Purported termination of the joint venture
53 On 26 November 2007 Mr Weston wrote to Henry Davis York alleging breaches of fiduciary and contractual duties of good faith said to be owed by Mr Van Grinsven to the Company, and alleging that SMA dishonestly assisted Mr Van Grinsven's breaches of duty. The letter foreshadowed a claim for recovery of profits, compensation or damages and asserted that any profit from performances of QIAKM and CW was held on a constructive trust for the Company. The letter complained that Mr Van Grinsven was taking for himself lucrative engagements, which he was obliged to obtain for the Company. The letter turned to the subject of "Termination" and asserted Mr Anderson and REM were entitled to elect to terminate the joint venture agreement for breach, and then said:
"We therefore put you on notice that our client does so elect to terminate the joint venture agreement, having regard to your client's words and conduct."
The letter then proceeded to set out a without prejudice offer to resolve the dispute between the parties.
54 On 3 December 2007 Henry Davis York responded, denying that Mr Weston's client had any entitlement to terminate, asserting that the letter of 26 November constituted repudiation of the joint venture agreement, and purporting to provide notice of termination of the agreement. The letter asserted that neither Mr Anderson nor the Company had any further authority to represent Mr Van Grinsven's and SMA's Queen tribute band shows (Ex R1, page 267).
55 On 15 January 2008 Henry Davis York wrote to Mr Weston asserting that as the joint venture had been terminated, the joint venture had no authority to continue to promote or present any future Queen tribute band productions (Ex R1, page 273). The letter alleged that Mr Anderson had agreed to deliver Queen shows in South Africa in May 2008 without Mr Van Grinsven's consent, and asserted that as the joint venture had been terminated, Mr Van Grinsven did not agree to those shows being conducted by the joint venture, but that he was prepared to negotiate for the delivery of the South African shows on the basis of arrangements entirely separate from the joint venture.
56 The letter of 15 January 2008 addressed the question of intellectual property rights in consequence of termination of the joint venture. It asserted that neither the Company nor Mr Anderson had any intellectual property rights relating to Queen tribute band shows, and that Mr Anderson was precluded from using information or intellectual property in relation to the Queen shows on an ongoing basis. The letter proposed an undertaking by Mr Anderson not to operate a Queen tribute band show for two years, and proposed an appointment of a receiver to the Company.
57 Mr Weston responded to the letter 15 January by a facsimile dated 18 January 2008. Apart from denials of various matters, the letter contended that the relationship between the parties was not merely contractual, but was reflected in a corporate and trust structure that had not been terminated. The letter asserted that the intellectual property rights to operate the QIAKM and CW tribute acts were the main trust assets. It contended that the trust had the exclusive right to operate the QIAKM and CW tribute acts and that Mr Van Grinsven could not do so for his own benefit.
58 There was also correspondence in December/January about the Company's cash assets. On 21 December 2007 Henry Davis York wrote to Mr Weston alleging that the Company had substantial cash assets in excess of $500,000 and demanding a copy of a current bank statement for the Company's account and an undertaking that Mr Anderson would make no payments out of the account other than for existing Showtime accounts from third parties in the usual course of business. Although it appears that the demanded bank statement was not provided, on 14 January 2008 Henry Davis York wrote again alleging that Mr Anderson had made unauthorised transfers of Showtime funds to REM, in excess of $45,000, as "management fees". The letter demanded that Mr Anderson repay those amounts and undertake to make no payments out of the Showtime account other than to third parties in the usual course of business (Ex R1, page 271-2).
59 SMA and Mr Van Grinsven commenced the present proceedings by originating process filed on 2 February 2008. The procedural and general history of the dispute thereafter is traced in my judgment of 13 June 2008, paras [17]-[38].
The amended cross-claim
60 Broadly speaking, the amended cross-claim seeks remedies based on contract, the "oppression" provisions of the Corporations Act, the fiduciary duties of joint venturers, the fiduciary and statutory duties of company directors to their company, liability for knowing assistance in a breach of fiduciary duty, and unconscionable conduct under the Trade Practices Act. Some relief is sought on behalf of either or both of Mr Anderson and REM, and some relief is sought on behalf of the Company. Some relief is sought against Mr Van Grinsven and SMA, and to a limited extent relief is sought against the Company.
61 The first substantive part of the amended cross-claim deals with the ownership of intellectual property rights and goodwill in respect of the QIAKM and CW acts under the joint venture arrangements (paras 6-22). It makes allegations about the content of the joint venture agreement made between the parties on 21 April 2005, and then pleads the steps taken by the parties pursuant to the joint venture agreement. The pleading contends (para 13) that pursuant to the joint venture agreement Mr Van Grinsven and/or SMA assigned to the Company as trustee for the Trust all of the rights in respect of the QIAKM act, including accrued goodwill and intellectual property rights. In the alternative, it is pleaded that the rights to the QIAKM act were exclusively licensed to the Company as trustee for the Trust on a perpetual, ongoing and irrevocable basis (para 14). It is pleaded that from about April 2005, the Company as trustee funded further development of the QIAKM act and promoted and managed it, and accordingly acquired goodwill in respect of it (paras 15 and 16).
