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The proceedings had different histories. The 2021 matter followed a Land and Environment Court judgment rejecting the applicant’s claim, an unsuccessful appeal, and later dismissal of an appeal after repeated failures to attend directions hearings. The dismissal was upheld by the Court of Appeal in 2022 [2]. In the 2022 matter, two Land and Environment Court judgments rejected the applicant’s challenges to the development consent. The Court of Appeal had also refused an earlier request to expedite the hearing of an application for leave to appeal [2]. These details explain the procedural background, but the 2025 judgment did not reconsider the substantive validity of either consent.

The immediate issue was narrower. On 24 March 2025, the Registrar made orders under r 13.6 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) for notice to be sent to Mr Jeray, the company’s sole director, requiring the applicant to show cause why the proceedings should not be dismissed or struck out for non-attendance [1], [6]. The Court sent the notification by substituted service to the applicant’s email address. The judgment notes that approximately 42 emails had passed between the Court and the applicant using that address over the period from 26 October 2022 to 23 May 2025 [6].

On 2 April 2025, the applicant did not appear. The Registrar then dismissed both proceedings under r 13.6 and made costs orders. The orders also vacated a directions listing and a hearing in the 2022 matter [7]. The applicant later filed motions seeking leave to file out of time and to set aside the Registrar’s orders. The motion relating to the 2022 proceeding also sought leave to file an amended notice of appeal and access to Council records [4]-[5].

Mr Jeray’s affidavit said that he had not received the 2 April orders and did not know about them until he attended the Registry on 23 April 2025 [11]-[12]. He did not, however, claim in the motions that the applicant had not received notice of the 2 April hearing listing [11], [14]. That distinction shaped the result.

There was a further attendance issue. The Registrar notified Mr Jeray on 23 May that the motions would be heard on 26 May. On 25 May, Mr Jeray asked for an adjournment because of an unspecified illness. He was told that the hearing would proceed, that he could attend remotely, and that he could seek an adjournment at the hearing with supporting medical evidence. No one appeared for the applicant when the motions were called [8]-[9]. USM’s counsel asked the Court to dismiss the motions with costs [10].

Griffiths AJA dismissed both motions and ordered the applicant to pay the relevant USM respondent’s costs in each proceeding [15].

Why the court decided this way

The decisive point was the difference between notice that a hearing was to take place and notice of the orders made after that hearing. The Registrar’s 2 April orders recorded that notice under r 13.6 had been sent and that the applicant had failed to appear [7]. The motions did not contest notification of the listing. They instead relied on the applicant not receiving copies of the resulting orders [14].

The judge rejected that complaint. The orders were listed on JusticeLink on or around 2 April in accordance with usual practice. Griffiths AJA considered it reasonable to infer from the applicant’s long involvement in litigation about these matters that it knew parties could use JusticeLink to monitor developments. The Court stated that it was not obliged to give the applicant personal notice of the orders [13]. The judge also noted that Mr Jeray became aware of the orders when he attended the Registry on 23 April [13].

The judgment therefore does not decide a contested question about whether the applicant was properly notified of the hearing that led to dismissal. The judge expressly observed that neither motion challenged the orders on the basis that notification of the listing had not occurred in accordance with r 13.6 [14]. The basis actually advanced, non-receipt of the orders themselves, was held to be misconceived.

The decision also records the applicant’s failure to appear at the hearing of its own motions, despite being told that remote attendance was available and that an adjournment could be sought at the hearing with supporting medical evidence [8]-[9]. However, the reasons do not expressly treat this non-appearance as an independent legal ground for dismissing the motions. The stated reason is the misconceived complaint about notice of the 2 April orders [13]-[15]. It would go beyond the text to assign the non-appearance a separate dispositive role.

The costs result followed the dismissal. USM had sought dismissal with costs [10], and the Court ordered costs payable to USM in its respective respondent capacities in the two proceedings [15]. The judgment does not explain a costs calculation or set out a general test for costs.

Before and after state of the law

The judgment applies the procedural setting provided by UCPR r 13.6. It records that the Registrar used that rule to dismiss proceedings after the applicant failed to attend despite notice of the listing [4], [6]-[7]. It does not quote the full text of r 13.6, analyse its subparts, or establish a general account of every circumstance in which a proceeding may be dismissed under it.

Before this ruling, the relevant procedural history already included earlier non-attendance and dismissal events in the 2021 proceeding. The Court noted that a prior dismissal for lack of utility, following repeated non-appearance at directions hearings, had been upheld in 2022 [2]. That history is recounted as background. The present judgment does not revisit or alter the reasoning of that earlier decision.

After this ruling, the specific motions to set aside the 2 April 2025 orders were dismissed, leaving those Registrar orders in place. The judgment does not announce a new legal test, amend the text of r 13.6, or state that all court orders are adequately notified merely by appearing on JusticeLink. Its expressed conclusion is narrower: on these facts, the applicant’s complaint about not receiving copies of the 2 April orders was misconceived, where the motions did not challenge notice of the hearing and the orders were listed on JusticeLink [13]-[15].

