The test looks to whether such a person would have foreseen, as a reasonable probability or reasonable likelihood, the prospect that the action or step or the failure to act or take an affirmative step would result in a shortfall amount and in determining that question, a relevant factual enquiry is whether the taxpayer made the reasonable attempts a person in the position of the taxpayer ought to have taken so as to comply with the provisions of a taxation law.

1. These observations have been quoted and adopted in a state tax context.[117]
2. In relation to the penalty for 'intentional disregard' of a taxation law, the leading decision (albeit in a Federal tax context) is Price Street Professional Centre Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Price Street).[118] In that case, Collier J observed:[119]

As made clear by the explanatory memorandum to the Taxation Laws Amendment (Self Assessment) Bill 1992 (Cth) which introduced s 226J, s 226J requires knowledge by the taxpayer that, for example, it has claimed a deduction knowing that it is not allowable. Accordingly, "intentional disregard" of the ITAA 1936 or regulations requires, inter alia, an understanding by the taxpayer of the effect of the relevant legislation or regulations, an appreciation by the taxpayer of how that legislation or regulation applies to the circumstances of the taxpayer, and finally, deliberate conduct of the taxpayer so as to flout the ITAA 1936 or Regulations.

1. Where penalty tax has been properly imposed, the Commissioner has a discretion, 'in such circumstances as the Commissioner considers appropriate' to remit penalty tax by any amount.[120] A similar discretion exists in relation to interest.[121]
2. In Conder Tower Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue,[122] Pagone J described the discretion in relation to interest as:[123]

a broad and general discretion given to the Commissioner to be applied when the Commissioner considers it appropriate that it be applied in each case. Each case in which the question of remission under the section arises must be considered on its own facts and circumstances without the imposition of an unenacted threshold hurdle of a need for there to be "exceptional circumstances".

1. The evidence shows that Seeby obtained preliminary advice from Mr Devcic about the extent of contamination and the likely remediation cost prior to the purchase of the Subject Property.[124] At that time, Mr Devcic advised that there was soil and groundwater contamination, and that remediation to allow the property to be applied to residential use could cost $300,000 to $1 million or more, and that further testing and cost risk analysis would be required.
2. Seeby contends that 'the direct result of this advice was that it was not possible to accurately value the [Subject Property]' and that '[f]acing uncertainty about the extent of the contamination and consequently the dutiable value of the Relevant Property, Seeby adopted the contractual consideration as the dutiable value'.[125] It is suggested that 'objectively, other purchasers in its position would have done likewise'.[126]
3. The Commissioner submits that obtaining Mr Devcic's preliminary views regarding the remediation costs 'is not sufficient to establish reasonable care', noting that it 'did not resolve the issue of dutiable value' and that Mr Devcic indicated that further work was required to confirm the costs (which did not occur until after the acquisition of the Subject Property).[127] Further, the Commissioner observes that the preliminary views were only sought 'for the purpose of assisting the applicant in its negotiations with BP'.[128]
4. I accept that there was uncertainty as to the likely cost of remediation as at the Acquisition Date. However, this does not mean that Seeby's adoption of the stated consideration was reasonable.

1. In circumstances where:
   • the stated consideration for the Subject Property had been set in negotiations regarding the purchase prices for all four properties the subject of the wider arrangement with BP, with a view to producing a net payment of $2.5 million by BP to the Jasbe Group;[129]
   • the most recent valuation of the property for rating purposes was $4.65 million;[130] and
   • Seeby had, soon after the acquisition, entered into a put and call option which envisaged a sale of the property for $7 million,

a taxpayer in Seeby's position would have foreseen, as a reasonable probability, that the value of the Subject Property may or was likely to have exceeded the stated consideration, and that a tax default could therefore arise if the duty were only paid on the latter amount.

