with Ms Serales. Mr Hargreaves told the Tribunal Ms Serales had no understanding about the cost of living and what was feasible for him financially. He submitted he had no ability to contribute to the school fees on the basis of his income and this has been the case for the last seven years. He debated this issue with Child Support.
5. Mr Hargreaves referred the Tribunal to the letter dated 29 September 2021 from Ms Serales' lawyer to his lawyers, which referred to recent discussions about what school [Child B] will attend next year, with Ms Serales seeking to enrol [Child B] at [School B] in [Town 1] and that she was willing to pay the school fees and Mr Hargreaves is not in agreement to this. Mr Hargreaves' lawyers were asked to confirm that Mr Hargreaves is still not in agreement in which case they may need to list this as an issue in dispute.

1. The Tribunal noted that subparagraph 117(2)(b)(ii) refers to the past expectation of the parents rather than 'agreement', current or otherwise: see for example, F & S [2003] FMCAfam 531 per Bryant CFM (as Her Honour then was). The expectation required the Tribunal to consider the manner of education. The Tribunal needs to consider the type of education expected by both parents, rather than any particular school intended by the parents: see Wild and Ballard [1997] FamCA 41; (1997) FLC 92-771.
2. Miss Serales has provided evidence that the parents mutually agreed to educate the child in the private system well prior to the child commencing school. This includes a copy of an enrolment acknowledgement letter dated 13 April 2019 from [School A], which is after the registration of the case with Child Support, addressed to both parents, stating enrolment has been completed; a receipt for an application fee of $110 was attached. The Tribunal accepts that Mr Hargreaves at a later date was asked to sign enrolment forms and he did not do so; his failure to sign the enrolment forms was a matter of dispute between the parties and involved their legal representative. As it was a requirement for enrolment forms to be signed once the child was offered a place in the school, so the child could commence school, Ms Serales signed the forms which Mr Hargreaves submitted meant that Miss Serales accepted full responsibility for the private school fees.
3. An email from [School A] dated 15 April 2019 confirms an application was received for admission of the child for kinder in 2022, but as the child was born in September 2018, the correct year of entry for four-year old kinder is 2023 and the application was amended accordingly to reflect. A letter dated 18 July 2023 from [School A] confirms an offer of a prep placement for the child commencing in 2024. Another letter from the school, dated 26 July 2023 addressed only to Miss Serales confirms a payment of $4,000 has been made to secure [Child A's] place in preparatory for 2024.
4. Mr Hargreaves gave evidence to Child Support and the Tribunal that there was never any agreement that the child would attend [School A]. Nevertheless, Mr Hargreaves submitted there may have been an agreement by the parties for their children to attend private school and this was reflected in an application to [School A] so as to secure a place for the child. A text dated 21 November 2021 by Mr Hargreaves that he will sign the documents for the children to attend private school supports such an agreement being in place between the parties.
5. The Tribunal accepts that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties in relation to the child's school being in a private school and that intention was formed when the intent to enrol the child at [School A] was initially signed by both parents.
6. Mr Hargreaves submitted that if there was an initial agreement it was to keep the option open for a private school education so as a place would be secured for the child. He submitted that he later changed his mind and as a result the mutual intention between the parties ceased. He referred to a letter from Ms Serales' lawyers which he submitted supports the cessation of a mutual intention. The Tribunal does not accept this submission and the letter simply acknowledged Mr Hargreaves' unwillingness to contribute to school fees, and sought confirmation if this was the case and if so a dispute would be issued. The Tribunal does not accept that on a simple reading of this letter there was a change in the previous mutual intent between the parties that the child be educated in a manner as previously agreed by the parties.
7. Mr Hargreaves gave evidence that he changed his mind about how the child is to be educated. Ms Serales also acknowledged post separation, after the initial agreement, Mr Hargreaves appears to have changed his mind. While the Tribunal accepts that this may have been the case, this apparent change of mind by Mr Hargreaves, in the absence of agreement of both parties, the change of mind by one of the parties does not automatically sever the earlier joint intent of the parties, as was submitted by Mr Hargreaves. Essentially, Mr Hargreaves submitted that if an intention existed between the parties to educate their children in the private system, they subsequently cannot afford the fees, it is not unusual that they change to more affordable public schooling. He submitted this is what occurred in this case. Mr Hargreaves submitted that appropriate public schools were available for the child and Ms Serales was not open to this option. It was Ms Serales' contention that while Mr Hargreaves may have changed his mind, there was no mutually agreed change from the earlier intention to provide the child with a private school education, which she met from her own financial resources without contribution by Mr Hargreaves.
