1. I first considered whether the Notice was valid.
2. I was satisfied, based on the evidence presented, that the Notice was given in the correct form and was served in accordance with the Act.
3. The Notice was required to meet the requirements of section 91ZZO of the Act, in that it was required to:

(a) be in the prescribed form;

(b) be addressed to the renters;

(c) be signed by the agent of the residential rental provider;

(d) specify the reasons it was given;

(e) be accompanied by a contract of sale, signed by the vendor and purchaser and dated, or a contract of engagement/authority to sell with a licensed estate agent or a contract of sale prepared by a conveyancer or an Australian legal practitioner;

(f) specify a termination date that was the date on which the renters were required to vacate.

1. In this case, an Exclusive Sale Authority ('Authority') signed by Ms Sathiyamoorthy and a real estate agent, dated 14 March 2025, appeared in the documents submitted to the Tribunal. The Authority said that the property was to be sold by private sale with vacant possession.
2. I queried at the hearing whether this attachment was, in fact, attached to the Notice when it was given.
3. I accepted the sworn evidence of Ms Skinner that the Authority was attached to the Notice when it was sent by registered post.
4. While this fact was not admitted by the Renters, Ms Gomez did not dispute it.

1. I then considered whether Ms Sathiyamoorthy was entitled to give the Notice and whether the grounds for giving the Notice were proven.
2. Ms Gomez, in written submissions received by the Tribunal on 7 July 2025, argued that the Notice was not valid because Ms Sathiyamoorthy did not have a genuine intention to sell the rented premises. This was said to be for two reasons:

(a) Ms Sathiyamoorthy had not proven financial hardship; and

(b) Ms Sathiyamoorthy's real motivation was to evict the Renters to stop them making VCAT applications.

1. I carefully considered this submission and addressed each of the issues in turn.

1. Ms Sathiyamoorthy's sworn evidence on 24 June 2025 was that she was experiencing some financial strain in that she was unable to afford two mortgages in circumstances where she is trying to buy a residence with her fiancé.
2. Ms Gomez questioned whether the rented premises was in fact mortgaged at all, because she believed Ms Sathiyamoorthy's parents bought the property for her.
3. Ms Sathiyamoorthy provided emails to the Tribunal from her lender, dated 21 February 2025, 21 April 2025 and 21 May 2025 showing direct debit transactions had been declined. In sworn evidence, Ms Sathiyamoorthy said that these documents were failed loan repayments for the rented premises. She said further that her situation was not so dire as to involve a risk of foreclosure by the lender.
4. Although I did not know the extent to which the rented premises were mortgaged, I accepted on the basis of Ms Sathiyamoorthy's evidence that the rented premises were, in fact, mortgaged.
5. I also observed that there must have been some hardship due to the accruing rental arrears, albeit that these were not substantial at the time the Notice was given. By the time of the hearing on 24 June 2025, the Renters were 83 days in rent arrears and, by the time of the Tribunal's oral decision on 8 August 2025, the arrears had grown to approximately $8,200. The significance of rent arrears is referred to in more detail later in these reasons.
6. While I agreed with Ms Gomez that the Tribunal had an incomplete picture of Ms Sathiyamoorthy's financial circumstances, I concluded that:

(a) there was some evidence of financial strain on Ms Sathiyamoorthy's part that was relevant to her giving the Notice; and

(b) the existence of financial strain was not a requirement to prove the grounds in the Notice. [5]

1. Ms Gomez, on behalf of the Renters, submitted that the Notice was given for reasons other than an intention to sell the rented premises. There were three threads to this submission that I identified and addressed in oral reasons:

(a) Retaliation;

(b) Lack of marketing; and

(c) Possible re-renting.