1. In those circumstances, I consider that a reasonable taxpayer would have sought advice and obtained at least an indicative valuation at or around the time of the Acquisition Date.
2. In response to a question posed at his formal interview by the Commissioner, Mr Be confirmed he was not aware of any valuations having been made prior to the Acquisition Date.[131] The documentary evidence suggests that Seeby did not obtain any valuation (ie. the Robertson & Robertson Valuation) until October 2016, some 22 months after the Acquisition Date.
3. In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that Seeby took reasonable care.

1. Seeby submits that intentional disregard requires 'actual knowledge that the statement made is false'; that is, the taxpayer 'must understand the effect of the relevant legislation and how it operates in respect of the [taxpayer's] affairs and make a deliberate choice to ignore the law'.[132] It says that 'none of these requirements are met', observing that the case is 'essentially a valuation dispute with competing valuations' and it would be 'anomalous for the quantum of the penalty to turn on an alleged intentional disregard of the law'.[133]

1. The Commissioner accepts that intentional disregard requires 'something more than reckless disregard of or indifference to a taxation law', but contends that the 'deliberate choice [by Seeby] to ignore the law' is evidenced by:[134]
   • determining the stated consideration for the Subject Property, without reference to value of the underlying land, to come up with the $2.5 million payable by BP to the Jasbe Group; and
   • Seeby failing to disclose to the Commissioner that the acquisition had been made for less than the unencumbered value of the Subject Property, or to correct the incorrect statement that the transfer had not been made for less than the unencumbered value in the goods statutory declaration provided by BP, which 'presumably must have been provided to the applicant as transferee'.
2. In light of the failure of Seeby to call Mr Be (or anyone else involved in the transaction on its behalf) to explain his knowledge about the difference between the stated consideration and unencumbered value, the Commissioner invites the Tribunal to draw an inference, based on the decision in Jones v Dunkel,[135] that any evidence he could have given would not assist Seeby's case (rule in Jones v Dunkel).
3. In the circumstances of the present case, Ms Baker (junior counsel for the Commissioner) submitted in closing that 'it is not open to Seeby to point to the absence of actual intention, and say the necessary requirements are not made out, because it did not call the witnesses' that could explain Seeby's intentions.
4. The Commissioner says that, in this case, inferences can and should be drawn having regard to the following matters:
   • The stated consideration for the Subject Property was 'improbably low'.
   • Jasbe North Dandenong Pty Ltd and Jasbe Supremacy Pty Ltd (both Jasbe Group entities) had made incorrect statements in the goods declaration regarding the Dandenong North and Mentone properties,[136] namely that the stated consideration was in each case not less than the market value of the relevant property.
   • The failure to call Mr Be or anyone else involved in the transaction for Seeby (applying the rule in Jones v Dunkel).

1. In reply, Seeby says that the only evidence of value available at the time was the rates notice, but that only provided the capital improved value of the Subject Property which did not to take into account the contamination of the site.[137] Given the disagreement between the valuers as to the dutiable value of the Subject Property in light of that contamination, Seeby submits that 'there is no basis ... to infer that Seeby was aware that the dutiable value was more than the consideration'.[138] It says that 'given the gravity of a finding of intentional disregard', it should not be 'imposed on the basis of an inference'.[139]
2. I have already found, in the context of the discussion concerning reasonable care, that Seeby should have foreseen, as a reasonable probability, that the value of the Subject Property would exceed the stated consideration.
3. The parties addressed me at some length about the impact of the onus of proof in tax proceedings in terms of the penalty for intentional disregard of the taxation laws.
4. In this regard, in Konnan Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Konnan),[140] Croft J set aside a Tribunal decision to confirm a penalty for intentional disregard where the Tribunal had not made an 'express finding of this nature' (ie. that the tax default was caused by the plaintiff's intentional disregard of the tax law).[141] His Honour observed that such a finding is 'clearly one of significant importance' and 'not a finding to be made lightly'.[142] On appeal, it was held that Croft J was correct to set aside the Tribunal's decision on this point.[143]
5. The approach taken by Croft J in Konnan can be contrasted with the approach taken by the Federal Court when considering the onus of proof in an income tax context. In Binetter v Commissioner of Taxation[144] (Binetter), the Full Federal Court observed (in relation to a question of whether the taxpayer had avoided tax by reason of fraud or evasion) that:[145]