8. For the Tribunal to be satisfied that there was a severing of the mutual intent, as claimed by Mr Hargreaves, it must be satisfied that the parents had another meeting of the minds whereby they mutually agreed to no longer educate the child in a private school and a different method of education for the child was agreed. The evidence before the Tribunal is clear that there was not another meeting of the minds between the parties to mutually agree that the child would not have a private school education.
9. The Tribunal has found that the parties entered into an agreement about their child's education including the type of education the children would attend, there also appeared to be agreement about attending [School A], which had particular fees the parents were aware of. The Tribunal finds that the intent between the parties was in relation to the type of education, the particular school and broadly, the general fees to be paid.
10. Mr Hargreaves submitted that his changed circumstances should be considered and it is no longer his intention to contribute 50% of the school fees for the child, due to his changed circumstances. The Tribunal accepts that the circumstances of the parties and between them may change after separation, nevertheless, this does not automatically denote their respective positions surrounding an intent to educate their child(ren) is severed. The Tribunal found sufficient evidence in this case of mutual intention between the parties in relation to the manner of education for the child, being a private school education.
11. On the overall evidence before the Tribunal, it finds that the child is being educated in a manner mutually intended by his parents. The first threshold requirement is therefore met.
12. The ordinary costs of schooling in a public school are factored into the administrative assessment of child support and so do not constitute special circumstances as parents of children who attend public school incur similar costs. This includes the cost of books, uniforms, excursions, fees for technology resources, library and extra-curricular activities and such costs are not generally considered to be special in terms under Reason 3 unless they are significantly above the norm. However, the costs of tuition in a private school are not factored into the usual child support formula and may be considered under Reason 3.
13. Ms Serales also provided evidence of other costs including: school uniform $1604.85 in 2024, 2024 resource list (books and stationery) of $295.31, 2025 resource list $306.84, 2024 school/sports shoes $99.99, $149.95 and $289.98. The Tribunal accepts that there are various other school costs incurred by Ms Serales. The additional costs however are not considered special and out of the ordinary when compared to similar costs incurred for other children attending school and therefore are not considered as part of the out of the ordinary educational costs incurred in this case.
14. Ms Serales provided evidence tuition costs for [School B] in the 2024 academic year were $1,627.50 per term over four terms ($6,510). In the 2025 academic year, tuition fees are $2,028 per term over four terms ($8,112). The Tribunal has found that the out of the ordinary tuition costs for the child are $6,510 in 2024 and $8,112 in 2025. The Tribunal considers this a significant expense for Ms Serales to bear on her own, noting also the annual increase in the fees.
15. Usually the costs of private education in the assessment of child support are taken to be in addition to normal child support incorporated into the administrative assessment of child support. In relation to private school fees, child support is calculated on the basis of both parents contributing to the high costs of private education.
16. Child Support noted the costs of the child as per the assessment formula are calculated at $6,224. The Tribunal accepts that when compared to the costs of the child according to the assessment formula, the school costs of $6,510 in 2024 and $8,112 in 2025, are significant. The costs remain significant in line with the child support according to the Tribunal's determination, as outlined below.
17. The Tribunal finds that the costs of educating the children, when compared with the costs of educating a child in the government school system, establish special circumstances in this case. Based on the evidence outlined above the Tribunal is satisfied that the child is being cared for, educated or trained in a way that both parents intended and that the associated costs significantly affect the costs of maintaining the child when compared to the assessed costs in the current child support assessment. This means that the second requirement is also met.
18. Special circumstances therefore exist and the Tribunal is satisfied Reason 3 is established in this case.
19. The ground for departure under subparagraph 117(2)(b)(ii) of the Assessment Act, that the costs of maintaining the child are significantly affected because they are being educated in a manner expected by their parents, is therefore established in this case.
20. Although Ms Serales applied for a change of assessment on multiple grounds, being Reasons 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10. Ms Serales confirmed to the Tribunal that as well as Reason 3, she also sought review by the Tribunal under Reasons 7 - Ms Serales' necessary expenses for self-support significantly reduce her ability to support the child, and Reasons 8A and 8B - Mr Hargreaves' income, property and financial resources and earning capacity make the child support assessment unfair. The Tribunal has considered these factors under the just and equitable considerations.

Issue 2 - Is it just and equitable to depart from the administrative assessment of child support?