62 As regards the CW act, it is contended that in about June 2005 Mr Van Grinsven and SMA agreed that the Company as trustee would form a new cast to conduct that act, and thereafter the Company funded the formation, promotion and management of the CW act and acquired goodwill and intellectual property rights in connection with it (paras 17-20), or an exclusive, perpetual, ongoing and irrevocable licence with respect to the CW act (para 21).
63 It is pleaded that in the result, as at 26 November 2007 all rights to both the CW act and the QIAKM act, including intellectual property rights and goodwill, had accrued or vested in the Company as trustee of the Trust (para 22). Note that paras 6-22 are directed to establishing ownership of goodwill and intellectual property rights but not to plead any cause of action.
64 Paras 23-28 deal with allegations of breach of the joint venture agreement. It is pleaded that as of 26 November 2007, Mr Van Grinsven and SMA were in repudiatory breach of the joint venture agreement in various particularised ways. The pleading then deals with various matters relevant to breach and termination of the agreement, and alleges that since about late August 2007 Mr Van Grinsven and SMA have been promoting QIAKM and/or CW or a very similar act for their own benefit without authorisation from the Company (para 27).
65 Paras 29-34 deal with allegations about fiduciary duties of the joint venturers. They plead that Mr Van Grinsven and SMA owed and continue to owe to Mr Anderson and REM various fiduciary duties arising out of the joint venture agreement, and that their duties continued following termination of the joint venture agreement. It is pleaded that the conduct of Mr Van Grinsven and SMA constituted breach of these duties, and in the alternative in the case of SMA, that it was knowingly concerned and involved in Mr Van Grinsven's breach of duties. Consequently it is contended that they are liable to account for any profits received from assets of the joint venture or to pay equitable compensation.
66 Paras 35-45 deal with allegations of breach of fiduciary and statutory duties owed by Mr Van Grinsven to the Company. It is pleaded that Mr Van Grinsven and SMA owed the Company fiduciary duties in relation to the joint venture (para 35), and that those duties continued pending realisation of the joint venture property (para 36). It is alleged that Mr Van Grinsven and SMA are in breach of those duties and that in the case of SMA, it was knowingly concerned in Mr Van Grinsven's breach (paras 37-38). Consequently Mr Van Grinsven and SMA are said to be liable to account or pay equitable compensation. A further or alternative pleading is made against Mr Van Grinsven, that he owed and continues to owe to the Company various specified statutory and general law duties of an officer, and that he has breached those duties (paras 41 and 42), and that SMA is involved in Mr Van Grinsven's contravention of his statutory duties under s 181 and 182, and consequently they are liable to pay compensation to the Company under s 1317H and should be restrained under s 1324 from continuing their breaches of the statutory provisions (paras 43-45).
67 The remainder of the amended cross-claim pleads the case of Mr Anderson and REM for remedies under the "oppression" provisions of the Corporations Act, and their case in equitable estoppel and/or unconscionability at general law and under s 51AA of the Trade Practices Act, and unconscionable conduct under s 51AC of that Act, and REM's claim for management fees. It is unnecessary to deal in detail with these matters.
68 By the amended interlocutory process filed on 17 April 2008, para 2, Mr Anderson seeks leave under s 237 to pursue on behalf of the Company the causes of action identified in paras 35 to 45 of the amended cross-claim. On my reading of the pleading, these are the appropriate paragraphs in respect of which to seek leave under s 237. As I have said, paras 6-22 do not themselves plead any cause of action, but they are relevant to the causes of action pleaded in paras 35 to 45.
69 The amended cross-claim seeks the following declaratory and substantive relief (apart from interest and costs) against Mr Van Grinsven and SMA for the benefit of Mr Anderson and REM :
(A1) declarations that SMA and/or Mr Van Grinsven were in repudiatory breach of the joint venture agreement as at 26 November 2007 and that the joint venture agreement was validly terminated by Mr Anderson and REM on or about that date (paras 5 and 6);
(A2) a declaration that Mr Van Grinsven and SMA breached their fiduciary duties to their joint venture partners and that they are accordingly liable to account for profits (para 8);
(A3) a declaration that Mr Van Grinsven and SMA have engaged in unconscionable conduct contrary to s 51AA or s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (para 18);
(A4) an injunction to restrain Mr Van Grinsven from promoting or conducting the QIAKM or CW acts or similar acts or diverting any business opportunities in relation to Queen tribute acts away from the Company (para 12);
(A5) a order under the "oppression" provisions of the Corporations Act (s 233) requiring Mr Van Grinsven or SMA to purchase Mr Anderson's shares in the Company or the units held by REM in the Showtime Presents Unit Trust, or as an alternative, that a receiver be appointed to the Company (paras 13-14);
(A6) an order under s 233 restraining SMA and its officers from continuing to engage in oppressive conduct (para 15);
(A7) an order for an account of profits (para 19);
(A8) further or alternatively, damages (para 20);
(A9) further or alternatively, equitable compensation (para 21);
(A10) other relief, including under s 87 of the Trade Practices Act (para 22).
