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1. THE COURT**:** Todd Sampson seeks leave to appeal against the aggregate sentence imposed upon him by his Honour Judge Bourke SC on 14 June 2024.

2. Mr Sampson was sentenced for seven sexual offences against four children, to which he pleaded guilty in the District Court. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 7 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months, dating from 31 January 2024.

3. He seeks to rely on the following grounds of appeal:

4. The sentencing judge erred by:

(a) failing to have regard to the applicant’s youth when considering the weight to be attributed to general deterrence; and/or (b) failing to explain in the reasons for sentence what impact the applicant’s youth had on general deterrence.

2. The sentencing judge erred by:

(a) failing to have regard to the applicant’s childhood and background when considering the weight to be attributed to general deterrence; and/or (b) failing to explain in the reasons for sentence what impact the applicant’s childhood and background had on general deterrence.

4. Mr Sampson requires an extension of time in which to file his application for leave to appeal. In his affidavit he explained that he did not know about, or receive any advice about, appealing against his sentence and it was only after speaking with some other prisoners that he sought assistance from a Legal Aid solicitor. Stephen Eccleshall affirmed in his affidavit that Mr Sampson contacted Legal Aid in October 2025. Thereafter, Legal Aid personnel obtained relevant documents, sought counsel’s advice and filed the application for leave to appeal on 16 April 2026. Because Mr Sampson’s lack of understanding is accepted, and his legal representatives proceeded without too much delay once instructed, we would grant an extension of time to file his application for leave to appeal.

5. In summary Mr Sampson committed 7 offences against 4 children, with whom he had family relationships, over 18 years, from 2003 to 2021. He was aged 18 or 19 at the time of the first offence and 37 when he committed the last offence. He was 40 when he was sentenced.

6. The child victims will not be identified by name or any other identifying factor, in accordance with s 578A of the C**rimes A**ct 1900 (NSW) and s 15A of the C**hildren (C**riminal P**roceedings) A**ct 1987 (NSW).

7. The offences, the facts of the offences, the assessed objective seriousness and the sentence indicated for each offence are as follows. Each indicative sentence encompassed a 5% reduction for the utilitarian value of late pleas of guilty.

8. The offences in Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 9 were aggravated indecent assaults of a child, aggravated by the child’s age. The offence in Count 10 was sexual touching of a child aged between 10 and 16 years. Each offence had a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Other than Count 1 and 10, each offence had a standard non-parole period of 8 years prescribed.

9. In assessing the objective seriousness of each offence, his Honour took into account the age of the child, the age disparity between the child and Mr Sampson, whether the touching was over clothing or on skin, if the offence occurred in the child’s home, and if the offending persisted when the child tried to move away.

10. The offence in Count 1 on the indictment occurred in late 2002 or early 2003. The child, S, was eight years old and the sister of a person with whom Mr Sampson was then in a relationship. The offence occurred in the child’s family home. Mr Sampson put his hand into the child’s pants and touched her genital area. This was witnessed by a relative, who told the child’s parents, but they did not believe the allegation. Judge Bourke SC assessed the offence as below the mid-range but not within the low range of objective seriousness. The sentence indicated was 2 years 10 months imprisonment.

11. The offence in Count 3 occurred in 2008 to 2009. The child victim, A, was aged seven. She was the niece of Mr Sampson’s then partner, the same partner he had at the time of the offence in Count 1. The offence occurred when the child was staying at the home of Mr Sampson and his partner, the child’s aunt. Mr Sampson touched the child’s vagina under her outer clothes, on top of her underwear, pressing his fingers against her vagina, continuing when she tried to move away from him. Judge Bourke SC assessed the offence as below the mid-range but not in the low-range of objective seriousness. The sentence indicated was 3 years 1 month imprisonment with a non-parole period of 1 year 10 months.