1. As the Tribunal is satisfied that there is a ground to depart from the administrative assessment of child support, the next step is to consider whether it is just and equitable as regards the children, the liable parent and the carer entitled to child support to make a particular determination in accordance with sub-subparagraph 98C(1)(b)(ii)(A) of the Assessment Act.
2. In deciding whether or not to change the assessment I must consider whether a change to the assessment would be fair (just and equitable) to the child and both parents. Mr Hargreaves and Ms Serales have the primary duty to financially support their child and this duty has priority over all other commitments of the parents other than expenses for their own self-support or the support of any other person or child they have the duty to maintain. In addition the costs of maintaining the child are significantly affected because they are being educated in a manner expected by his parents, discussed in detail above, the Tribunal is required to consider:
   • the nature of the duty of a parent to maintain a child and the earning capacity, property and financial resources of the child/ren;
   • the proper needs of the child/ren;
   • the parents' earning capacity;
   • the income, property and financial resources of the parents;
   • the necessary self-support commitments of the parents;
   • any direct and indirect costs incurred by Ms Serales in providing care for the child/ren; and
   • any hardship to the parents or the children by the making of a departure determination.

The nature of the duty of a parent to maintain a child and the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the child

1. There was no evidence before the Tribunal that the child has access to any other income, property or financial resources from which to support themselves and the Tribunal finds accordingly. The child is entirely reliant on their parents to meet all of their needs.

1. Subsection 117(6) of the Assessment Act states that in having regard to the proper needs of the child, the Tribunal must have regard to the manner in which the child is being, and in which the parents expected the child to be, cared for, educated or trained; and any special needs of the child.
2. The Tribunal has considered the education costs of the child in some detail above. The Tribunal has found that the tuition fees for the child were $6,510 in 2024 and $8,112 in 2025.
3. Ms Serales gave evidence that the child appears to be 6 to 12 months behind in his learning and a cognitive assessment by a paediatrician is planned. The costs of the assessment and follow-up are likely to be covered by an insurer. Ms Serales told the Tribunal that there are no costs at this stage.

The income, property and financial resources of Mr Hargreaves

1. Ms Serales submitted that Mr Hargreaves has a higher earning capacity and has not been truthful about the level of his income. Mr Hargreaves acknowledged that he is employed in his family's [business, Business 1] and is a part of the family trust. Ms Serales submitted that Mr Hargreaves has access to a [business] overdraft account and therefore has access to financial resources which are not reflected in the assessment formula.
2. The objections officer noted Mr Hargreaves conceded whilst his income may not be reflective of a full-time wage, he has come to an agreement with his father to accept a lesser wage in return for other benefits.
3. Mr Hargreaves gave evidence that he was [an Occupation 2 at Business 1] on a full-time basis. Ms Serales suggested that Mr Hargreaves was more skilled than [an Occupation 2] and he [helped] manage the overall business, rather than [an Occupation 2]. Mr Hargreaves acknowledged that he works [at Business 1], and undertakes a range of tasks including higher level duties such as managing the [business]. His income is $47,000 per annum and this has not changed. Mr Hargreaves told the Tribunal that the income of $47,472 used by Child Support in the assessment was about right. He told the Tribunal he is paid on an ad hoc basis and generally would be paid $1,750 gross per fortnight or $3,500 gross per month. His income varies depending on the [time of year]. He estimated that he may be paid less for three to five weeks in the year but overall his pay averages out at $3,500 per month gross. Mr Hargreaves told the Tribunal he is paid $3,048 per month net, deposited into his bank account. Mr Hargreaves told the Tribunal he has no other income and he has not had a pay increase since March 2024.