Although the Tribunal re-examines whether, on the evidence before it, there was an avoidance of tax due to fraud or evasion, and is able to substitute its opinion for that of the Commissioner, the issue for the Tribunal is whether the taxpayer has discharged the onus of showing that the opinion that there was fraud or evasion should not have been formed ...

The Tribunal was correct to hold that [the applicant taxpayer] bore the onus of proving that the conditions for the exercise of the amendment power did not exist. [The applicant taxpayer's] contention that the Tribunal must itself on review form the opinion that there was fraud and evasion "before there is power to amend the assessments" fails to take account of, or give due regard to, the effect of [the corresponding onus of proof provision in the Federal tax administration legislation].

1. The Commissioner contends that I should follow the Federal Court approach.
2. The simple question to be determined is whether, considered in its totality, the evidence supports the Tribunal finding, on the balance of probabilities and paying appropriate regard to the 'significant importance' of such a finding, that Seeby knew:
   • the unencumbered value of the Subject Property was greater than the consideration it had agreed in the contract with BP; and
   • its reliance on the consideration in terms of the assessment of duty was contrary to the Duties Act,

such that Seeby can be said to have acted in intentional disregard of the law.

1. In my view, the evidence does support those findings for the reasons set out below.
2. As a starting point, it is relevant to observe that:

(a) the consideration adopted in the contract of sale for the Subject Property was set in negotiations between Seeby and BP, and was designed to produce a net payment from BP to the Jasbe Group of $2.5 million from the four transactions between BP and the Jasbe Group/Seeby.

(b) Mr Be, the sole director and shareholder of Seeby,[146] is also the sole director and shareholder of each of Jasbe North Dandenong Pty Ltd[147] and Jasbe Supremacy Pty Ltd,[148] the vendors of the Dandenong North and Mentone properties respectively.

• Jasbe North Dandenong Pty Ltd had a valuation, dated 22 February 2011, valuing Dandenong North at:

• - $1.5 million, 'as is'; or
  • - $5.83 million, on completion of a redevelopment of that site for ongoing petrol station use;[149] and

• Jasbe Supremacy Pty Ltd had a valuation, dated 25 March 2009, valuing Mentone at $2.67 million.[150]

(d) Those values were far in excess of the consideration agreed with BP in 2014 for the Dandenong North (presumably after redevelopment) and Mentone properties of $2.5 million and $1.5 million respectively.