12. The offence in Count 5 occurred in 2009 to 2010. The victim A was the same victim as in Count 3. A was aged about eight at the time of this offence, which occurred while A was visiting Mr Sampson and her aunt. He took A swimming and touched her on the vagina through her shorts, placing pressure against her vagina with his fingers. A tried to move away. Judge Bourke SC assessed the objective seriousness of this offence as slightly below the mid-range. The sentence indicated was 3 years, 2 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 1 year 10 months.

13. The offences in Counts 7 and 8 involved the victim M, who was the younger sister of A, the victim of the offences in Counts 3 and 5, and the niece of Mr Sampson’s then partner.

14. The offence in Count 7 occurred in 2009 to 2010 when M was aged 4. The offence occurred in a car when Mr Sampson was sitting in the passenger seat and M was sitting on the floor in front of him. It was dark. He touched her leg, then thigh, then vagina under her underwear. The sentence indicated was 3 years 6 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years 1 month.

15. The offence in Count 8 occurred in 2010 to 2011 when M was aged 5. She was again sitting in the footwell area in the front of a car and Mr Sampson was sitting in the passenger seat. It was dark. He touched her legs and then rubbed her vagina on the outside of her clothing. The sentence indicated was 3 years, 5 months imprisonment with a 2 year non-parole period.

16. Judge Bourke SC assessed both offences as within the mid-range of seriousness.

17. The offences in Counts 9 and 10 were against a child L, the daughter of a person with whom Mr Sampson was in a relationship at the time of the offences. The offence in Count 9 occurred in 2018 when L was aged 7 and Mr Sampson was looking after her in her home while her mother was away. He touched her on her vagina on the outside of her clothing for a few seconds. His Honour assessed the offence as within the mid-range of seriousness. It involved a breach of trust, as Mr Sampson was minding L at the time. The sentence indicated was 3 years 3 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 1 year 11 months.

18. The offence in Count 10 occurred in 2021 when L was aged 11. The offence occurred in the child’s home, in her room. Mr Sampson rubbed her vagina on the inside of her shorts, above her underwear. She told him to stop and tried to push his hand away, but he did not stop. A short time later L’s mother came downstairs and Mr Sampson stopped his conduct and told L to hide, which she did. L’s mother asked Mr Sampson why he was sitting next to L’s bed. Shortly thereafter L told her mother about Mr Sampson’s conduct, which was reported to police.

19. His Honour assessed the offence in Count 10 as slightly below the mid-range of seriousness. In indicating the sentence for the offence in Count 10, his Honour took into account an offence on a Form 1 of intimidating the child L by telling her he would have to kill her father if she visited him. His Honour also took into account that the offence in Count 10 was committed while Mr Sampson was the subject of conditional liberty, in the form of a Community Correction Order and an Intensive Correction Order. The sentence indicated was 3 years 1 month imprisonment.

20. His Honour took into account the following subjective matters. Mr Sampson’s criminal history did not assist him in claims for leniency. He had no prior convictions for sexual offences, but that needed to be balanced against his having committed the offences for sentence over a period of about 18 years against 4 children. His personal circumstances were put before Judge Bourke SC in a psychologist’s report.

21. Mr Sampson told the psychologist that he was raised by his natural parents, although there were periods of separation between his parents, and he experienced somewhat transient care arrangements in his early childhood. He said his father was good and hard-working and he had a close relationship with his mother. There were no drug or alcohol problems in his home, and although his parents argued frequently, there was no domestic violence or abuse. His schooling was disrupted, with frequent moves due to housing relocations. He lived with his family until the age of about 18 or 19, and then moved in with his partner.

22. During his adolescence he had become involved with older peers who were engaged in antisocial behaviour and drug abuse, and he was exposed to some violence, including racial vilification. He had used illicit drugs and misused alcohol. In 2021 he had engaged in a rehabilitation program but relapsed into alcohol use when charged with the offences for sentence. He said he had remained abstinent from drug use in custody. Mr Sampson told the psychologist he could not recall any details of the offences and was unable to provide any insights into any causal or contributing factors.