1. Mr Hargreaves told the Tribunal his partner worked prior to the birth of their child and has not worked since January 2024. The household expenses are met through his income. He disagreed that he controlled [Business 1] and he can pay himself what he wants, as claimed by Ms Serales. The business accounts and financial obligations are overseen by an accountant and he is simply not able to pay himself what he wants. His responsibilities include doing BAS statements for [Business 1].
2. Mr Hargreaves acknowledged he obtains other non-monetary benefits such as some fuel, tyres and registration for his motor vehicle. He said this was mostly [for business use with some] personal use. He estimated the cost of fuel for personal use may be $50 per week as he mainly uses his vehicle [for work]. He receives rent- free accommodation [from the business] and pays for his own food, estimated at $500 to $600 per week, and electricity which he estimated at $2,500 per quarter. His partner usually does the shopping at nearby [Town 2] which is about one hour away from [home]. He has phone costs of $150 per month. He told the Tribunal medical costs may be $100 per month. Mr Hargreaves told the Tribunal that his parents may [occasionally share their food with him]. Mr Hargreaves told the Tribunal that in [one period a year] (for one month) his father pays for electricity.
3. Mr Hargreaves acknowledged he has incurred significant legal expenses as a result of numerous court cases over the years and these costs have been met by his parents; he is not sure what his parents have outlaid for legal costs.
4. Since October 2024 he also incurs significant expenses for supervised visits with the child in Melbourne. He pays $400 to a supervisor for a three hour visit every second Sunday as this is a condition imposed by the court. The cost, including transportation, and cost of activities could be $600 to $700 per visit which commenced in October 2024. Mr Hargreaves told the Tribunal that he and his partner have a newly born child (in [date]) and they have various costs associated with the child such as car seat ($900) and pram ($700).
5. Mr Hargreaves told the Tribunal that given what he estimated he spends for his three-person household, the $7,978 self-support amount applied by Child Support seemed a bit low to him.
6. Ms Serales told the Tribunal that [Business 1 operates in various locations]. There are a number of fuel tanks across the various [locations] to enable refuelling of vehicles. She gave evidence that the business also has accounts for various expenses [away from these locations], including fuel, and Mr Hargreaves uses the [business] account for his personal expenses beyond what he has presented. She told the Tribunal that Mr Hargreaves lives in one of the properties [of the business] with his partner and newborn child. She submitted that Mr Hargreaves has access to the business bank accounts and he is responsible for making payments for wages and expenses using a "bank dongle". She submitted that he has full control of the business accounts and from her experience he works long hours and is able to pay himself however and whatever he wishes. She submitted that Mr Hargreaves has the ability to access the financial resources of the business and this is reflected in the significant legal costs he has been able to meet in legal proceedings with them, which are clearly beyond his claimed income.
7. Mr Hargreaves was obliged to provide full and frank disclosure of his financial circumstances as related to the child support assessment. The Tribunal directed he provide an updated Statement of Financial Circumstances, three recent payslips showing year-to-date earnings, all bank statements and credit cards statements in his name and/or joint names for the last six months and personal tax returns for the financial years 2023/2024 and 2022/2023. This information was relevant to the review as it would provide evidence of Mr Hargreaves' financial circumstances including his income, property and financial resources and outgoings but he did not do so.
8. Mr Hargreaves previously made it clear to Child Support he had no intention of providing information about his financial circumstances, including payslips and bank statements, as requested by Child Support. Child Support subsequently issued a legal notice to a financial institution with whom Mr Hargreaves is known to hold accounts and also accessed information from the Australia Taxation Office (ATO).
9. As requested by the Tribunal, Mr Hargreaves provided an earlier Statement of Financial Circumstances dated 20 August 2024, which had very limited information.
10. Mr Hargreaves has not provided financial information as directed to by the Tribunal and previously to Child Support. He made it clear he has no intention to do so and the Tribunal can refer to the information previously obtained by Child Support.
11. The Tribunal has no documented evidence in relation to Mr Hargreaves' financial circumstances to support Mr Hargreaves' oral evidence. The Tribunal therefore draws the adverse inference that Mr Hargreaves has a higher income than he has presented in his oral evidence.
12. The courts have held that, in such circumstances, the Tribunal is able to proceed to draw adverse inferences about a parent's financial position. For example, in Agrippa and Horton (Social Security Appeal Tribunal (SSAT) Appeal) [2010] FMCAfam 1144 (at [24]-[25]) the Federal Magistrates' Court noted that:

There is further significance in the inconsistency between the father's evidence to the Tribunal and the financial records. In financial proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 a party has a duty of full and frank disclosure of all of his or her financial circumstances (Black & Kellner[1992] FamCA 2; , (1992) 15 Fam LR 343, (1992) FLC 92-287, Weir & Weir[1992] FamCA 69; , (1992) 16 Fam LR 154, (1993) FLC 92-338). If it is established to the Court's satisfaction that there has been deliberate non-disclosure, "then the court should not be unduly cautious about making findings in favour of the innocent party. To do otherwise might be thought to provide a charter for fraud" (Weir, above, FamLR at 158, FLC at 79,593).

