The question is whether it is appropriate to make a declaration in circumstances where the substantive dispute has been resolved and the declaration would have no foreseeable consequences for the parties.

Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld)

ss 228(1), 238(1), 276(1)

• [1] The Body Corporate for Sanctuary Park CTS 20085 (applicant) is governed by the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (Act) and the Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard Module) Regulation 2020 (Standard Module).
• [2] On 26 August 2025, the applicant body corporate resolved to terminate its agreement with the respondent, its then-body corporate manager, and issued it a notice pursuant to section 235 of the Standard Module requiring the return of the body corporate's funds, records and other documents.
• [3] Thereafter, the parties fell into dispute about whether the respondent had properly complied with the notice insofar as returning the funds, essentially because the respondent remained as a signatory on the bank account holding the funds. The applicant's underlying concern apparently was that the respondent would take an unauthorised deduction from the account.
• [4] Initially, the applicant sought an interim order to restrain the respondent from making unauthorised deductions, and final orders to return the funds and any outstanding property and records.
• [5] The parties then engaged in further self-resolution, and so I agreed to stay determination of the interim order application. I am now informed by the applicant that it is satisfied the funds have been properly returned to the applicant.
• [6] The applicant has therefore abandoned its application for interim orders and the initially-proposed final orders. However, the applicant asserts that there remains to be resolved a dispute about whether the respondent had contravened section 235 of the Standard Module, by failing to 'return' the funds to the applicant within 14 days, and it seeks a declaratory order about that.
• [7] As to the appropriateness of making a declaration in circumstances where the underlying dispute is resolved, the applicant submits:

This is a matter of importance to the Applicant but also to Queensland's strata industry. This decision will resolve and provide clarity on whether a body corporate manager who remains a signatory on a body corporate's bank account can refuse to return the funds to the body corporate by bank cheque or electronic funds transfer because the body corporate could go through the difficult and delayed process of changing signatories through the bank to gain possession and control for itself.

• [8] The applicant is now in effect asking for what is called an 'advisory opinion'. About such matters, in Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission[1] in the High Court, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ said:

It is now accepted that superior courts have inherent power to grant declaratory relief. It is a discretionary power which "it is neither possible nor desirable to fetter... by laying down rules as to the manner of its exercise". However, it is confined by the considerations which mark out the boundaries of judicial power. Hence, declaratory relief must be directed to the determination of legal controversies and not to answering abstract or hypothetical questions. The person seeking relief must have "a real interest" and relief will not be granted if the question "is purely hypothetical", if relief is "claimed in relation to circumstances that [have] not occurred and might never happen" or if "the court's declaration will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties". > > [citations omitted]

• [9] Taking that up, Gaudron J and Kirby J separately in the High Court in Truth About Motorways v Macquarie said:[2]

[52] There may be cases where a bare declaration that some legal requirement has been contravened will serve to redress some or all of the harm brought about by that contravention. Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission was such a case. But a declaration cannot be made if it "will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties." That is not simply a matter of discretion. Rather, a declaration that produces no foreseeable consequences is so divorced from the administration of the law as not to involve a matter for the purposes of Ch III of the Constitution. ... > > ... > > [167] ... Basic to [the] Constitution is the acceptance that the sole function of federal courts is the determination of "justiciable controversies" or "legal controversies". Such courts are not places which can be turned into "judicial versions of college debating forums", nor a vehicle for the vindication of the "value interests of concerned bystanders". Nor may they give advisory opinions or answer questions divorced from concrete cases which involve an "immediate right, duty or liability" ascertained by reference to pre-existing law. > > [citations omitted]

• [10] The point made in those passages is that an application for a declaration which produces no concrete or foreseeable consequences for the application parties fails to enliven the jurisdiction of the court and give standing to the applicant, and accordingly the application does not 'get through the front door'.
• [11] I consider the same limitation is imposed on adjudicators. Applications for dispute resolution in this jurisdiction are made and decided under Ch 6 of the Act. Within that, section 228(1) provides that the purpose of the chapter is (among other things) to resolve disputes, section 238(1) requires an applicant to have a direct (and ongoing) connection to a relevant dispute, and section 276(1) limits an adjudicator's power to make an order to those same circumstances.
• [12] This application was commenced with concrete outcomes in mind, but if it were made in its present form - an application for a declaration about an already-resolved dispute - it would likely be rejected by the Commissioner and therefore never be referred for department adjudication.
• [13] In light of that, I decline to make the requested declaratory order and dismiss the application.
• [14] My primary reason for dismissing the application is a lack of jurisdiction or power to make the order. That said, even if the dismissal were referrable to section 270(1)(c) of the Act, my power to order costs is discretionary. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that a costs order in the respondent's favour would be appropriate.

[1] [1992] HCA 10, (1992) 106 ALR 11 at 22

[2] [2000] HCA 11