23. Directly relevant to Ground 2 his Honour stated:

“[55] Counsel for the offender pointed to the offender’s childhood and adolescent background as a matter that is relevant to his moral culpability: see Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37. It was not submitted that his background had any direct causal and/or contributory link to his offending. However, it was submitted that the deficits in his early upbringing may provide some explanation for the offender’s subsequent pathway to drug and alcohol abuse and his prior interaction with the criminal justice system.

[56] On the other hand, it was conceded by counsel that there is no evidence to support a conclusion that the offender was affected by alcohol or drugs when he committed any of the offences … The boundaries of ‘Bugmy type’ cases are not black and white and the boundaries of the operation of that principle have not been clearly or definitely delimited: see Nasrallah v R [2021] NSWCCA 207. It is also the case, as Brereton JA observed in Hoskins v R [2021] NSWCCA 169, that there is no need to characterise an offender’s childhood as “profound” in terms of deprivation before the principle is engaged.

[57] The current case is not, in my view, one where the offender’s childhood can be said to have been seriously deprived or compromised, but his early years did involve disruptions to his care and his education, and he was, whilst still at a relatively young age, exposed to alcohol, drugs, violence and other negative influences. These are matters which I accept contributed to the offender’s abandonment of his education and to his continued use of substances, mainly alcohol, into his adulthood. His background can be seen in this way, as the psychologist suggests, to have had a negative impact on his psychological development and to have contributed to a distorted self-perception and low self-worth.

[58] These are matters which in turn made some contribution to the offender’s inability to control impulses such as those apparently involved in the offences. I accept that in this way, his moral culpability is reduced although to a limited degree.”

24. Relevant to Ground 1 his Honour stated the following:

“[59] I have also considered the submission on behalf of the offender that his moral culpability is reduced in relation to the earlier in time offences by reason of his youth or relative youth. This submission was directed primarily at the offence in count 1 when the offender was aged about 18 or 19 and to a lesser extent to the offences in counts 3, 5, 7 and 8 when the offender was aged between about 24 and 27 years. Youth can be a matter that mitigates an offender’s moral culpability, because an immature person may be more prone to engaging in impulsive behaviour and may be less able to think through the consequences of their actions: see BP v R [2010] NSWCCA 159, and also TM v R [2023] NSWCCA 185.

[60] While I accept that the offender’s relative youth at the time of the count 1 offence is a matter that reduces his moral culpability slightly, I do not accept this in relation to any of the later in time offences. That is because of the offender’s relatively mature age at those times and also, the fact that when regard is had to all of the offences on the indictment, they tend to demonstrate a pattern of opportunistic and similar conduct which cannot be attributed to youthful impulsiveness.”

25. Also relevant to the grounds of appeal, his Honour said:

“[67] In determining the appropriate sentence in this matter, I have had regard to the purposes of sentencing set out in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 – there is an obvious need to ensure that the offender is adequately punished, to protect the community, to make the offender accountable and denounce his conduct, as well as recognise the harm done to the victims and, in a sense, to the community generally.

[68] It is also important, in my view, to give weight to the importance of general deterrence and also personal deterrence of this particular offender. However, it is also necessary to take into account as I have, the importance of promoting, If possible, the rehabilitation of the offender.”

26. In support of Ground 1 counsel for Mr Sampson submitted that his Honour found that Mr Sampson’s moral culpability in respect of Count 1 was reduced by reason of his youth at the time of that offence. He submitted his Honour did not consider or explain how that reduction in moral culpability affected the weight to be given to general deterrence, principally, or other purposes of sentencing.

27. During the appeal hearing, in response to a question, counsel agreed that if Judge Bourke SC had said the weight given to general deterrence was slightly reduced in relation to Count 1 he could have no complaint.

28. Counsel submitted that the omission by his Honour informed the sentence indicated for the offence in Count 1 and therefore affected the aggregate sentence imposed.

