Relevant principles and statutory provisions
11 During the period he was a director of SBA Music, Mr Hall was subject to the statutory duties in ss 181-183 of the Corporations Act. As a director, he also owed fiduciary duties to SBA Music: Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 (Breen v Williams) at 107.
12 Mr Hall's fiduciary and statutory duties applied despite his status as an independent contractor. Notwithstanding that Mr Hall was engaged as an independent contractor, he was nevertheless capable of being a director, or an officer of a corporation pursuant to s 9 of the Corporations Act, and a fiduciary of both SBA Music and SBA Solutions: Redwood Anti-Ageing Pty Ltd v Knowles (2013) 101 IPR 358; [2013] NSWSC 508 at [58]; Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) (2012) 200 FCR 296 at [68]; and Equity 8 Pty Limited v Shaw Stockbroking Limited [2007] NSWSC 413 (Equity 8 Pty Limited) at [43]-[58]; Commonwealth v Davis Samuel Pty Ltd (No 7) (2013) 282 FLR 1; 35 ACSR 258 (Commonwealth v Davis Samuel) at [297]-[312].
13 Further, by reason of the position held, and the duties performed by Mr Hall, Mr Hall owed fiduciary duties to both SBA Music and SBA Solutions. The categories of fiduciary relationships are not closed: Hospital Products Limited v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 (Hospital Products Ltd) at 68 per Gibbs CJ; Breen v Williams at 107. The critical feature of fiduciary relationships is that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense. The relationship between the parties is therefore one which gives the fiduciary a special opportunity to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of that other person who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his position: Hospital Products Ltd at 96-97 per Mason J.
14 Where reliance is placed on an independent contractor in relation to tasks of special responsibility critical to the financial and reputational well-being of the enterprise, such reliance and the trust that it involves may cause the contractor to owe fiduciary duties: Equity 8 Pty Limited at [57] citing Hospital Products Ltd; Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O'Malley (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371 (Canadian Aero Service); Re Morvah Consols Tin Mining Company (1875) 2 Ch D 1; Smith v French [2000] VSC 381; and Minlabs Pty Ltd v Assaycorp Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 509.
15 In Commonwealth v Davis Samuel, the following factors (at [306]) were found to be relevant in finding that an independent contractor owed fiduciary duties to the Commonwealth:
(a) there was a clear relationship of confidence;
(b) there was an undertaking by the contractor to provide specified services to the Commonwealth in the interests of the Commonwealth, which were to be carried out in a way that was in large measure indistinguishable from those carried out by an employee;
(c) the contractor had scope unilaterally to exercise a power or discretion which may affect the rights of the Commonwealth which was, therefore, put in a position of vulnerability because of access given to the Commonwealth's facilities;
(d) the Commonwealth was dependent on and vulnerable to the contractor; and
(e) the contractor was provided with access to confidential information and obliged to respect the confidence of the Commonwealth in that information.
16 Mr Hall's position had each of these qualities.
17 Further, such duties may be more readily implied where a person is engaged as a contractor or consultant, but occupies a position akin to that occupied by an employee: Equity 8 Pty Limited at [32]. In the present case, Mr Hall held a position that was akin to that occupied by an employee.
18 Pursuant to s 9 of the Corporations Act, an "officer" of a corporation is defined to include a person:
(a) who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or
(b) who has the capacity to affect significantly the corporation's financial standing; or
(c) in accordance with whose instructions or wishes the directors of the corporation are accustomed to act (excluding advice given by the person in the proper performance of functions attaching to the person's professional capacity or their business relationship with the directors or the corporation).
19 Mr Hall's position and duties were such that he was clearly an officer of both SBA Music and SBA Solutions.
20 As a director of SBA Music and an officer of both SBA Music and SBA Solutions, Mr Hall was subject to the statutory duties contained in ss 181-183 of the Corporations Act and owed fiduciary duties to those companies.
21 The content of fiduciary duties is often expressed in terms of the "conflicts" rule and the "profits" rule: Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178 (Chan v Zacharia) at 198-199 per Deane J. The two rules, whilst overlapping, are distinct: Chan v Zacharia at 199 per Deane J. The duties involve the following (see Manildra Laboratories v Campbell [2009] NSWSC 987 (Manildra) at [57] per McDougall J):
(a) a fiduciary obligation not to obtain a personal benefit by use of the fiduciary's position or from an opportunity or knowledge gained by the fiduciary by reason of that position;
(b) a fiduciary obligation to avoid conflict, or a real or substantial possibility of conflict, between the interests of the company and the fiduciary's own interests (and interests of or duties owed by him or her to others); and
(c) a fiduciary obligation to account to the company for any benefit or gain obtained by him or her in breach of either of those duties.
22 The "conflicts" rule is that a fiduciary must avoid actual or significant possibility of conflict between fiduciary duty and personal interest in the pursuit or possible receipt of a benefit or gain: see Chan v Zacharia at 198 per Deane J. The fiduciary duty with respect to a "conflict of interest" is shorthand for a conflict between the duty owed by the fiduciary to the principal and the interests of the fiduciary. It is to avoid particular circumstances, involving use of position or of information gained by virtue of their position or role, to gain an advantage for themselves or another, or to the detriment of the principal. It relates to the fiduciary not placing him or herself in a position in which his or her own interest in a transaction within the sphere of the principal's business operations conflicts with the fiduciary's duty to act solely in the principal's interest in relation to that transaction: Digital Pulse Pty Ltd v Harris (2002) 166 FLR 421; 40 ACSR 487 at [22].
