Schiller & Waterman (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2F 1869 (11 December 2025)

1. Pursuant to ss.65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in Annexure A and these particulars are included in these orders.
2. If in any proceedings there are allegations of family violence and the provisions of section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 apply (see attached Family Violence Information Sheet), any unrepresented party will not be permitted to personally cross-examine the other party/parties.

1. Affected unrepresented parties may apply to the court and then to the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme ("the Scheme") for representation but any such application must be made at least 12 weeks prior to the final hearing.

1. Further information about the legislation and the Scheme can be found at Part 4 of the attached Family Violence Information Sheet.
2. If s102NA applies and a party becomes unrepresented after trial directions have been made, that party is required to promptly advise the Court.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are the settled reasons of a judgment delivered ex tempore. These reasons were delivered orally. These settled reasons have been corrected from the transcript where appropriate to correct grammatical errors, to add citations, passages of authorities and evidence, to add observations inadvertently omitted due to the pressure of time and to attempt to make the orally delivered reasons easier to read. The substance is unchanged.

1. The major decision that I must make this day in this matter concerns the schooling of the child, X, who is eight years old and attends a private school in the outer suburbs of Melbourne and the school her sister is to commence at. That private school has a sympathy or teaching consistent with the Islamic religion, though as I understand it, the school can be described as non-denominational in the sense that it is not compulsory for students at the school to follow the Islamic religion. X was enrolled in that school.
2. The further background to this matter can be found in my previous decision of 14 April 2025.[1] That decision also explains why I am dealing with this matter on an interim basis in December 2025 rather than having determined the matter on a final basis at a final hearing that was set down in April 2025. That April hearing was the third time the matter had been set down for final hearing.
3. To cut a long story short, I determined that there should be an updated family report by Dr B. Dr B had previously prepared a family report dated 8 March 2024. The children's father, Mr Schiller ('the Father'), is highly trained and highly educated in what is known as the technology sector. He is 43 years old. The children's mother, Ms Waterman ('the Mother'), is 40. She is currently a homemaker. She is highly trained and educated as a professional and holds a master's degree. I suspect that there are not many suburbs in Melbourne like where this family moved in that they increased the average level of education significantly. Notwithstanding that level of education and intellectual sophistication of each of them, the parents are highly opposed on many matters.

1. They are also opposed in regard to the proceeds of sale of their former matrimonial home, which will be sold soon to avoid a mortgagee's auction. They are opposed as to the living arrangements to their two children referred to above. They are opposed as to whether or not X should continue in 2026 at the school that she commenced in what is known as foundation, which in other schools is called prep, back in January 2023, or a different school. The parents are opposed in regard to whether Y, X's sister, who is now four (and it is common ground should start school next year) should start school at the school that X has been attending since January 2023 or a different school.
2. I am attempting to decide this on an interim basis in the circumstances of the matter is listed again for the fourth time for a final hearing of parenting and property matters on 9 February 2026. It is regrettable that this matter has to be determined on an interim basis and then determined on a final basis in February 2026.

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer ('ICL') has called into evidence a report from what is now a previous therapist of the child X. Relevant parts of that report are as follows:

[X] has been receiving psychological intervention since 2023. She presents with significant challenges including high anxiety levels and possible autism spectrum traits. I respectfully request that serious consideration be given before requiring her to transition to a new school environment, as such a change could cause substantial psychological distress and further destabilize her already fragile mental state.

[X] has exhibited marked symptoms of anxiety that have been consistently observed by both her Mother and her classroom teachers. Transitions, unfamiliar environments, and changes in routine are known to intensify her anxiety, often leading to emotional dysregulation, sleep disturbances, and difficulty functioning socially and academically. A school change at this time would represent a major upheaval, one that could exacerbate these existing challenges.

...

...Disrupting her current educational environment would not only be developmentally inappropriate, but it could also be harmful to her emotional and cognitive growth.

...

Having [X] and her sibling, [Y] attend the same school can be especially critical for both but especially for [X] given she is facing significant psychological and emotional challenges. In the case of [X], who has been receiving psychological intervention since 2023 and presents with high anxiety levels and possible autism spectrum traits, the presence of a sibling in the same school provides a vital source of emotional stability and reassurance.

...

... I urge the court to prioritize continuity and emotional safety in her schooling. Remaining in her current school, where she has established relationships and a familiar routine, is not simply a matter of convenience but one of psychological necessity.