70 After seeking leave under s 237 (para 26), the amended cross-claim seeks the following relief against Mr Van Grinsven and SMA for the benefit of the Company, in addition to interest and costs:
(B1) a declaration that the Company owns all of the goodwill and intellectual property rights with respect to QIAKM and CW (as particularised in para 22 of the amended cross-claim) (para 27, and also para 3);
(B2) a declaration that Mr Van Grinsven and SMA are estopped from denying the Company's ownership of such rights (para 28, and also para 4);
(B3) a declaration that Mr Van Grinsven breached his fiduciary duty to the Company as a director, and his statutory duties to the Company as an officer under s 181 and 182 of the Corporations Act (para 29, and also para 7);
(B4) a declaration that SMA was involved in Mr Van Grinsven's contraventions of his fiduciary and statutory duties as a director and officer of the Company (para 30);
(B5) a declaration that there is a constructive trust over any profits or benefits or business opportunities received by Mr Van Grinsven and/or SMA in relation to the QIAKM or CW acts by way of diverted business opportunities of the Company in breach of their fiduciary duties (para 31, and also para 9);
(B6) an injunction to restrain Mr Van Grinsven from promoting or conducting the QIAKM or CW acts or similar acts or diverting any business opportunities in relation to Queen tribute acts away from the Company (para 32);
(B7) a compensation order under s 1317H of the Corporations Act (para 33);
(B8) an order for damages or, alternatively, an account of profits (para 34);
(B9) further or alternatively, equitable compensation (para 35).
71 The amended interlocutory process seeks leave to pursue on behalf of the Company the claims for relief identified in paras 26 to 38 of the prayers for relief in the cross-claim. Note that orders B1 and B2 relate to the ownership of goodwill and intellectual property rights. Presumably those declarations are intended to be prefatory to the substantive claims for relief for breach of fiduciary duty.
72 The amended cross-claim also seeks the following relief against Mr Van Grinsven and SMA for the benefit of the Company:
(C1) a declaration that REM is entitled to receive a management fee up to the date of termination of the joint venture agreement, and Mr Van Grinsven and SMA are liable to contribute to any shortfall in the Company's ability to pay that fee (paras 10 and 11);
(C2) an order that the Company pay REM the balance of its management fee, and that Mr Van Grinsven and SMA contribute to any shortfall in payment on the part of the Company (paras 16 and 17).
Statutory derivative action
73 Section 236 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) permits a person to bring proceedings on behalf of a company if, inter alia, the person is a member or officer of the company, and is acting with leave granted under s 237. Mr Anderson qualifies both as a member and an officer of the Company.
74 Under s 237(1) such a person may apply to the court for leave to bring proceedings. Section 237(2) provides that the court must grant the application if it is satisfied that:
(a) it is probable that the company will not itself bring the proceedings, or properly take responsibility for them, or for the steps in them; and
(b) the applicant is acting in good faith; and
(c) it is in the best interests of the company that the applicant be granted leave; and
(d) there is a serious question to be tried; and
(e) either the applicant has given at least 14 days written notice to the company of the intention to apply for leave and the reasons for applying, or it is appropriate to grant leave even without such notice.
75 In the present case requirement (a) is plainly satisfied. Mr Van Grinsven and Mr Anderson are equal shareholders and co-directors of the Company and they are completely at loggerheads. Mr Van Grinsven opposes the proceedings and the s 237 application and on his behalf, his solicitors have refused a formal request that the plaintiffs consent to the bringing of the derivative action.
76 The serving of the amended interlocutory process and amended cross-claim are adequate written notice to the Company (given that it comprises only Mr Anderson and Mr Van Grinsven) of Mr Anderson's intention to apply for leave and the reasons for applying. The issues in the application relate to whether requirements (b), (c) and (d) have been satisfied.