23 The "profits" rule is that a fiduciary must avoid making a benefit or gain obtained or received by reason of or by use of the fiduciary position or of opportunity or knowledge resulting from it: Chan v Zacharia at 198-199 per Deane J. A fiduciary cannot divert to him or herself, or another person or company with whom or with which he or she is associated, a maturing business opportunity which the company is actively pursuing: Canadian Aero Service at [25] per Laskin J. A maturing business opportunity often takes the form of an opportunity to supply some services or goods which is approaching the stage where a contract can be formed but has not yet reached it; an unconscionable diversion of such an opportunity amounts to a breach of the "profits" rule: Weldon & Co v Harbinson [2000] NSWSC 272 (Weldon v Harbinson) at [73].
24 Diverting business or profits, including maturing business opportunities which came to the fiduciary through or in the course of the relevant engagement with the principal would amount to a breach of the fiduciary duty: Timber Engineering Co Pty Ltd v Anderson [1980] 2 NSWLR 488; Weldon v Harbinson at [10] per Bryson J; Canadian Aero Service.
25 A fiduciary's position inhibits him or her not only in respect of business opportunities that the company is actively pursuing, but also opportunities in which the company might reasonably be expected to be interested, given its current line of business. A fiduciary may also be liable for misuse of knowledge or position where the fiduciary misuses his fiduciary office in order to ascertain information, for example, obtaining the relevant information by purporting to be acting in a representative capacity or having sought the information expressly in that capacity, when in actuality intending to act in a private capacity.
26 It is not necessary to show that the opportunity taken by the fiduciary is one that could have been exploited by the company: Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley [1972] 2 All ER 162; Showtime Management Australia Pty Ltd v Showtime Presents Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 618 at [109] per Austin J. The reason for that is that, because of the ongoing fiduciary duty owed, the pursuit of the opportunity by the fiduciary gives rise to a possible conflict between the director's personal interest and ongoing duty, which is unacceptable.
27 The fiduciary obligation to account exists where there is a profit or benefit obtained in circumstances where there was a conflict, or possible conflict, between interest and duty, or by reason of the fiduciary position or by reason of the fiduciary taking advantage of opportunity or knowledge derived in consequence of occupation of the fiduciary position: Hospital Products Ltd at 107 per Mason J.
28 Each of ss 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act effectively reflects a fiduciary obligation under the general law: Manildra at [131]; Landmark Underwriting Agency Pty Ltd v Kilborn [2006] NSWSC 1108 at [71], referring to Rosetex Company Pty Ltd v Licata (1994) 12 ACSR 779 and Forkserve Pty Ltd v Pacchiarotta (2000) 50 IPR 74; [2000] NSWSC 979 at [28]. It follows that if a breach of a general law fiduciary duty is made out, it is likely that there will also be a contravention of ss 182 and/or 183 of the Corporations Act: Manildra at [133].
29 Section 182(1) of the Corporations Act provides that:
A director, secretary, other officer or employee of a corporation must not improperly use their position to:
(a) gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or
(b) cause detriment to the corporation.
30 Section 183(1) of the Corporations Act provides that:
A person who obtains information because they are, or have been, a director or other officer or employee of a corporation must not improperly use the information to:
(a) gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or
(b) cause detriment to the corporation.
31 The requirement of acting "improperly" does not necessarily equate to dishonest conduct: Kwok v R (2007) 64 ACSR 307 at [80] per Santow JA. A director of a company may act improperly with no intention of acting dishonestly or otherwise than in the best interests of the company as a whole: Chew v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 626 (Chew v The Queen) at 640 per Dawson J.
32 The relevant "improper" conduct, also referred to as "impropriety", in the use of a position (or information), may consist in an abuse of the power or authority which the position of director confers: R v Byrnes (1995) 183 CLR 501 (Byrnes) at 512 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ. Where there is such an abuse for the purpose of gaining an advantage for himself, herself or another person, or of causing detriment to the corporation, both elements of the provision are established: Byrnes at 512.
33 The test of impropriety, in the sense of "improper use", is objective: Byrnes at 514-515. In Byrnes, the High Court held that impropriety does not depend on consciousness of impropriety, but consists in a breach of the standards of conduct that would be expected of a person in the position of the alleged offender by reasonable persons with knowledge of the duties, powers and authority of the position and the circumstances of the case.
34 Accordingly, the majority in Byrnes held (at 517) that a fiduciary who exercises an authority or power for the personal benefit or gain of the fiduciary (or a third party) without the beneficiary's consent, acts improperly.
35 The decision in Byrnes was followed in Doyle v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2005) 227 CLR 18, where it was held at [35], that conduct would be relevantly improper if it involved a breach of the standards of conduct that would be expected of a person in the director's position by reasonable persons with knowledge of the duties, powers and authority of the position and the circumstances of the case, including the commercial context. Such standards are expressed according to objective criteria. See also Forkserve Pty Limited v Jack (2000) 19 ACLC 299 (Forkserve v Jack) at [120] per Santow J, referring to Residues Treatment & Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 54, Southern Resources Ltd v Residues Treatment and Trading Co Ltd (1990) 56 SASR 455.
36 In Grove v Flavel (1986) 43 SASR 410, it was held that a director who used knowledge that a company had liquidity difficulties breached the statutory duty. The court also held (at 420) that "improper" is not a term of art. It is to be understood in its commercial context to refer to conduct which is inconsistent with the "proper" discharge of the duties, obligations and responsibilities of the officer concerned (cited with approval in Byrnes at 514).
37 A director may breach the section even if the purpose of gaining an advantage by the director is not achieved: Forkserve v Jack at [119] per Santow J, referring to Chew v The Queen.
38 It follows that what is improper depends in certain respects on the position at general law, and, in particular, in relation to the precise scope of the fiduciary duty owed by directors to the company. Where there is no breach of fiduciary duty and no breach of obligation in respect of confidential information, then there will be no contravention of ss 182 or 183 of the Corporations Act: Manildra at [133] per McDougall J.