1. The Tribunal is of the view that the same principle must apply in the assessment of child support for the same reason. If the SSAT is satisfied that a parent has made a deliberate non-disclosure of his or her financial circumstances, it should be reasonably robust in assessing the non-disclosing parent's financial circumstances adversely to that parent and in favour of the other parent. That is not to say that it may arrive at an entirely arbitrary result, but rather that it may draw generous inferences adverse to the non-disclosing party about that party's financial circumstances.
2. For the reasons outlined below, in the current case, the Tribunal has concluded that Mr Hargreaves earns more than was represented at the Tribunal hearing.
3. The Child Support material shows that Mr Hargreaves declared income of $40,200 in his 2022/2023 tax return and prior to this tax return being lodged Mr Hargreaves was assessed on a provisional income of $21,552.
4. The objections officer considered bank statements (for account [number]) for the period 12 June 2023 to 11 January 2024 which show credits to Mr Hargreaves' account from the family trust of approximately $25,800. For the period 15 January 2024 to 23 March 2024 there are credits of $9,800. This means over a nine-month period Mr Hargreaves had access to funds of around $35,600 which extrapolates to approximately $47,472 over a one- year period. Debits to the account over the period 12 June 2023 to 11 January 2024 amount to around $23,376. The subsequent period from 15 January 2024 to 23 March 2024 are all EFTPOS transactions and so it is not possible to tell what costs represent necessary self-support and what were discretionary costs. The objections officer found that the majority of the spending from the accounts relates to discretionary costs.
5. The objections officer found that Mr Hargreaves has previously been assessed on an income of $21,552 and more recently his ATI was $40,200. Applying an income of $47,472 results in the annual rate of child support increasing from $1,972 to $3,148. Mr Hargreaves acknowledged to the Tribunal that an annual income figure of $47,472 as determined by the objections officer, was about right. Applying a CPI increase of 3.9% (until 31 December 2026) as noted by the objections officer, results in an annual figure of $49,323.
6. The Tribunal accepts that Mr Hargreaves has some influence and control over what he is paid from [Business 1] and family trust and that he controls his income to a substantial extent. He also has various expenses, met by the family business which is not reflected in his taxable income. The Tribunal accepts, as does Child Support, that Mr Hargreaves' current financial resources and income are significantly higher than is reflected in the administrative assessment of child support and Mr Hargreaves has a much greater capacity to provide financial support for the child than is indicated in the assessment, which applied an annual income of $40,200.
7. Mr Hargreaves gave evidence that he has gross monthly income of $3,500 with a net monthly income of $3,048. The limited oral evidence Mr Hargreaves presented to the Tribunal was that he has expenses of $500 to $600 per week for food, $2,500 per quarter for electricity, $150 per month for mobile telephone and $650 per fortnight supervised visitation costs. Mr Hargreaves also referred to other costs associated with the recent birth of his child. This represents expenses of approximately $4,300 to $4,800 per month, which is significantly more than Mr Hargreaves' stated income, and more than the annual income determined by the objections officer. Mr Hargreaves' evidence about his expenses was limited and non- specific, noting his non compliance with the Tribunal's direction in relation to providing various documents. The objections officer determined an ATI of $47,742 represented Mr Hargreaves' level of income, property and financial resources. The Tribunal has found that Mr Hargreaves has income, property and financial resources sufficient to meet monthly expenses of at least $4,800, based on the limited information provided by Mr Hargreaves, which requires an annual net income of $57,600. This represents a grossed-up figure of $71,159 per annum. Applying a CPI increase of 3.9% to this figure results in a figure of $73,934 per annum.
8. Mr Hargreaves gave evidence that he lives rent free in a property [of the business] and does not pay rent. He gave evidence that he pays for various other costs, which does not align with previous evidence provided to Child Support. The Tribunal has the benefit of reduced living costs as various costs that he would normally be expected to meet are met by the business.
9. When considering Mr Hargreaves' capacity to provide financial support for the child the Tribunal and Child Support were satisfied it is fair to consider an adjustment to Mr Hargreaves' self-support costs reflected within the assessment given this amount reflects the costs incurred by most parents.
10. The method of calculating the self-support reflected within the assessment was initially calculated based on ABS statistics related to household expenditure in the 2015/2016 financial year. This survey identified a lone household would require $445.55 per week to meet expenses, which is broken up as follows: $185.31 on housing, $26.53 on fuel and power, $105.94 on food, $41.52 on medical and health care and $86.25 on transportation. This reflects an annual figure of $23,168.60. The objections officer noted that whilst the self-support costs within the current assessment are increased the methodology still applies. Accordingly, housing, fuel and food component of the self-support costs equate to approximately 71% of the $445.55 weekly expenditure outlined above. A reduction of 71% to Mr Hargreaves' self-support amount would equate to a self-support amount of $7,978 ($27,508 minus $19,530).
11. As calculated by the objections officer, applying an ATI of $47,742 to the assessment formula and reducing Mr Hargreaves' self-support amount to $7,978, increases the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves from $1,972 to $6,372 which is significant.