1. The Renters said that the timing of the Notice was suspicious, because the Notice was given nine days after Ms Gomez initiated an application for compensation in the Tribunal.
2. The Renters also drew the Tribunal's attention to a previous occasion when they sought to exercise their rights in 2024, and were advised, in response, that their Agreement may be terminated at the end of the fixed term.
3. The circumstances, briefly stated, were that Ms Gomez declined on behalf of the Renters to agree to allow access to the rented premises to BMT Quantity Surveyors, who were going to prepare a depreciation schedule for Ms Sathiyamoorthy. This was because the Renters did not wish for photographs to be taken that might include their personal possessions.
4. Subsequently, Ms Sathiyamoorthy's agent served a Notice of Entry under the Act which said that entry was required for the purpose of 'valuation'. Ms Gomez disputed the grounds in this notice and declined to allow entry. In response, the agent of Ms Sathiyamoorthy stated, on 31 May 2025 at 10:23am:

After the long email conversation between you and the BMT tax Depreciation inspection officers, the landlord feels as though there is little chance that you will allow bmt [sic] to complete a full depreciation assessment while you are renting the premises. Due to this she will be subject to financial [sic] and has no choice but to complete the bmt [sic] assessment when you have moved out of the premises, when your rental lease comes to an end in October this year. So she decided to not do [sic] for more information please email me or call me.[6]

1. I acknowledged that the Renters were genuine in considering that the timing of the Notice was suspicious and that the relationship between the parties had further broken down.
2. However, I did not regard the Notice as retaliatory in the true sense or consider that there was a basis on which to conclude that Ms Sathiyamoorthy was acting in bad faith when she issued the Notice.
3. The main reason was that the Notice had no real bearing on the claim for compensation. Ms Sathiyamoorthy would be obliged to pay compensation if ordered by the Tribunal; the Notice could not avoid that consequence.

1. The Renters argued that the absence of active marketing was indicative that Ms Sathiyamoorthy had no genuine intention to sell.
2. I accepted that, if marketing had commenced, this would assist Ms Sathiyamoorthy to demonstrate that she was genuinely intending to sell the rented premises.
3. However, the inverse proposition - being a failure to commence marketing at the time of giving the Notice - did not equate to an absence of an intention to sell.
4. I explained that, in the Tribunal's experience, it is not unusual for a rental provider selling a rented premises to delay marketing if intending to sell the rented premises with vacant possession.

1. The Renters also argued that, if possession was granted or they vacated the rented premises in response to the Notice, Ms Sathiyamoorthy may rent the property to someone else within two months, which counted against her intention to sell.
2. I stated that the Act specifically prohibits a rental provider or an agent from re-renting a premises after possession is obtained in response to a notice to vacate under section 91ZZB within six months of the notice being given, unless the permission the Tribunal is obtained.[7]
3. I said that provision would bind Ms Sathiyamoorthy in relation to any future decision making and I noted that she had, in any event, signed an exclusive sales authority with a real estate agent.

1. I therefore found that Ms Sathiyamoorthy was entitled to give the Notice and that the grounds for giving the Notice were proven.

1. I noted that the Renters did not vacate the rented premises by the termination date in the Notice and that the Notice had not been withdrawn. It therefore remained in effect at the time of the hearing and the Tribunal's decision.

WHETHER IT IS REASONABLE AND PROPORTIONATE TO MAKE A POSSESSION ORDER

1. In considering whether it is reasonable and proportionate to make a possession order, the Tribunal was (and is) required to take into account the factors set out in section 330A of the Act.[8] Some of the factors - being those in subsections (a) to (g) of section 330A of the Act[9] - are not relevant to an application for a possession order based on the proposed sale of a rented premises.[10] Therefore the Tribunal did not consider these irrelevant factors in its reasons.
2. The factors from section 330A that were relevant to the Tribunal's decision were:

(a) whether any other order or course of action was reasonably available, instead of making a possession order;

(b) the behaviour of the residential rental provider; and

(c) any other matter the Tribunal considered relevant.[11]

1. Although I considered all submissions and evidence provided by the parties (and noting paragraph 13 above), it was not possible to address every submission and piece of evidence in the Tribunal's oral decision, given the sheer volume of material before the Tribunal.
2. However, I identified five areas of dispute between the parties relevant to whether it was reasonable and proportionate to make a possession order. These were:

(a) Ms Gomez' credibility;

(b) Maximising the rental provider's financial gain;

(c) Whether the rented premises could be presented in a good light during a sales campaign;

(d) The availability of alternative properties; and

(e) The Renters' refusal to pay rent.