Good faith
77 It is for the applicant for leave to establish affirmatively to the satisfaction of the court that he or she is acting in good faith: Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 52, at [69] per Tobias JA (with whom Beazley and Bell JJA agreed). There are two interrelated factors to which the courts will have regard in determining whether the good faith requirement of s 237(2)(b) is satisfied: whether the appellant honestly believes that a good cause of action exists and has a reasonable prospect of success; and whether he or she is seeking to bring the derivative action for such a collateral purpose as would amount to an abuse of process: Swansson v R A Pratt Properties Pty Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 313; [2002] NSWSC 583, at [36] per Palmer J. The concept of abuse of process involves using the derivative proceedings as a means to obtain some advantage for which the action was not designed or some collateral advantage beyond what the law offers: Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 at 526.
78 However, the expression "good faith" in this context should not be restrictively construed: Chahwan, at [69]. It extends beyond conduct that would constitute an abuse of process: Chahwan, at [81]. An applicant is acting in good faith only if he or she would suffer a real and substantive injury if the derivative action were not permitted, and the injury is dependent on or connected with the applicant's status as a shareholder or director or one of the other persons permitted to seek leave: Chahwan, at [74].
79 Although Mr Anderson bears the onus of establishing good faith, and has not directly given evidence about his motives or purposes (and has not been asked any questions about these matters in cross-examination), my view is that good faith is clearly established here. It is not a requirement that the applicant deposes to his belief, as long as the court is satisfied that the applicant is acting in good faith on the evidence presented: South Johnstone Mill Ltd v Dennis and Scales (2007) 64 ACSR 447, at [69] per Middleton J.
80 The relationship between Mr Van Grinsven and Mr Anderson with respect to the joint venture broke down over a period of time up to about August 2007. As I have indicated, towards the end of that month correspondence was exchanged that implied serious disagreement on several fronts. There were deep and apparently bitter disagreements about the following matters: ownership of intellectual property rights to QIAKM and CW; Mr Anderson's allegation that Mr Van Grinsven was wrongly using the Company in connection with events he was producing unrelated to QIAKM and CW; Mr Anderson's concern about breach of copyright over the Mayqueen incident and his consequent lack of trust in Mr Van Grinsven; Mr Van Grinsven's allegation of overcharging against Mr Anderson and REM. An impartial observer reading the correspondence up to the end of August would conclude that the commencement of legal proceedings by either or both parties was practically inevitable.
81 If, for the purpose of framing Mr Anderson's complaints in legal terms, one reflects on the nature of the disagreements, and on the relationship between the parties, one is drawn to the conclusion that his complaints are partly about wrongs said to have been done to him as a joint venturer with Mr Van Grinsven, and partly about wrongs said to have been done to the company. In the former category there are alleged wrongs in the nature of breach of contract including denial of contractual entitlements, alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by one joint venturer to another, and alleged unconscionable conduct. In the latter category there is Mr Van Grinsven's denial of the alleged intellectual property rights of the Company, and his diversion of the Company's business opportunity in relation to the South African tour to another corporate entity and perhaps indirectly to himself.
82 That such claims by or on behalf of the Company emerge rationally from an analysis of the relationship of the parties and the ingredients of their dispute points to the conclusion that an applicant who seeks to assert those claims is likely to be acting in good faith. A further indication pointing to the same conclusion is that Mr Anderson's allegation that Mr Van Grinsven committed breaches of fiduciary duties owing by him to the Company was made as early as 26 November 2007, in Mr Weston's letter to Henry Davis York.
83 It was submitted on behalf of Mr Van Grinsven that, in circumstances where he and Mr Anderson are unable to work together, the Company no longer trades, and its utility as a promotional vehicle is nil, the appropriate course is to wind the Company up and appoint a liquidator, and in the meantime, to appoint a provisional liquidator. This proposition is not obviously true, as the Company's business is conducted by it as trustee for the Trust and the originating process does not on its face seek orders for the winding up of the Trust. Additionally, it is not clear from the evidence whether the Company's utility as a promotional vehicle has been eliminated at this stage. The answer to that question seems to depend on whether it has any rights over QIAKM, which according to the evidence is a profitable act, and if it has, whether it could exploit those rights without co-operation from Mr Van Grinsven.
84 In his written submissions counsel for Mr Van Grinsven contended that Mr Anderson has not filed any grounds opposing the winding up order sought by Mr Van Grinsven, and that the winding up application appears to be unopposed. But in fact the notice of appearance for the second and third defendants sets out the grounds upon which the application for winding up is opposed: it is contended in the notice of appearance that it is not appropriate for an order for just and equitable winding up to be made in the circumstances, and that further grounds of opposition are contained in the affidavits filed on behalf of Mr Anderson and REM.