The decision’s practical procedural distinction is consequently important but should not be broadened beyond its reasoning. The Court considered the availability of the orders on JusticeLink, the applicant’s history of litigation, the Court’s lack of an obligation to give personal notice of these particular orders, and the applicant’s later discovery of them at the Registry [13]. The judgment does not address different facts, such as a claim that the hearing notice itself was not received, or a challenge to the adequacy of the method by which the hearing notice was given.

Key passages with plain-English translation

At [13], the judge stated: “There was no obligation on the Court to give personal notice to the applicant of the orders dated 2 April 2025.” In plain English, the Court distinguished the notification that a hearing was listed from a separate requirement to send the applicant a personal copy of the orders made after it did not attend. The judge said the orders were available on JusticeLink and the applicant had later obtained a copy at the Registry.

Also at [13], the judge said it “may reasonably be inferred” from the applicant’s lengthy involvement in litigation that it knew parties could seek access to JusticeLink to monitor developments. This is an inference about this applicant and its litigation history. The passage should not be treated as a universal finding that every litigant knows how to use JusticeLink.

At [14], the judge explained: “Neither motion challenges the 2 April 2025 orders on the basis that no notification of the listing was made in accordance with r 13.6.” This identifies what the motions did not put in issue. The applicant’s complaint was about not receiving the orders after the hearing, not about failing to receive notice that the hearing would occur.

At [15], the judge dismissed both motions and made costs orders. In practical terms, the applicant did not obtain the orders it sought to set aside the Registrar’s dismissals, and it became liable for the specified respondents’ costs of the motions.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

The decision most directly concerns a procedural situation in which proceedings have been dismissed after a party failed to attend a listed hearing, the party later seeks to set aside the dismissal, and the stated complaint concerns not receiving the resulting orders rather than not receiving notice of the hearing. The judgment’s analysis was tied to the fact that the Registrar had sent notice under r 13.6, that the dismissal orders were listed on JusticeLink, and that the applicant later learned of them at the Registry [6]-[7], [11]-[14].

A fact pattern involving a specific challenge to whether notice of the hearing was sent or properly given would raise a different issue from the one decided here. The judge expressly identified that no such challenge was made in these motions [14]. The judgment does not decide how a challenge of that kind would be resolved.

Other case-specific features included the applicant’s extensive litigation history, the email exchanges between the Court and the applicant, the use of an email address supplied to the Court, and the applicant’s later access to the orders at the Registry [6], [13]. Those details informed the judge’s reasoning, but the decision does not specify how much weight each would carry in a different case.

The judgment also records that the applicant did not attend the hearing of its own motions after seeking an adjournment because of illness. The Court had provided remote attendance options and stated that supporting medical evidence would be required for an adjournment application [8]-[9]. Because the reasons do not identify this as an independent ground for dismissal, it should be treated as procedural context rather than a separate holding.

How later courts have treated it

The judgment was delivered on 26 May 2025. The supplied judgment contains no later judicial decisions discussing or applying it. Accordingly, no account of subsequent treatment can be given from this source.

The decision itself refers to earlier judgments in the parties’ litigation. It recounts the 2021 Land and Environment Court decision, the ensuing Court of Appeal decision, and the 2022 Court of Appeal decision upholding a Registrar dismissal in the earlier 2021-related appeal [2]. It also describes the Land and Environment Court decisions concerning the 2022 event and an earlier Court of Appeal refusal to expedite the hearing of an application for leave to appeal [2]. These references provide procedural history. In this judgment, Griffiths AJA did not analyse those authorities to derive a new rule about JusticeLink or notice of orders.

The citations listed in the judgment therefore should not be mistaken for decisions that have subsequently considered the 2025 ruling. The judgment’s stated reasoning rests on the procedural facts before Griffiths AJA and the distinction between notice of the listing and notice of the resulting orders [13]-[14].

Still-open questions

Several questions remain outside the judgment’s scope. First, the decision does not determine what would follow if a party made a properly particularised challenge to whether notice of a hearing was given under r 13.6. The Court recorded that the motions did not raise that challenge [14].

Secondly, the judgment does not set out the full text of r 13.6 or explain the requirements for substituted service in general. It says that notification was made to the applicant’s supplied email address and records the history of email exchanges, but the motions did not contest that notification [6], [14].

Thirdly, it does not establish a general rule about the circumstances in which parties must monitor JusticeLink, nor does it consider the position of a litigant without this applicant’s lengthy litigation history. The Court’s observation about JusticeLink was expressly linked to an inference about this applicant [13].

Fourthly, the judgment does not examine whether the illness-related adjournment request could independently have justified an adjournment. It records that the illness was unspecified, that supporting medical evidence was required, and that no one appeared when the hearing began [8]-[9]. It does not provide a broader test for adjournment applications.

Finally, the judgment does not address the merits of the underlying development-consent challenges, the applicant’s requests concerning amendment and Council records, or the substantive prospects of any appeal. Those matters were not resolved by the reasons for dismissing these motions.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.