1. I explained my findings regarding these five issues and then addressed the factors in section 330A of the Act, having regard to those findings, to decide whether it was reasonable and proportionate to make a possession order.

1. Ms Sathiyamoorthy submitted two published decisions from Federal Courts about historical business and financial matters concerning some of the Renters (namely Ms Gomez and her husband, and a company associated with their son). Ms Sathiyamoorthy's purpose in submitting these decisions was to draw my attention to negative comments made about Ms Gomez and her husband by judicial officers.
2. I said that comments by Judges in other jurisdictions in a completely different context had no relevance to the issues in this proceeding. I did not take them into account.
3. Further to this, Ms Sathiyamoorthy and her representatives made submissions about Ms Gomez' credit, to the effect that her evidence should not be accepted on certain topics.
4. I accepted that Ms Gomez' evidence shifted on some topics, such as whether her family had an alternative residence available and whether the Renters would pay the outstanding rent that was owing. I addressed this evidence and its significance later in the reasons.
5. However, I did not make adverse findings about Ms Gomez' credit and I decided the case based on other considerations.

Issue 2: Maximising the Rental Provider's Financial Gain

1. The Renters submitted that any desire of Ms Sathiyamoorthy to maximise the sale price for the rented premises for her financial gain, by selling the property with vacant possession, should not be determinative of the Tribunal's consideration.
2. I accepted that, in principle, this was an appropriate approach for the Tribunal to take in its deliberations.
3. However, Ms Sathiyamoorthy did not give evidence, or make submissions, that her intention in selling the rented premises with vacant possession was to maximise her financial gain. She also did not provide evidence to show that a sale with vacant possession would, in fact, yield a better sale price.
4. The reason that Ms Sathiyamoorthy intended to sell with vacant possession was for different reasons, discussed below.
5. So, while I agreed with the Renters' statement of principle, it was not decisive of the case.

Issue 3: Presenting the Property in a Favourable Light

1. Ms Gomez submitted that the Tribunal should take into account whether renters are willing to assist a rental provider to present the rented premises in a good light during a sales campaign.[12]
2. I had little evidence of the condition of the rented premises. There were no photos contained in the ingoing condition report prepared by Ms Sathiyamoorthy's previous agent and there were no photos attached to the routine inspection reports submitted. The reason for the absence of photos in routine inspection reports was that the Renters did not permit any property managers to take photos.
3. Ms Sathiyamoorthy's position was that she was concerned the premises would not be in a good state to sell with the Renters in possession. Her oral evidence was that, when she attended a routine inspection in 2024, there was 'stuff everywhere' which made the properly 'look small'. She also said that she was concerned that, based on past behaviour, the Renters might not cooperate with a sales campaign and might refuse to allow photos to be taken. She also said that the Renters have a cat, which may interfere with the conduct of sales inspections.
4. In response, Ms Gomez gave evidence that she keeps a good house. She drew the Tribunal's attention to the comments on a routine inspection report, dated 27 August 2024, which described the property as 'well maintained'. She also stated that the cat can be secured for marketing purposes but that she did not want any photos taken with the Renters things in them.
5. I accepted that this was not a case in which the evidence showed that the Renters were keeping the premises in a way that meant it would present poorly for marketing and inspection purposes.
6. I observed that, in theory, a sale of a rented premises could be arranged having regard to the provisions of the Act that allow for rental providers or their agents to enter a rented premises to produce photos and videos, after serving a relevant notice,[13] and to conduct inspections of the property for prospective buyers.[14] I also took into account that renters have a duty to keep a rented premises in a reasonably clean condition.[15]
7. However, I said that the Tribunal had real concerns about how the arrangements for marketing and inspections would work in practice in this case, given the level of animosity between the parties.
8. Ms Gomez repeatedly stated at the hearing that the breakdown in the parties' relationship was not her fault. Her evidence was to the effect that all she had ever done was to stand up for the Renters' rights. On this issue, I accepted that in the May 2024 communications, cited above at paragraph 41, Ms Gomez was seeking to protect the Renters' interests.
9. However, since then, the manner and style of communication of both parties, as presented to the Tribunal, could only be described as hostile. Their emails and submissions were characterised by accusations of harassment from both sides,[16] inflammatory language,[17] accusations of unlawful conduct[18] and threats about future legal proceedings.[19] There was also a particularly heated exchange at the end of the hearing on 24 June 2025, in my presence.[20]
10. Because of the state of the parties' relationship - which in my opinion involves fault on both sides - I concluded that any attempt to sell the property with the Renters in possession would be extremely difficult.