1. Subsection 117(7B) of the Assessment Act requires the Tribunal to consider the following matters in determining that a parent's earning capacity is greater than what is reflected in his or her income used in the administrative assessment:
   • Whether the parent:
     • ­ Is not working despite ample opportunity to do so (subparagraph 117(7B)(a)(i)); and/or
     • ­ Has reduced their weekly hours of work to below full-time work (subparagraph 117(7B)(a)(ii)); and/or
     • ­ Has changed their occupation, industry or working pattern (subparagraph 117(7B)(a)(iii)); and
   • If the parent's decision about his/her work arrangements is not justified by either his/her caring responsibilities (subparagraph 117(7B)(b)(i)) or his/her state of health (subparagraph 117(7B)(b)(ii)); and
   • If the parent has not demonstrated that it was not a major purpose of their decision not to work despite ample opportunity to do so or to stop working, reduce their hours of work or change their occupation, industry or working pattern to affect the administrative assessment of child support (paragraph 117(7B)(c)).
2. Ms Serales submitted that Mr Hargreaves' role was managing [Business 1] in a remote location, such a role would attract a salary of $130,000 per annum, and this is what should be applied to Mr Hargreaves.
3. There is no dispute that Mr Hargreaves is employed [at Business 1] on a full-time basis. Mr Hargreaves described his role as [an Occupation 2], undertaking a range of tasks and stated this has been the case for many years, although he acknowledged he undertakes higher responsibilities including managing the business affairs of [Business 1].
4. The Tribunal found that Mr Hargreaves' usual occupation was as a full-time [business] worker; he has worked in this capacity for many years and has not changed his occupation or hours. Accordingly, the first criterion is not satisfied and in these circumstances, the Tribunal has concluded that it is not appropriate for the Tribunal to make an earning capacity determination in respect of Mr Hargreaves' work.

The income, property and financial resources and earning capacity of Ms Serales

1. The Tribunal finds that Ms Serales is employed as [an Occupation 1], working full-time is a PAYG employee and she has held this job for many years. The Tribunal has found Ms Serales has 100% care of the child. Ms Serales' 2022/2023 financial year ATI was $64,120. Ms Serales provided recent payslips which show her current annual base salary is $70,483. The Tribunal accepts Ms Serales' ATI is as reflected in her income tax returns therefore incorporated into the assessment.
2. The Tribunal accepted that Ms Serales' level of income, property and financial resources is reflected in her annual tax returns.
3. The Tribunal accepted Ms Serales is employed on a full-time basis as [an Occupation 1], and Ms Serales gave evidence that she has worked in this capacity for many years and this is ongoing.
4. The Tribunal finds that it is not open to make an earning capacity determination in respect of Ms Serales' circumstances.

1. Mr Hargreaves did not raise any issues for consideration by the Tribunal.

1. Ms Serales gave direct evidence that she has been significantly impacted by the tragic death of the parties' [other] child in [an] accident and the legal proceedings that followed. She suffers from depression, anxiety and [Medical condition 1]. She has an accepted claim with the Transport Accident Commission (TAC) which is funding her treatment which includes psychological treatment, and [Medical condition 1] treatment. The TAC also funds a support person for 15 hours per week for her to have respite. The TAC does not cover the cost of activities with the child during the respite.
2. She told the Tribunal she attends a psychologist regularly for 8 hours per fortnight, to undertake cognitive behavioural therapy and assist her with coping and parenting. She has a long session with the psychologist at [Location 1], usually taking the whole day. She told the Tribunal various costs continue to be met through the TAC and she has out-of-pocket costs of $500 to $600 per month, including for travel and medication. She generally pays the costs and is then reimbursed by the TAC. In her Statement of Financial Circumstances, Ms Serales listed medical costs of $250 per month. On the evidence before the Tribunal it is satisfied that Ms Serales has an accepted claim with the TAC that covers various expenses, while she may pay for some costs, she is then reimbursed. Ms Serales provided some evidence of chemist costs however there was very limited medical evidence provided in relation to Ms Serales' necessary self-support. On the evidence before it, the Tribunal was not satisfied the costs claimed by Ms Serales are so significant so as to render the assessment unfair.
3. The objections officer noted that Miss Serales did not speak to the change of assessment during the process and did not provide any specific examples of her necessary costs for self-support. Miss Serales subsequently provided Child Support a notice of costs issued by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, showing costs awarded to Mr Hargreaves in relation to an Interim Defended Hearing on 9 August 2023. Costs of $67,103.35 were listed with a further $7,742.35 in legal fees yet to be paid; future costs were estimated at $66,000 with an amount of $7,000 payable to an expert witness.
4. Miss Serales provided some medical evidence to the objections officer regarding costs incurred for psychology in 2023. There was no evidence that the costs are ongoing. Costs associated with private health insurance, were considered discretionary.