85 It was submitted for Mr Van Grinsven that the orders sought in the amended cross-claim largely concern claims by Mr Anderson and REM against Mr Van Grinsven and the Company. That is untrue. By orders 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 Mr Anderson and REM seek declaratory and other orders against Mr Van Grinsven and SMA but not against the Company. Orders 3, 4, 7, 9, 12, 19, 20, 21, 27-37 seek declaratory and other relief against Mr Van Grinsven and SMA to vindicate rights of the Company. It is only in orders 10 and 16 that REM seeks declaratory and other relief against the Company, to establish an entitlement to management fees, and by order 14 Mr Anderson and REM seek (as an alternative to other relief) an order appointing a receiver to the Company. I regard the claims in the cross-claim against the Company adjectival to the principal case. The personal claims against Mr Van Grinsven and SMA on the oppression ground, for breach of the fiduciary duty of joint venturers, and for breach of contract, are central to the dispute, but equally central are the claims on behalf of the Company to ownership of intellectual property and improper diversion of business opportunities in breach of the fiduciary duty of a director.
86 Counsel for Mr Van Grinsven also submitted that the proposed derivative suit by Mr Anderson seeks to delay the winding up of the Company. If that is meant to be an assertion about Mr Anderson's motive in seeking to bring the derivative action, my answer is that I have detected no evidence of such a motive, and on the contrary, the alleged rights of the Company (at any rate, its rights against Mr Van Grinsven for breach of his fiduciary duty as a director) were asserted well before the winding up proceedings began. Counsel's submission that "no suggestion of any such claim being pursued was made prior to the commencement of the winding up proceedings" is wrong, in light of Mr Weston's letter to Henry Davis York of 26 November 2007. I am surprised that such a submission would be made, given the terms of that letter.
87 It was submitted for Mr Van Grinsven that it was unclear why Mr Anderson had not sought to have a provisional liquidator appointed over the Company. He relied upon Re Nerang Investments Pty Ltd (1985) 9 ACLR 646 for the proposition that where there is an application on the just and equitable ground to wind up a company that is a quasi-partnership, and there is a strong possibility that the affairs of the company are being (or would be) conducted for the benefit of one member's interest to the prejudice of another (as is Mr Anderson's claim), the court will appoint a provisional liquidator to address the situation. There was no application for the appointment of a provisional liquidator presented for adjudication at the hearing on 4 and 5 June 2008 and I am not in a position to say whether, if such an application were made, it would succeed. But in circumstances where he opposes the winding up and where, as I have said, it is not self-evident that winding up is the best way forward, I cannot accept a submission that Mr Anderson should have applied for the appointment of a provisional liquidator rather than, as he has done, for leave to constitute a derivative action, or that his failure to seek the appointment of a provisional liquidator is a sign of bad faith.
88 Counsel for Mr Van Grinsven contended, relying on some observations of Tobias JA in Chahwan's case, cited above, that there are two aspects of the amended cross-claim that suggest that Mr Anderson is in reality seeking to further his own personal interests rather than the interests of the Company as a whole. First, reference was made to para 16, which seeks an order that the Company paid to REM the balance of the management fee owing, specifying the method of calculation, and para 65, in which it is alleged that REM is entitled to be paid by the Company $686,681.92 by way of deferred management fees. Counsel submitted that it is therefore in Mr Anderson's interests, given that he owns REM, to promote a claim which (if it succeeds) will lead to money being paid to the Company by Mr Van Grinsven and/or SMA, so as to put the Company in funds to discharge its alleged debt to REM.
89 In assessing this submission, it is necessary to bear in mind a distinction explained by Palmer J in Swansson v Pratt at [40], and by Tobias JA in Chahwan at [75]. Their Honours were considering a more difficult hypothetical case than the present one, a case where a creditor who was formerly a shareholder seeks to bring a derivative action that will put the company in funds to pay the debt claimed by the creditor. They distinguished between two situations. The first is where the derivative action is commenced and maintained in order to achieve the purpose for which it is designed, namely to recover property for the company, where there is no abuse of process and consequently no lack of good faith simply because the success of the derivative action places the company in a financial position to repay the debt. The second is where the creditor, in making the application for leave to bring a derivative action, is in reality seeking to vindicate his or her interests as a creditor and not whatever interest he or she may have as a former shareholder.
90 Telling these two situations apart will often be difficult. But where, as here, the applicant for leave is an existing shareholder and director of the company, and the gist of the derivative action is both to prevent the cross-defendants' wrongdoing and to make them accountable for it, the task is somewhat easier. Unless there is some evidence to point to the conclusion that recovery of the shareholder/director's debt is the predominant consideration, the court conclusion is likely to be that the derivative action, if allowed, will be directed towards obtaining the advantage to the company for which such litigation is designed, even though success in the action may put the company in funds to pay the applicant's claim, and success by the applicant in concurrent proceedings (or in pursuing personal claims concurrently with derivative claims) will establish entitlement to the debt. In my view that is the situation in the present case. Mr Anderson's proposed derivative action is in the former rather than the latter category.