Issue 4: Availability of Alternative Properties

1. Ms Gomez gave conflicting evidence about whether the Renters had an alternative residence available, in the event that a possession order was made.
2. At the hearing on 24 June 2025, Ms Gomez gave sworn evidence that her family was building a house. She showed me an invoice for the lock-up stage of a construction, addressed to her son, who is one of the Renters. [21] Ms Gomez' evidence was to the effect that her family expected to be able to move into this house August 2025 or September 2025, all going well. She otherwise said that it would be difficult to find another property because the rental market is very tough, especially for short-term rentals, and because of her 'tarnished' rental image, which she said was attributable to Ms Sathiyamoorthy.
3. In written submissions after the hearing, Ms Gomez said that the house being built by her son was not intended to be a new home for her entire family, but was a home in which he could start a family. She said it would be hard for her and her husband to find another rented premises.
4. Based on the evidence received by the Tribunal, I accepted that the house under construction is intended to be occupied by Nathan Gomez and that it was not intended to be a permanent future residence for the entire family.
5. I also accepted that securing an alternative rented premises may not be simple in the current rental market in Melbourne.
6. I otherwise observed that the submission about the limited availability of alternative rental accommodation was largely speculative. I was not provided by the Renters with any evidence of attempts to secure an alternative rented premises, inspections attended, applications made and reasons why they were rejected.
7. I therefore found that the evidence did not show that the Renters have no alternative options or that they had exhausted their options.
8. I also noted that if the Renters' 'tarnished' record related to arrears of rent under the Agreement, then this was at the Renters' election, which I now explain further.

1. As at the date of the hearing on 24 June 2025, the Renters were in arrears of $5,860.12.
2. At the date of the Tribunal's oral decision on 8 August 2025, the Renters were in arrears of $8,287.06. The rent was paid to 19 June 2025 with $1,451 on account.
3. At the hearing on 24 June 2025, I asked Ms Gomez on oath whether the Renters were going to pay their rent in the event that I did not make a possession order. The answer was relevant to whether the ongoing Agreement was viable.
4. Ms Gomez initially avoided answering that question, stating that the payment of rent would depend on whether or not the Renters received compensation from Ms Sathiyamoorthy in a separate proceeding. However, she later said at the hearing, 'the rent will be paid'.
5. Notwithstanding that commitment to the Tribunal, on oath, by the time of the Tribunal's decision on 8 August 2025 - some 45 days later - the Renters had made only one payment of $480, on 7 July 2025. This was not evidence of the Renters' bona fides. In their final written submissions after the hearing, the Renters explained that they 'had no choice but to hold back the rent sufficient to cover [their] compensation claims'.
6. This was surprising given that, at a directions hearing before me on 13 May 2025, the Renters sought orders for the rent to be paid into the rent special account, to secure the payment of compensation they believed was owing to them. In declining that request, on the basis it was not possible under the Act,[22] I said to Ms Gomez that the Renters were obliged to pay their rent. I also pointed out that there is no requirement under the Act for a party to provide security for compensation that may be ordered in a claim brought under the Act. Any compensation ordered by the Tribunal is enforceable as a judgment debt.[23]
7. I told the Renters that their decision to withhold rent entirely of their choosing is not lawful under the Agreement or the Act.
8. In reaching that view, I took into account what the Court of Appeal said in its decision in Anderson v Sharpe.[24] In that case, the Court of Appeal upheld the rulings of Justice Gorton that a renter cannot withhold payments of rent if a renter claims there are outstanding repairs to be carried out by the rental provider and said, further, that payments of rent are not subject to the resolution of any claim for compensation. [25]
9. So, while this proceeding was not about termination of the Agreement on the basis of rent arrears, the refusal to pay rent and the accruing rent arrears were relevant to whether it is reasonable and proportionate to make a possession order.