1. On this interim hearing it appears, but I am not entirely certain, and I do not make it as a finding, but it appears that the therapist was involved by the Mother's agitation, which speaks highly of her parental responsibility of involving a psychologist to assist X with what was seen as problems at the time. But unfortunately, it appears that the Father was not involved in either the decision to have the child attend a psychologist or that particular psychologist or in the briefing or initial briefing of the psychologist from the parent that took the child along. The Father alleges, and I will make no finding about it, that that particular therapist was aligned with the school that he alleges the Mother chose and that he asserts is problematic for the children.

1. I also now have the benefit of an updated report where the family report writer Dr B is critical of both parents in the manner in which they communicate and the potential risk to both of the children from competing loyalties and the conflict of loyalty that the children likely feel to each of their parents.

1. The Mother points to the enrolment form of the school on 13 September 2023 and to the emails of 14 April 2022 as significant in this case. The Mother says that the enrolment of X in the Islamic aligned school was a joint decision of the parents. She says that each of them were born of Islamic families and that the parents, grandparents, siblings, cousins, etc of both of the parents are and were at all material times of Islamic faith. In substance, she says it is unsurprising that a school aligned with the Islamic faith was chosen jointly by the parents.
2. The Father's position is that the school was chosen solely by the Mother for the purpose of aligning with her faith. The Mother says there are other important reasons why that school was chosen separate to and apart from religious ones. The emails of 14 April 2022 are from the school to the Father, and the Father forwards those emails to the Mother. At that time, the parents had been separated for about three months.
3. Exhibit F1 was brought forward to the Court and tendered as a 16 June 2025 letter from the Father to D School of his unhappiness of X's enrolment and the potential exclusion of himself from communication with the school. The letter was very detailed with many allegations and concerns. I take into account the Father's unhappiness in D School as stated within that letter. On this interim hearing, I am not critical of the school administration for the manner in which they dealt with the Father based on the information they had received.

1. The Mother then points to a 2Houses communication she received on 13 January 2024 where the Father, she says, tells her, and consistently with the context of those communications, that he has adopted the Buddhist religion and intends to inform the children of those two religions and that he has already involved the children in exposure to the Buddhist faith or religion, to the extent that it is accurate to describe Buddhism as a religion and a faith as opposed to a philosophy.
2. The Mother then alleges and points to, though they are not in evidence, what are said to be communications on the 2Houses app in March 2024 where she says for the first time the Father objects to X continuing education at the Muslim aligned school.
3. There is no other evidence before me, and it does not appear seriously disputed, that it is in March 2024 that the Father first complained of or objected to the continuing education of X at the religiously aligned school.
4. It is common ground that back in 2020, the enrolment of the child X at a different city campus of a regional private school was discussed between the parents. I am not familiar with any religious alignment of that school, but I am satisfied that it is not religiously aligned with either the Buddhist or the Islamic religion or philosophies.