29. Counsel sought to rely on this Court’s decisions of TM v R [2023] NSWCCA 185 (‘TM*’) and MA v R [2026] NSWCCA 92 (‘MA’*). TM involved a child who committed a robbery offence at the age of 15 and was 16 when he was sentenced. MA involved a person who had committed sexual offences against young relatives when he was aged between 15 and 19 years old, although he was an older adult at the time he was sentenced almost 20 years after the offences. Neither of those decisions or their circumstances assist Mr Sampson’s case. Judge Bourke SC took into account Mr Sampson’s youth at the time of the offence in Count 1.

30. In support of Ground 2, Mr Sampson’s counsel sought to rely on YZ v R [2025] NSWCCA 165 (‘YZ*’*). He submitted that Judge Bourke SC did not comply with the approach summarised by Weinstein J in YZ, in that his Honour having found that Mr Sampson’s background reduced his moral culpability to a limited degree he did not go on to consider or explain how the various purposes of sentencing were impacted by that finding of reduced moral culpability.

31. It was submitted that, his Honour having found that Mr Sampson’s moral culpability was reduced to a limited degree by reason of his background and reduced slightly in respect of Count 1 by reason of his youth at the time of that offence, it was necessary for his Honour to explain how that bore upon the sentencing discretion. It was put thus in oral submissions:

“When his Honour turned at paras [67] and [68] his Honour did not mention how, if at all, the finding of reduced moral culpability bore upon any of those purposes. It cannot be assumed that there was any moderation to any of those purposes and if there was not the reasons for that there was a finding some significance and had the capacity to be influential in the aggregate sentence.”

32. It was said that his Honour was required to make a finding as to how that reduction in culpability impacted on the weight to be attached to the purposes of sentencing and the sentence: Taylor v R [2026] NSWCCA 32 at [114] - [116] (‘Taylor*’*), per N Adams CJ at CL, with whom Fagan and Boulten JJ agreed, and that by omitting to expressly state such a finding his Honour erred.

33. We do not accept these submissions. They turn on an over-elaborate reading of what was said in Taylor. What in fact was said at the paragraphs relied upon was:

“[114] Since the decisions in Muldrock and Bugmy, sentencing courts are required not only to make findings as to the objective seriousness of the offence(s) but also to make separate findings concerning an offender’s moral culpability for the offence(s) in cases where an offender has, for example, a mental illness, an intellectual disability or Bugmy considerations. Where an offender’s moral culpability is found to have been reduced, the court must then consider how that finding bears upon the weight to be attached to various sentencing factors such as general deterrence.

…

[116] Given that a potential finding of reduced moral culpability is now a feature of many sentencing proceedings, if a submission is made that moral culpability should be reduced then the sentencing judge is required to consider that submission and then make a finding as to how any reduction in moral culpability impacts on the sentence.”

34. What is involved in following that approach will depend on the facts of the particular case, including the extent to which the finding of reduced moral culpability impacts upon the sentencing discretion. The present facts are a relatively extreme case, especially insofar as they turn on the applicant’s youth. That was found to reduce the applicant’s moral culpability “slightly” in relation to Count 1 and only Count 1. That reduction is seen in the slightly reduced indicative sentence for that count. But having addressed the submission, and made the finding at [60] which was (albeit only slightly) favourable to the applicant, it was not necessary for his Honour to do anything further.

35. The finding of disruptions to the applicant’s care and education in [57] - [58] were also qualified. His Honour concluded that the applicant’s moral culpability was “reduced although to a limited degree”. It was not necessary to say anything more, and it would be artificial to require any further articulation of how a minor reduction in moral culpability bore upon the various sentencing factors such as general deterrence in the absence of any such submission being made to his Honour.

36. Therefore the orders of the Court are:

37. Extend time for the filing of the application for leave to appeal to 16 April 2026.

38. Grant leave to appeal.

39. Dismiss the appeal.

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