1. I then turned to consider the applicable factors in section 330A of the Act.

Whether any other course of action is available: section 330A(h)

1. I considered whether the property could be sold by Ms Sathiyamoorthy with the Renters in possession. If this course was taken, an investor purchaser could either take on the Agreement, or the residential rental provider could serve another notice to vacate on the Renters if a purchaser required vacant possession: see section 91ZZB(2).
2. Having regard to my findings, I found that this course of action would be fraught and was, in my opinion, not a viable option.
3. This was because I had doubts about the parties' ability to cooperate during a sales campaign due to the breakdown in their relationship. I also doubted the Renters' bona fides. This was because of their willingness to take matters into their own hands, having decided whether and when they would comply with their obligation to pay rent because of a pending compensation claim, even after being advised by the Tribunal of the need to pay rent and being reminded of this by Ms Sathiyamoorthy's agents.

The behaviour of the residential rental provider: section 330A(i)

1. I accepted that the Renters were awarded compensation by the Tribunal in an earlier proceeding for a breach by the residential rental provider or her agent of the obligation to afford the Renters quiet enjoyment of the rented premises.
2. I also accepted that the relationship between the parties had clearly broken down, with some fault from Ms Sathiyamoorthy and/or her agents.
3. I concluded that the residential rental provider's behaviour was not without fault, but that this was not determinative of the application.

Any other matter the Tribunal considers relevant: section 330A(j)

1. I considered the ongoing viability of the Agreement was a relevant consideration, particularly having regard to the recent non-payment of rent, noting that the amount of unpaid rent as at 8 August 2025 was a significant sum.
2. I also considered the behaviour of the renters was relevant, particularly in deciding not to pay rent owing under the Agreement.
3. While this was not a case of the Agreement being terminated on the basis of rent arrears, the Tribunal was concerned that the Renters were refusing to pay rent because of an erroneous belief in an entitlement to do so, having regard to a pending compensation case and notwithstanding observations by the Tribunal to the contrary.
4. I thought that their decision begged a number of questions: what if the Renters were not successful in their claim for compensation? What if they did not receive all the compensation they were seeking? What would happen then? What decision would the Renters make about paying rent? The problem was that the viability of the Agreement was uncertain, as was Ms Sathiyamoorthy's financial position.
5. Balanced against this, I took into account that there may be limited alternative accommodation options available to the Renters at this time, if they were seeking to rent again. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that all options have been exhausted. There was also evidence that a premises being constructed by one of the Renters may be available soon, with the possibility of the other Renters staying there in the short term.

1. In deciding the application, I emphasised that the decision was not simply a comparison of relative hardships, as that was not the test provided for under the Act.
2. I took into account that the behaviour of the residential rental provider and her agents has not been perfect.
3. However, I found that there were other factors weighing heavily in favour of making a possession order, being that:

(a) the alternative course of selling the property with the Renters in possession was precarious, at best;

(b) the rent not being paid and the amount of arrears accruing, meant that the Agreement was unlikely to be viable; and

(c) there was some prospect of an alternative residence under construction, and close to completion, being available to the Renters, at least on a short term basis.

1. I therefore concluded that in all of the circumstances of this proceeding that it was reasonable and proportionate to make a possession order, requiring the Renters to vacate within 30 days. This gave them the maximum amount of time allowed for under the Act to arrange their affairs.

[1] See section 98(1)(a) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic).

[2] This meant that I took into account material about rental market conditions and the extent to which the renters were by then in rent arrears. I explained this to the parties prior to delivering the oral decision.