The direct and indirect costs incurred by Ms Serales in providing care for the child

1. The Tribunal noted that the legislation requires the Tribunal to consider any direct and indirect costs incurred by the carer entitled to child support in providing care for the child.
2. The Tribunal has presented the costs incurred by Ms Serales in relation to the child above.

1. Paragraph 117(4)(g) of the Assessment Act requires the Tribunal to consider any hardship that would be caused to Mr Hargreaves, Ms Serales and to the child or other person that the parties have a duty to support, by the making of, or the refusal to make, a departure determination.
2. Ms Serales told the Tribunal that if Mr Hargreaves does not make a greater contribution in child support to cover the child's needs, including the school fees, she will have to pick-up more work to be able to meet those expenses. This would mean that she will have less time to spend with the child and it will impact on her own mental health. She has 100% care of the child and has limited opportunity to increase her hours of work. Ms Serales submitted as a single income earner, she has limited capacity and meeting extra costs on her own also impacts on future plans such as building a house on a block of land.
3. Mr Hargreaves told the Tribunal he will experience hardship if his child support liability is increased. He told the Tribunal he is at his financial limit with the current assessed child support and has no capacity to pay any more than what he is currently paying and he will have to cut back on other expenses.
4. Ultimately, he and his parents live off the same bank account and he will have to repay his parents at some time if they provide him with financial assistance. He told the Tribunal the matter has been financially and emotionally taxing for him and his family.

1. The Tribunal has determined the ground for departure from the administrative assessment under reason 3 has been established in this case. The Tribunal has accepted the child's annual school fees in 2024 were $6,510 in 2024 and $8,112 in 2025, which are significant for one parent to meet without contribution from the other.
2. The Tribunal accepts it was fair that Mr Hargreaves contribute 50% of those costs. The annual rate of child support paid by Mr Hargreaves is therefore increased by $3,255 in the 2024 calendar year and by $4,056 in the 2025 calendar year. In their presentation to the Tribunal, it was apparent that the parents may not reach an agreement in relation to school fees for the child in the period ahead. To allow for certainty for the parties and the child the Tribunal has set the period of the determination from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2026, and applied a Child Support Inflation Factor increase of 3.9% to the 2025 fees, which results in the annual total fees being $8,428, with Mr Hargreaves' contribution being $4,214 in 2026.
3. The Tribunal has found Mr Hargreaves' income, property and financial resources is reflected in an ATI $71,159 per annum from 21 March 2024 to 30 June 2025, increasing to $73,934 per annum from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026.
4. Applying a 50% contribution to the child's school fees and the above ATIs, in accordance with the Tribunal's findings outlined above, to Mr Hargreaves, will result in an increase to the child support being paid by Mr Hargreaves. The Tribunal accepts, in light of its findings regarding Mr Hargreaves' income, his reduced self-support amount and his 50% contribution to the child school fees, he has the capacity to pay an increased amount of child support accordingly, and there is no hardship caused to Mr Hargreaves from the Tribunal's decision.
5. If there is a material change in the parents' circumstances prior to the expiration of this determination, it is open for either parent to apply for a change of assessment in future, accompanied by relevant evidence to support their application.
6. Given the findings of the Tribunal above regarding Mr Hargreaves' overall circumstances, including his financial circumstances, Ms Serales' financial circumstances and the costs she meets for the child, including the costs of schooling, it accepts the child support assessed under the administrative assessment is insufficient to meet the necessary expenses of the children, including the costs of educating the child.
7. The Tribunal finds that Ms Serales has 100% care of the child and is incurring significant costs in raising the child, over and above a child of their age, due to the manner in which the child is being educated, which the Tribunal has found was the intention of the parents. The Tribunal finds that Ms Serales would face significant financial hardship if it were to refuse to depart from the administrative assessment of child support, given these additional costs that she incurs in providing care for the child. The Tribunal further finds that the child would also experience hardship if the Tribunal were to refuse to make a departure determination in this matter, given Ms Serales would experience difficulty in continuing to educate the child in the manner expected by the parents and difficulty in continuing to meet their other necessary costs. Without contribution by Mr Hargreaves, Ms Serales is unlikely to have the capacity to meet the children's school fees on her income and financial resources.
8. The Tribunal places weight on the parents' primary duty being to support the child. In the difficult circumstances of this case, including the parties' financial circumstances, and the needs of the child, on balance, the Tribunal considers it is fair that Mr Hargreaves contribute 50% of the school fees. The Tribunal finds Mr Hargreaves has the income and financial resources to meet half the school fees for the children without hardship caused to him from the Tribunal's decision.