1. In circumstances where the consideration for each property was designed to produce a fixed net payment to Mr Be's entities and the apparent discrepancies between the consideration to be received for, and valuations of, other properties forming part of the overall transaction, it follows (in my view) that Seeby:
   • clearly knew the consideration it agreed to pay to BP for the Subject Property was not set based on the value of the Subject Property; and
   • can readily be inferred to have been aware that the consideration was unlikely to be equivalent to the value of the Subject Property.
2. At the time of entry into the contract of sale to acquire the Subject Property, Seeby:
   • was (as previously noted) in possession of a rates notice, valuing the Subject Property at $4.65 million;
   • can be inferred to have been negotiating the put and call option with Mr Ciarma (entered within days afterwards) that envisaged a sale of the Subject Property for $7 million; and
   • had indicative advice from Mr Devcic that the costs of remediation were likely to be in the range of $300,000 to $1 million, although they could be more.
3. There is no evidence to suggest Seeby had its own valuation of the Subject Property or was aware of the Newton Valuation. However, in order for the consideration to have been equivalent to the value of the Subject Property, the remediation costs would have to have been $3,715,000 (using the rating valuation) or $6,065,000 (using the exercise price in the put and call option). In other words, the remediation cost would need to be some 3.5 to 6 times more than the upper end of the indicative range provided by Mr Devcic.
4. Seeby was aware, from no later than November 2019 (when the Commissioner filed his legal contentions), that its state of knowledge as to the value of the Subject Property was in issue in relation to the question of penalty. Seeby has been legally represented throughout the investigation and this proceeding. There has been no explanation for the failure to call Mr Be and/or any other person involved in the dealings with BP on Seeby's behalf who may have been able to shed further light (and be cross-examined) as to Seeby's knowledge. In those circumstances, I am prepared to draw the inference (based on the rule in Jones v Dunkel) that any evidence those people could have given would not have assisted Seeby.
5. Further, in the absence of any reason being proffered to support remediation costs 3.5 to 6 times higher than the upper end of the indicative range provided by Mr Devcic, I infer that Seeby knew the value of the Subject Property exceeded the consideration agreed with BP, even if Seeby could not identify with any precision what the difference might be.
6. The other issue to be considered is Seeby's state of knowledge as to duty being payable on the higher of the consideration for, or unencumbered value of, the dutiable property.
7. In this regard, Seeby obviously knew that it was assessed to duty of $51,170, based on the consideration of $935,000 for the Subject Property.[151]
8. At the same time, Mr Be made statutory declarations, in the form of Duties Form 2 - Goods statutory declarations, relating to the sale by Jasbe North Dandenong Pty Ltd[152] and Jasbe Supremacy Pty Ltd[153] of the Dandenong North and Mentone properties.[154] The declarations were made before the solicitor who undertook the conveyancing work associated with all four properties. In making the declarations, Mr Be acknowledged that they were 'true and correct' and did so 'in the belief that a person making a false declaration is liable to the penalties of perjury'.
9. In Part A of the statutory declaration, the vendor of a property is specifically asked '[i]s the sale for less than the unencumbered or market value' noting that, if the answer is yes, 'evidence of value is required when you submit this form'. This puts anyone that signs the declaration on notice that there is some relevant distinction between consideration and value.
10. Further, paragraph 5 of the explanatory notes to the statutory declaration make it clear (expressly referencing sections 20 and 22 of the Duties Act) that:

[t]he dutiable value of dutiable property is the greater of ... [t]he consideration (if any) for ... and ... [t]he unencumbered or market value of the dutiable property.

1. Yet, despite the most recent valuations obtained by Jasbe North Dandenong Pty Ltd and Jasbe Supremacy Pty Ltd indicating that the value of the Dandenong North and Mentone properties far exceeded the consideration agreed to be paid for them, Mr Be ticked 'no' in response to the question in Part A.
2. When Mr Be was interviewed by the State Revenue Office in March 2017,[155] he was asked questions about his 'understanding of market value'[156] in the context of the statutory declarations and, specifically, the information Mr Be had provided 'in relation to market value' for the Dandenong North property.[157] Mr Be did not really answer, suggesting that his opinion of market value was 'irrelevant' because he is not a valuer.[158]
3. Seeby was aware, from November 2019 when the Commissioner filed his legal contentions, that its state of knowledge as to the duty law was in issue. As already noted, there is no explanation for the failure to call Mr Be. In those circumstances, I am prepared to draw the inference (based on the rule in Jones v Dunkel) that any evidence he could have given would not have assisted Seeby.
4. Further, having regard to the goods statutory declarations signed by Mr Be relating to the sale by Jasbe North Dandenong Pty Ltd and Jasbe Supremacy Pty Ltd of the Dandenong North and Mentone properties, I am prepared to infer that Seeby was aware of the requirement for duty to be paid on the higher of the consideration for, or value of, the Subject Property.
5. Having regard to the entirety of the evidence, including the inferences that I am prepared to draw for the reasons outlined above, I am comfortably satisfied that Seeby intentionally disregarded the law.