91 The second matter to which counsel for Mr Van Grinsven drew attention is that in paras 46-52 of the amended cross-claim Mr Anderson pursues oppression proceedings, seeking an order that Mr Van Grinsven or SMA purchase his shares in the Company or REM's units in the Trust. Counsel submitted that it is in Mr Anderson's best interest to expand the coffers of the Company by pursuing a derivative suit aimed at enlarging the company's value, and hence the value of his 50% shareholding.
92 In Chahwan, Tobias JA said (at [83]):
" As I have already observed, it must be kept well in mind that the onus lies upon the applicant to satisfy the court that, in applying to it for leave to bring the relevant proceedings, he or she is acting in good faith. If such an applicant is in reality seeking to further his or her own personal interests other than as a current or former shareholder of the company, rather than the interests of the company as a whole, then my view that onus will not have been discharged."
93 For present purposes, the qualifying words used by his Honour, "other than as a current or former shareholder of the company", are important. Here Mr Anderson seeks relief under the "oppression" provisions as a member of the Company (s 234(a)), and he seeks leave to bring derivative proceedings as a member and officer (s 236(1)(a)). Nothing prevents him from making those two claims concurrently, although success in one claim might affect the remedial outcome in the other. If he succeeds in making out one of the grounds stipulated in s 232, the court may make an order for his benefit, such as an order requiring Mr Van Grinsven and/or SMA to buy his shareholding or REM's unit holding at an assessed value. That value will be affected by whether the Company succeeds in recovering profits made directly or indirectly by Mr Van Grinsven or SMA through the exploitation of business opportunities belonging to the Company. But in my view all of this emerges from the assertion by Mr Anderson of rights that come to him as a member. The claim for a remedy under the oppression provisions is not incompatible with pursuing the derivative action in the interests of the company as a whole.
94 Counsel for Mr Van Grinsven and SMA complained that the derivative claims to be brought against his clients were replicated by the various personal claims to be pursued by Mr Anderson and REM. He said this would raise "the serious spectre of double dipping". He acknowledged that double dipping can often be accommodated by carefully crafted orders, but he contended that the existence of co-terminous claims pointed out the collateral purpose for pursuing the derivative suit. I disagree with this submission. Inevitably there is a substantial amount of overlapping in the evidence when derivative and personal claims are brought by a member of a company that is essentially a quasi-partnership. In my view this overlapping does not itself indicate a collateral purpose, or even bear on the question whether a collateral purpose is present. Evidentiary overlapping provides the justification for the derivative and personal claims being prosecuted in the same proceedings. But precisely because of this overlapping, the court will be particularly alert to any risk of "double dipping", and it seems to me highly unlikely that it would allow such an unjust outcome, especially when the court has the assistance of able counsel. No case was cited in which this had occurred.
Best interests of the company
95 As Palmer J pointed out in Swansson v Pratt, at [55], the requirement of s 237(2)(c) is for the court to be satisfied, not that the proposed derivative action may be, or appears to be, or is likely to be, in the best interests of the company but, rather, that it is in the company's best interests. His Honour set out some matters upon which the applicant is normally required to adduce evidence: (i) the character of the company (for example, whether it is a large public listed company or a closely-held family company); (ii) the business of the company, so that the effects of the proposed litigation on that business may be appreciated; (iii) whether the substance of the redress which the applicant seeks to achieve is available by a means which does not require the company to be brought into litigation against its will; (iv) the ability of the defendant to meet at least a substantial part of any judgment in favour of the company, so the court may ascertain whether the action would be of any practical benefit to the company.
96 As to (i), the Company is the corporate vehicle for a joint venture or quasi-partnership between the Van Grinsven interests and the Anderson interests. In Swansson v Pratt, at [57], Palmer J remarked that where the company is a joint venture company in which the venturers are deadlocked, the proposed derivative action may be for the purpose of vindicating one side's position rather than the other's in a way which will not achieve a useful result. In my opinion that description does not apply to the present case. While, no doubt, success in the derivative action would vindicate Mr Anderson's position against Mr Van Grinsven, the immediate purpose of the derivative action is to assert rights of the company with respect to goodwill and intellectual property associated with QIAKM and CW and to recover the unauthorised profits of exploitation of the Company's business opportunities.