What is the proposed departure determination in this case?

1. The Tribunal considers it would be just and equitable to make a departure determination that reflects the significant schooling costs being incurred by Ms Serales and that also reflects Mr Hargreaves' income and financial resources.
2. The Tribunal considered that a failure to make a departure determination would cause significant financial hardship to Ms Serales, who has 100% care of the child and who is currently meeting the child's education costs, and other needs. Not making a departure determination would also cause significant hardship to the child.
3. Miss Serales lodged her application for a change of assessment with Child Support on 17 November 2023 and did not present special or out of the ordinary circumstances which would warrant backdating of the assessment.
4. Mr Hargreaves was not made aware of Ms Serales' application for a change of assessment application until he was contacted by Child Support on 21 March 2024.
5. On balance, weighing up the circumstances of the case, including the impact on Mr Hargreaves, Miss Serales and the child, the Tribunal finds the assessment should change from 21 March 2024 which will result in minimal arrears being generated for Mr Hargreaves.
6. The Tribunal is not limited to considering the same period as that considered by Child Support, ending the departure determination on 31 December 2026 gives the parties certainty going forward while also allowing for a reassessment of the children's needs at that point in time.
7. The Tribunal considers that the school fees for the children as assessed by Child Support for 2024, 2025 and 2026 (as projected by the Tribunal), are significant, and will continue until 31 December 2026. In considering the timeframe from which to set Mr Hargreaves' income, on the evidence before the Tribunal it accepts that is unlikely that Mr Hargreaves' circumstances will significantly change and to provide some consistency to the assessment, the Tribunal considers it is fair to apply a Child Support Inflation Factor of 3.9% until 31 December 2026. The Tribunal has set an income for Mr Hargreaves, being an ATI of $71,159 per annum from 21 March 2024 to 30 June 2025, increasing to an ATI of $73,934 per annum from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026. In the Tribunal's view this is conservative and the resultant child support payable is unlikely to cause him any significant financial disadvantage.
8. The Tribunal therefore proposes to apply the following:
   • for the period 21 March 2024 to 30 June 2025, the ATI for Mr Hargreaves is set at $71,159;
   • for the period 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026, the ATI for Mr Hargreaves is set at $73,934;
   • from 21 March 2024 to 31 December 2024 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves is to be increased by $3,255 in recognition of his contribution towards the child's education costs (annualised) for the whole of the 2024 academic year;
   • from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves is to be increased by $4,056 in recognition of his contribution towards the child's education costs;
   • from 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2026 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves is to be increased by $4,214 in recognition of his contribution towards the child's education costs; and
   • from 21 March 2024 to 31 December 2026 the self-support component in the assessment formula for Mr Hargreaves is to be reduced to $7,978.
9. Applying the abovementioned change results in Mr Hargreaves being assessed to pay an increased annual rate of child support.
10. The Tribunal is satisfied this change is just and equitable to both parents and will not jeopardise the ongoing support of the children. Based on the Tribunal's findings about Mr Hargreaves' income, property and financial resources, it is satisfied he has the financial resources to meet the ongoing child support liability and enter into an arrangement to repay the generated arrears.
11. Should the circumstances of either parent or the child change significantly whilst this decision continues to affect the assessment, it is open to them to submit a new application for consideration.

Issue 3 - Is it otherwise proper to make a departure determination?

1. The third step is to consider whether it would be otherwise proper to make a particular departure determination in accordance with sub-subparagraph 98C(1)(b)(ii)(B) of the Assessment Act. The Tribunal accepted from Ms Serales' evidence that she is currently in receipt of family tax benefit and other income support payments from Centrelink. The Tribunal decided that any departure determination made by the Tribunal is not likely to adversely impact on the public purse and the Tribunal therefore concluded that it is otherwise proper to make the proposed departure determination.

The Tribunal set aside the decision under review and substituted its decision that**:**

• for the period 21 March 2024 to 30 June 2025, the ATI for Mr Hargreaves is set at $71,159;
• for the period 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2026, the ATI for Mr Hargreaves is set at $73,934;
• from 21 March 2024 to 31 December 2024 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves is to be increased by $3,255 in recognition of his contribution towards the child's education costs (annualised) for the whole of the 2024 academic year;
• from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves is to be increased by $4,056 in recognition of his contribution towards the child's education costs;
• from 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2026 the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Hargreaves is to be increased by $4,214 in recognition of his contribution towards the child's education costs; and
• from 21 March 2024 to 31 December 2026 the self-support component in the assessment formula for Mr Hargreaves is to be reduced to $7,978.