Did Seeby hinder the Commissioner's investigation?

1. Seeby submits that the Commissioner's position, that Seeby took steps to prevent or hinder the Commissioner's investigation, is 'erroneous and misconceived'.
2. It observes that its officers and representatives responded to the Commissioner's requests for information on multiple occasions during the investigation through 2016 and 2017 and that, 'on its own initiative, obtained the [Robertson & Robertson Valuation]' which it then supplied to the Commissioner on 7 December 2016.[159]
3. It is also suggested that Mr Graeme Halperin (Seeby's solicitor) assisted the Commissioner to focus on the relevant issue, by suggesting that the Commissioner ought to obtain his own expert valuation.[160]
4. By contrast, the Commissioner contends that Seeby and its representatives:

repeatedly failed to respond to written notices issued by the Commissioner under s 73 of the [TA Act] by partially providing the information sought or [not] producing the documents requested by the required date and, in some cases, not at all.[161]

• the failure of Seeby to produce 'calculations explaining how the applicant determined the purchase price for the [Subject Property]';
• the failure to produce an executed copy of the JVA entered into with Mr Ciarma and his entities; and
• the failure to produce a full copy of the contract of sale relating to the Subject Property containing the vendor statement (which, relevantly, included the rates notice previously referred to).

1. It is necessary to briefly outline the course of the Commissioner's investigation before considering whether I am satisfied as to the basis for the imposition of the additional 20% penalty.
2. The Commissioner notified Seeby (through the solicitor that undertook the conveyancing work for the acquisition) of the commencement of his investigation on 8 July 2016.[163] Requests for information and responses to those requests were provided by Seeby or its representatives over the course of July and August 2016.[164]
3. On 14 September 2016, the Commissioner informed Seeby's representative that it required a valuation of the Subject Property, in line with its revenue rulings.[165] The Robertson & Robertson Valuation was produced to the Commissioner on 21 October 2016.[166]
4. In February 2017, the Commissioner issued a notice under section 73 of the TA Act requiring Mr Be to attend a formal interview.[167] That interview took place on 1 March 2017.[168]
5. In April 2017, the Commissioner obtained his own valuation, through the Valuer-General of Victoria, being the Torr Valuation.
6. There was some correspondence between the Commissioner and Mr Halperin in June to July 2017 regarding the status of the put and call option under the JVA.
7. In October 2017, Mr Halperin provided a critique of the Torr Valuation prepared by Mr Robertson.
8. On 7 February 2018, the Commissioner issued the Reassessment which assessed duty based on the Torr Valuation.
9. While Seeby was not as co-operative as it perhaps could have been, the evidence does not establish that Seeby took steps to prevent or hinder the Commissioner becoming aware of the nature and extent of the tax default.
10. In this regard, by September 2016, just over four months after the commencement of the investigation, Seeby had produced the Robertson & Robertson Valuation which clearly established that the market value of the Subject Property exceeded the stated consideration for its acquisition. As such, the 'nature' of the tax default was well known at that point.
11. In terms of the 'extent' of the tax default, it was a matter for the Commissioner to determine whether he would accept the valuation produced for Seeby or seek to obtain his own valuation under section 273 of the Duties Act (which he subsequently did). There was nothing that Seeby could have done to prevent or hinder the Commissioner from doing so.
12. In relation to the particular matters referred to by the Commissioner (at [167]), I am not satisfied that they had any impact on the Commissioner's understanding of the 'nature and extent of the default' as those matters relate to the put and call options that were not in fact exercised and arrangements that impacted on the determination of the consideration for, rather than value of, the Subject Property.
13. For these reasons, I consider that the penalty of 20% imposed under section 32 of the TA Act ought to be set aside, and the penalty imposed under the Reassessment reduced by $50,266.

Is there any basis for remission of penalties or interest?