97 As to (ii), there is an issue as to the effects of the proposed derivative action on the proper conduct of the Company's business. According to the evidence of Mr Van Grinsven, the Company cannot produce the QIAKM and CW shows without his co-operation. However, assuming that to be correct, it does not follow that the Company will be unable to operate if the derivative action is successful. The derivative action might lead, for example, to a negotiated buy-out of Mr Anderson's interests by Mr Van Grinsven or to the sale of the business to a third party, with the co-operation of Mr Van Grinsven. There is also the prospect that Mr Anderson's concurrent oppression proceedings may lead to some form of relief that will re-establish the company's business. On balance, it seems to me more likely than not that the company's interests will be best served by establishing its rights and putting it in a position to negotiate a favourable outcome, one-way or another, for itself as a separate entity.
98 As to (iii), there is an issue as to whether a satisfactory resolution of the dispute between the Van Grinsven and Anderson interests might be achieved without the derivative action - for example, by leaving it to Mr Anderson and REM to prosecute their other claims, including claims based on the statutory remedy for oppression. In my view, however, if Mr Anderson's application were denied and the litigation were left to be pursued on these other grounds, some very substantial components of the overall dispute between the parties would be excluded from the purview of the litigation: namely the issue of whether the Company has goodwill and intellectual property rights with respect to QIAKM and CW, and whether (notwithstanding termination of the joint venture) the Company is entitled to complain that Mr Van Grinsven's participation in staging the QIAKM and CW acts is an improper diversion of a corporate opportunity belonging to the Company, in breach of fiduciary duty.
99 As to (iv), there is evidence before the court that Mr Van Grinsven owns two properties at Helensvale, which were valued in late 2007 with total market values of $1.025 million and $575,000, subject to substantial mortgages.
100 Counsel for Mr Van Grinsven submitted that Mr Anderson's evidence failed to disclose why the proposed derivative action would in fact be in the best interests of the Company. In my opinion, however, the evidence does establish that this is the case. The derivative action will assert the Company's claim to goodwill and intellectual property concerning QIAKM and CW, and seek to recover profits made in exploiting the opportunity to stage these acts, leading potentially to substantial recovery for the Company and the prospect of future exploitation of the acts for the corporate benefit. Contrary to the submissions made on behalf of Mr Van Grinsven, the evidence does permit a form of cost-benefit analysis of the potential benefit to the Company of a successful derivative action, and the costs of such an action.
101 There is evidence from Mr Anderson estimating that the profits of the Johannesburg performances will be in the vicinity of $330,000, assuming that approximately two-thirds of the available tickets have been sold (Ex A7, tab 30). If the derivative action is not brought, it can be anticipated that Mr Van Grinsven will continue with other performances of QIAKM and CW. While many of those performances will be club performances with modest revenue (in this respect I agree with counsel for Mr Van Grinsven that the performances identified in para 27 of the amended cross-claim are unlikely to produce substantial net profit), if there are further overseas or local tours substantial additional revenue is possible.
102 To be balanced against this potential profit is the cost of bringing derivative proceedings. Counsel for Mr Van Grinsven stated in submissions that the cost of a 5-7 day case could exceed $400,000. However in the present case, the proceedings brought by Mr Anderson and REM in their personal capacities will cover all or most of the evidentiary ground that would need to be covered in the proposed derivative action, and in those circumstances I agree with the submission by senior counsel for Mr Anderson and REM that the additional costs of adding the derivative claims to the existing litigation will not be substantial. Moreover, Mr Anderson has undertaken to the court to indemnify the Company for any costs incurred by it in bringing the derivative action and any cost orders that may be made against it in that action. In reaching my decision I rely on that undertaking.
103 Counsel for Mr Van Grinsven submitted that, in circumstances where REM claims $686,681.92 against the Company, any money received by the Company will inure only for the benefit of Mr Anderson and REM if REM's claim is successful. But the derivative action seeks to restore to the Company what was alleged to be its goodwill and intellectual property rights with respect to QIAKM and CW, and to put it in a position to earn future profits or at least to negotiate with Mr Van Grinsven for his co-operation in future productions. Additionally it is not clear at this stage whether REM could make out its entitlement to the full amount claimed. Counsel's proposition was not put to Mr Anderson in cross-examination and senior counsel for Mr Anderson informed me that it is hotly contested. In those circumstances I am not in a position to accede to the submission.
Serious question to be tried
104 There may still be some room for debate as to precise meaning of this requirement, and the extent to which the analogy with interlocutory relief is less than perfect: Ragless v IPA Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) [2008] SASC 90 at [40], per Debelle J (with whom Sulan J and Vanstone J agreed). But it is unnecessary to explore those issues here, as the application of the criterion is, in my view, reasonably straightforward.
105 I dealt with the issue whether there is a serious question to be tried in my reasons for judgment of 13 June 2008 ([2008] NSWSC 594 at [44]-[48]), concluding that this criterion was satisfied for the purposes of interlocutory relief. I referred, in particular, to the proposition emerging from Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178, that a fiduciary cannot take advantage of an opportunity which has come to him in the course of or as a result of the fiduciary relationship, even after the business relationship between the parties that has given rise to fiduciary obligations has been terminated, so long as the affairs of the business relationship have not been wound up.