[3] After the hearing at which oral reasons were provided, Ms Gomez contacted the Tribunal to seek written reasons. Initially, the Tribunal refused that request. However, having received further correspondence and listened to the recording of the hearing, I granted the request for written reasons because it was made prior to or at the time of the Tribunal's orders: see Clause 74 of Schedule 1 to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic).

[4] It was permissible to file the application before the termination date in the notice: see section 326(1) of the Act.

[5] The Renters argued in their written submission that 'courts usually require full financial documentary evidence of hardship', relying on a decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia about waiver of court fees. The case was called MENNA by next friend DEAN MENNA -v- ROMANO as Executor of the Estate of LOUIS JOSEPH PATRICK JORRE-DE-ST.JORRE [2014] WASC 276.

[6] There were other emails exchanged following this and the renters ultimately obtained $340 compensation on 14 January 2025 from a differently constituted Tribunal, for a breach of the rental provider's obligation to afford quiet enjoyment to the renters.

[9] They are the factors which relate to notices to vacate based on breaches of an obligation by a renter.

[10] Smyth v Trovato Investments Pty Ltd (Residential Tenancies) [2024] VCAT 603 at [152].

[11] These are paragraphs (h), (i) and (j) of section 330A of the Act.

[12] Danrell v Morris (Residential Tenancies) [2022] VCAT 1303, at [18] and [24].

[13] See sections 85(b)(i), 86(1)(b) and 89A of the Act.

[14] See section 85(b)(i) and 86(1)(b of the Act.

[15] See section 63 of the Act.

[16] At the hearing on 24 June 2025, Ms Sathiyamoorthy variously said there has been 'constant harassment', that Ms Gomez 'has tried to harass' her, that she suspects 'out of retaliation and malintent' that the Renters have been 'damaging the property'. In written submissions, Ms Gomez said that the Renters have 'suffered intimidation, harassment and neglect at the hands of this rental provider'.

[17] In her written submissions, Ms Gomez described Ms Sathiyamoorthy as having an 'irresponsible attitude', a 'lack of respect for the law and a blatant disregard for others'. She also said that 'future tenants are guaranteed to be subjected to the same abuse, in her hands and the previous agent.'

[18] Some of these accusations were contained in email correspondence to VCAT about the disclosure of 'Government-related IDs' that Ms Gomez said were in documents submitted to VCAT by the rental provider's representatives. I did not see those documents as they were refiled in a redacted form, but I am aware of the covering correspondence from Ms Gomez, which appears on the Tribunal file.

[19] In email correspondence about a directions hearing to request orders for production of documents, to which VCAT was copied, Ms Sathiyamoorthy said to Ms Gomez, with VCAT copied, 'I do not wish to receive threats from yourself', to which Ms Gomez responded, 'You need to understand the difference between threats and legal positions. If you withhold crucial evidence, it can be used against you in the court of law'.

[20] At the conclusion of the hearing on 24 June 2025, I reminded Ms Gomez of the need to pay her rent and there followed a fairly heated exchange between Ms Gomez, the rental provider's agents and Ms Sathiyamoorthy about this topic. Ms Gomez told the agents their ledger was 'all wrong' and asked them to send her an email, they responded that they had emailed her '100 times' and would 'send her another notice'.

[21] When I advised that the document must be disclosed to the renters, Ms Gomez sought permission to do so in a redacted form, which I permitted.

[22] At that time there were no pending applications for repairs that would have engaged section 77 of the Act.

[23] Ms Gomez responded 'I will sort out the rent today ... I was holding back because of the application I made, but since you've made it clear you can't do anything I will sort out the rent'.

[24] [2024] VSCA 166.

[25] Specifically, the Court stated that 'the obligation of a renter to pay rent is not conditional upon, or subject to, compliance by the residential rental provider with the obligation to maintain the premises in good repair...It is no answer to this that the applicant claims to have been unable to pay the rent because of the dispute over the repairs. As we have explained, the obligation of the renter to pay rent while remaining in possession and occupation of the rented premises was not, as a matter of law, conditional upon, or subject to, the resolution of any claim that she made for either repairs or compensation under the Act': see paragraphs [97] and [107].