1. Seeby says that 'special circumstances' do not need to be established in order for the remission discretion to be exercised and submits that, if penalty and interest are imposed, they should be remitted 'for the reasons outlined'.[169] The reasons referred to are the same matters that are discussed in relation to the level of penalty to be imposed.
2. The Commissioner's submissions do not address the question of remission of the penalty, although he does note that:
   • interest was only charged at the market rate, so that '[i]nterest at the premium rate [ie. 8% above the market rate] was remitted in full';[170] and
   • there is no basis for further remission '[g]iven the function of the market rate component is to reimburse the Government for the financing costs incurred due to the revenue forgone as a result of the tax default'.
3. The penalty imposed by the Commissioner in the Reassessment was calculated at 90% (rather than 95%) of the additional duty imposed. It would appear to reflect an implicit remission of 5% of the penalty otherwise to be imposed in accordance with sections 30(2) and 32 of the TA Act. I consider that the penalty should be remitted in that sum.
4. I do not consider that any basis has been shown for further remission of the penalty. In the absence of any alternative explanations from the parties involved, I consider that a penalty of 70% appropriately reflects the 'culpability' of Seeby in all the circumstances.
5. In relation to remission of interest, Seeby has already enjoyed the benefit of interest being charged at the market rate only (ie. rather than at the higher premium rate).
6. There was some unexplained delay in the finalisation of the Reassessment between the completion of the Commissioner's investigation (sometime around July to October 2017) and the issue of the Reassessment in February 2018. However, this operated to Seeby's benefit in that it was not subject to that liability and so could continue to use the funds for its business purposes and presumably generate returns in excess of the market rate of interest. As such, I do not consider this provides a proper basis for further remission of the interest imposed.

(a) the penalty of 75% imposed under section 30(2) of the TA Act, for intentional disregard of a taxation law, remains appropriate;

(b) the penalty of 20% imposed under section 32 of the TA Act, for hindering the Commissioner's investigation, should be set aside; and

(c) the penalty should be remitted by 5% under section 30(3) of the TA Act, in line with the implicit remission in the Reassessment.

1. Further, the interest should remain at the market rate of interest.

[1] Having regard to the usual considerations, as set out in Conder Tower Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2012] VSC 107 [33]-[34] and [47]-[48], I granted the Commissioner leave, under section 109 of the TA Act, to raise the issue of GST, despite it not being taken into account when he determined Seeby's objection to the Reassessment.

[6] Duties Act, ss 7(1)(a) and 10(1)(a).

[7] Duties Act, s 20(1).

[8] Duties Act, s 20(2).

[9] Duties Act, s 22(1).

[12] See, for example, Roth v Commissioner of State Revenue [2006] VCAT 2536 [65] and Parklea (Estates) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2018] VCAT 1439 [17].

[14] Electricity Commission of New South Wales (t/as Pacific Power) v Arrow (1994) 85 LGERA 418, 419.

[15] [2018] VSC 696.

[18] 101 Collins Street Pty Ltd v City of Melbourne (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Batt J, 2 April 1996) 83.

[19] Challenger Property Asset Management Pty Ltd v Stonnington City Council [2011] VSC 184; (2011) 34 VR 445, 453 [18].

[20] [2018] VSC 696 [75]-[77] (citations omitted).

[21] [2016] VCAT 551.

[24] Closer Settlement Ltd v Minister (1942) 17 LGR (NSW) 62 at 65.

[25] Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 64; (1999) 74 ALJR 209; 167 ALR 575 at [286].

[26] Gwynvill Properties Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Main Roads (1983) 50 LGRA 322, 326.

[34] Under the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), Sch 1, cl 89.

[45] Devcic Statement [22], [36], [37], [38] and [39] (or parts thereof).

[46] O'Grady Statement [2] and [5].

[47] Transcript of Proceedings (ToP), 64 (lines 21-28) and 67 (lines 2-11).