1. The crisis is that Y needs to start school in January or the end of January 2026 and the parents disagree what school she will be enrolled in. At a time when I was unable to deal with the matter in any detail, I ordered that Y be enrolled in the religious aligned school that her older sister attended as well as the school the Father seeks. In other words, all options were to be kept open. However, push has come to shove today, on 11 December 2025, and I must now decide on an interim basis without a testing of evidence, including a testing of the opinions of Ms E and the observations of the family report.
2. Along the way it is apparent that the Mother takes issue with certain observations in the family report and sought to prevent the release of that family report. This interim hearing arose because the parties had leave to raise this issue of the schooling after the release of the updated family report. That family report was released on 24 November 2025.
3. The Father points to a number of matters, including the greater travel for him to the existing school, and points to a number of significant practical problems, as he sees it, that, from his point of view, plagued X over 2024 and 2025. He asserts that that same practical difficulty ultimately either caused or contributed significantly to the loss of his employment.
4. Many of the factual matters in this case are disputed, but it seems clear enough at this point that whether or not the Father agreed at the time with X being involved in the religious aligned school, he was aware of it, and that he formally complained, whatever his personal feelings about it may have been before then, when X was already in grade 1.
5. I am unable to determine that Ms E's opinions are correct. However, I am satisfied that there is a real risk that she might be correct, and the matters that she points to, albeit back in May, if she is correct, would have a very significant impact on X. Because of the risk that Ms E may be correct, I am not satisfied that X's school should be changed as a consequence of this interim hearing. It is common ground that it is far more practical and sensible that Y commence school at the same school that X will attend.
6. I take into account all of the matters conveniently discussed at paragraphs 109 to 115 of Licata & Buxton [2019] FCCA 3181, those passages are as follows:
   1. The parents' interests in securing an arrangement that is convenient for them is a matter that is appropriate to take into account: Eden & Eden- Proust. This is because, while the interests of the child are required to be the paramount consideration, s 60CA does not provide that those interests are the sole consideration: AMS v AIF; Eden & Eden- Proust. It follows that some regard should be had to the relative inconvenience to each of the parents with respect to matters such as any necessary transport arrangements: Eden & Eden-Proust.
   2. For example, in Low & Chapman, Monahan J observed that to enrol a child at a school which was located at a place mid-point between the parties' residences was perhaps 'an obvious option' where the parties live some distance apart. I did not understand His Honour to be suggesting any more than that such an option may be an obvious point for consideration alongside any other suitable options.
   3. While it will ordinarily be of importance to consider the effect on the resident parent, this does not mean that the convenience of the nonresident parent is ignored: Bilz & Breugelman. Again, it may be added that the distinction between a resident and non-resident parent becomes diluted where the parties have agreed upon a week about parenting arrangement, particularly one that has been on foot and to which the parties have adhered to for some years.
   4. The views of the children may be a relevant but usually not a determinative consideration: s 60CC(3)(a) Bilz & Breugelman; Re G. The child's views on schooling may be of lesser weight if the child is of a young age: Stevens & McLaren.
   5. The process of evaluating competing school proposals should not entail an assessment of the relative merits of the schools preferred by the parties, at least in circumstances where those schools are prima facie satisfactory: Bilz & Breugelman. The location of the school to the children's residence remains an important factor: Re G.
   6. The court may be assisted in the resolution of a schooling dispute by the opinions of an expert: Stevens & McLaren. By s 60CD(2) the court may 'inform itself of views expressed by a child' by a number of means, including a report given to the court by a family consultant under s 62G(2) or, subject to the Rules of Court, 'by such other means as the court thinks appropriate': .
7. The practicality of the parents is an important factor. The issue of changing a school is an important one. The issue that I am deciding, a school on an interim situation, when that will be influential on the final hearing is also a matter that I take into account. Nonetheless, I am deciding this case until the conclusion of the final hearing. I take into account all of the matters under section 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), and it is unnecessary that I refer to them further.

1. I am satisfied at this point that, in the unsatisfactory circumstances of such serious issues being decided on an interim hearing, that X should continue at the start of 2026 at her existing school and in the circumstance where that is at the sole expense of the Mother. In this case, she puts her money where her mouth is, if I can adopt that vulgar colloquialism. In the circumstances of X attending or continuing at the same school, I am satisfied that it is in Y's best interests to commence school at the same school that X already attends.
2. I do not make any judgment whatsoever about the comparative quality of education, benefit, sensitivity to particular circumstances of children and sensitivity to parents in high conflict, as between the school that the Father contends that both children should attend from the 2026 year and the school that the Mother contends for. I am proceeding on the basis that the school that the Father proposes is an entirely good and proper school. It is not religiously aligned and is funded almost entirely by the State Government.
3. I take into account the untested observations of Dr B and note that Dr B has the advantage of being involved with this family by extensive interviews and having prepared a report back in March 2024 and then again in November 2025. I take into account that the ICL also asserts that it is in the best interests of X to continue at her existing school and for Y to commence school at that school. I take into account that the Mother will, at least at this time, be solely responsible for the expense. Ultimately, whether by reason of the Child Support Agency or otherwise, part of that burden is ultimately shared by the Father is something that I am not determining on this hearing.
4. Hence, in terms of the orders that I make, I note that the ICL presses a form of orders that contemplates that Y, at the time those orders were drafted, was not yet enrolled at D School. Y is now enrolled at D School and has been accepted into the school, and I note to the credit of the Father that he, at least to some extent (and the extent to which he cooperated with that is controversial) facilitated Y's enrolment notwithstanding that he was philosophically, if not religiously, opposed to that school. Hence, I think the only order I need to make is roughly equivalent to order 4 of the proposed orders of 15 September outline of case.
5. Those are my reasons.

I certify that the preceding twenty-eight (28) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex tempore Reasons for Judgment of Judge O'Shannessy.

[1] Schiller & Waterman [2025] FedCFamC2F 560