106 The amended cross-claim alleges a fiduciary relationship between Mr Van Grinsven and SMA, on the one hand, and Mr Anderson and REM, on the other, and that Mr Van Grinsven and SMA have breached their fiduciary duties. There is evidence that they entered into a commercial enterprise with a view to profit, that profits were to be shared, that the policy of the joint enterprise was a matter for joint decision, and in other respects the relationship was very like a partnership. These facts suggest a fiduciary relationship: United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 1, at 10-12 per Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ. Whether or not the pleaded fiduciary relationship arose between the venturers, it seems likely on the facts that the venturers owed fiduciary duties to the joint venture vehicle, the Company: Mesenberg v Cord Industrial Recruiters (1996) 19 ACSR 483 at 492.
107 In my earlier judgment I also dealt with the claim by Mr Anderson and REM that the Company has goodwill and intellectual property rights with respect to QIAKM and CW ([2008] NSWSC 594 at [41]-[43]). Counsel for Mr Van Grinsven submitted that Mr Anderson had failed to point to any evidence to establish the claimed intellectual property rights, but there is some evidence, which, if accepted at the trial, may do so. In his first affidavit Mr Anderson gave evidence of conversations he claimed to have had with Mr Van Grinsven in March 2005 and in April or May 2006 relating to intellectual property rights, and to his registration of the QIAKM business name and an application for trademark registration (paras 22, 33-4, 37-8). Additionally, the minutes of the directors' meeting on 22 April 2005 (if accepted at the trial), and the "To whom it may concern" letter of 12 April 2006 (if the court finds that it was approved by Mr Van Grinsven) may also provide some evidence suggesting either the presence of some such intellectual property rights as particularised, or an estoppel against Mr Van Grinsven and SMA in respect of such a claim.
108 Counsel for Mr Van Grinsven made various submissions designed to show that there could be no copyright in respect of any aspect of QIAKM or CW, but it seems to me that the contentions particularised in para 22 of the amended cross-claim are prima facie plausible, and that a proper determination of the Company's copyright claim would depend upon the investigation of facts that are necessarily not fully presented to the court at this stage. In these circumstances the claims to ownership of goodwill and intellectual property rights raise a serious question to be tried.
109 Failure by Mr Anderson to make out his claim that the Company has goodwill and intellectual property rights in respect of QIAKM and CW would not lead to dismissal of the Company's claims in the derivative action. The pleading concerning goodwill and intellectual property in the amended cross-claim does not purport to set up any cause of action, but instead it feeds into other claims including the claims for breaches of fiduciary duties arising out of improper diversion of the Company's business opportunities (see, in particular, para 36(d)). The claim for breach of fiduciary duty does not require proof of the existence of goodwill or intellectual property rights. That claim does not require a company to show that it had a proprietary interest in the opportunity that was exploited by its fiduciary (Green & Clara Pty Ltd v Bestobell Industries Pty Ltd [1982] WAR 1), or even that the opportunity was one that it could have exploited (Chan v Zacharia is an example of this point).
Conclusions
110 For the reasons I have given, Mr Anderson has established to my satisfaction each of the five ingredients of s 237(2), and therefore I am required to grant his application for leave under s 237(1). I am satisfied that para 2 of the amended interlocutory process correctly identifies those parts of the amended cross-claim that are appropriate to be asserted by derivative action. The order should be made nunc pro tunc so as to validate the derivative claims in the amended cross-claim filed on 17 April 2008, as I am satisfied that if the issue had arisen at the time of filing of the amended cross-claim I would have granted leave to Mr Anderson then, and that there is no relevant prejudice arising from now granting leave nunc pro tunc (see the discussion in South Johnstone Mill v Dennis and Scales, at [56]-[59]). I shall accordingly make an order in terms of para 2 of the amended interlocutory process.
111 It will be necessary for Mr Anderson as applicant to ensure that the derivative claims comply with s 236(2), according to which proceedings brought on behalf of a company must be brought in the company's name.
112 This is one of those cases, unfortunately too common in Australian commercial life, where parties to a profit-making commercial venture have allowed their personal animosity and mistrust to damage the commercial operation and potentially destroy it. Rationality and the profit motive both suggest the paramount need for a negotiated solution of the dispute, so as to permit business activity to be resumed at full pace. I urge the parties to consider, before it is completely too late, whether a negotiated resolution is possible. To that end, during the hearing on 4 and 5 June I invited submissions as to whether I should make orders referring the dispute to mediation. Neither party opposed my doing so, and therefore I shall make those orders. I am sure the legal representatives of the parties will convey my comments to their clients.
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