[56] ToP, 66 (lines 26-31) and 67 (line 1). Mr O'Grady made reference to mortgage security valuation guidelines, but could not produce any when these were called for by the Commissioner in cross-examination.

[58] Valuation of Land Act 1960 (Vic), s 30.

[60] ToP, 175 (lines 18-21) and 176 (lines 8-11).

[65] In his oral evidence, Mr Torr referred to this as a downward adjustment but, in context, he clearly meant an increasing adjustment on the basis of the more regular shape of the Subject Property as compared to the irregular shape of 88 Carlisle.

[71] ToP, 109 (lines 8-13) and 163 (lines 2-5).

[76] ToP, 74 (lines 2-4, 19-21), 75 (lines 12), 86 (lines 27-30), 88 (lines 4-22) and 117 (lines 26-30).

[77] Torr Valuation [6.3] and Supplementary Statement, 3.

[78] ToP, 123 (lines 17-18) and 118 (lines 23-29).

[82] ToP, 221 (lines 22-31) and 222 (lines 1-22).

[84] ToP, 86 (line 31) and 87 (lines 1-6).

[86] ToP, 82 (lines 17-20) and 115 (lines 27-28).

[88] ToP, 71 (lines 29-31), 73 (lines 1-7) and 95 (lines 7-20).

[90] ToP, 37 (lines 11-26) and 45 (lines 5-7).

[93] Per Mr Devcic at ToP, 55 (lines 12-18) and Mr Torr at ToP, 226 (lines 19-24).

[103] ToP, 142 (lines 18-27) and 144 (lines 24-31).

[104] Closer Settlement Ltd v Minister (1942) 17 LGR (NSW) 62 at 65.

[105] ToP, 191 (lines 1-9) and 203 (lines 1-2).

[107] ToP, 191 (lines 14-15) and 200 (lines 7-11).

[108] ToP, 191 (lines 15-17) and 200 (lines 11-15).

[109] ToP, 200 (lines 16-20 and 25-27), 257 (lines 28-31) and 258 (lines 1-3).

[111] TA Act, ss 3 (definition of 'tax default'), 29(1).

[115] Aurora Developments Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2011] FCA 1090; (2011) 196 FCR 457 [38].

[117] Marks & Anor v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2018] ACAT 84 [82].

[118] [2007] FCA 345; (2007) 66 ATR 1.

[122] [2012] VSC 107.

[125] Applicant's Statement of Legal Contentions dated 9 September 2019 (ASLC) [121].

[127] Respondent's Statement of Legal Contentions dated 22 November 2019 (RSLC) [59].

[129] Email from BP to Seeby dated 29 October 2014 and response from Seeby to BP dated 6 November 2014: T Documents, T16 and T17.

[131] T Documents, T83, 7, lines 14-17.

[135] [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298, 308, 312 and 320-1.

[137] Applicant's Reply dated 27 February 2020 (AR) [31].

[140] [2015] VSC 23.

[143] Commissioner of State Revenue v Konann Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 278 [125].

[144] [2016] FCAFC 163.

[145] Ibid [93] and [95] (see also Price Street [42]).

[146] See Equifax Company Extract - Current & Historical at T Documents, T150.

[147] See Equifax Company Extract - Current & Historical at T Documents, T151.

[148] See Equifax Company Extract - Current & Historical at T Documents, T152.

[151] See the Duty Statement - Transfer of Land at T Documents, T123.

[154] T Documents, T83, 12, lines 32-35.

[155] The full transcript of this interview is included in the T Documents, T83.

[160] ASLC [128] (referencing an email sent by Mr Halperin to the Commissioner on 7 February 2017 (T Documents, T82)).

[164] See, generally, T Documents, T53-T77.

[168] A transcript is contained in the T Documents at T84.

[169] ALSC [129] (referencing Dixon as trustee of the Dixon Holdsworth Superannuation Fund v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCAFC 54; (2008) 69 ATR 627 [23]).